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THE 
STRANGLING OF PERSIA 




MR. w. morgan shuster, LATE TREASURER-GENERAL OF PERSIA. 



THE 
STRANGLING OF PERSIA 

STORY OF THE EUROPEAN DIPLOMACY 
AND ORIENTAL INTRIGUE THAT RE- 
SULTED IN THE DENATIONALIZATION 
OF TWELVE MILLION MOHAMMEDANS 

A PERSONAL NARRATIVE 



BY 

W. MORGAN SHUSTER 

EX-TREASURER-GENERAL OF PERSIA 



ILLUSTRATED WITH PHOTOGRAPHS AND MAP 




NEW YORK 

THE CENTURY CO. 

1912 






Copyright, 1912, by 
The Century Co. 



Copyright, 1912. by 
Thb World To-Da* 

Published June, 1912 



&CI.A314943 



%s 



TO THE PERSIAN PEOPLE 

In the endeavor to repay in some slight measure 
the debt of gratitude imposed on me through their 
confidence in my purposes toward them and by their 
unwavering belief, under difficult and forbidding cir- 
cumstances, in my desire to serve them for the re- 
generation of their nation, this book is dedicated by the 
author. 



CONTENTS 

CHAPTER I 

Persia decides to obtain financial administrators from America. The 
Americans arrive at Teheran 3 

CHAPTER II 

The political and financial situation in Persia as we found it. Powers 
of the Regent, the Cabinet and the Medjlis. Form of government 
and sources of revenue. The public debt. The various foreign 
loans 35 

CHAPTER III 

General plan adopted for reorganization. The law of June 13, 1911. 
Attitude of the foreign powers. The Stokes incident. The Treas- 
ury Gendarmerie. The " spirit " of the Anglo-Russian Convention 
of 1907 49 

CHAPTER IV 

The attempt of Muhammad Ali Mirza, ex-Shah of Persia, to regain 
the throne. Russian intrigues and connivance. Military operations 
apxinst the ex-Shah and his brothers. Success of the Nationalist 
t oops. Defeat and death of Arshadu'd-Dawla 85 

CHAPTER V 

Military operations against Prince Salaru'd-Dawla. His defeat by the 
Government forces. The incident arising from the confiscation by 
the Government of the estates of Prince Shuau's-Saltana. My letter 
to the London Times 134 

CHAPTER VI 

The first Russian ultimatum to Persia. The British Government ad- 
vises Persia to accept. The Persian Government apologizes. The 
second ultimatum 157 

CHAPTER VII 

The bread riots. The Medjlis rejects Russia's ultimatum. Invasion 
by Russian troops. Persia plans for resistance. Part played by 
Persian women. Abolishment of the Medjlis by coup d'etat Decem- 
ber 24 169 



CONTENTS 

CHAPTER VIII 

PAGE 

My relations with the de facto Government of Persia. Massacres at 
Tabriz, Resht and Enzeli by Russian troops. My departure from 
Teheran 205 

CHAPTER IX 

Character of the Regent, of the different Government officials and of 
the Medjlis. Character and capacity of the Persian people . . .231 

CHAPTER X 

The European diplomatic field in 1911. British and Russian policies. 
The Potsdam Agreement and the secret understanding between Rus- 
sia and Germany. Strategical value of Persia. Sir Edward Grey's 
charges against the Treasurer-General. The Anglo-Russian Agree- 
ment ... 247 

CHAPTER XI 

The taxation system of Persia. My plans for the reorganization of 
the finances. Possibilities of railroad development. Potential 
wealth and resources of Persia 277 

CHAPTER XII 
.Conclusion i. . 319 



LIST OP ILLUSTRATIONS 

PAGE 

Mr. W. Morgan Shuster, Late Treasurer-General of Persia . Frontispiece 
Nasiru'd-Din Shah (with overcoat) and a group of his Ministers and 

Attendants xix 

Mushiru'd Dawla . xxvi 

Aynu'd-Dawla, One of the Persian Grandees of the Old Regime . . . xxvi 

Muhammad Ali Shah Mounted on his Favorite Horse xxxi 

Aminu's-Sultan, " Atabak " xxxi 

Russian and Persian Officers of the Notorious " Cossack Brigade " . xxxviii 

Muhammad Ali Shah (now ex-Shah) and His Suite xliv 

Mr. H. C. Baskerville, The American Teacher in Tabriz .... xlvii 

Mr. W. A. Moore xlvii 

Muhammad Ali Shah and His Suite Iviii 

Ayvan, one of the two Assassins of the Persian Minister of Finance, 

Saniu'd-Dawla, who was shot in February, 1911 . .... . . lxi 

Saniu'd-Dawla, The Minister of Finance lxi 

Map showing the three " Spheres " (Russian, British and Neutral) De- 
fined in the Anglo-Russian Agreement of August 31, 1907 ... 4 
Mr. F. S. Cairns, Director of Taxation, and Mr. Shuster's Principal 

Assistant in Persia 7 

Mr. Charles I. McCaskey, Inspector of Provincial Revenue and Second 

Assistant to the Treasurer-General 7 

Mr. and Mrs. Shuster in Atabak Park 14 

A Gathering in the Democratic Club at Teheran . . ,. ,. ,. . . 17 
Mons. Naus (in center), The Notorious Belgian ex-Minister of the Per- 
sian Customs 26 

Prince Salaru'd-Dawla 39 

Mr. Shuster in His Private Office in Atabak Palace . . . ... .46 

Hajji Agha 51 

Alau'd-Dawla 51 

Mumtazu'd-Dawla .... ,., .. ... >, ,., & WJ . ,. ,. 51 



LIST OF ILLUSTKATIONS 

PAGE 

Mutashamu's-Saltana 51 

Nasiru'1-Mulk, Regent of Persia . 58 ' J 

Amir Azam (in left Center with Sword), Vice-Minister of War ... 63 v 

Colonel Hjalmarsen " .... 72 

Major C. B. Stokes, of The British-Indian Army 72 

Ephraim Khan, Chief of the Police and Gendarmerie of Teheran . . 81 

Prince Shuau's-Saltana, Brother of Muhammad Ali 92 v 

Husayn Kuli Khan, Nawwab 95 *' 

Sipahdar-I-Azam 102 

The First Battalion of the Treasury Gendarmerie at Teheran . . . 105 / 

Sardar-I-Asad 114 

Sardar-I-Bahadur, Son of Sardar-I-Asad 119 

Arshadu'd-Dawla 119 

The ex- Shah's General, Arshadu'd-Dawla, A Few Minutes before he was 

Executed 126 v 

Arshadu'd-Dawla, on His Knees, Waiting to Receive the Second Volley 

from the firing Party 126 

Arshadu'd-Dawla, The Famous General of the Ex- Shah, About to be 

Shot as a Rebel 131 ^ 

Body of Arshadu'd-Dawla Just after the Execution 131 

The Mountain Gun Detachment Starting on an Expedition . . . . 137 v 
The Quick-Firing Guns of Ephraim's Gendarmes at Teheran . . . .137 

Company of " Amnieh," Persian Roadguards, with their Officers . . 144 
Ephraim Khan and Sardar-I-Bahadur during the Campaign against the 

Shahsevens . 144 

Artillery belonging to Ephraim's Gendarmerie at Teheran .... 149 

Sipahdar-I-Azam with his Staff 149 

Sardar-I-Muhiy, The "Walking Arsenal" 156 

Sattar Khan, One of the Defenders of the City of Tabriz when it was 

besieged by the forces of Muhammad Ali Shah 156 

Wuthuqu'd-Dawla, Minister of Foreign Affairs During most of the time 

Mr. Shuster was in Persia 163 v 

Ghavamu's-Saltana, Minister of the Interior and Brother of Wuthuqu'd- 
Dawla 163 

Taqi-Zadeh, The Famous Constitutionalist Deputy from Tabriz . . .174 
Prince Sulayman Mirza, Leader of the Democrats in the Med j lis . .174 

Group of American and Persian Officials of the Treasury 180 ' 



LIST OF ILLUSTKATIONS 

PAGE 

Typical Persian and Armenian " Fighting Men " 185 

Persian Artillery Leaving Teheran to take the Field 185 

A Persian Woman 196 

The Medjlis Building 201 

Entrance to the Parliament (Medjlis) Grounds 201 

Amir-I-Mufakhkham 208 ' 

Sardar-I-Zaffar 208 

Amir Mujahid 208 

Sardar-I-Jang 208 

The Persian Nationalist Troops at Tabriz, under the Command of Prince 

Amanullah Mirza Ziyau'd-Dawla 211 

The " Ark/' A Citadel in Tabriz 218 

View of the City of Tabriz 218 

Sultan Ahmad Shah, The Present Ruler of Persia 221 

Mr. Shuster, Mrs. Shuster and their two little Daughters .... 228 ' 
Loading the Automobile for Mr. Shuster and his Family to leave 

Teheran on January 11, 1912 228 

Abu'l-Qasim Khan, Nasiru'1-Mulk, the Present Regent of Persia . . . 233 
Mirzayantz, An Armenian Deputy in the Medjlis, from Teheran . . 244 

Arbab Kaikhosro, A Parsee Deputy in the Medjlis 244 

Mutaminu'1-Mulk, The President of the Persian Medjlis 249 

Wahidu'1-Mulk (Unique one of the Kingdom) 249 

Ephraim Khan (with fur-collared overcoat), Amir Mujahid (Leaning 

on Cane) and Mr. Shuster 256 

Ephraim Khan 256 

Persian Nationalists in Chains at the Bagh-I-Shah 265 

Azadu'1-Mulk, Elected Regent at the beginning of the Reign of Sultan 

Ahmad Shah 274 

Ephraim Khan, Sardar-I-Bahadur and Major Haase 279 

Sipahdar-I-Azam and Sardar-I-Asad (with cane) 286 

Nasiru'd-Din Shah 291 

A Party of Volunteers who fought for the Constitution in Persia . . 300 

Samsamu's-Saltana 309 

Heads of Turcoman Chiefs, stuffed with straw and brought to Teheran . 322 
Front View of Atabak Palace taken from Across the Lake .... 327 
A Corner of the Large Salon at Atabak Palace 327 



FOREWORD 

THE interest shown by the public in the recent happenings in 
Persia, and a desire to place on record, while the memory 
is still green, a detailed account of the remarkable series of 
events which resulted in the writer's expulsion from the post of 
Treasurer-general of Persia in January of this year, are respon- 
sible for this book. 

The facts are taken from the most authoritative sources avail- 
able, supplemented by a private diary kept by the writer during 
the entire period of his sojourn in Persia. To this story have 
been added only such historical references and explanations as 
seemed necessary to give a clear understanding of recent events, 
and such comments as the writer felt justified in making. 

I was deeply disappointed at being forcibly deprived of the 
opportunity to finish my intensely interesting task in that an- 
cient land ; but such rancor or bitterness as I may have felt at 
the time of my departure has certainly disappeared, and the cor- 
dial reception given me on the occasion of my visit to London, 
last February, and subsequently by the press and my country- 
men in America, has so amply repaid me for any inconvenience 
or annoyances that I suffered during the last two months of my 
service at Teheran, that no sting whatever remains. 

Only the pen of a Macaulay or the brush of a Verestchagin 
could adequately portray the rapidly shifting scenes attending 
the downfall of this ancient nation, — scenes in which two power- 
ful and presumably enlightened Christian countries played fast 
and loose with truth, honor, decency and law, one, at least, hesi- 
tating not even at the most barbarous cruelties to accomplish 



xiv FOREWORD 

its political designs and to put Persia beyond hope of self- 
regeneration. 

In the belief that the real interests of humanity and the bet- 
terment of international relations demand that the truth be told 
in cases of this kind, I have written down the facts with a blunt- 
ness which perhaps, under other circumstances, would be sub- 
ject to criticism. 

The Constitutionalists of Modern Persia will not have lived, 
struggled, and in many instances, died entirely in vain, if the 
destruction of Persian sovereignty shall have sharpened some- 
what the civilized world's realization of the spirit of inter- 
national brigandage which marked the welt-politik of the year 
1911. 

W. MoEGAliT ShTJSTEB. 

Washington, D. C, April 30, 1912. 



INTRODUCTION 

THERE are several peculiar features about writing any 
detailed account of the recent political events in Persia 
which make necessary some slight explanation. 

The first point is that Persian political affairs, fraught as they 
are with misfortune and misery for millions of innocent people, 
are conducted very much as a well-staged drama — I have heard 
some critics say, as an opera bouffe. The reader will find the 
same old characters weaving in and out of the story, at one time 
wearing the make-up of a Eoyalist Minister, at another the garb 
of a popular patriot. Cabinets are formed and dissolved with 
unreal rapidity. Men high in the councils of the nation sink 
in a day into perfect obscurity, — only to emerge again as the 
ceaseless whirl of intrigue drags them into public favor. All 
these men belong to what may be described as the professional 
governing class in Persia, and there is very distinctly such a 
class. Indeed it is only in recent years that the idea has been 
even admissible that a man of mediocre parentage, or without 
a title, could fill any official position. Thus the fortunes and 
hopes of millions of voiceless subjects are largely dependent 
upon the line of action which some professional cabinet officer, 
or governor, or self-styled general may decide to adopt at a 
given time. Couple with this the fact that the principal object 
of holding office has always been, with slight exception, to 
enrich oneself and one's friends, and the strange actions of 
Persian personages become somewhat clearer. 

A proper understanding of the character, motives and type 
of some of these men, whose personal actions and motives have 
played such a large part in Persia's recent political happenings, 
is essential to the correct reading of her history. 

Another feature which is very puzzling to the uninitiated is 

xv 



xvi INTRODUCTION 

the — to foreigners — absurdly complicated system of names 
and titles. Ordinary Persians have merely names, yet I have 
known but few who did not possess some form of title, and the 
failure to know or recognize a man's title is not easily over- 
looked. 

Imagine a gentleman in American political life deciding that 
he would adopt and wear the title of " Marshal of the Mar- 
shals," or " Unique One of the Kingdom," or " Fortune of the 
State. ' ' Having duly taken such a title, and obtained some form 
of parchment certifying to his ownership, he drops his real name 
and is thereafter known by his high-sounding title. It is rather 
difficult for foreigners to remember these appellations, espe- 
cially as a great many of them end with one of the four words 
Mulh (kingdom), Dawla (state), 8 alt ana (sovereignty), or 
Sultan (sovereign). 

The present Regent was formerly known only by his title of 
Nasiru'l-Mulk (The Helper of the Kingdom), but since he has 
become Regent he is also referred to by another title, that of 
Naibu's-Saltana, or " Assistant of the Sovereignty." 

Still another difficulty is in spelling with Roman characters 
these names and titles. Half a dozen people are apt to write a 
Persian name in six different ways. Thus, one of the prominent 
Persian cabinet officers during the past year writes his own 
title in English as Vossough-ed-Dovleh; others write it Vossuk- 
e-Dowleh; while Professor E. G. Browne, of Cambridge Uni- 
versity, and a most distinguished Persian scholar, transcribes 
this title as Wuthuqu'd-Dawla. 

To avoid confusion the writer has deemed it best to follow, 
so far as possible, the method of spelling these names and titles 
which has been adopted by Professor Browne in his various writ- 
ings on Persian history. 

Most readers are more familiar with ancient Persian history 
than with modern events in that strange land. The purpose of 
this book is not historical in any but a very limited sense, and 
the following brief resume of the Persian Risorgimiento, or 
revolutionary movement, which resulted in what may be termed 



INTRODUCTION xvii 

the establishment of a constitutional monarchy on August 5, 
1906, during the reign of Muzaffaru 'd-Din Shah, is given only 
that the more recent political events which are narrated herein, 
and in which the writer had some part, may be better under- 
stood. 

During the past generation the most striking evidence of the 
power and desire of the Persian people to have even a small 
voice in their public affairs was the remarkable prohibition on 
the use of tobacco proclaimed by the Islamic clergy and immedi- 
ately obeyed by the people when, in 1891, the famous Tobacco 
Concession was actually put into force. The previous year 
Nasiru 'd-Din Shah Qajar had granted to a British corporation 
in London a monopolistic concession for the entire handling, 
buying and selling of all tobacco raised in Persia. The corpora- 
tion was capitalized at £650,000, and was expected to make an 
annual profit of about £500,000. One quarter of the profits 
was to go to the Persian government, which meant to the Shah 
and his ministers and court. 

Even the long-suffering Persians had grown tired of this 
wholesale selling of their rights and industries, and in December, 
1891, as a result of a religious decree, all the tobacco-shops 
closed their doors, the people destroyed or put away their water- 
pipes, and in a marvelously short time the use of tobacco prac- 
tically ceased. This agitation did not stop until the Shah had 
been forced to rescind the Concession, after agreeing to pay the 
British corporation an indemnity of £500,000, which was bor- 
rowed by the Persian Government at 6%, thus arbitrarily fasten- 
ing upon the people an annual interest charge of £30,000, for 
whch they received no tangible return. 

Nasiru 'd-Din Shah, who had ascended the throne on Septem- 
ber 20, 1848, was shot on May 1, 1896, after nearly fifty years 
of power. His assassin was a fanatic named Mirza Muhammad 
Riza, of the city of Kirman, and the motive, though never 
clearly established, was not unconnected with the general belief 
that the rights of Persia were being rapidly sold out to for- 
eigners. 



xviii INTRODUCTION 

The Crown Prince, Muzaffaru'd-Din Shah Qajar, was made 
Shah on June 8, 1896, and reigned until January 4, 1907, when 
he died. Some six months before his death the Persian people, 
whose discontent with the tyranny of their rulers had been con- 
stantly increasing, commenced an open agitation for the grant- 
ing of a constitution, and in July, 1906, by a measure which was 
as remarkable as it was successful, they brought about this 
result. 

Some 16,000 people of Teheran, from all walks in life, after 
being exhorted by the Mullahs or priests, took refuge or sanctu- 
ary — bast it is called in Persia — in the vast compound of the 
British Legation, and in the mosques and other sacred places. 
The crowds gathered there in the utmost good order ; they estab- 
lished their commissariat and sanitary arrangements, and by 
these purely passive measures succeeded in compelling the Shah 
to dismiss an obnoxious minister, the Aynu 'd-Dawla, and to 
grant them a code of laws or constitution. After various 
attempts to break up this peculiar form of resistance, the Shah 
and his government were compelled to yield, partly through the 
strange humiliation which the adoption of this course by the 
people conveys to the minds of the Persian governing class 
against whom it may be directed, and partly through fear of 
further and more active measures of opposition. On August 5, 
1906, the so-called constitution was granted and the people 
resumed their homes and ordinary avocations. 

Thus, by an almost bloodless revolution, the centuries-old 
absolutism of the Persian monarchs had been legally modified 
by constitutional forms, imperfect in many respects as they were, 
and, what was even more important, the people had learned 
something of their real power and were more determined than 
ever to save their nation from the straight road to disintegration 
and decay along which it had been for generations skilfully 
piloted by its hereditary rulers. 

The principal modification in the Shah's absolute power 
obtained by this revolutionary action was the right of the people 
to have a Medflis, or national elective assembly, which should 



INTRODUCTION xxi 

have a voice in the selection of ministers and in the framing of 
laws. After many negotiations and even a second bast, com- 
menced in the British Legation grounds early in September, 
1906, the actual elections took place during the first days of 
October, and on the 7th of that month, without awaiting the 
arrival of the deputies from the provinces, the first Medjlis was 
opened at Teheran, and a speech from the throne was read. 

At the death of Muzaffaru 'd-Din Shah, on January 4, 1907, 
he was succeeded by the Crown Prince, Muhammad Ali Mirza, 
who had been at Tabriz, governing the rich and important prov- 
ince of Azarbayjan. This infamous individual arrived at 
Teheran on December 17, 1906, the Shah being very ill, and was 
crowned on January 19, 1907, having previously pledged him- 
self to observe the constitution and rights granted by his father. 

Muhammad Ali Shah Qajar was perhaps the most perverted, 
cowardly, and vice-sodden monster that had disgraced the throne 
of Persia in many generations. He hated and despised his sub- 
jects from the beginning of his career, and from having a 
notorious scoundrel for his Russian tutor, he easily became the 
avowed tool and satrap of the Russian Government and its agent 
in Persia for stamping out the rights of the people. 

The reign of Muhammad Ali Shah started out most inau- 
spiciously. He began by ignoring the Medjlis and mutual sus- 
picions and open dissensions became the rule. The Medjlis 
proposed to exercise some of its hard-won authority, while the 
Shah with his favorites, thoroughly reactionary ministers and 
court party, was equally determined to wield all that old arbi- 
trary and cruelly oppressive power for which the House of 
Qajar has been notorious. He intrigued with Russian emis- 
saries against his own people, and actually contracted with 
Russia and England for a secret loan of £400,000, to be squan- 
dered by himself, though the arrangement was shortly after- 
wards discovered and balked by the mullahs and the Medjlis. 

The deputies of the Medjlis were becoming more and more 
convinced that the Shah and his party regarded them as ene- 
mies to his plans, and they determined to assert their strength 



xxii INTRODUCTION 

to bring about the reforms which were most urgently needed. 
They particularly desired to prevent any further loans from 
Eussia and England, as they had come to regard the rapidly 
increasing foreign indebtedness of the Persian nation as a source 
of danger to her independence and safety. [ They sought there- 
fore to limit the Shah's expenditures for his court and civil list, 
to diminish the rampant fraud and corruption in the system of 
farming out the taxes to the Shah's favorites, and to put an end 
to the malign influence of a certain Mons. Naus, a Belgian who, 
with a number of his countrymen, had been employed for some 
years to organize the Persian Customs, and who had succeeded 
in acquiring a large fortune and in establishing himself as a 
political and financial power of the most baleful description. 
The Medjlis also planned to establish a national bank, to be capi- 
talized with money raised from internal subscriptions, in order 
that their dependence on foreign financial assistance might be 
lessened. 

On February 10, 1907, the Shah was compelled to dismiss 
Mons. Naus, and this one achievement vastly increased the 
prestige of the Medjlis with the people. 

The Shah now decided to invite the famous Aminu's-Sultan 
(also known as Atabak-i-Azam) to return to Persia and resume 
the post of Prime Minister. This grandee, the Atabak, is per- 
haps the strongest figure in recent Persian history. Of 
unusually broad European education, widely traveled, but 
thoroughly despotic and corrupt, he had been condemned by 
the mullahs for his dishonest participation in the two Russian 
loans to Persia of 1899-1900 and 1902, and had been forced into 
exile in 1903. "When his consent to return became known, the 
Russian Government lost no time in resuming warm relations 
with him, and he was conveyed across the Caspian to the Persian 
port of Enzeli in a Russian gunboat, with the highest official 
honors. When he landed, the people of Resht, the capital of 
the province, compelled him to swear fidelity to the Constitution 
before permitting him to continue on his journey to Teheran. 



INTRODUCTION xxiii 

On reaching Teheran, the 26th of April, the Atabak found a 
state of disorder and chaos in every department of the govern- 
ment. The treasury was in its normally void condition and 
there were uprisings and disturbances throughout the entire 
Empire. The Medjlis knew more or less what should be done, 
but the Shah was determined that they should do nothing unless 
to carry out his own plans. The people of Isfahan had already 
revolted against the rule of the Shah's uncle, the Zillu's- Sultan; 
the city of Tabriz was in a ferment, and in June that Persian 
" madcap," Prince Salaru'd-Dawla, brother to the Shah, openly 
revolted in the district of Hamadan and proclaimed his inten- 
tion to seize the throne at Teheran. After a three days' fight 
with the Shah's forces at Nihawand, he was defeated and cap- 
tured in June, 1907. 

Matters went from bad to worse, and during the month of 
August, Russia, which had never been content with the estab- 
lishment of a constitutional regime in Persia, began to threaten 
the Medjlis with intervention. Troubles with Turkey also arose, 
and an army of 6,000 Turkish troops crossed the northwestern 
Turco-Persian frontier, and after occupying a number of Per- 
sian towns, actually threatened the city of Urmiah. 

All this time the Atabak had been working to bring about 
another Russian loan, though he was afraid to contract the same 
without the approval of the Medjlis. By the end of August he 
had almost succeeded in winning over to his project a majority 
of the deputies when, on August 31, he was shot and killed, 
as he was coming out of the Assembly building, by a young man 
named Abbas Aqa, of Tabriz, who immediately committed sui- 
cide. This youth was a member of one of the numerous anju- 
mans or secret political societies which had sprung up in great 
numbers, and his undoubted motive was the, to him, patriotic 
idea of saving the constitutional government from ruin and 
betrayal at the hands of the clever and intriguing prime minis- 
ter, whom he considered a traitor. 

The assassination of the great Atabak was taken as positive 



xxiv INTRODUCTION 

evidence of the existence of a large body of men who had sworn 
to uphold the Constitution and to remove all those who opposed 
its representatives, even at the cost of torture and a felon's 
death. 

A period of great confusion followed, during which the Shah 
and Medjlis were unable to agree on a cabinet, until towards 
the end of October, 1907, Nasiru '1-Mulk (now the Regent of 
Persia) succeeded in doing so. Most of the members of this 
cabinet were believed to be favorable to the Constitution. They 
remained in the office until December, when they resigned. 

On August 31, 1907, the so-called Anglo-Russian Convention 
had been signed at St. Petersburg. between England and Russia. 
On September 4 it was made public at Teheran, and despite 
its carefully worded assurances of respect for the integrity and 
independence of Persia, this famous document produced a most 
painful impression on the Persian people. 

The importance to subsequent history of this much-discussed 
agreement is such that the parts most vitally affecting Persia 
may well be inserted here : 

CONVENTION". 

1 His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and 
His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, animated by the sincere desire 
to settle by mutual agreement different questions concerning the interests of 
their States on the Continent of Asia, have determined to conclude Agree- 
ments destined to prevent all cause of misunderstanding between Great 
Britain <md Russia in regard to the questions referred to, and have nom- 
inated for this purpose their respective plenipotentiaries, to-wit : 

His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ire- 
land and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, the 
Right Honorable Sir Arthur Nicolson, His Majesty's Ambassador Extraor- 
dinary and Plenipotentiary to His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias; 

His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, the Master of his Court 
Alexander Iswolsky, Minister for Foreign Affairs; 

Who, having communicated to each other their full powers, found in good 
and due form, have agreed on the following: — 

i The italics are the author's. 








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INTRODUCTION xxvii 

ARRANGEMENT CONCERNING PERSIA. 

The Governments of Great Britain and Russia having mutually engaged 
to respect the integrity and independence of Persia, and sincerely desiring 
the preservation of order throughout that country and its peaceful develop- 
ment, as well as the permanent establishment of equal advantages for the 
trade and industry of all other nations; 

Considering that each of them has, for geographical and economic reasons, 
a special interest in the maintenance of peace and order in certain provinces 
ef Persia adjoining, or in the neighborhood of, the Russian frontier on the 
one hand, and the frontiers of Afghanistan and Baluchistan on the other 
hand ; and being desirous of avoiding all cause of conflict between their 
respective interests in the above-mentioned Provinces of Persia; 

Have agreed on the following terms: — 



Great Britain engages not to seek for herself, and not to support in favor 
of British subjects, or in favor of the subjects of third Powers, any Con- 
cessions of a political or commercial nature — such as Concessions for rail- 
ways, banks, telegraphs, roads, transport, insurance, &c. — beyond a line 
starting from Kasr-i-Shirin, passing Isfahan, Yezd, Kakhk, and ending at 
a point on the Persian frontier at the intersection of the Russian and 
Afghan frontiers, and not to oppose, directly or indirectly, demands for 
similar Concessions in this region which are supported by the Russian 
Government. It is understood that the above-mentioned places are included 
in the region in which Great Britain engages not to seek the Concessions 
referred to. 

II. 

Russia, on her part, engages not to seek for herself, and not to support 
in favor of Russian subjects, or in favor of the subjects of third Powers, 
any Concessions of a political or commercial nature — such as Concessions 
for railways, banks, telegraphs, roads, transport, insurance, &c. — beyond 
a line going from the Afghan frontier by way of Gazik, Birjand, Kerman, 
and ending at Bunder Abbas, and not to oppose, directly or indirectly, de- 
mands for similar Concessions in this region which are supported by the 
British Government. It is understood that the above-mentioned places are 
included in the region in which Russia engages not to seek the Concessions 
referred to. 

III. 

Russia, on her part, engages not to oppose, without previous arrangement 
vith Great Britain, the grant of any Concessions whatever to British sub- 



xxviii INTRODUCTION 

jects in the regions of Persia situated between the lines mentioned in Arti 
cles I and II. 

Great Britain undertakes a similar engagement as regards the grant 
Concessions to Russian subjects in the same regions of Persia. 

All Concessions existing at present in the regions indicated in Articles 
and II are maintained. a 

** IV. 



It is understood that the revenues of all the Persian customs, with the 
exception of those of Farsistan and of the Persian Gulf, revenues guaraqfe 
teeing the amortization and the interest of the loans concluded by the 
Government of the Shah with the " Banque d'Escompte et des Prets de 
Perse " up to the date of the signature of the present Arrangement, shalt 
be devoted to the same purpose as in the past. 

It is equally understood that the revenues of the Persian customs of 
Farsistan and of the Persian Gulf, as well as those of the fisheries on the 
Persian shore of the Caspian Sea and those of the Posts and Telegraphs, 
shall be devoted, as in the past, to the service of the loans concluded by the 
Government of the Shah with the Imperial Bank of Persia up to the dat? 
of the signature of the present Arrangement. 

V. 

In the event of irregularities'occurring in the amortization or the payme»t 
of the interest of the Persian loans concluded with the " Banque d'Escompte 
et des Prets de Perse " and with the Imperial Bank of Persia up to the 
date of the signature of the present Arrangement, and in the event of the 
necessity arising for Russia to establish control over the sources of revenue 
guaranteeing the regular service of the loans concluded with the first- 
named bank, and situated in the region mentioned in Article II of the 
present Arrangement, or for Great Britain to establish control over the 
sources ol revenue guaranteeing the regular service of the loans concluded 
with the second-named bank, and situated in the region mentioned in 
Article I of the present Arrangement, the British and Russian Govern- 
ments undertake to enter beforehand into a friendly exchange of ideas 
with a view to determine, in agreement with each other, the measures of 
control in question and to avoid all interference which would not be in 
conformity with the principles governing the present Arrangement. 

The other clauses of the Convention refer to Afghanistan and 
Tibet. 

This Convention was made purely between Russia and Eng- 
land, and ostensibly to arrange questions concerning their 




INTRODUCTION xxix 

respective ' ' interests ' ' — all self -created — in Persia, and other 
countries, as between themselves. To it Persia was not a party, 
either directly or in any manner. In fact, the Medjlis was in 
total ignorance of the conclusion of the Convention until its 
unheralded publication in Teheran on September 4. 

The Persian people decidedly resented having their country 
" partitioned " over-night, even by imaginary geographical 
lines drawn by self-styled friendly governments which pro- 
claimed so unequivocally their " mutual engagement to respect 
the integrity and independence of Persia " and their " sincere 
desire for the preservation of order throughout that country, 
and its peaceful development." 

The populace at Teheran grew very excited, and there were 
demonstrations and the usual ferment in the bazaars. On the 
following day the British Minister at Teheran, Sir Cecil Spring- 
Rice, made an official communication to the Persian Government, 
explaining the true intent and meaning of the obnoxious Con- 
vention in the following language: 

TRANSLATION OF THE OFFICIAL COMMUNICATION CONCERNING 
THE NATURE AND OBJECTS OF THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN CON- 
VENTION, TRANSMITTED IN PERSIAN BY THE BRITISH MIN- 
ISTER IN TEHERAN TO THE PERSIAN MINISTER FOR FOR- 
EIGN AFFAIRS ON THE 4TH SEPTEMBER, 1907: 

i Information has reached me that the report is rife in Persia that the 
result of the Agreement concluded between England and Russia will be the 
intervention of these two Powers in Persia, and the partition of Persia 
between them. Your Excellency is aware that the negotiations between 
England and Russia are of a wholly different character, since the Mushiru'l- 
Mulk recently visited both St. Petersburg and London, and discussed the 
matter with the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of both Powers, who explicitly 
declared to him the objects aimed at by their respective Governments in 
Persia, which assurances he has no doubt duly reported. 

Sir Edward Grey has informed me of the substance of his conversations 
with the Mushiru'1-Mulk, and also of the substance of M. Iswolsky's declara- 
tions, officially communicated to the British Government. 

Sir Edward Grey informs me that he has explained to the Mushiru'l- 

i The italics are the author's. 



xxx INTRODUCTION 

Mulk, that he and M. Iswolsky are completely in accord on two fundamental 
points. 

Firstly, neither of the two Powers will interfere in the affairs of Persia 
unless injury is inflicted on the persons or property of their subjects. 

Secondly, negotiations arising out of the Anglo-Russian Agreement 
must not violate the integrity and independence of Persia. 

Sir Edward Grey also observes that hitherto antagonism has existed 
between England and Russia, each of whom has endeavored to prevent the 
continuance of the other in Persia, and had this antagonism been prolonged 
in the present uncertain state of Persia, one or both of these two Powers 
might have been tempted to interfere in the internal affairs of Persia, so 
as not to allow the other to profit by the existing state of things, or to 
profit by it to the detriment of others. The object of the present negotia- 
tions between England and Russia is to prevent such difficulties from 
arising between them and these negotiations are in truth in no wise 
directed against Persia, as M. Iswolsky has clearly explained to the 
Mushiru'1-Mulk, saying, " Neither of the two Powers seeks anything from 
Persia, so that Persia can concentrate all her energies on the settlement of 
her internal affairs." Both Ministers are entirely in accord as to the policy 
of non-intervention in Persia, and have left no possible ground for doubt in 
the matter. M. Iswolsky's words, which include the intentions of England, 
are as follows : — " Russia's general principle will be to refrain from any 
kind of intervention in the internal affairs of other countries so long as 
nothing injurious to her interests is done; and it is quite impossible that 
she should deviate from this principle in this present case." 

As to the reported partition of Persia between Russia and England, con- 
cerning which it is asserted that the two Powers above mentioned wish to 
define spheres of influence for themselves, Sir Edward Grey and M. Iswol- 
sky have explicitly declared that these reports have no foundation. What 
the two Powers desire is to come to an agreement which will prevent future 
difficulties and disputes from arising, by guaranteeing that neither Power 
will aim at acquiring influence in those parts of Persia which are adjacent 
to the frontier of the other. This Agreement is injurious neither to the 
interests of Persia nor to those of any other foreign nation, since it binds 
only England and Russia not to embark on any course of action in Persia 
calculated to injure the interests of the other, and so in the future to deliver 
Persia from those demands which in the past have proved so injurious to 
the progress of her political aspirations. This is what M. Iswolsky says : — 

" This Agreement between the two European Powers which have the 
greatest interests in Persia, based as it is on a guarantee of her inde- 
pendence and integrity, can only serve to further and promote Persian 
interests, for henceforth Persia aided and assisted by these two powerful 
neighboring States, can employ all her powers in internal reforms." 



INTRODUCTION" xxxiii 

From the above statements you will see how baseless and unfounded are 
these rumors which have lately prevailed in Persia concerning the political 
ambitions of England and Russia in this country. The object of the two 
Powers in making this Agreement is not in any way to attack, but rather 
to assure for ever the independence of Persia. Not only do they not wish 
to have at hand any excuse for intervention, but their object in these 
friendly negotiations was not to allow one another to intervene on the pre- 
text of safeguarding their interests. The two Powers hope that in the 
future Persia will be for ever delivered from the fear of foreign interven- 
tion, and will thus be perfectly free to manage her own affairs in her own 
way, whereby advantage will accrue both to herself and to the whole 
world. 

The British Blue-Book up to December, 1911, did not contain 
this important state paper, hut it has since been ascertained 
through questions put to the British Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs, on the floor of the House of Commons, that the 
above communication was in fact made to the Persian Govern- 
ment on September 5, 1907, by the British Minister at Tehe- 
ran. 

The disordered condition of Persia had continued unabated 
and in November the Teheran press attacked the Shah in articles 
whose bitterness, scorn and lightly-veiled threats almost surpass 
belief. On November 4 the Shah had visited the Med j lis in 
state and for the fourth time solemnly sworn on the Koran to 
be faithful to the Constitution. 

It was apparent that, early in December, Muhammad Ali Shah 
had made up his mind to destroy the Med j lis. For this purpose 
he had two forces, the so-called " Cossack Brigade," a body of 
from 1200 to 1800 Persians, commanded by Russian army officers 
detailed by the Russian Government for that purpose, but paid 
from the Persian treasury, and an undisciplined organization 
made up of his own servitors, grooms, and muleteers, augmented 
by the discontented rabble of the capital. The Persian army 
had fallen into such abandon and disrepute that nobody paid 
much attention to it as a serious factor in affairs. 

On December 15 the Shah sent for the members of Nasirul- 
Mulk's cabinet, which had just resigned, and forcibly detained 



xxxiv INTKODUCTION 

them, including the Prime Minister himself. 1 Meanwhile, the 
Shah's hired ruffians started a disturbance in the " Gun- 
Square, ' ' in the central part of Teheran, and began an agitation 
against the Medjlis. No adequate steps were taken, however, to 
occupy the Baharistan — the building where the deputies held 
their sessions — so that, on the following day, the Medjlis sat as 
usual, while all the approaches and entrances were guarded by 
armed volunteers from all classes of the people) who had 
responded immediately and spontaneously to the threat against 
their constitutional representatives. Neither the Shah's rabble 
nor the Persian Cossacks dared to attack the Medjlis under these 
circumstances, and as a result a truce was declared, the Shah 
agreeing to exile and dismiss certain of his court favorites and 
ministers, to punish the lutis (roughs) who had been disturbing 
public order and plundering the inhabitants of Teheran, to bring 
the Cossack Brigade and other royal troops under the Ministry 
of War, and again to send to the Medjlis a solemn, sealed oath to 
obey the Constitution. In the meantime the people throughout 
the provinces, on hearing of the threatened destruction of the 
Medjlis, immediately telegraphed offers of support to the depu- 
ties and people, and actually despatched several armed con- 
tingents towards the capital. •* 

On December 20, 1907, after order had been restored, a new 
cabinet was proposed by the Shah, with Nizamu 's-Saltana as 
Prime Minister. . The Medjlis continued in .its conciliatory atti- 
tude towards the Shah, but fresh incidents continued to arise. 

Towards the end of February, 1908, an attempt to assassinate 
the Shah was made while he was driving in Teheran. " He was 
seated in a carriage, being driven behind the royal, automobile in 
which he was believed to be. A bomb was thrown at the top of 
the automobile and exploded, slightly injuring the chauffeur, a 
Frenchman named Varnet. Muhammad Ali Shah himself 
escaped with nothing worse than a severe scare. The Shah of 

i Nasiru'1-Mulk was released through the intervention of the British Le- 
gation. He was a classmate of Sir Edward Grey and a friend of many 
prominent British statesmen. 



INTRODUCTION xxxv 

course suspected the Constitutionalists of this attempt on his 
life, and his relations with the Medjlis became very strained. 

Towards the end of May, 1908, each party had formulated 
certain demands upon the other, and it was agreed that both the 
Royalists and the Constitutionalists should act simultaneously in 
complying with them. On June 1, therefore, the Shah reluc- 
tantly dismissed a number of his reactionary courtiers, the one 
most hated by the people, Amir Bahadur Jang, taking refuge in 
the Russian Legation. 

On the following day began the open intervention of the 
Russian and British Legations which so directly contributed to 
the overthrow of the Medjlis and the bombardment of the 
Baharistan by the Cossack Brigade just three weeks later. 

In effect, the Russian Minister, Mons. de Hartwig, and the 
British Charge d 'Affaires, Mr. Marling, called on the Persian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs and threatened the Government with 
Russian intervention if the opposition to the Shah's plans and 
wishes did not cease. The Russian Minister took the lead and 
framed the threats and demands, and the British representative 
merely announced his Government's approval of the Russian 
Minister's words. 

How this threat by Russia and England to interfere forcibly 
with Persia's purely internal affairs was reconciled with the 
declarations of the Anglo-Russian Convention, and with Sir 
Cecil Spring-Rice 's communique to the Persian Government, does 
not appear. It was, of course, a flagrant breach of the promises 
therein made. 

This ominous message from the two Legations was immedi- 
ately communicated to the Medjlis, where it had the effect 
evidently intended by the diplomatic representatives. The 
Medjlis was constantly in the greatest fear of foreign interven- 
tion, and its members, after having practically forced a treacher- 
ous and perjured ruler to live up to the law, were compelled to 
let their struggles go for naught at the behest of two legations 
whose sole desire seemed to be to keep matters in the country in 
statu quo, apparently that they might ' ' fish in troubled waters. ' ' 



xxxvi INTEODUCTIOK 

On the next day, June 3, 1908, the Shah's nerves drove him 
to leave the city and take up his residence in the Bagh-i-Shah 
(Garden of the King), just outside the walls. In order to pro- 
tect himself from any possible interference while making this 
short journey through the streets, the Shah created a panic in 
the city by letting loose some 2000 guards and 300 Cossacks 
with artillery, and under cover of this was escorted by Colonel 
Liakhoff, commander of the Cossack Brigade, to the Bagh-i-Shah. 

The next day a large crowd of people, believing that the Shah 
was meditating another attack on the Med j lis, demanded that his 
deposition should be proclaimed. 

On June 5 the Shah caused to be arrested a number of Con- 
stitutionalists, whom he had invited to confer with him at the 
Bagh-i-Shah, but one of them escaped and immediately reported 
the occurrence to the Medjlis. This affair caused intense excite- 
ment in the capital. 

Between June 6 and June 23, the Shah continued his open 
and threatening preparations against the Constitutionalists. He 
collected troops, arms and munitions at the Bagh-i-Shah, seized 
the telegraph offices, thereby cutting off communication between 
the Medjlis and the provinces, appointed well-known reaction- 
aries to government posts held by Constitutionalists, made a 
number of prisoners, declared martial law in the city, and placed 
the Russian Colonel, Liakhoff, in supreme command. He then 
sent Cossacks with an ultimatum to the Medjlis, threatening 
bombardment of a mosque if the people there did not disperse, 
demanded the expulsion of a number of pro-Constitution editors 
and orators, and finally deceived the Medjlis and the people by 
agreeing, on June 22, to submit all questions in dispute to a 
mixed committee of Royalists and Nationalists. 

Before sunrise on June 23, over 1000 Cossacks and other 
troops surrounded the Medjlis buildings and occupied the 
adjoining streets. The deputies and others who rushed to the 
scene were allowed to enter but not to come out. An hour 
later, Colonel Liakhoff, with six other Russian officers, arrived 
and disposed the troops and six cannon so as to command the 







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INTRODUCTION xxxix 

locality. Colonel Liakhoff then mounted a horse and rode off, 
whereupon the troops and guns, under fhe command of the 
remaining Russian officers, opened fire on the Medjlis buildings, 
killing at the first volley a number of Nationalist volunteers who 
were there. 

The 100 or more armed Nationalists who were present now 
returned the fire, putting three of the Cossack guns out of action. 
Cossack reinforcements arrived, and despite the odds against 
them, the volunteer defenders of the Medjlis kept up a stout 
resistance for seven or eight hours until the buildings were 
badly damaged by the shells and shrapnel, and the inmates were 
either killed, captured or put to flight. 

Many well-known Nationalists were arrested and strangled or 
imprisoned, and some who were being sought succeeded in 
making their escape. Colonel Liakhoff and his troops bom- 
barded and looted for several days the homes of persons disliked 
by the Shah. The records of the Medjlis even were destroyed. 
Colonel Liakhoff remained the virtual dictator of Teheran. 
Although he was a Russian officer, wearing a Russian uniform 
and receiving pay from his Government, the Russian Cabinet, in 
the face of the British and European criticism of the part he had 
played, promptly disclaimed either responsibility for or knowl- 
edge of his acts, claiming that he was entirely under the orders 
of the Shah. There has been considerable evidence brought for- 
ward, however, tending to show that in planning and executing 
the destruction of the Medjlis and Constitution, Liakhoff was 
actually carrying out the designs of the so-called " forward 
party," a reactionary clique who surrounded the Czar at St. 
Petersburg, and of whom Mons. de Hartwig, Russian Minister at 
Teheran, was such a striking example. 

Meanwhile, riots had broken out in the provinces, principally 
at Resht, Kirman, Isfahan and Tabriz — from which latter place 
the deposition of the Shah was announced, and from which a 
force of 300 horsemen was despatched to Teheran to defend the 
Constitution. 

The prospects at this time for the restoration of constitutional 



xl INTRODUCTION 

government were decidedly poor, and it is little wonder that 
the Persian people in Teheran felt that their last hope had gone. 

At Tabriz, the next important city in Persia after the capital, 
street fighting broke out between the Nationalists and the Royal- 
ists on the very day that Colonel Liakhoff was bombarding the 
Medjlis at Teheran. The inhabitants of Tabriz had learned to 
know and dislike Muhammad Ali Shah during the time that he 
was Crown Prince and Governor of that province. 

For ten months after the destruction of the Medjlis at Teheran 
the Constitutionalists at Tabriz kept up the unequal struggle 
against, first, the Royalists, whom they practically expelled, and 
then against famine when the roads were closed and the blockade 
of the city was complete. In October, 1908, it began to be 
rumored that Russia intended sending troops to intervene at 
Tabriz, on the ground that the Russian Consul considered that 
there was serious and imminent danger to Europeans. During 
this period the Russian Consul-General, Mons. Pokhitonoff, was 
discovered to be intriguing with the Royalists to supply them 
with arms and ammunition. The Nationalist forces were care- 
ful to respect foreign lives and property, and there is ample 
testimony from Europeans to the effect that a remarkable degree 
of order was maintained under the local constitutional govern- 
ment. 

On October 11 a force composed of 400 Persian Cossacks, 
with four guns, and commanded by Russian officers of the Cos- 
sack Brigade, left Teheran for Tabriz, to overthrow the National- 
ists. In Tabriz, however, by October 12 the Nationalists were 
in undisputed possession of the city. 

In the latter part of November, despite the arrival of the 
Cossacks and guns to reinforce the besiegers of the city, the 
Tabriz Nationalists continued to win victories. . Thus time was 
given to the Nationalists in other provincial centers to formu- 
late their plans, and during the next four months they suc- 
ceded in gaining control also of Resht, Isfahan, Lar, and later at 
Shiraz, Hamadan, Meshed, Astarabad, Bandar-i-Abbas and 
Bushir. 



INTRODUCTION xli 

On January 5, 1909, two chiefs of the Bakhtiyari tribesmen, 
the Samsamu 's-Saltana and the Zarghamu 's-Saltana, with 1000 
of their men, were in possession of the city of Isfahan, and the 
so-called Royal troops were dispersed. The Bakhtiyaris had 
decided to side with the Nationalists. 

At Resht, in the north, the Nationalist movement was aided 
by that remarkable personage, the Sipahdar-i-Azam, who, a few 
months before, had been in command of the Shah's forces 
besieging Tabriz. 

During the month of January the inhabitants of Tabriz were 
in severe straits. Many were dying from hunger or barely sub- 
sisting on grass. The city was surrounded by the savage tribes- 
men of Rahim Kahn and by the troops of the Shah, who had 
been kept at the task only by promises of unrestricted rapine 
and loot, if they succeeded in taking the place. 

In their attempted sorties to open one of the roads and obtain 
provisions for the city, the Nationalists were joined by two 
foreigners, Mr. W. A. Moore, a Britisher, who had come out to 
Persia representing several English newspapers, and Mr. H. C. 
Baskerville, an American, who was a teacher in the Boys' School 
conducted in Tabriz by the American Presbyterian Mission. In 
a sally made on April 21 Baskerville was killed. 

When the food situation at Tabriz became desperate, sug- 
gestions were made that all foreigners should leave, and the com- 
mander of the Shah's troops was instructed to give them safe- 
conduct. Nearly all the foreigners, however, were unwilling to 
abandon their interests, and on April 20 Russia decided to 
send troops into the city, to facilitate the entry of provisions, 
to protect the foreign consuls and subjects, and to assist any 
who might wish to leave the town. 

On April 29 a Russian force composed of four squadrons of 
Cossacks, three battalions of infantry, two batteries of artillery, 
and a company of sappers, arrived outside Tabriz and entered 
the city on the following day. The Russian Government gave 
the most explicit assurances that the troops would remain 
only so long as might be necessary to guarantee the security 



xlii INTRODUCTION 

of the lives and property of foreign consulates and their sub- 
jects and that they would abstain from taking part in the 
political conflict. 

As was to be expected under such circumstances, friction 
and more serious difficulties occurred between the 4,000 Rus- 
sian troops in and about Tabriz and the native inhabitants ; and 
the promised withdrawal of the Russians, although order was 
completely restored, has never taken place. During March 
the Nationalists of Resht had occupied a portion of the road 
leading from the Caspian Sea to Kasvin and Teheran. Their 
progress was slow, as they were awaiting the concurrent ad- 
vance of the Bakhtiyari forces from Isfahan and the south. 

As a result of a strong note presented to the Shah by the 
Russian and British Legations on April 22, the Shah, on May 
10, again solemnly promised to restore and observe the Consti- 
tution, but the Nationalist leaders and the people had by this 
time lost all confidence in his pledges. - 

The combined advance on the capital by the two Nationalist 
armies therefore continued. The troops from Isfahan were 
commanded by the Bakhtiyari chieftain, the Samsamu 's-Saltana, 
who was joined about May 7 by his more active brother, the 
Sardar-i-Asad, who had returned fom Europe by way of the 
Persian Gulf. Against this force the Shah had despatched 
some Royalist soldiers. 

By this time the Nationalist force from Resht had taken pos- 
session of Kasvin, some 90 miles to the north of Teheran. They 
were commanded by the Sipahdar-i-Azam, although the mov- 
ing spirit of this expedition is said to have been an Armenian 
named Ephraim Kahn. Kasvin was taken on May 5, and 
on May 6 a force of Persian Cossacks with two Maxim guns, 
commanded by the Russian Captain Zapolski, was despatched 
from Teheran, to guard the pass and bridge at Karaj, about 
30 miles northwest of the capital. The Nationalist force was 
less than 600 men. 

At this juncture the Russian Legation again intervened by 




I A 






INTRODUCTION xlv 

sending a threatening communication to the Sipahdar, demand- 
ing, in effect, the cessation of his march on Teheran. 

On June 16 the Bakhtiyari forces, composed of about 800 
men, actually started for Teheran, and shortly thereafter they 
were in communication with the Nationalists at Kasvin. Both 
the British and Russian Legations exhausted every effort to 
deter the Bakhtiyari leaders from their purpose, but without 
success. On June 23 the advance guard of this force had 
reached Qum, eighty miles to the south of Teheran. 

In spite of repeated threats from the Legations the Sardar-i- 
Asad announced that he had certain demands to make on the 
Shah, and the advance continued. Still endeavoring to frighten 
the Nationalist forces, the Russian Government began to assem- 
ble an expeditionary army at Baku to be sent into Northern 
Persia. 

At this time the Shah's troops were reported to be some 5000 
at Saltanatabad and 1350 soldiers of the Cossack Brigade, of 
whom 800 under Colonel Liakhoff were at Teheran, 350 to the 
north of the capital, and 200 to the south, awaiting the ap- 
proach of the Bakhtiyaris. On July 3, the force at Karaj 
fell back to Shahabad, only 16 miles from Teheran, and on the 
next day a skirmish between this body and the advancing Na- 
tionalists took place. The Persian Cossacks, under Captain Za- 
polski, with two Russian non-commissioned officers and three 
guns, lost one Persian officer, three men killed and two wounded. 
The Nationalists lost twelve. 

Meanwhile, Russia was despatching her troops from Baku 
and by July 8 some 2000 of them were on Persian soil. On 
July 11 they had reached Kasvin. The Legation had also 
warned the Nationalists that any further advance by them to- 
wards the capital would be followed by foreign intervention. 

Further endeavors to frighten or persuade the Nationalist 
leaders were made, but without effect. 

On July 10 an engagement took place between troops of the 
Cossack Brigade and the Bakhtiyaris at Badamak. fifteen miles to 



xlvi INTRODUCTION 

the west of Teheran, but the result was indecisive. Skirmish- 

%• 
ing continued for the next two days, and on July 13 the two 

Nationalist forces, to the utter surprise of the "Cossack Brigade 
and Royalist troops, slipped through their lines and quietly 
entered Teheran at 6 : 30 in the morning. The skill of the 
manceuver was undoubtedly due to Ephraim Khan, the Armen- 
ian leader who has been mentioned heretofore. 

There was street fighting in Teheran during the entire day. 
The people received the Nationalist forces with the greatest 
enthusiasm, and July 13 was regarded as the day of their 
salvation. On the next day the Cossack Brigade, under Colonel 
Liakhoff, was still besieged in its barracks and square in the 
center of the city, and the Russian Colonel wrote to the Sipah- 
dar, as head of the Nationalist forces, proposing terms for the 
surrender of the Brigade. The Nationalist troops behaved 
themselves throughout with the utmost discretion and gallantry. 
On July 15 they were in full possession of the capital, al- 
though the Cossack Brigade still held the central square. 

On July 16 at 8 : 30 a. m. the Shah, with a large body of 
his soldiers and attendants, took refuge in the Russian Legation 
in Zargundeh, some miles outside the city, and thus abdicated 
his throne. / He had previously obtained the consent of the Lega- 
tion to his doing this. Both Russian and British flags were 
hoisted over the Russian Minister's home as soon as it was oc- 
cupied by the Shah. In the meantime Colonel Liakhoff had 
practically surrendered to the Nationalist leaders, and had 
formally accepted service under the new Government, agree- 
ing to act under the direct orders of the Minister of War. 

Late this same evening an extraordinary meeting took place at 
the Baharistan grounds, and the Shah was formally deposed. 
His son, Sultan Ahmad Mirza, aged twelve, was proclaimed his 
successor, and Azudu '1-Mulk, the venerable head of the Qajar 
family, was declared Regent. 

Thus, on July 16, 1909, the apparently lost cause of consti- 
tutionalism in Persia had been suddenly revived, and by a dis- 
play of courage, patriotism and skill by the soldiers of the 




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INTRODUCTION xlix 

people, their hopes for a representative government had been 
restored, almost over-night. 

Prolonged negotiations followed between the National Council, 
or Emergency Committee, of the restored Constitutional Govern- 
ment and the British and Russian Legations, as to the terms 
upon which Muhammad Ali, ex-Shah, should leave Persia, 
give up the Crown jewels, pay off the debts and mortgages on 
his private estates — lest these latter should fall into the hands 
of the Russians — and, lastly, as to his pension. On September 
7 an agreement was reached, and a protocol embodying the 
various stipulations was signed by the representatives of the 
British and Russian Governments and by the other parties. 
The ex-Shah's pension was fixed at about $80,000 per annum. 
On September 9 he left the Russian Legation, accompanied 
by his family and retinue, and started towards the Caspian Sea, 
to journey to Odessa. He sailed from the Persian coast on Oc- 
tober 1, and was conveyed from Baku to Odessa in a special 
train furnished by the Russian Government. 

On July 18 the young Shah had been acclaimed by the Regent 
at Saltanatabad and on July 20 he entered the capital, which 
was illuminated in his honor. Shortly thereafter the new consti- 
tutional regime was formally recognized by England and Rus- 
sia. 

The National Council proceeded to nominate a cabinet, and 
Ephraim Khan was placed in charge of the policing of the city. 

The free press which had sprung into being during the exist- 
ence of the first Med j lis now appeared again. During the 
following October the elections for deputies to the Med j lis had 
taken place throughout the country, and on the 28th of that 
month some sixty-four, three more than the number required 
for a quorum, were gathered in Teheran. 

On November 15, 1909, the solemn opening of the new Med- 
jlis took place. JA.11 classes of the people were represented. The 
Sipahdar was made Prime Minister and Minister of "War, and 
it was he who read out the speech from the Throne. 

During all this time large bodies of Russian troops were 



1 INTRODUCTION" 

quartered at Tabriz, Kasvin, Resht, and at various other points 
in Northern Persia, and their presence was the source of increas- 
ing distrust on the part of the Nationalists, who harbored 
well-founded suspicions as to Russia's ultimate designs. 

Despite the frightful odds and conditions by which they were 
confronted, the new Medjlis and Cabinet set bravely to work 
to restore order, to police the country, to gather revenue, and 
to provide for the security of lives and property. The entire 
nation was, of course, in a terrible state of disorder, the worst 
feature of all being the financial chaos and heavy foreign indebt- 
edness under which Persia labored. 

A French gentleman, Mons. Bizot, was employed to assist 
the new Government in its financial work, but during the two 
years which he remained in Teheran he accomplished no actual 
reforms, and conditions went from bad to worse. Unfortunately 
for Persia, the patriotism which impelled numbers of her brave 
Nationalists to fight to depose the ex-Shah, and to exercise an 
admirable self-restraint in the hour of victory, did not suffice 
to keep many of them from profiting personally through the cha- 
otic state of the public treasury, and through the entire absence 
of any check on fraud and corruption in the financial adminis- 
trations, so that with an empty treasury, a large foreign debt, 
a rapidly growing deficit and but the ruins of absolutism on 
which to build, it is little wonder that the members of the 
Medjlis decided that some new plan must be tried if the nation 
and its newly established Government were to escape speedy 
and humiliating disintegration. 

Despite the brilliant success of the Persian Nationalists in 
forcing the deposition and exile from the country of the late 
Shah after his repeated violations of his promises and oaths 
to faithfully observe the Constitution and the rights of his 
people, the prospects of Persia being able to evolve from the 
complicated situation confronting her a reasonably stable and 
orderly government were far from encouraging. Such a govern- 
ment must both command the respect and support of the majority 
of the Persians and remove all reasonable pretext for a fur- 



INTRODUCTION li 

ther intervention in her internal affairs by the so-called friendly 
powers claiming to have special interests in her as a nation. 
The general administration of the Government under the former 
Shahs — and above all the conduct of the financial departments 
— had become so absolutely disorganized and broken down that 
Persia had neither credit abroad nor with her own. people, and 
the utmost courage and patriotism were necessary on the part 
of her intelligent classes, if she was to extricate herself from 
the abyss of administrative chaos and ruin into which she had 
fallen. 7 The internal difficulties alone made the task an almost 
hopeless one; but to these were to be added the open hostility 
of Russia and the scarcely less injurious timidity of England 
so far as thwarting Russia's evident designs upon the success 
of the Constitutional Government in Persia was concerned. 
The new Constitutional Government was therefore confronted 
at the outset with a most extraordinary and peculiar relation- 
ship towards certain foreign powers, which relationship had 
been forced upon her regardless of her rights as a sovereign 
nation. 

^The poor of the provinces were compelled, under one regime 
after another, to pay taxes, not a cent of which was ever used 
for their benefit, and to be ever the prey of brigands without 
and of the brigands within — the so-called Government officials 
whom fate had placed above them. The people themselves were, 
to a very large extent, too ignorant to realize the duties which 
devolved upon them as subjects of a constitutional monarchy, 
or to feel the responsibility which rests always upon those 
who would maintain a free and democratic form of govern- 
ment. But the most pressing danger of all was that before 
they could ever hope to acquire education sufficient to enable 
them to grasp those things, their country would have probably 
disappeared from the map as an independent and sovereign 
nation.] A most heavy responsibility, therefore, rested. upon the 
more" intelligent and enlightened Persians who, during the 
eighteen months which followed the deposition of the ex-Shah, 
had succeeded to power and places of influence in the new 



/ 



Hi INTRODUCTION 

regime. And it is not strange that true to the traditions of 
their past, these men at first regarded their newly acquired 
positions quite as much as a means to self -advancement as a 
sacred trust to be administered for those who looked to them 
to uphold and protect their interests. 

As has been said, a large number of Russian troops had been 
sent into Northern Persia, although both the Russian and the 
British Governments had stated that they would be withdrawn 
as soon as they were no longer needed, " for the protection of 
foreign rights and property from the possibility of danger. ' ' 

Due partially to the presence of these troops, and partially 
to the class of local disorders which always follow in the train 
of political upheavals such as Persia had been witnessing dur- 
ing the preceding four years, the new Constitutional regime 
was hampered by fresh and increasing difficulties. In Septem- 
ber, 1909, the famous brigand, Rahim Khan, had attacked the 
town of Ardabil, in Northern Persia, and his action had been 
promptly seized upon by the Russian Government as an excuse 
to send still more troops into the country and to postpone the 
promised withdrawal of the troops which were already stationed 
at Kazvin. The Persian Government was compelled to spend 
considerable sums in the equipment of forces sent against him, 
but on January 24, 1910, he had been so surrounded by the 
troops under the command of Ephraim Khan, that his only 
method of escape was across the Russian frontier. The Russian 
Government, in plain defiance of Article XIV of the Treaty of 
Turkmanchay, permitted him to cross into Russian territory, 
where he was safe from pursuit and where he remained until 
January, 1911, when he again returned to Tabriz, to become 
a further source of expense and difficulty to the Constitutional 
regime. 

In May, 1910, a certain Persian Prince, Darab Mirza, who had 
been naturalized as a Russian subject and held a commission 
in a Russian Cossack regiment which formed part of the forces 
quartered at Kazvin, started a movement to overthrow the 
Constitutional Government. Despite the protests of the Per- 



INTRODUCTION liii 

sians, who desired to deal with the incipient insurrection them- 
selves, Russian troops intervened and pretended to arrest him. 
He was in their company returning to Kazvin when the Rus- 
sian soldiers encountered a Persian force which had been sent 
out to capture him, and fired upon them, killing the Persian 
officer who was in command of the troops. Although the Rus- 
sian authorities denied all complicity in this attempt to provoke 
civil war, it was proved that a certain Russian Colonel at Kazvin 
had supplied a number of Darab Nirza's accomplices with 
letters of protection signed and sealed by the Colonel himself, 
declaring the bearers to be under the protection of the Emperor 
of Russia and threatening severe punishment for any Persian 
who might interfere with them or their followers. 

In February, 1911, Russian troops massacred some 60 villagers, 
including women and children, at Varmuni, near the town of 
Astara, in Persia v 

In the meantime, the Persian Government, starting in De- 
cember, 1909, had been seeking to obtain a loan of about $2,- 
500,000 from the Russian and British Governments, but the 
conditions which the two powers endeavored to impose upon the 
granting of this assistance were so dangerous to, and even 
destructive of, Persia's independence, that the Medjlis was 
compelled to reject them. Shortly thereafter Persia entered 
into negotiations with a private banking house in London for a 
loan and it was upon the point of being concluded on terms 
mutually satisfactory, when, in October, 1910, the negotiations 
were brought to an end through the action of the British 
Government, working in harmony with Russia, whereby Persia 
was prevented from realizing money on the Crown jewels which 
she was ready to pledge for the loan. All this time Russia had 
been openly endeavoring to extort a number of valuable con- 
cessions from the Persian Medjlis as the price of withdrawing 
her troops from Northern Persia. The general attitude of the 
two . powers towards Persia was marked with increasing un- 
friendliness and hostility. The so-called " forward party " in 
the Russian Government was increasing in power and influence 



liv INTRODUCTION 

at St. Petersburg, and the appointment of such a man as Mons. 
Pokhitanoff, who had distinguished himself by his cold-blooded 
intrigues and bitter hostility to the Constitutional Government 
while he was Russian Consul at Tabriz, to be the Russian Consul- 
general at Teheran, was a fair sample of the course which 
Russia had marked out for herself toward the Persian people. 
On October 16, 1910, the British Government delivered its now 
famous " ultimatum " to Persia, complaining of the condition 
of the southern roads and trade routes, and practically demand- 
ing that a number of officers of the British-Indian Army should 
be placed in charge of the policing of these roads under the 
general supervision of the British Government, the expense of 
the work to be paid out of the Persian Customs revenues. This 
action provoked the greatest alarm and protest in both Persia 
and Turkey, and an appeal was telegraphed by certain Mu- 
hammadan elements to the German Emperor, requesting him tc 
display his friendliness toward the people of Islam. The only 
effect of this attempt to involve Germany in Persia's political 
affairs appears to have been to hasten the Potsdam Agreement 
which was reached on November 5, 1910, and came as a great 
surprise to both the French and British Governments. This 
entente between Russia and Germany, 1 both because of the 
nature of the disclosed terms of the agreement and because of 
what has since been generally reputed to be an even more defi- 
nite and remarkable secret understanding, enabled Russia to 
adopt a harsh and drastic attitude toward the Persian nation 
without fear of interference or adequate protest by her partner 
to the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, on which all actions 
of Britain and Russia towards the Persian people were sup- 
posed to be based. 

On October 29, 1910, the then Persian Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Husayn Kuli Khan, had informed the British and 
Russian Legations that the Persian Government, having dis- 
covered treasonable correspondence between the ex-Shah and 

J For detailed discussion of this Agreement see Chapter X. 



INTRODUCTION lv 

some of the chiefs of the Turcoman tribes on the northeast 
Persian frontier, proposed, in accordance with the terms of the 
Protocol of August 25, 1909, to stop the payment of the next 
instalment of his pension until further investigation could 
be made. The two Legations not only refused to pay attention 
to this just demand, but subjected the Persian Minister of 
Foreign Affairs to the vulgar insult of sending Legation servants 
in uniform to follow him about the streets of the capital and to 
stand outside the door of his private house until the money 
was forthcoming. According to diplomatic usage this action 
was an unprecedented and unjustifiable outrage and insult. 
A month later the Russian Minister demanded an apology from 
this same Persian Minister for an alleged insult to the Russian 
Consular Agent at the town of Kashan. This Russian agent 
was, in fact, a Persian of evil reputation to whose appointment 
the Persian Government had most strongly objected. After 
undergoing the humiliation of tendering this apology it became 
so evident to Husayn Kuli Khan that the Powers were bent 
upon getting rid of him, that he felt compelled to resign, 
which he did a month later. 

In the meantime, the ex-Shah had left Odessa and started on 
a tour through Europe, ostensibly for his health, but in real- 
ity to lay plans for the attempt to overthrow the Constitutional 
Government, which culminated in his landing upon Persian 
soil with an armed force in July of the following year. On 
February 1, in the city of Isfahan, a certain ex-official of 
police wounded the Constitutional Governor, killed his cousin, 
and then took refuge in the Russian Consulate there. Five 
days later the Persian Minister of Finance, Saniu'd-Dawla, 
was shot and killed in the streets of Teheran by two Georgians, 
who also succeeded in wounding four of the Persian police 
before they were captured. The Russian Consular authorities 
promptly refused to allow these men to be tried by the Persian 
Government, and took them out of the country under Russian 
protection, claiming that they would be suitably punished. On 



lvi INTRODUCTION 

February 8 the new Regent, Nasiru '1-Mulk, who had been elected 
after the death, on September 22, 1910, of the first Regent, 
Azadu'1-Mulk, reached Teheran, and the Russian garrison at 
Kazvin, with the exception of some eighty Cossacks who re- 
mained, was withdrawn a month after his arrival, it is said, as 
a compliment to him. 

This brings us down to the arrival in Persia of the American 
finance administrators. And perhaps, at this point, a few words 
as to the physical characteristics of this strange country where 
there is so much politics may not be inappropriate. 

Persia is an elevated plateau surrounded and intersected by 
mountains. In the North, along the Caspian Sea, there is 
abundant rainfall, and all kinds of fruits and vegetables, and 
rice, are produced. Silk worms are grown in great numbers. 
In Teheran whenever a question is asked as to the origin of the 
better articles of food, the answer is almost invariably that they 
are " from Mazandaran," a province on the Caspian. 

In the Province of Azarbayjan the trees and fruits there, 
grapes, melons, peaches, pears, plums, etc., are not to be sur- 
passed. The central part of Persia is a large salt desert. 

The mountains are generally treeless and rocky. Their 
snows act as storage reservoirs, and thousands of streams pour 
down all summer, furnishing water for the plains, large areas 
of which, for want of any or proper irrigation arrangements, 
go to waste. 

The soil responds promptly to irrigation, and the potential 
agricultural wealth of the country is unlimited. From what is 
known of the mines of turquoise, gold, copper, and coal, min- 
eral wealth is also an important item. Up to the present not 
a railroad has been allowed to enter Persia, lest some strategic 
advantage should be obtained or lost by Russia, Great Britain or 
Turkey. 

At present, camels, mules and donkeys spend weeks on the 
roads, transporting Persian goods to the ports of Bushir, Ban- 
dar-i-Abbas and Mohammerah on the Persian Gulf, and to 



INTRODUCTION lix 

Ahwaz, near the Gulf, on the Karun River (upon which ply 
the steamers of the Lynch Transportation Company), or to 
Enzeli and other ports on the Caspian, and Trebizond on the 
Black Sea, in Turkey, or out through Kirmanshah to Bagdad 
and the Tigris River. Little merchandise goes out to the east- 
ward, as the British Protectorates of Afghanistan and Balu- 
chistan block that way. Of interior commerce there is no lack, 
particularly the business of transporting grain and other foods 
from the fertile or irrigated portions of the country to other 
sections. Teheran, not being in a grain section, is thus sup- 
plied from a distance, although its neighborhood when watered, 
as at Shah-Abdu '1-Azim, just to the south of the city, produces 
splendid wheat. 

Wood and coal are carried by pack animals. Coal is brought 
from the mines some thirty miles to Teheran. It is of good 
quality and somewhat resembles the bituminous coal of West 
Virginia. 

Of the great trade routes, one crosses the country from north 
to south, that is, from the Caspian at Enzeli, via Teheran, Qum, 
Kashan, Isfahan, Shiraz, to Bushir. Mails and merchandise 
from India, and at times from Europe, come all the way from 
Bushir to Teheran over this route. Another route, known 
sometimes as the Lynch-Bakhtiyari road, connects at Isfahan 
with this one, and goes to Ahwaz, in the southwest corner of 
Persia, near the only oil territory which has been developed. 
Goods come also from Europe through the Suez Canal and the 
Red Sea around to Bushir and Ahwaz. 

A long trail connects Teheran with Trebizond, passing 
through Kasvin and Tabriz. By her transit tariff Russia drives 
the merchants of other nationalities to detours via Trebizond 
or the Persian Gulf — long tedious routes, when they might 
take a short cut by rail through Batum, on the Black Sea, and 
Baku, the Russian oil city, on the Caspian. This tariff, sup- 
plemented by the most vexatious Batum Custom service, has 
been verv effective. 



lx INTRODUCTION 

Other somewhat less important routes go northeast from Te- 
heran to Meshed and various ports on the eastern shore of the 
Caspian. One road goes from Isfahan to Yezd, Kirman, Sei- 
stan and Bandar-i-Abbas, in the southeastern section of Persia. 
Kirman is the principal rug-making district of Persia. 

The long route through the Bakhtiyari district to Ahwaz is 
closed by the snows on the mountains in mid-winter. The route 
from Bushir to Shiraz, Isfahan and Teheran is sometimes in- 
fested with robbers, but to a much less extent, it is believed, 
than the British traders, with their headquarters in India, are 
willing to have merchants of other nationalities believe, since 
the British naturally desire to monopolize this trade. 

There are several telegraph lines in Persia, chiefly British, 
running to Europe, Turkey, India, and connecting all of the 
chief Persian cities and towns. Telephone lines are established 
from Enzeli to Teheran and to Hamadan, but only for the use 
of the road company on the Russian-built road. There is an 
interior parcels '-post system, and a mediocre postal service. 

The population of Persia has been singularly misrepre- 
sented; an old so-called census of sixty years ago seems to be 
the basis of the low figures given in some books and generally 
accepted by outsiders. Certain it is that no census has been 
taken since then, but Europeans who are familiar with the 
situation estimate the total population at from 13,000,000 to 
15,000,000. Teheran has increased in the past forty years 
from 100,000 to some 350,000 inhabitants. 

The climate is very agreeable. The weather is usually clear, 
and dry and bracing, — if anything, a little too stimulating, es- 
pecially at Teheran, which has an altitude of 4000 feet. 

Such inconveniences as may be inferred from an absence of 
railroads and such faults as may be expected in human nature 
tyrannized over and corrupted by an aristocracy of selfish land- 
owners are to be found, but Persia, when one becomes ac- 
customed to it, is an attractive and comfortable place in which 
to live. Every house of any size is the center 'of a beautiful 
garden of flowers, fruits and fountains. The servants are 




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"i. i- S3 

S2H 



EC O 

3 3 



WES' 



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INTRODUCTION lxiii 

neither good nor bad. The people are kind and hospitable and 
capable of rapid development in Western ways. Thousands 
have traveled or been educated abroad. French is very gen- 
erally spoken, and an increasing amount of English, especially 
among the younger Persians. 



THE STEAKGLING OF PEESIA 



" Time with whose passage certain pains abate 
But sharpens those of Persia's unjust fate." 



THE 
STRANGLING OF PERSIA 



CHAPTEE I 

PEESIA DECIDES TO OBTAIN FINANCIAL ADMINISTRATORS FEOM 
AMERICA. THE AMERICANS ARRIVE AT TEHERAN. 

DURING the months of November and December, 1910, the 
idea had been discussed among the deputies of the Med j lis 
of securing finance administrators from the United States in 
the hope that officials who were free from any European in- 
fluence would be able to accomplish some practical results in the 
reorganization of the archaic and chaotic treasury of Persia. 

As a result of a growing sentiment in favor of taking this 
step, the Persian Cabinet, through its Minister of Foreign Af- 
fairs, Husayn Kuli Khan, sent, on December 25, 1910, the 
following instructions to the Persian Legation in Washington: 

Persian Legation, 
Washington. 

Request immediately Secretary of State put you in communication with 
Imperial American financial people and arrange preliminary employment 
for three years subject to ratification by parliament of disinterested Amer- 
ican expert as Treasurer-general to reorganize and conduct collection and 
disbursement revenue assisted by one expert accountant and one inspector 
to superintend actual collection in provinces secondly one director to or- 
ganize and conduct direct taxation assisted by one expert inspector similar 
to above. 

American Minister informs us Secretary of State ready and willing, avoid 

3 




SEA 



to r«\ 






Chaha^Maha?j 



3 eSftT ^^r I 
£ jc -o^y^^ I Bujn 

§ ^^l/'Gumesh-Teppch 

^Hr^ . Aatarabad * Jajarr 
* Bistam 

Sab 




~Shu8htg?r — t — - 
^'ARAB/STAN) 




Reproduced by permission of Prot. K (i. Browne, Cambridge University, England. 

MAP SHOWING THE THREE "SPHERES" (RUSSIAN, BRITISH AND NET 
(It will be noticed that all the principal towns of Persia except Dlzful, Shushtar, Shiraz and Kirman, as well 

consists mostly of desert, and con tali 




\L) DEFINED IN THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN AGREEMENT OF AUGUST 31, 1907. 

le most fertile and populous part of the country, are Included In the *' Russian Sphere." The "British. Sphere" 

ly one town of Importance, viz. Klrman.) 



THE AMERICANS ARRIVE 5' 

February 24, 1911. 
Mr. W. Morgan Sinister, 
Union Trust Building, 
Washington, D. C. 

Sir: The Department is in receipt of your letter of the 14th instant, 
in reference to the employment by the Persian Government of five Amer- 
ican financial advisers, and making inquiry as to the facts which led to 
your selection for the office of Treasurer-general of the Persian Govern- 
ment. 

In reply you are informed that in December last the Persian Charge 
d'Affaires in this city, acting in accordance with instructions from his 
Government, requested the assistance of this Department in placing the 
Legation in communication with American financial experts, with a view 
to the ultimate employment by the Persian Government of five American 
financial assistants. In compliance with this request the Department 
submitted a list of names, including your own, of persons with whom it 
was suggested that the Persian Charge d'Affaires might appropriately com- 
municate in reference to this matter. The Department is happy to note 
from your letter and from a communication from the Persian Legation 
dated the 17th instant that you have been selected for the position of 
Treasurer-general under the Persian Ministry of Finance. 
I am, sir, 

Your obedient servant, 
For Mr. Knox: 

(Signed) Huntington Wilson, 
Assistant Secretary of State. 

I have been informed on good authority that when Russia 
first found that the idea of securing finance administrators 
from America was making Tieadway among the deputies of the 
Medj lis, she gave the matter her official attention at Teheran. 
An early attempt was made by Russian emissaries to employ 
certain persuasive and notorious members of the Parliament 
to defeat the project. Failing, however, to change the purpose 
of the great majority of the deputies, the story runs that Rus- 
sia next approached the American State Department, which at 
that time was in complete ignorance of the idea of the Persian 
Government, and delicately intimated that it would be unwise 
or unkind to send American financial experts to Persia. The 



6 THE STRANGLING OF PEESIA 

State Department replied, with entire candor, that it knew noth- 
ing of the affair, and that the question would be dealt with when 
it arose. 

When, shortly afterwards, the Persian Government did re- 
quest that the American State Department should lend its as- 
sistance to secure the services of five American financial ex- 
perts, the British Government was asked whether the objections 
previously expressed by Russia to Americans going to Persia 
for this task were shared by England. The British reply was 
that such had been the view of their Government, but that the 
objections no longer existed. The Russian Government was 
then obliged either to object openly to the employment of Amer- 
ican citizens' as such, or to use smooth diplomatic language and 
allow the matter to proceed. 

On February 2 ! , 1911, the Med j lis approved the terms of our 
contracts by a large majority and amid great enthusiasm. 

We went to Persia, therefore, in good faith, and in the natural 
belief that the two powers having (to use their own language) 
" special interests " there offered no objection to the fair and 
honest accomplishment of our task. 

On April 8, 1911, I sailed from New York with a party of 
Americans consisting of Mr. Charles I. McCaskey of New 
York ; Mr. Ralph W. Hills of Washington, D. 0. ; and Mr. 
Bruce G. Dickey of Pine Island, Minnesota, to take up the 
work of reorganizing the finances of the Persian Government. 
Mr. McCaskey, Mr. Hills and myself were accompanied by our 
families, making with children and servants a party of sixteen. 

I had agreed to serve the Persian Government for three years 
as Treasurer-general, having entire control of the financial 
operations and fiscal affairs of that country. Mr. McCaskey 1 

iMr. Charles I. McCaskey, who was engaged as Inspector of Provincial 
Revenues in Persia, was born on August 7, 1877, at Port Snelling, Minne- 
sota. His parents are Major-General and Mrs. William S. McCaskey, United 
States Army retired. Mr. McCaskey went to the Philippines with his 



THE AMERICANS AERIVE 9 

had accepted the post of Inspector of Provincial Revenues, Mr. 
Hills that of Accountant, and Mr. Dickey 1 that of Inspector of 
Taxation, all for the term of three years, under my supervision. 
Mr. E. S. Cairns, 2 then Collector of Customs at Iloilo in the 
Philippine Islands, had been appointed Director of Taxation, 
and was to follow us to Teheran as soon as possible. He was 
to be the Treasurer-general's principal assistant. The men 
engaged for this work had enjoyed a number of years' experi- 
ence at somewhat similar tasks, and were thoroughly acquainted 
with organization problems and revenue work in undeveloped 
countries. 

We traveled via Paris and Vienna, reaching Constantinople 

father in March, 1899, and after being in the field and in action with his 
father's regiment, he returned to Manila, and on April 15, 1899, entered 
the Customs Service as an Inspector, remaining in this service from that 
date until the summer of 1907, having been promoted to the position of 
Deputy Surveyor of Customs at Manila. In the spring of 1905, Mr. Mc- 
Caskey returned to the United States on a leave of absence, and on arriving 
at San Francisco, was married to Miss Selden Fant, of Holly Springs, 
Mississippi. He has three children. 

Early in 1907, on account of the illness of his wife, he was obliged to 
resign and return to the United States, where he was appointed an In- 
spector of Customs at the Port of New York. On September 7, 1909, he 
was promoted to Acting Deputy Surveyor of Customs, which position he 
held until he went to Persia. 

i Mr. Bruce G-. Dickey, who went to Teheran as Inspector of Taxation, 
was born at Pine Island, Minnesota, on April 25, 1881, and resided there 
until the year 1899, at which time he went to the Philippine Islands and. 
entered the Customs Service at Manila as Inspector of Immigration. He 
was subsequently promoted to the positions of Appraiser of Merchandise 
and Chief of the Passenger and Baggage Division of the Manila Custom 
House. Later, he was made Assistant Cashier of the Custom House at Ma- 
nila, which position he resigned in 1908 to return to this country. He is 
unmarried. 

2 Mr. F. S. Cairns was at the time of his appointment as Director of Tax- 
ation the Collector of Customs for the Port of Iloilo, in the Philippine Is- 
lands. Prior to 1898, he had been a Special Agent for the United States 
Treasury Department for several years. 

After the first American occupation of Cuba starting January 1, 1899, he 
became Chief of the Special Agents of the Cuban Customs Service, in which 
position he served until 1901, when he was appointed Surveyor of Customs 
for the Philippine Islands. He served in this position with great credit 
until 1910, when he was appointed to the Collectorship at Iloilo, the second 
largest port in the Philippines. 



10 THE STRANGLING OF PERSIA 

on April 25. Thence we went by sea to Batum, Russia, 
where we arrived May 3, taking the train next day for Baku. 
We sailed from Baku at 4 o'clock in the afternoon of May 6, 
on the Russian steamer Bariaiinski, a little side-wheeler, and 
crossing that part of the Caspian Sea during the night, we 
arrived the next morning at the Persian port of Enzeli, about 9 
o'clock. Once on land, and the Customs formalities over, we 
went by launch and sail-boat, and then by carriage, to the town 
of Resht, which is the capital of the Persian province of Ghilan. 
Here we were entertained for two days by the Acting Governor 
of the Province while arrangements were being made for the 
transportation of our party and our baggage to Teheran, which 
lies some 220 miles to the south. This journey was made in 
unwieldy postchaises of antique type and dilapidated appear- 
ance drawn by four scrawny and diminutive ponies which were 
changed at the stations every ten or twelve miles along the 
road. Our party occupied four carriages, and left Resht on 
May 9, at 8 :30 in the morning, having sent the heavy baggage 
on in advance in two large, springless wagons. We were ad- 
vised to take the trip rather slowly on account of the women 
and children in the party, and after a number of interesting 
adventures along the road we reached the last station before 
arriving at Teheran on May 12, about 2 o'clock in the after- 
noon. Here we found our trunks awaiting us, although they 
were in a decidedly damaged condition due to three days and 
nights of alternate rain and dust and the jolting of the spring- 
less wagons. If we had not been warned at the last moment 
before despatching them at Resht to have them sewed up in 
native felt, they would probably have been useless by the time 
we saw them again. About four miles outside of the Kazvin 
gate of the city of Teheran we were met by the American Min- 
ister, Mr. Charles W. Russell, and his family and by a numbei 
of American missionaries and Persians. 



THE AMEKICANS ARRIVE 11 

We took city carriages and were driven at once to Atabak 
Park, a very beautiful residence and grounds on a palatial scale, 
which had been prepared for us. The building was formerly 
the summer palace of the great reactionary Prime Minister of 
that name. He was also known as Aminu's-Sultan, and was 
assassinated on August 31, 1907. This palace and grounds, 
covering about eight acres in the portion of Teheran occupied 
by the legations and European residences, had passed into the 
hands of a very patriotic and wealthy Parsee merchant named 
Arbad Jemshid. He had very generously placed this residence 
at the disposal of the Government for our entertainment while 
in Teheran. The building itself was of white stone, two stories 
high, containing about thirty rooms, a number of which were 
extremely spacious, and it was filled with a most remarkable 
collection of curious bric-a-brac and strange furniture from all 
corners of the world, including a number of very fine and rare 
Persian rugs. The grounds were laid out in an immense park 
with several artificial lakes and water-courses, and the entire 
place was surrounded by a high and very thick baked mud wall, 
which is typical of the larger private residences in Teheran. 

I well recall the impression produced upon us by our arrival 
in the early evening at the gates of this park. For three days 
and nights we had been traveling through dust and rain, in the 
alternate cold of the Elburz mountains and the heat of the 
plains, sleeping in uncomfortable road-houses and eating such 
food as we could take with us from place to place or find upon 
the journey. We were sunburned, covered with dust, dirty and 
tired ; and to be conducted through a beautiful drive-way in the 
cool of the evening, under trees sparkling with lanterns, up to 
the magnificent entrance of the palace where a crowd of strik- 
ingly uniformed servants and guards awaited us on that beau- 
tiful May night of our arrival, was a change which made Tehe- 
ran almost a fairy land. After dinner we spent several hours 



12 THE STRANGLING OF PEESIA 

on the balcony listening to the songs of the Persian nightingales 
in the trees around the house. 

Before we could unpack a trunk, callers of all kinds began 
to pour in upon us, and for two months the stream, from early 
morning till late at night, never seemed to diminish. 

To see and talk with one tenth of the people who sought an 
interview consumed a great amount of time, but we were able to 
acquire by this means a great fund of valuable information and 
we were told that these people were all important personages 
who would be mortally offended if they were not given the oppor- 
tunity to explain their views on the situation and point out the 
steps which they deemed necessary to reorganize the Govern- 
ment. 

At Enzeli we had been met by a Persian gentleman named 
Hormuz Khan, who had been sent there by the Government to 
receive us and act as our courier and guide on the road to the 
capital. Hormuz Khan presented us his card on which he de- 
scribed himself as an " American Student " ; he spoke English 
fairly well, and was most anxious that we should receive a 
favorable impression of his native land. His conversation and 
his songs on the way along the road and at the stopping-places 
did much to relieve the monotony of the journey. If we ap- 
peared fatigued by many hours of travel over a dusty and arid 
plain, he would point out a mountain somewhere in the distance 
and call our attention to the beauties of nature, thus strewn be- 
fore the weary wayfarer. Although a good Muhammadan, he 
was a firm believer in the efficacy of an occasional cup of cognac 
upon trips of this kind, and never failed to remind some one of 
the party when he considered that a sufficient time had elapsed 
since the last one. On our arrival at Teheran, Hormuz Khan 
felt that his personal services to our party had been such that he 
should immediately be rewarded with the post of Assistant 
Treasurer-general, or Chief Tax Collector, and it was through 



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THE AMERICANS ARRIVE 15 

his disappointment at my inability to confer this trifling favor 
upon him within the first few days after our arrival, that an 
estrangement took place which gradually led us into different 
paths. 

The day after our arrival at Teheran was spent in conference 
with Minister Russell and with a number of other callers, among 
them the then Minister of Finance, Mumtazu'd-Dawla, a very in- 
telligent man who had formerly been a President of the Med j lis. 
He spoke French fluently, as do all educated Persians, and was 
most cordial in his offers of assistance and his assurance of en- 
tire cooperation and support in our efforts to build up the finan- 
cial administration of his country. We began to discover about 
this time that there was a large number of very intelligent Per- 
sians apparently permanently attached to our household in vari- 
ous capacities which we were unable to figure out. They all 
spoke either English or French, and some remained for weeks 
on duty, always ready to interpret, if necessary, or to assist in 
any other way, merely in the hope of being found useful by those 
to whom they looked to aid their country and their people. 

On May 16, by previous arrangement between the Minister 
of Finance and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Muhtashamu's- 
Saltana, we called upon the latter at the Foreign Office, accom- 
panied by Minister Russell, and indulged for the first time in 
the necessary official ceremony of taking tea. In driving 
through the streets of the city and walking through the grounds 
of the Government buildings, called the Darbar, we were made 
aware of the fact that we were objects of very unusual curiosity. 
Looking back to that time, I am still unable to imagine what the 
name " American " conveyed, or what any American could have 
previously done, to have excited the interest of the Persian peo- 
ple to the extent which we apparently did. Later that after- 
noon we were taken over to the official reception palace of His 
Highness, the Regent, Easiru'1-Mulk, to whom we were for- 



16 THE STRANGLING OF PERSIA 

mally presented. I found the Regent to be a most kindly and 
intelligent-looking man with a perfect command of the English 
language. Nasiru'1-Mulk is an Oxford graduate, and was a 
classmate of Sir Edward Grey, the present Secretary of State 
for Foreign Affairs of England. We talked with him for ten 
or fifteen minutes, and he especially invited me to call upon him 
without ceremony at any time and to discuss my work with him 
in the freest manner. 

That evening I made the acquaintance of a man who was 
destined to become the best and truest friend that the Americans 
in Persia found during their stay in that country. Arbab 
Kaikhosro is a Parsee gentleman who had been educated abroad 
and, having returned to Persia, had thrown in his lot with the 
Nationalist movement and been elected one of the deputies from 
Teheran to the second Medjlis. He represented the Parsee 
community of the city, and was a merchant and property-owner. 
He was a man of the most pleasing personality, with a good 
command of English, and later proved himself to be of both 
inflexible integrity and unfailing courage under the most trying 
and difficult circumstances. He promised me in our very first 
interview that he would give us every assistance in his power, 
and from that moment until the day that we left Persia, he 
never ceased, day or night, to work for our success in his country 
and to defend the American finance officials against intrigues 
and attacks from every source. 

On the next day we went with Minister Russell to call on a 
very remarkable official, His Highness, Sipahdar-i-Azam, who 
at that time was Prime Minister holding the portfolio of War. 
The Minister of Finance, Mumtazu'd-Dawla, and the Vice Min- 
ister of War, Amir Azam, were present at this interview. 
Those who have read the introductory chapter of this story will 
recall that the Sipahdar, or " greatest of the marshals," as his 
title means in Persian, took a very prominent part in the second 



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THE AMERICANS ARRIVE 19 

Nationalist uprising which resulted in the capture of Teheran 
by the combined Nationalist forces and the deposition of the 
Shah in July, 1909. Until shortly before that time the 
Sipahdar had been commonly regarded as a supporter of the 
Shah and as a reactionary grandee of the most pronounced type. 
He possessed vast landed estates in two or three of the provinces 
of Persia, owned hundreds of villages, and was generally re- 
puted to be the richest man in the Empire. A tall, thin, 
weazened figure, of about 60 years of age, with small black eyes, 
grizzled hair and mustache, and a very nervous manner, he 
gave one the impression of being rather more an arch intriguer 
than the leader of a victorious army. He was one of the few 
prominent Persian officials who could talk neither English nor 
Erench, and his Vice-minister, a fat and oily giant, who spoke 
French quite well, served as our interpreter. I mention this 
distinguished personage with such care because of the part which 
he will play in the subsequent incidents of our stay in Persia. 

The next four days were spent in exchanging visits with 
members of the Persian Cabinet and prominent deputies of the 
Medjlis. At the request of the leading Persian newspaper 
editors of Teheran, I gave them an interview in which I out- 
lined the general plan of the work which the Americans hoped 
to accomplish. We had from that time on the undivided sup- 
port of the Persian press, not only at Teheran, but throughout 
the entire country wherever a paper was printed. One of the 
evidences of the Persians' inexperience in political affairs is 
their laughable sensitiveness to any form of newspaper criti- 
cism. Erom the Regent down, every Persian Government offi- 
cial lived in daily terror of being held up by the newspapers to 
public condemnation or ridicule. Despite the freedom of 
speech provided for in the constitutional decrees, it was a fre- 
quent occurrence for the Minister of the Interior to suppress one 
or more papers in Teheran for casting even some very general 



20 THE STRANGLING OF PEESIA 

aspersion on the Government's actions or motives. The doughty 
editors, however, always managed to resume after a few days or 
weeks. The principal papers in Teheran at this time were the 
Estehlal, the organ of the so-called Moderate Party in the 
Med j lis, and the IranirNoh, the organ of the Democrats. 
The latter was perhaps the best and most fearlessly edited jour- 
nal in Persia, and it did yeoman service for the American 
finance officials from the day of their arrival in Teheran. 

On May 22 the chef de ceremonie of the Ministry of For- 
eign Affairs, conducted us to the temporary offices in the Darbar, 
or government center, which had been provided for us. Here 
the Vice-minister of Finance and the different chiefs of the of- 
fices were presented to us and a great quantity of tea and ciga- 
rettes was consumed. Also much time. Each chief was 
desirous of having a series of private interviews running over 
several days in order that he might properly explain the organ- 
ization of his office, his own thorough grasp of the needs of the 
situation, and the failure of the Government to provide him or 
his employees with sufficient pecuniary lubricant to grease the 
wheels of his department. 

The Minister of Finance, Mumtazu'd-Dawla, was aiding us 
in every possible way, and we had just reached a tentative basis 
for commencing work when, on May 23, eleven days after our 
arrival, there was a Cabinet •" crisis " and he resigned. It seems 
that the Prime Minister and Minister of War, Sipahdar, felt 
that the Finance Minister was not signing checks and warrants 
with the freedom and abandon which the Premier had a right 
to expect. 

I was somewhat disturbed by this Cabinet change right at the 
outset of our work, but later grew to take such things more phil- 
osophically. 

Among the various officials of the Finance Department whom 
we met was a Mr. Lecoffre, a British subject, of French extrac- 



THE AMEKICANS AEEIVE 21 

tion, who had been in Persia for a number of years. He was a 
great deal more of a Frenchman than anything else, and he 
occupied the post of Controlleur. After all the other offi- 
cials had left our office, Mr. Lecoffre sat down, looked me in the 
eye, and said : " I am glad, Mr. Shuster, that you have come, 
because between us we shall be able to straighten the miserable 
finances of these people." I thanked him for the encouraging 
thought. 

On May 25, Mr. Hills and his family, who had been com- 
pelled to remain behind in Constantinople on account of the 
serious illness of their infant daughter, arrived at Teheran. 
Unfortunately another of his children fell ill just after their 
arrival and he was compelled to give up his post and return to 
America. They left Teheran on June 2, to the great regret 
of our entire party. 

On our arrival at Atabak Park we had found fifteen or twenty 
very efficient Persian servants, who had been placed there by 
some Persian gentlemen who were entertaining us for a day or 
so until we could get our bearings. When we took over the me- 
nage two days later we naturally retained these domestics, who 
had all been highly recommended to us. It was not until sev- 
eral weeks afterwards that the rumor began to reach me that 
the Americans were believed to be Bahais, 1 and that we had 
come to Teheran, not to reform the finances, but to proselytize. 
Finally the Minister of Finance very gravely called my atten- 
tion to the matter, and suggested that I should discharge our 
servants as " they were all Bahais." This was news to me. I 
had never thought to put our personal servants to a religious 
test as to their orthodoxy, especially as it is against civil service 
principles in America. I told the Finance Minister that the 

i The Bahais, Bahaists or Babis, are a religious sect among the Persians 
who are greatly disliked by the Muhammadans. Up to quite modern times 
they were cruelly persecuted by orthodox Moslems. They are now tolerated, 
and include many of the most enlightened and patriotic Persians. 



22 THE STRANGLING OF PERSIA 

Americans were not Bahais, but that I did not propose to have 
the Persian Government or people pass on the religious faith 
of ourselves, or our servants, or the color of our neckties, and 
that if the Government had not something more important than 
that to think about, it should find something. That was the 
last I heard officially, but the tale was spread broadcast by certain 
elements who were antagonistic to our work, and we were car- 
tooned in some of the local newspapers. Finding that we were 
attending to our own business, the public soon forgot the matter. 

About this time I received an insight into the so-called " in- 
trigues " which were going on in connection with our arrival 
and contemplated duties. Nearly every one with whom I 
talked brought out, at some point in the conversation, the word 
" intrigues." " The Cabinet is making intrigues against you." 
" The Belgian Customs officials are intriguing against the 
Americans." " This is a terrible place, Mr. Shuster, for 
intrigues." " Persia is the land of blague and intrigues." In 
sheer self-defense I was compelled to tell every one that Ameri- 
cans thrived on intrigues and rather liked to see them going on. 

The first tangible one which we met, however, was engineered 
by a Mons. Mornard, a Belgian Customs official, who held the 
post of Administrator-general of the Customs Department of 
Persia. This gentleman had been a Customs employee in his 
own country of very inferior grade, and had gone to Persia as 
an assistant to his notorious countryman, Mons. Naus, who had 
been employed by Muzaffaru'd Din Shah to organize and estab- 
lish the Persian Customs Department, a thing which he did with 
such startling success that he quickly became extremely influ- 
ential and wealthy, and was highly regarded by the Russian 
Government. One of the first acts of the original Persian 
Medjlis was, on February 10, 1907, to compel the Shah to dis- 
miss Mons. Naus, who by that time occupied a number of high 
positions. He is now reported to be enjoying his handsome 



THE AMERICANS ARRIVE 23 

chateaux and estates in Belgium. It was this gentleman who 
negotiated several highly important fiscal affairs for the Persian 
Government, such as the present Persian Customs Tariff and 
two of the Russian loans, which are now such a burden on the 
Persian people. Of the Customs tariff, more later. 

Mons. Mornard had become one of Mons. ]STaus' principal as- 
sistants and proteges, and when Mons. Naus was driven out by 
the Med j lis, Mons. Mornard was left to fill one of his numerous 
posts, — that of Chief of Customs. 

With Mons. Mornard at the time of our arrival were some 
twenty-five or thirty of his countrymen in charge of all the 
custom-houses in Persia. We were informed that Mons. 
Mornard, with the active support of the Belgian and Russian 
legations, had tried hard to obtain for himself the post of 
Treasurer-general, but the Medjlis apparently wanted a com- 
plete change. Einding themselves blocked in this attempt, the 
Belgian Customs officials sought another plan to nullify as far 
as possible the effect of the employment of the Americans. 

Very shortly before our arrival, the negotiations had been 
completed for a loan to the Persian Government of £1,250,000 
sterling by the Imperial Bank of Persia, a British corporation. 
All the terms had been agreed upon, and about two weeks be- 
fore our arrival at Teheran, the resolution of the Medjlis ap- 
proving the contract had actually been passed. A portion of 
the deputies had favored the idea of awaiting our advice before 
taking the final step, but the Cabinet was extremely anxious- to 
see the affair concluded, and the vote was taken. 

Mons. Mornard, in connivance with certain well-known Rus- 
sian agents in and out of the Medjlis and Persian Cabinet had 
prepared, just before our arrival, a draft of a law placing the 
entire control of the expenditures of the money derived from this 
loan in the hands of a " commission " composed of fifteen mem- 
bers, of which he was to be the head and center. Thus the 



24 THE STRANGLING OF PERSIA 

American Treasurer-general, who had come to take charge of 
the Persian finances, would have found himself in the delight- 
ful dilemma of either serving as a subordinate to Mons. 
Mornard on this " commission," which was to supervise the 
Government expenditures, or of staying away and seeing the 
only available funds of the Government controlled by other 
hands. The project for this law was already before the Med- 
jlis when the matter was first brought to my attention. I im- 
mediately drafted and presented to the Persian Cabinet a brief 
report on the then existing situation in the Ministry of Einance, 
and asked whether they desired " to add another room in the 
house of chaos." With this report was transmitted a simple 
project of law placing the control of the refunding operations 
and expenditures growing out of the £1,250,000 loan contract in 
the hands of the Treasurer-general, where it belonged. 

The Cabinet promptly approved this and it was sent to the 
Medjlis and on May 30 it was duly made into law. Thus the 
first attempt by foreign elements to tie our hands before we 
could even get started had failed, and the deputies of the Med- 
jlis expressed their delight that we had discovered the situation 
to them. 

During this time I had an experience which it seems worth 
while to recount as showing what trifling matters are regarded 
as important with an oriental people. As I had received lit- 
erally hundreds of visits from Persians and foreigners since our 
arrival — according to the hospitable custom in that country — 
I was somewhat surprised to receive a call from a young man 
who explained that he was the Secretary of His Excellency the 
Sardar-i-Asad, who, it will be remembered, was one of the 
Bakhtiyari chieftains, or " Khans," who took a prominent part 
in the overthrow of the late Shah in 1909. The young man 
said that His Excellency had been awaiting my visit to. him, as 
he was anxious to know me. I told him that I was nearly al- 




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THE AMERICANS ARRIVE 27 

ways at home at the Atabak Park after five in the afternoon, 
and that I would be delighted to see His Excellency. He de- 
parted and on the next day sent me a note saying that the Sar- 
dar-i-Asad would await me at six that evening at his residence 
in Bakhtiyari street. The day following the Secretary again 
called to inquire why I had disappointed His Excellency, " who 
was a very powerful man and of great pride." I told him that 
in my country we did not allow those minor considerations to 
outweigh the ordinary social customs and rules of hospitality, 
and that I would be glad to receive his distinguished chief. 
That evening the Sardar-i-Asad called and we had a friendly 
talk. I returned his call the next day. I afterwards learned 
that His Excellency at the instigation of his clansmen,, had 
tried to make the American Treasurer-general call on him as 
special mark of distinction and prestige, in order that he might 
lower the prestige of his great rival, the Prime Minister, Sipah- 
dar. Had I gone, I should have made a sworn enemy of the 
latter. 

A week after our arrival in Teheran one of my Persian vis- 
itors took occasion to inquire politely when I would find time 
to call at the Russian Legation ; a little later an emissary came 
apparently on a similar errand from the British Legation. I 
replied that I would not have my household furniture or be set- 
tled, after such a long journey, for at least a month. From this 
time on scarcely a day passed that I did not receive a direct or 
indirect intimation that the foreign legations were awaiting my 
call. After two weeks the affair became truly laughable, and 
when I was able to inquire what was the custom in such matters 
when Persian officials arrived at the capital, and learned that 
the newcomers into official circles always received the first call, 
it became almost interesting. It seems absurd as a statement, 
but the question of whether or when I would call on the foreign 
legations (meaning thereby the British and Russian Legations) 



28 THE STRANGLING OF PERSIA 

actually became the all-absorbing topic, not only in European 
social circles, but in Persian officialdom. 

I bad been told the sad bistory of Mons. Bizot, tbe eminent 
French " finance-doctor," who had arrived at Teheran some two 
years before us, and finding that the Russian, British and other 
foreign diplomats were most charming and hospitable men, ever 
ready to advise him as to his work, had been so thoroughly en- 
tranced by their good fellowship and the numerous social festivi- 
ties given at the different legations in his honor, that he 
completely forgot the trifling fact that he had gone to Persia to 
reform the finances of that country, and not merely to drink tea, 
play bridge and ride out for his health. If he ever awoke to a 
sense that he ought to take hold of his duties, he doubtless found 
that the Med j lis, whether rightly or not, had already classified 
him with his Belgian predecessors, and that so far as doing any- 
thing with Persian support and cooperation was concerned, he 
might as well start back to la telle France. At all events, Mons. 
Bizot displayed a masterly inactivity in making any financial re- 
forms during his two years at Teheran, and at the end of that 
time he bequeathed to the patient and trusting Persian Govern- 
ment a thirty-page typewritten report, edited in beautiful 
French, and expressing Bizot's opinion as to what somebody 
should do to reorganize Persia's fiscal system. He returned to 
his Government post at Paris greatly improved in health, but the 
Persian finances continued to stumble and stagger as before. 

Finally the Regent, in one of our talks, asked me whether I 
was going to call on the Russian and British Ministers. Hav- 
ing no desire to debate these delicate subjects I replied, in truly 
oriental fashion, that I was very busy getting my house in order 
and preparing a basic financial law for submission to the cab- 
inet and the Medjlis. Finally, at one of the sessions of the 
Cabinet, to which I was often invited, the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, a most oleaginous personage, Mutashamu's-Saltana by 



THE AMERICANS AERIVE 29 

name, brought solemnly before bis colleagues tbe fact that the 
foreign ministers at Teheran did not know why I had not called 
on them and were anxious about it. Said he : " The Belgian, 
French and other employees in the Persian service have always 
considered it an honor to call at the legations. The diplomats 
cannot understand why the Americans do not follow the same 
rule." 

I said : " Your Excellency, there are a number of points to 
this very delicate and complicated question, but before going 
any further I should like to inquire whether I am not an official 
of the Persian Government; if I am, should I not observe the 
rules of etiquette laid down by that Government ? " 

After some discussion, the entire Cabinet agreed and decided 
that I was under no obligation to pay first calls ; quite the con- 
trary, and they seemed rather to like the idea of a foreigner con- 
sidering himself to be a genuine part of their Government, in- 
stead of merely condescending to accept their money. 

As I look back now, the case seems even more amusing. The 
Russian and British Ministers knew that I was intending to 
present to the Medjlis a financial law for enactment; Russian 
agents and proteges had openly threatened to kill that law, or at 
least to emasculate it; they had found that the great majority of 
the deputies, after some three weeks' intercourse with us, had a 
surprising degree of confidence in our plans and our desire to 
help their country, and they, the diplomats, were confronted by 
the dismal prospect of a foreigner, a mere outsider, actually 
walking in and assuming his duties without first doing public 
homage to them. 

One little call, or even a bent card, and the music would have 
begun to play, the dinner invitations to rain in, with return calls 
to follow, and we would have been socially certified as fit for 
the rarefied atmosphere of Eastern diplomatic circles, — and, 
merely en passant, my finance law would never have passed the 



30 THE STRANGLING OF PERSIA 

Med j lis and we might have spent the rest of our time in Persia 
playing tennis and bridge. 

During this little by-play the Persian people were not en- 
tirely idle. They rubbed their eyes a few times and then com- 
menced to have a new sensation. " Inshalldh, have we a 
faranghi among us who takes not his orders from the foreign le- 
gations. Let us help him." 

In the real East rumor wears seven-league boots, and on the 
13th day of June, just one month after our arrival at Teheran, 
the deputies by a practically unanimous vote, passed a law giv- 
ing to a foreigner full and complete powers in the handling of 
their finances, and we were ready to commence work in ear- 
nest. 

As it seems now, I think that we would have called on the 
foreign diplomats, — certainly as soon as the pressing matter of 
establishing and defining by legislation our official status and 
positions had been arranged, — but these diplomatic gentlemen, 
by their own loud outcries and running around in circles, from 
the very day after our arrival, had so attracted the attention of 
every one and so sharpened this point of the whole affair, that 
for me to have yielded at that time would have lost for us, with 
the already suspicious and oft-deceived Persian people, the last 
chance of gaining their confidence and obtaining the legislative 
authority necessary to give to our efforts any hope of success. 
Thus before we could arrange a chair to sit on at home, there 
had been thrust upon us a mild diplomatic intrigue in full 
swing. If we had succumbed to it, by that trifling action we 
would have lost any real cooperation of the Persians, and by re- 
fusing to walk into the prearranged trap, we have been charged 
with the high-crime of lack of tact. 

At this point the reader may laugh without offending the 
writer in the least; he feels that way himself, but this little 
story is told because it shows the real spirit pervading certain 



THE AMERICANS ARRIVE 31 

quarters in Teheran 'which shortly set on foot the countless in- 
trigues and chicaneries which during the succeeding months of 
our stay in Persia were employed to distort the truth, to falsify 
the record, and to discredit publicly a few men who refused to 
become the mere tools of alien political interests. 

On June 1 the Sipahdar gave a garden fete at his beautiful 
and spacious park in Teheran. It was understood that one 
of its purposes was to bring the Americans into contact with the 
diplomatic society of the capital. I remember very well driv- 
ing with my wife through the dusty streets towards the Sipah- 
dar's that rather hot afternoon. On the way, as we neared the 
British Legation gate, the distinguished-looking Minister and 
his wife drove out, escorted by Indian sawars with their lances, 
and preceded us up the roads. It was the first time that I had 
seen Sir George Barclay. Once in the garden, the air was cool 
and fresh. Dozens of beautiful fountains played on all sides. 
We approached the reception tent by a winding road, bordered 
with trees and flowers, while the Royal band played martial airs 
in the background. 

Arrived at the entrance to the tent, after greeting our host 
and his receiving party, we were ushered into the midst of a 
gloomy and forbidding circle of European ladies and gentlemen 
who, posed in attitudes of studied indifference, stared stonily 
at the intruders. Though the tent was closed on three sides 
and not a breath of air was stirring, I could detect a distinct 
atmosphere of frost. We stood in the very center, my wife and 
I, with Mr. and Mrs. McCaskey, who had come with us, and, 
recognizing the situation, I whispered to the others to give their 
best representation of four people conversing in a desert. The 
trouble was partly with the Sipahdar and his chef de ceremonie, 
Mutashamu's-Saltana, Minister of Foreign Affairs. These 
worthies had been willing to bring " hostile foreign elements " 
into the same enclosure, but as for deciding which one should 



32 ^ THE STRANGLING OF PERSIA 

be presented to the other — Inshallah! no; that would be going 
too far. 

There we stood, gazing in awe and admiration at the various 
archaic types of top-hats worn by the gallant secretaries of the 
legations, — most of them of rare vintage (the hats), and many 
sizes too large. Why the young Englishmen wore top-hats 
which were prevented from engulfing their entire countenances 
only by their ears puzzled me for sometime afterwards. I 
subsequently learned that the supply of these social weapons is 
limited in Teheran and, as they are hard to transport over the 
Elburz mountains, they are treated by the junior diplomats as 
official heirlooms. From which I take it that megalocephalia 
was prevalent among their predecessors in office. 

After ten minutes of standing around, during which we gave 
no cry of distress, the ice thawed somewhat and the guests 
began to mingle. Some friends of ours arrived and Mr. Mc- 
Caskey informed me that Sir George Barclay (whom he had 
met) was desirous of making my acquaintance — as I was his. 
After meeting Sir George and while chatting with him as to 
the financial situation of Persia and the prospect of doing any 
work, I noticed a very distinguished gentleman whose uneasy 
expression suggested to my mind a diplomat of high rank. He 
gazed long and hard at Sir George, and finally catching his eye, 
nodded very distinctly. Said Sir George : " My dear Mr. 
Treasurer-general, have you met Poklewski, the Russian Min- 
ister, — a splendid fellow, you know." I expressed regret that 
I had not been favored. -" I think he may be passing this way 
soon. I will introduce you," added Sir George. As I soon 
learned, the uneasy gentleman standing not eight feet away, 
was Mons. Poklewski. At this precise moment it occurred to 
him to stroll by us, swinging his cane and gazing at the con- 
course. As he passed, Sir George touched him on the arm, and 
by this accident Mons. Poklewski and I met, without further 



THE AMERICANS AERIVE 33 

disturbing the diplomatic balance of the world. The French 
Minister was likewise present in the tent, but either missed his 
cue or changed his mind, and I never had the pleasure of his 
acquaintance during my stay in Teheran. 

Sir George Barclay and Mons. Poklewski-Koziell were on 
this occasion, as ever afterwards when I talked with them, most 
pleasant and polished gentlemen. But their official tasks in 
Persia seemed to weigh heavily upon them, and their duties, I 
fear, were not infrequently distasteful. 

One must at times separate a gentleman and a diplomat from 
his official acts performed under orders from his home govern- 
ment; otherwise great confusion and injustice would occur. 
Some governments have a little way of telling those who repre- 
sent them abroad and especially in the Orient, to get such and 
such a thing done, and done it must be. Nor would those high 
Government officials at home care often to hear the painful de- 
tails of the successful execution of many such orders which are 
given. 

One of the first financial questions submitted to me for an 
opinion was that of the continuance of the salt-tax which had 
been established about a year. The people were complaining 
very bitterly about it, and I found on investigation that there 
was a tax of 64 krans (about $5.70) per 600 pounds on Persian 
salt mined within the country, whereas the Customs tax on for- 
eign salt imported was only $.09 for the same quantity. As no 
internal tax could be imposed, under the Customs stipulations, 
on imported articles, the salt-producers of Persia and the peo- 
ple living in the interior districts were most unjustly treated. 
In addition, the Persian Government had received in the course 
of a year from this purely revenue-producing measure the in- 
significant net sum of 42,000 tumans (about $37,000), al- 
though the gross taxes collected from the people were nearly 
209,000 tumans, — the expenses of collection absorbing all the 



34 THE STRANGLING OF PEKSIA 

difference. I immediately recommended the abolition of this 
■unproductive and uneconomic law and the Med j lis approved the 
proposal. 

This comparatively trifling affair did much to strengthen the 
prestige of the Constitutional Government with the people in 
the provinces, who had really been suffering from a measure 
which benefited no one but the tax-collectors who fattened on 
its proceeds. 



CHAPTEK II 

THE POLITICAL AND FINANCIAL SITUATION IN PEKSIA AS WE 
FOUND IT. POWERS OF THE REGENT, THE CABINET AND THE 
MEDJLIS. FORM OF GOVERNMENT AND SOURCES OF REVENUE. 
THE PUBLIC DEBT. THE VARIOUS FOREIGN LOANS. 

FROM the day that we reached Teheran we were constantly 
warned that we would never be allowed to do any real 
work in behalf of Persia; that other foreign advisers and of- 
ficials who had come to Teheran and attempted to bring about 
practical reforms had early been compelled either to leave the 
country or to " go over to the other side," and that we had 
better make our peace with those in power, f " The other side " 
and " those in power " we soon found to mean the clique of re- 
actionary Persian officials, principally hold-overs from the 
despotic past regimes, and comprising men of great wealth, 
power and influence, who, as a rule, had received a European 
education and training. . They had reached the conclusion that 
it was far safer and easier to become the tools, agents and pro- 
teges of the Russian Government, for instance, and have its 
powerful influence exerted in their favor, than to side with their 
own people who were struggling heroically, but with all the 
faults of inexperience and ignorance of the technique of repre- 
sentative government weighing heavily against their efforts. 

It early became the jest of the diplomatic corps at Teheran 
that the Americans would not remain in Persia three months ; 
the wife of one distinguished foreign minister said that a month 
would see them on the road back to Enzeli; and the idea that 
any serious attempt would be made to straighten out Persian 
financial affairs only called forth laughter. 

35 



36 THE STRANGLING OF PERSIA 

On our way to Persia we had spent five days at Constanti- 
nople, where there is a large colony of Persians. The Turkish 
capital is always in close touch with Teheran, and there we 
met many Persians who had but recently come from their own 
country. Some were in political exile, like the famous Con- 
stitutionalist deputy from Tabriz, Taqi-zada, who called on me 
and talked for an hour of the troubles in Persia. Others whom 
we met had taken prominent parts in the Nationalist move- 
ment, among them being, merchants, priests, foreign-office offi- 
cials and diplomats. Here I received my first insight into the 
conditions prevailing in Persia and I confess that the prospects 
were not particularly encouraging. 

I was given friendly warning of many things, ranging from 
foreign intrigues to personal injury, but among all the diverse 
advice vouchsafed there was a clear agreement of opinion to the 
effect that the Persian Medjlis, or National Parliament, repre- 
sented the actual progressive movement of the people of Iran, 
and that it was, both by law and by reputation, the symbol of 
Persian nationalism and liberty. " Gain the confidence and 
good will of the deputies of the Medjlis," said our friendly 
callers, " and half of your work will already be done. Eail to 
obtain its cooperation, and you may as well give up your efforts 
to accomplish any real results." 

It was not so very long afterwards that we all saw how true 
this statement was. Ignorance of the fact, or wilful neglect 
of its portent, was the rock upon which preceding foreign ad- 
visers and administrators in Persia had invariably split. No 
one of them had ever experienced any difficulty in gaining the 
confidence of the innermost diplomatic circles in Teheran — the 
method of doing so was plain and even inviting — but the very 
evident intimacy thus established by them with the representa- 
tives of certain foreign powers, which the Persian people be- 
lieved were hostile to their aspirations, sealed the fate of any 



POLITICAL AND FINANCIAL 37 

such foreign adviser or administrator so far as winning the con- 
fidence and support of the Med j lis or of the Nationalist party 
was concerned. 

The diplomatic corps at Teheran was composed at this time 
of the Russian, British, German, American, Italian, Austro- 
Hungarian and Dutch Ministers, and the Turkish Ambassador. 
With the exception of the first two and the Turkish Ambassa- 
dor, three who had political roles to play, these distinguished 
representatives had no greater task than to keep a number of 
their citizens and subjects on the salary and pension rolls of 
the bankrupt Persian Government. Most of these pensioners 
bore splendid titles, it being rare to find less than a colonel, while 
one Italian officer who was supposed to be in some manner dimly 
connected with the Persian War Office rejoiced in the self- 
created rank of full general. 

This work is not put forth as a study of Persian geography, 
nor as a chronicle of social life in the oriental center of civiliza- 
tion, but it would be cruel to leave this subject without paying 
a tribute to the real authors of the fascinating and continuous 
round of gossip, scandal and small talk which so thoroughly 
enlivens existence in the European colony at Teheran. 
Imagine, if you will, a fast decaying government amid whose 
tottering ruins a heterogeneous collection of Belgian customs 
officers, Italian gendarmes, German artillery sergeants, French 
savants, doctors, professors and councilors of state, Austrian 
military instructors, English bank clerks, Turkish and 
Armenian courtiers, and last, but not least, a goodly sprinkling 
of Eussian Cossack officers, tutors and drill instructors all go 
through their daily task of giving the Imperial Persian Gov- 
ernment a strong shove toward bankruptcy, with a sly side push 
in the direction of their own particular political or personal 
interests. In this pleasant diversion the gentlemen and even 
the ladies of the foreign legations were somewhat peacefully 



38 THE STKANGLING OF PEESIA 

engaged, when several unfortunate Americans landed on Persian 
soil with the truly extraordinary idea that they were to be em- 
ployed under the orders of the Persian Government. Later, 
lest the gaiety of the scene should diminish, some ten or more 
Swedish officers were added to the list of those whom the 
raiyat of the provinces paid their tithe to maintain. 

Eor several weeks before the financial law of June 13 was 
voted by the Med j lis, we had been seeking to obtain some ac- 
curate information as to Persia's financial condition. 

The Customs service under Mons. Mornard had its own 
books and records, but there was no way of our getting reports 
from them at that time. Certainly none were volunteered. 
In the other departments of the Ministry of Finance there was 
nothing in the way of permanent or coherent records or sta- 
tistics. The desks and chairs themselves were as eloquent 
of facts as the suave but uncommunicative Persian gentlemen 
who then presided over the financial destinies of their native 
land. 

I might say that the Persian finances were tangled — very 
tangled — had there been any to tangle. There were no Per- 
sian finances in any ordinary sense of the word. The so- 
called Ministry of Einance, presided over by a succession of 
frequently changing Persian gentlemen whose sole claims to 
financial genius lay in their having run through their own 
money and thus become in need of pecuniary recuperation, was 
in reality an unorganized collection of under-officials who had 
charge of various bureaus or offices through which the internal 
taxes, called, generically, maliat, were supposed to be collected 
for the benefit of the Persian Government. There were no 
such things as civil service, or examinations or tests for fitness 
or integrity. The places were doled out by the different 
Ministers of Finance to those having sufficient family or po- 
litical influence to obtain them. No official could be sure of 




PRINCE SALARU'D-DAWLA. 
The brother of Muhammad All and twice pretender to the throne. He entered Persia and captured 
Hamadan during the summer of 1911 with several thousand Kurdish tribesmen 
k from the Turkish frontier. 



POLITICAL AND FINANCIAL 41 

retaining his post even over night, and the general atmosphere 
of the department might be summed up in the time-honored 
adage, carpe diem. There had never been any attempt made 
at centralizing the revenues in order that the Government might 
know just what it should receive from its various taxes and 
what it did not receive; nor was there any attempt to control 
the expenditure of such funds as did, in some mysterious man- 
ner, percolate into the coffers of the so-called treasury at 
Teheran. One of the first inquiries that I made was for the 
budget — the national budget — from which I hoped to gain 
some idea of the total gross revenues or receipts of the Govern- 
ment from all sources and of the amounts which were supposed 
to be allotted to the different ministries and departments for 
their maintenance and upkeep. I soon learned that no budget 
existed, although Mr. Lecoffre, of whom mention has been made 
heretofore, had spent nearly two years in working, under im- 
possible conditions, to produce something which might be desig- 
nated as a budget. This gentleman possessed more information 
as to the supposed source of revenue and the supposed ex- 
penditures of the different ministries and departments of the 
Government than could be accumulated from all the other so- 
called official records and accounts put together. From the day 
that he started upon the task of ascertaining where the money 
came from and how it was alleged to be spent he had been 
looked upon with suspicion by every minister of finance and 
tax-collector who had come into power, to say nothing of the low 
esteem in which he was held by the gentry of the Persian War 
Department, who claimed the time-honored privilege of dis- 
posing of about one-half of the total nominal revenues in ex- 
change for conducting the commissariat, arsenals, general staff, 
medical corps, infantry, cavalry, and artillery divisions of the 
Persian regular army — ■ a mythical corps worthy to take rank 
with the gnomes who disturbed the slumbers of Eip Van Winkle 



42 THE STRANGLING OF PERSIA 

or with that most elusive of human conceptions, the Golden 
Fleece. During the eight months which I spent in Teheran — 
of which four were filled with active military preparations by 
the Government to defeat the filibustering expedition of the 
ex-Shah and his eccentric brother, the Prince Salaru'd-Dawla, 
I never encountered the Persian regular army in appreciable 
quantities except upon the requisitions for their pay presented 
at the end of each month or in the form of bills for large orders 
of uniforms and other equipment which it was the privilege 
of the War Office to submit to the Treasurer-general for 
liquidation. 

Persia is divided into a number of provinces or districts, 
each having its capital city. The principal ones of these are 
Azarbayjan (capital, Tabriz) ; Mazandaran (capital, Sari) ; 
Ghilan (capital, Eesht) ; Khorasan (capital, Meshed), all in 
the North, and Isfahan (capital, Isfahan), and Fars (capital, 
Shiraz), in the South. At each of these cities and towns, and 
at a great many other towns which were the centers of smaller 
districts and providences, there was supposed to be a financial 
agent of the Central Government whose duty it was to collect 
during the year the different taxes from the people and to 
remit them, minus the expenses incident to the collections and 
including his own compensation, to the Minister of Finance. Of 
the exact details of this system more will be said in another 
chapter. It is enough to state at this time that the Minister 
of Finance found it much easier to draw warrants or checks 
addressed to these different financial agents or tax-collectors 
and thus to smilingly honor the requisitions made upon him by 
his colleagues of the Ministries of War, Justice, Public Instruc- 
tion, Interior, and Foreign Affairs, than ever to have any deal- 
ings upon the basis of vulgar cash. The question of whether 
any funds could ever be obtained upon these paper-writings, so 
copiously dispensed by every minister of finance, was entirely 



THE PUBLIC DEBT 43 

aside from the issue, and as each finance minister naturally 
strove to make a reputation for himself as a successful fiscal 
administrator, as well as to gratify the legitimate demands of 
his colleagues and of the public by punctually meeting in full 
all Government obligations of every description, it so happened 
that in the course of years an immense flock of these little 
paper birds had flown forth from the central treasury to settle 
in the pockets of more or less unsuspecting creditors of the 
Government, petty tradesmen, minor public employees and 
ignorant pensioners, to the amount of so many millions of 
dollars that no sane person would ever dream of attempting 
either to calculate the sum or to redeem the obligations. In 
speaking, therefore, of the public debt of Persia, no account 
is taken of this floating and intangible mass of quasi-obliga- 
tions, constituting, as they do, a problem which only the all- 
curing hand of time can definitely settle. 

On June 13, after the basic financial law which. I had 
recommended to the Med j lis had been adopted, I asked His 
Excellency, Muawinu'd-Dwala, who had by that time become 
Minister of Finance, to please turn over to me, as Treasurer- 
general, in accordance with the terms of the new law, the bank 
balances and cash belonging to the public treasury. His 
Excellency smiled back at me in the most friendly manner and 
agreed that such was the proper course. Said he : " Monsieur 
Sinister, I am ready at once to transfer these important matters 
to you. Our current account is kept with the Imperial Bank 
of Persia. I believe that at present it consists of a deficit 
or overdraft of 440,000 tumans (about $400,000). Here is an 
order upon the bank instructing them to place the account to 
the credit of the new Treasurer-general." I thanked His 
Excellency, and upon that same day commenced my duties 
as Treasurer-general of the Persian Empire under the favor- 
ing auspices of this deficit and a cloud of urgent demands by 



44 v THE STRANGLING OF PERSIA 

His Excellency's colleagues of the Cabinet for the payment 
of pressing obligations, all necessary, so I was informed, to 
keep the Persian Government from immediate disintegration, 
and totaling up to the modest sum of $700,000. 

There was one department of the Ministry of Finance which 
came nearer to dealing with actual money than any others. 
This was the Imperial Mint, located several miles outside of 
the city, where, with rather antiquated and worn-out ma- 
chinery, the Persian silver krans (worth about nine cents each 
in United States money) were coined from silver bars imported 
under contract by the Imperial Bank of Persia, which needed 
silver money in large quantities for its current business. I 
had sometime previously sent Mr. Dickey, one of my two 
American assistants, to inspect this plant and to prepare to take 
over its administration, which he had done. 

I therefore found myself seated in the office which had been 
arranged for our occupation, looking across my desk at my 
other assistant, Mr. McCaskey, and trying to realize that I 
was in charge of the " entire finances, both collections and 
disbursements, of the Persian Empire." 

A letter was sent to each one of the five banks doing business 
in Teheran, informing them that from that date no checks, 
drafts, warrants, orders of payment, or Government obligations 
of any kind, were valid or payable unless they bore the signa- 
ture of the Treasurer-general. The banks were likewise in- 
formed that all balances or accounts standing to the credit 
of any government department or government official were to 
be turned in to the credit of the Treasurer-general, to be dis- 
posed of on his order. One result of this apparently here- 
tofore unknown procedure was to gather in a list of com- 
paratively small but very interesting accounts and balances, 
of the existence of which we should probably never otherwise 
have known. Among them was an account standing to the 



FORM OF GOVERNMENT 47 

credit of Mons. Mornard, the Belgian Administrator of Cus- 
toms, known as the " F. R. C. account," which was grossly ir- 
regular. 

Of Persia's political situation at this time, it is not neces- 
sary to speak here at length. The Government was perhaps 
correctly described as a constitutional monarchy, although the 
monarchial features were limited to the existence of a Shah 
on the throne, represented, during his minority, by a Regent, 
and surrounded wherever he went by a large and expensive 
coterie of parasitic gentlemen who styled themselves members 
of His Majesty's Court. The real functions of government 
were vested in the Medjlis or National Parliament, composed 
of some eighty deputies, who were elected, according to the 
population, from the various provinces and districts of the 
Empire. To this body was submitted, from time to time, for 
approval, a cabinet of seven members, nominated under the 
direction of the Regent; but, as the Medjlis, according to the 
Persian constitutional decrees, had exclusive legislative power 
and, in addition, could instantly depose any cabinet by a vote 
of lack of confidence at any time, the real power lay in the 
representatives more or less chosen by the direct vote of the 
Persian people. 

The two foreign powers which, to use their own words, had 
" special interests " in Persia, were Russia and Great Britain. 
As will be remembered, these two governments had signed a 
convention in the year 1907 in which they purported to define 
the geographical spheres of their respective interests, Russia 
in the north, and England in the southeastern corner, of the 
Persian Empire. Nominally, at least, the Persian Constitu- 
tional Government was that of a sovereign nation to which the 
diplomatic representatives of foreign European governments 
were duly accredited, as well as one from the United States, 
and this sovereignty had been expressly recognized and pro- 



48 THE STRANGLING OF PERSIA 

claimed by the voluntary action of the Russian and British 
nations in signing the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. 

The Persian foreign debt consisted of several loans which 
had been made to the different shahs by the Russian Govern- 
ment and which had been consolidated through the Banque 
d'Escompte de Perse, a branch at Teheran of the Russian State 
Bank. There was also the so-called Indian Government loan 
made in the time of the former shahs by the British Govern- 
ment from the funds of the Indian Empire; and, lastly, there 
was the so-called Imperial Bank loan of 1911, which was rati- 
fied and approved just before our arrival at Teheran. Of 
the details of these loans more will be said in another chapter. 
In addition to this, there was a large and unknown amount of 
foreign claims against the Persian Government, most of which 
were unliquidated, but aggregating several millions of dollars. 

This, then, was the general situation of the Persian Gov- 
ernment on June 13, 1911, when I assumed charge of the 
financial affairs of that country. 



CHAPTER III 

GENERAL PLAN ADOPTED FOR REORGANIZATION. THE LAW OF 
JUNE 13, 1911. ATTITUDE OF THE FOREIGN POWERS. THE 
STOKES INCIDENT. THE TREASURY GENDARMERIE* THE 
" SPIRIT " OF THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN CONVENTION OF 1907. 

IT seemed perfectly obvious to us that no headway at all 
could be made toward straightening out Persia's financial 
affairs unless full powers to deal with the chaotic situation 
were conferred by proper authority upon those to be charged 
with the task. It would have been entirely useless to attempt 
to accomplish any definite results by acting in an advisory 
capacity to the different ministers and other Cabinet officials 
who, up to that time, had been occupying themselves with the 
collection and disbursement of the revenues. These gentlemen 
were neither equipped by experience, and training, nor suited 
by character and disposition, to undertake the somewhat thank- 
less task of stamping out the corruption and venality which 
marked the administration of Persian finances, both at Teheran 
and throughout the provinces. 

If anything was to be done, therefore, it must be ac- 
complished through the independent initiative of foreign 
finance administrators free from the necessity of receiving 
either the support or the approval of the Persian official who 
might, from time to time, be occupying the post of Minister 
of Finance, or from the control of the rapidly changing groups 
who might constitute the Persian Cabinet. 

My purpose in drafting the law of June 13, 1911, was to 
establish a central organization to be known as the office of 

49 



50 THE STEANGLING OF PEESIA 

the Treasurer-general of Persia, which should be responsible 
for and have charge of the collection and of the disbursement 
of all revenues and Government receipts, from whatever source 
derived — an office which should make and authorize all pay- 
ments, for whatever purpose, in behalf of the central Govern- 
ment of Persia. Up to that time, collections of money had 
been made not only by the officials of the Ministry of Einance, 
but by certain departments of the Ministry of Posts and Tel- 
egraphs, of the Ministry of Justice, of the Ministry of the In- 
terior, of the Ministry of Public Instruction, and by the 
Passport Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In like 
manner, these different government departments had been ex- 
pending, without supervision or control, such funds as they 
were able to collect. There was no one office or department in 
which these various lines crossed; hence it was manifestly im- 
possible for the Government to know, however desirous it might 
be, what the public revenues were, whence they came, or 
whither they went. If we had waited to perfect an organi- 
zation before assuming this heavy responsibility, it is probable 
that some change would have occurred in the spirit or temper 
of those in authority; subject as they were to the constant 
intrigues and even threats of reactionary agents hostile to any 
improvement; and even the attempt to modernize the Persian 
fiscal system would have never been made. As it was, despite 
the handicaps under which those charged with the new law 
labored, and despite the abnormal conditions of war and dis- 
order into which Persia was plunged but a few weeks after 
this law was passed, during the eight months of our work in 
Teheran a large proportion of the taxes stated to be due were 
collected both at the capital and throughout the provinces, the 
^/extraordinary expenses incident to the attempt of Muhammad 
Ali Mirza to regain the throne were promptly met, the salaries 
of' the diplomatic representatives of Persia abroad were sent 




HAJJI AGHA. 

One of the few reactionary deputies of the Medjlls. 

ITe took part In the plot to destroy the 

Constitutional Government. 



ALAU'DtDAWLA. 
A powerful reactionary grandee. He was sus- 
pected of plotting In favor of the return of 
Muhammad All and was shot In the streets 
of Teheran on December 1, 1911. 




MTJMTAZU'D-DAWLA. 

Minister of Finance, who assisted Mr. Shuster on 

his arrival In Teheran. He was formerly the 

President of the Medjlls. 



.. MUTASHAMU'S-SALTANA. 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, when the American 
finance officials arrived at Teheran. 



ATTITUDE OF THE POWEES 53 

them for the first time in several years, all foreign obligations 
and the current salaries of the different ministries were 
promptly paid, and a complete and accurate record of every 
receipt and expenditure was kept in the central office of the 
Treasurer-general. 

What there was about this plan or its proposed execution 
to excite the hostility of any foreign power, no matter what its 
legitimate interests might be in connection with Persia, it is 
difficult to imagine. Certainly, so far as the rights or interests 
of foreign creditors, whether governments or individuals, were 
concerned, the only change in the old order of things was by 
way of affording additional guarantees and safeguards for those 
payments. Yet the very day that this law was passed, al- 
though it had been discussed publicly in the Med j lis in several 
previous sessions, the Russian Legation openly declared war 
upon it and the Russian Minister announced that the Belgian 
Customs employees should not be subjected to the control or 
supervision of the American Treasurer-general, and even went 
so far as to threaten to have Russian troops seize the customs- 
houses in the north and put Russian officials in charge. 
During the next two weeks the Russian, French, German, 
Italian and Austro-Hungarian Legations at Teheran rained 
protests upon the Persian Foreign Office, many of them couched 
in the most undiplomatic, impolite and insulting language, in 
a brazen attempt to bulldoze the Persian Government into 
giving up its rights to act as it saw fit in this purely local and 
internal affair. The British and Dutch Legations, and Turkish 
Embassy, and, of course, the American Legation, kept clear. 

In the course of this remarkable campaign, Count Quadt, 
then German Minister at Teheran, saw fit to send a written 
communication to the Persian Government, protesting against 
the infringement of German interests which he alleged would 
result from the checks in payment to certain German subjects 



54 THE STRANGLING OF PEESIA 

in Teheran being signed by the Treasurer-general of Persia 
instead of by Mons. Mornard, the Administrator-general of 
Customs, as had previously been the case. On examination I 
found that these German " interests " consisted of two sub- 
sidies of 6,000 tumans ($5,400) paid annually to two German 
subjects who were in charge of the so-called German School 
and German Hospital, which has been established in Teheran 
on the subsidy demanded and obtained by one of the richest 
and most powerful nations of Europe from the impoverished 
Persian Government. Count Quadt, in his official communica- 
tion, referred to the Treasurer-general of Persia, with delicate 
sarcasm, as " a certain Mr. Shuster." The Italian Charge- 
d' Affaires, whose principal interest in Persia appears to have 
been to keep an aged and distinguished subject of his country 
on the pay-roll of the Persian Government as a military in- 
structor with the title of general — although this gentleman 
was incapacitated from doing anything more active than passing 
his time in an arm chair — not to be outdone by his German 
diplomatic colleague, referred, in his protest addressed to the 
Persian Government, to the " so-called Treasurer-general." 

Thus encouraged by Russia, Mons. Mornard let it be known 
that he did not propose to obey the law of the Government 
whose paid official he was, nor to recognize the American Treas- 
urer-general. That he had good reason for taking this stand 
was made plain shortly afterwards, when, in fear of having 
his lucrative contract canceled by the Medjlis, as I had been 
compelled to threaten to recommend, he reluctantly turned over 
his balances, among which we found certain items which could 
only be explained on the ground of gross irregularity. 

This harassing campaign kept up until the middle of July, 
when the Belgian Customs officials decided to agree to obey 
the law, and Mons. Mornard so informed me. It was not, 
however, until having drawn a number of checks on the Cus- 



ATTITUDE OF THE POWEKS 55 

toms revenues in favor of various foreign employees in the 
Persian service, it was found, on presenting them at the banks, 
that they would not be honored, that he decided to take this 
step. 

Having once received the promise of the different banks that 
they would respect the law of the Government and would not 
honor checks signed by any one but the Treasurer-general, we 
could afford to await patiently the time when the different 
foreign employees, who had a natural desire to receive their 
salaries, decided to desert their doughty diplomatic representa- 
tives and incur their displeasure in cashing checks signed by 
an American. 

In the meantime the new Treasury had been having some 
difficulties with the Cabinet. The Prime Minister, Sipahdar, 
had been very active in supporting my recommendations for the 
new financial law, and he had on more than one occasion as- 
sured me of his entire support and cooperation in stamping out 
abuses in the Government service. He was even kind enough 
to admit that while he was a natural military genius, there 
might be some things which he did not know about the organiza- 
tion of the War Department — as to which he would gladly 
have my advice. Inasmuch as that branch of the Government 
was the roosting-place for the most brilliant galaxy of uni- 
formed loafers, masquerading as generals, commissaries, and 
chiefs of staffs, of petty grafters, amiable cutthroats and all- 
round scoundrels which it has ever been my fortune to encounter, 
the Sipahdar's generous admission greatly increased my opinion 
of him. He was particularly anxious to know when I was 
going to be able to raise some ready cash at the Bank, and he 
explained that it was only by his great personal influence and 
prestige with the people of Persia, that he was able to keep the 
governmental fabric from dropping apart until a little pecuniary 
assistance could be furnished for the gallant men of the regular 



56 THE STRANGLING OF PEESIA 

army. On June 4 (before the finance law was actually passed 
by the Med j lis) I had arranged with Mr. A. O. Wood, the 
chief manager of the Imperial Bank of Persia, for a temporary 
advance of 250,000 tumans, to be secured on the new loan. At 
seven o'clock that same evening the Sipahdar's carriage drove 
into Atabak Park, and I was requested to drive to the private 
residence of His Excellency, who awaited me there with the 
Minister of Einance. 

I arrived at his beautiful park just about dusk, and was con- 
ducted between long lines of soldiers and military gentlemen 
of varying rank, back through the grounds to a small out- 
residence, on the flat tile roof of which handsome rugs, tables 
and chairs had been arranged. Here I found the Minister of 
Einance nervously pacing up and down. Lamps were lighted, 
the inevitable tea and cigarettes served, and we sat down to 
await His Excellency's arrival. 

The evening was a very clear and beautiful one, and from 
the roof we could look out over the walls of the city towards 
the snow-covered mountains some twelve miles away. Nestling 
in their lower folds and at their feet were the summer quarters 
of the different Legations, — Zargundeh, Gulhak and Ted j rich, 
and the villages and summer palaces belonging to the grandees 
of Teheran. 

Of a sudden there were hoarse commands, the grounding 
of arms, much " salaaming " by the double row of servants 
standing in front of the house, — a quick, nervous step on 
the stairs, and the great Sipahdar had arrived. 

A casual military salute, an air of great preoccupation, and 
he was seated. Before we could begin any conversation a ven- 
erable priest of Islam presented himself, and approaching the 
Sipahdar appeared to ask some favor. As he lingered a mo- 
ment, the Prime Minister called a near-by officer, gave him 
a sharp order, and the priest retired. 




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KEOKGANIZATION 59 

The solemn-visaged Minister of Finance shook his head 
slowly, and spoke to me in French : 

" You see, Mons. Shuster, what a dominating man His Ex- 
cellency is, and how great is his power. Did you notice that he 
refused the supplication of a " mullah " and that the prisoner 
in whose behalf the appeal was made is to be hanged to-morrow 
morning ? " 

Once free to devote a few moments of his valuable time to 
us, the Sipahdar referred lightly to the financial needs of the 
War Department. Speaking in Persian (for he knew very 
little French), he had the Minister of Finance interpret to me 
and explain the dangerous crisis which confronted us. " If the 
poul. [money] is not forthcoming," declared the Premier, 
" even our own -lives will not be safe ! " 

This was the first, but not the last time that I was able to 
distinguish the ever-recurring word poul in conversations in 
Persian. 

I made bold to describe to His Excellency the same dan- 
gerous financial crisis which we of the Treasury were endeavor- 
ing to live through ; then asked him what sum was absolutely 
the minimum with which the raging troops could be temporarily 
held in check. 

The Premier pulled a slip of paper from his pocket and 
handed it to the Minister of Finance to read to me. As he 
did so, his feelings apparently overcame him and he stepped 
down-stairs for a few moments. The Finance Minister gravely 
read the items and the total. The trifling sum of 406,000 
tumans was a sine qua non. Of this, nearly half was not for 
the unpaid troops, but for stores, uniforms, artillery horses, and 
incidentals. 

I made no comment. The Premier returned with a busy 
but anxious look. I thought I saw the eye-signals cross; per- 
haps I was mistaken. 



60 THE STRANGLING OF PERSIA 

Said the Minister of Finance : " His Excellency requests 
your answer as to this important matter." 

I threw up my right hand in a despairing gesture: "C'est 
impossible,, Excellence." 

The Sipahdar jumped as if he had been shot. Volley after 
volley of eloquent persuasion and martial imprecation seemed 
to pour from his lips. The amiable Finance Minister grew 
pale and advised me that I was making a mistake. I tried to 
ascertain from His Excellency, in the French language, whether 
he knew any successful method of extracting blood from a 
stone. He had nothing to suggest, except that the funds should 
be forthcoming. 

Three hours later we compromised on 100,000 tumans, and 
in the light of subsequent experience and knowledge even that 
payment has troubled my conscience at times. 

As I passed out, I could almost hear the whisper of His 
Excellency the Premier to His Excellency the Minister of 
Finance : " The faranghi fights hard, but, inshalldh, we will 
get him next time." 

Eleven days passed, during each one of which I had the 
honor of at least one call from His Excellency, Amir Azam, 
Vice-minister of War, who outdid Verestchagin in painting 
the horrors of mutiny, rapine and bloodshed which would 
shortly result from the unwillingness of the Treasurer-general 
to produce the modest sums demanded by that great patriot, the 
Premier, Sipahdar. Nothing but a heart of flint coupled with 
an empty coffer could have resisted his pathetic appeals. 

On June 15, just two days after the finance law giving the 
Treasurer-general absolute control of the Government's moneys 
was passed, His Excellency Sipahdar arose in the Medjlis and 
voiced his displeasure with the fact that an arbitrary restraint 
was being put upon him in the performance of his onerous 
duties as Premier and Minister of War. As he looked into 



REORGANIZATION 61 

the unsympathetic faces of the deputies, who all knew of his 
valiant efforts to secure cash for the War Office, his anger 
rose and he strode proudly from the chamber. Stepping into 
his carriage, which with its mounted escort, awaited him at 
the gate, he remarked to his coachman, " Buru faranghistan I " 
the meaning of which is, " Drive me to Europe." The 
Premier's carriage passed swiftly out the city gate and started 
up the two hundred and twenty mile road to Enzeli on the 
Caspian Sea. At this same time the rumor spread that a 
brother of the ex-Shah, Prince Salaru'd-Dawla, had captured 
the city of Tabriz, in Northwestern Persia, promising the peo- 
ple that if they would seat him on the throne, he would abolish 
all taxes except those necessary to supply his personal expenses. 
The public mind was therefore divided as to whether the in- 
furiated Premier would join the ex-Shah's brother or pass over 
the Caspian to Russia and Europe. 

Eor a week preceding this event the Regent, Nasiru'1-Mulk, 
had been strongly intimating his desire to leave Persia, alleg- 
ing that the Medjlis had passed a new court budget, greatly re- 
ducing the allowances for that purpose, without consulting 
him. His Highness sent for me on June 8 to come to his 
private residence, and for three hours discussed his troubles 
and anxieties, which were, beyond doubt, very real. I told His 
Highness that his departure from the country at that time, or 
even the rumor of it, would not only greatly embarrass the 
new financial work, but would throw the Government into dis- 
order generally. 

He promised to give up the idea, but after talking the situa- 
tion over with some of the deputies, we deemed it wise to take 
the matter up with Sir George Barclay, the British Minister, 
with the suggestion that Sir Edward Grey, the British Secretary 
of State for Foreign Affairs, should send a personal cable 
message to the Regent, who knew and highly regarded Sir Ed- 



62 THE STRANGLING OF PERSIA 

ward, urging him to remain in Teheran. This was done, but 
in the meantime His Highness had apparently abandoned his 
intention of going. 

During this period I had almost daily talks with His High- 
ness, who seemed greatly worried by the situation in Persia 
and extremely pessimistic as to the ability of the people to 
hold the Government together. There was constant friction 
between the Cabinet and the Medjlis, and intense animosity 
between the different political parties or groups themselves. 

The sudden departure of the Sipahdar had added to the con- 
fusion and uncertainty. The other Cabinet ministers were 
holding frequent telegraphic conversations with him at Resht, 
where he arrived by the 18th. His anger had apparently 
cooled somewhat by that time, and though he still asserted 
his desire to go to Europe for his health, the other ministers 
were of the opinion that he should either come back to the 
capital or resign. 

In the meantime I had been attending the sessions of the 
Cabinet, in an endeavor to get the ministers to realize the 
seriousness of the situation and cease demanding impossible 
sums of money. The loudest in his complaints and dire pre- 
dictions of impending disaster was His Excellency Amir Azam, 
now rejoicing in the title and dignity of Acting Minister of 
War. The Amir Azam was a man whose general reputation 
would warrant a long sentence in any workhouse. I had an 
agent look into some of the financial transactions of the War 
Office and particularly the private bank balances of the Acting 
Minister. When, therefore, in a council of the ministers 
of June 19, at which I was present, he proclaimed that a 
general rising of the " Army of Teheran " would take place 
the following day, if a mere 42,000 tumans was not at once 
forthcoming for their pay and rations, I politely asked him 
what disposition had been made of the similar sum which I 




AMIR AZAM (IN LEFT CENTER WITH SWORD), VICE-MINISTER OF WAR 

With his personal staff. 



REORGANIZATION 65 

had given him for another month's arrears only ten days be- 
fore. " Gone," said his Excellency ; " all disbursed to the 
poor, starving troops of the army." " Have you none of that 
money left ? " I said. " Not a kran remains in the war-chest," 
he replied. I thought it convenient at this point to pull out 
a private memorandum which I had brought with me, show- 
ing that His Excellency had deposited the last month's pay 
and several other sums for military purposes, in all 83,000 
tumans, with a native banker, with whom it rested at that 
moment while the predicted rising of the troops was being 
staged by the Amir's gallant officers of the line. 

Reading the dates and amounts of the deposits from my 
private memorandum, I asked him whether they were not cor- 
rect. 

His Excellency, Amir Azam, Vice and Acting Minister of 
War, lifted his two hundred and forty pounds of brain and 
adipose tissue to his full height of six feet, five. Placing his 
hand upon his heart, and looking proudly at his distinguished 
colleagues of the Council, he demanded to know whether his 
honor was being aspersed. As there seemed to be some doubt 
on that point, he passed on in his discourse, concluding his 
remarks with the statement that if he had 83,000 tumans to his 
credit, he was the last to know it. This latter- statement ap- 
parently impressed the gentlemen of the Cabinet as the height 
of improbability, so that it was suggested that His Excellency 
summon his confidential accountant. This was done, and we 
sat around, at my request, until the accountant arrived. The 
Amir arose, stepped out, held a hurried conversation with his 
faithful keeper of the war-chest, and returning, with a metallic 
smile of joy and friendship upon his countenance, assured 
the Council and myself that I was right — in fact, correct — 
since he had just learned, to his intense surprise, that the 
preceding month's payment had not been made to the troops 



66 THE STRANGLING OF PERSIA 

(although His Excellency had so directed some time ago), 
and it was that sum for which the army had been clamoring. 
It was all a mauvaise intelligence. By this simple means the 
rising of the troops was successfully postponed. 

On this same evening our organization was strengthened 
by the arrival of Mr. F. S. Cairns, who had been appointed 
Director of Taxation and my principal assistant before we 
left Washington, but who had just been able to reach Teheran 
from the Philippine Islands, where he had been serving as 
Collector of Customs of the Port of Iloilo. 

On June 23 the Sipahdar was reported to have telegraphed 
from Resht to the Regent, stating that he would return to 
Teheran and take up his duties if certain articles of the finance 
law of June 13 were modified, so as to allow him a greater 
participation in deciding upon the disposition to be made of 
the public revenues. There was loud mirth in the Med j lis 
when this statement was reported. 

There were likewise rumors of the formation of an " Anti- 
American Society " among the Persians, principally among the 
so-called Mustofis, or Persian accountants, who had to do with 
the supervision of the maliat taxes in the provinces. 

Strikes by the employees of the various ministries were 
engineered every day or so, and we were compelled to an- 
nounce that any employee refusing duty would be permanently 
dropped from the rolls. In the meantime I had taken over all 
the offices and bureaus of the Ministry of Finance, leaving the 
Minister and Vice-Minister, with the Secretary-General and 
Chef de Cabinet, alone in their glory and undisturbed by the 
necessity of giving any orders or signing any Government ob- 
ligations whatever. 

Ever since the 13th of June, Mons. Mornard and the Rus- 
sian Minister, Mons. Poklewski-Koziell, had been endeavoring 
by alternate threats and persuasions to get the Imperial Bank 



REORGANIZATION 67 

of Persia to honor Mornard's checks, the principal one of 
which was to be for a payment of 360,000 roubles said to be 
due to the Russian Government for a shipment of second-hand 
rifles which that bold financier, the Sipahdar, had purchased 
some months previously in behalf of the Persian Government. 
These arms were to be delivered to the Persian War Office in 
Persia, but they had not yet reached the port of Enzeli. The 
price worked out about three times that for which the same 
arms could be obtained on the market in Europe. It may be 
properly left to the Russian Government and the Sipahdar to 
state where the difference went. 

The Chief Director of the Imperial Bank declined, how- 
ever, to do otherwise than obey the law of the Med j lis, and 
as I had authorized him to state to the Russian Minister that 
the sum would be promptly paid on delivery of the arms, the 
latter and Mons. Mornard were forced to abandon their posi- 
tion. 

Up to this time I had never seen Mons. Mornard, and as 
the Cabinet, on June 29, had adopted a resolution calling upon 
him to obey the law of June 13, which he had thus far failed 
to do, I wrote to the Acting Premier, Mutashamu's-Saltana, 
stating that I could no longer permit the situation to continue, 
and that if immediate action were not taken to secure Mons. 
Mornard's recognition of the authority of the Med j lis and its 
laws, I would be compelled to lay the case before that body 
direct. 

On July 2 the Cabinet " resigned," but I soon learned that 
its members expected to continue the performance of their du- 
ties. The " resignation " of a cabinet in Persia is usually a 
mere figure of speech, indicating at worst that some of the 
members are vexed at something. 

During this time the British Minister let it be known that 
while he was not taking any part in the controversy with 



68 THE STRANGLING OF PERSIA 

Mornard, he favored the financial plans and organization which 
we were endeavoring to put into effect. 

The entire Belgian force in the Customs department were 
threatening to resign en bloc, if they were to be placed under 
the control of the Treasurer-general, and this, coupled with the 
menacing attitude of the Russian Government, had made the 
Persian Cabinet extremely nervous. Eurthermore, there were 
some members of the Cabinet, such as the Acting Premier and 
Minister of Eoreign Affairs, Mutashamu's-Saltana, who I be- 
lieve were not over-anxious that any serious change should be 
effected in the previous methods of conducting fiscal affairs. 
This distinguished Cabinet officer had already presented to me 
for payment a claim of his own, amounting to some 14,000 tu- 
mans, for unrewarded services while he was a member of the 
Turco-Persian Boundary Commission several years before. 
Indeed, there were not many Persian gentlemen who had ever 
been in political office who could not present any number of 
claims on the Government for divers services rendered, but not 
satisfactorily recognized by an ungrateful nation. 

Finally, on July 8, the Council of Ministers demanded that 
Mons. Mornard should present himself and state whether or 
not he proposed to recognize and obey the law of the Medjlis 
of June 13, involving as it did the control by the Treasurer- 
general of all financial departments of the Persian Government, 
including the Customs service. Mons. Mornard presented him- 
self at 10 o'clock in the morning. After a long discourse 
in French, in which he recounted the work of the Bel- 
gian Customs officials and expounded the difficulties of mak- 
ing any change whatsoever in their existing method of con- 
ducting the business, he stated that he, of course, had never 
had any other intention than that of obeying the law. The 
Acting Premier asked me whether I had anything to say, and 
I replied that J had not come to the Council to indulge in 



THE TREASURY GENDARMERIE 69 

any " pourparlers " with any one as to whether any official 
of the Government would obey the law or not, but that, inas- 
much as I had heard Mons. Mornard state that he did intend 
to obey the law, there appeared to be no need for further dis- 
cussion and it only remained for him to do so. Immediately 
after this conversation ended, Mons. Mornard showed himself 
extremely polite and attentive, and evinced a desire to discuss 
the situation of the Customs service and the method of handling 
funds thereof, of all which I was very glad to talk with him. 
He promised to send a list of all deposits of Government funds 
which he had in the different banks and to submit the usual 
requisitions for expenses which had already been prescribed by 
my office. 

I had by this time become acquainted with the Military At- 
tache of the British Legation, Major C. B. Stokes, whose four- 
year term of service in that capacity would shortly expire. I 
had been warned against Major Stokes by several people who 
claimed that he was a " scout " or spy of the British and Rus- 
sian Governments, and was inimical to the aspirations of the 
Persian people. He was an officer in the British-Indian Army, 
and spoke, read and wrote Persian with facility, in addition to 
having made many trips throughout the country and being thor- 
oughly acquainted with the manners, habits, customs and char- 
acter of the people and with the different political elements 
throughout the provinces. I had for some time been formulat- 
ing a project for the formation of a special gendarmerie force 
which should be under my direct orders and should assist and 
cooperate with the civilian officers of the Treasury in the col- 
lection of the different kinds of taxes throughout the Empire. 
It is true that the existing gendarmerie of the Persian Govern- 
ment was supposed to lend a hand in this task, but apart from 
the fact that they were almost as mythical a body as the Per- 
sian regular army, and, outside Teheran, were quite as apt to 



10 THE STRANGLING OF PERSIA 

make away with, the taxes as to assist in their collection, they 
were under the orders of the Persian Minister of the Interior 
and commanded, by some officers at Teheran who did not belong 
to the elements desirous of seeing the finances of the country 
put upon a solid basis. It seemed vitally necessary, therefore, 
that if any serious effort was to be made to collect the taxes due 
to the Government in the places outside of the capital and two 
or three other large centers, like Tabriz, Kazvin, Isfahan and 
Shiraz, a new force would have to be organized especially for 
this purpose. I planned, therefore, to build up a department 
to be known as the Treasury Gendarmerie, which, should be an 
integral part of the office of Treasurer-general. It was hoped, 
within a year, to enlist and instruct several thousands of men 
for this purpose, and, in the course of several years, to increase 
the force to 10,000 or 12,000, with which it would be possible 
to practically assure the collection of the entire revenue nomi- 
nally due the Government. The Persian peasants, laboring- 
classes and small property-owners are not intractable in the 
matter of paying their dues to the Government, but the peculiar 
condition in that country demanded that the Government 
should be able to show the necessary force with, which to exact 
the taxes before it could hope to receive them on the mere de- 
mand of civilian officials. After a number of talks with. Ma- 
jor Stokes I became convinced that he was an ideal man to un- 
dertake the work of organizing and of instructing, along 
technical lines, the officers and men who should compose this 
force; and finding that he was loath to leave Persia, in whose 
future prospects and regeneration he was sincerely interested, 
I made the proposal to him, informally, that he should accept 
the post of chief of this future gendarmerie organization, under 
my own direct supervision and orders. I thereupon wrote to 
Sir George Barclay, British Minister, stating that, upon the 
termination of Major Stokes' services as military attache to 



THE STOKES INCIDENT 73 

the Legation, I would be pleased to secure him in some manner 
for the purpose of organizing the proposed Treasury Gendar- 
merie. After some correspondence with the Legation, I was 
informed, in writing, on July 22, by the British Minister, 
that he was authorized by his Government to tell me " that 
Major Stokes, before accepting the command of the gendar- 
merie, will have to resign his commission in the Indian Army." 
As the original tender made by me to Major Stokes contained 
no suggestion that he would be required, in order to accept it, 
to resign from the British-Indian Army, and as the situation 
would have been equally well met from the standpoint of the 
Persian Government by his being seconded for three years, I 
naturally assumed that on his tendering his resignation, in re- 
sponse to the condition thus made by his own Government, — 
a thing which he immediately did by cable, — it would be 
accepted. After two weeks, during which we had regarded the 
matter as practically settled, I was astonished to learn that 
the British Government had presented a note verbale on August 
8 to the Persian Foreign Office " warning the Persian Govern- 
ment that it ought not to persist in the appointment of Major 
Stokes unless he is not to be employed in Northern Persia." 
This remarkable communication went on to say that " if the 
Persian Government does persist, His Majesty's [British] 
Government will recognize Russia's right [sic] to take such 
steps as she thinks are necessary in order that her interests in 
Northern Persia may be safeguarded." 

This action was followed on August 19 by another note re- 
peating " the warning given on the 8th instant." 

Thus the British Government, presumably acting in its right 
senses, had received a request for the services of a British sub- 
ject for a period of three years to take part in the reorganization 
of one branch of the Persian Government and had formally ex- 
pressed its consent, requiring only that the individual in ques- 



H THE STRANGLING OF PERSIA 

tion should resign his commission in the British-Indian Army, 
and, upon his doing so, in good faith, had suddenly executed a 
complete volte face and without any change in the legal aspects 
of the situation or in the rights of the parties concerned, had 
not only receded from its promise and agreement, but had 
combined with another foreign government in a cold-blooded 
attempt to intimidate the Persian Government in the exercise 
of its most elementary sovereign rights. 

I had desired to secure Major Stokes, not because he was a 
British subject, but in spite of that fact, and solely in the be- 
lief that he was the most efficient and capable man for the im- 
portant work which was to be done, and because the prompt 
and thorough execution of this task was vital to my whole 
scheme of financial reform in Persia. The Treasury Gendar- 
merie was not to be a dress-parade feature which might adorn 
the fiscal organization which we were endeavoring to create, 
but it was an indispensable part thereof, since without a well- 
trained, well-equipped force to assist the tax-collectors, and, 
by their mere presence, to maintain a certain degree of order 
in the provinces and distant districts, there was no possible 
hope of getting in the revenues. I knew perfectly well that, 
through personal acquaintance with them, I could probably 
have secured the services of any one of a number of retired of- 
ficers of the United States army who would have done every- 
thing possible under the circumstances; but Major Stokes met 
the requirements of the situation exactly and possessed qualifi- 
cations which no other man lacking his experience could pos- 
sibly have, however intelligent he might be, and it was for this 
reason alone that he was selected. To this day I have never 
discovered just what were those indefinite " interests " in 
Northern Persia on which so much stress was laid by both the 
British and Russian Governments. It seems clear that they 
were not defined in the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. 



THE STOKES INCIDENT 75. 

It is equally clear that the Persian Government did not know 
of them. Nor did the British Government know of them as 
late as July 22 ; as otherwise how could that Government have 
contemplated accepting Major Stokes' resignation from the 
British-Indian Army in order that he might sign the contract 
which I had offered him to serve as Chief of the Treasury Gen- 
darmerie ? 

To complete the record of this affair it should be mentioned 
that the Bussian Legation, on August 19, addressed a memoran- 
dum to the Persian Foreign Office stating that " the Imperial 
Government of Bussia, for reasons explained at the time to the 
Persian Government, considers the engagement by the latter 
of Major Stokes as chief of the armed forces — called gen- 
darmerie — for the collection of taxes as incompatible with its 
interests, and I am charged to protest against that appointment. 
Failing satisfaction, the Imperial Government would reserve 
to itself the right to take such measures as it might judge to be 
necessary for the safeguarding of its interests in the North 
of Persia." 

On learning of the first note presented to the Persian Gov- 
ernment by the British Legation, I expressed the following 
views to the British Minister at Teheran: 

I beg leave to address you, unofficially, on a subject of great importance 
to my work here. I have been intensely surprised to learn this evening 
that your Government has conveyed to the Persian Foreign Minister a 
note of warning or protest against my proposed employment of Major 
Stokes in the Treasury Gendarmerie. You are doubtless aware of the 
course of this matter up to the present. Need I say that in view of 
the tone of the communication which your Government instructed you to ad- 
dress to me on July 22 last, in effect that Major Stokes could accept the 
position upon resigning from the Indian Army, the apparent volte face 
indicated by their note of to-day is almost incomprehensible. 

. . . Does your Government quite realize the position in which it is 
placing me before the Persian people and their Government in now sud- 
denly joining another power to prevent the exercise of the most elemental 



76 THE STRANGLING OF PERSIA 

act of sovereignty by this country whose independence and integrity both 
of those foreign powers have solemnly pledged themselves, jointly and 
severally, to respect? 

My personal feelings are of no importance, but the success or failure 
of my mission here is of moment both to Persia, which entrusted her 
financial affairs to my care, and to my countrymen who are not unnaturally 
interested in the creditable accomplishment of my task. 

Before accepting this work I was given clearly to understand that 
neither of the two principal powers having interests here offered any 
objection to my undertaking it, and surely such a statement was some- 
thing more than an empty pledge. 

No one, I am assured, knows better than yourself that the choice of 
Major Stokes was actuated by no political motive in the faintest degree, 
and no thinking person could suspect me of any intention to engage in 
political jobbery here, — a thing which would only make me ridiculous 
and spell absolute ruin for my work. 

What, then, am I to think when I see the first vital step which I 
undertake in the task of bringing order out of chaos here obstructed and 
relentlessly opposed by the very two nations who have time and agiiin 
professed their sincere desire to see the progress and prosperity of the 
stricken country which I am seeking to serve? 

Does your Foreign Office fully realize that in adopting its most recent 
attitude in this affair it is inevitably producing the impression on the 
Persian People that it is in reality opposed to the successful accomplish- 
ment of my work, in addition to forcing me to assume that I can count 
on no friendly moral assistance from your Government in a vital matter 
of this kind? 

If this were a normal place, where well-trained, capable and experienced 
men could be had, in comparative abundance, the result (though not 
the principle) of your Government's objections might not be so bad, 
but here, where, as you know, good men are extremely scarce, the attitude 
adopted amounts to a virtual veto of my efforts and a nullification of my 
chances of success. 

I hope and trust that in some manner your Government may be brought 
to see the matter in this light, apart from what I am frank to say seems 
to me a totally uncalled-for interference in the purely routine and internal 
affairs of the financial organization which I am endeavoring to build up. 

Personally, I feel so strongly on the subject that I am forced to con- 
template the necessity of setting right my own countrymen, at least with a 
formal public statement of all my experiences in this connection since 
arriving at Teheran. Needless to say, such a course would be much to my 
regret, but there is such a thing as just dealing even between Govern- 
ments and individuals, and certainly in this case I feel that my own 



THE SPIKIT OF THE CONVENTION 77 

record is sufficiently clear to bear the light of the most thorough in- 
spection. 

From a review of this incident it is manifest that unless the 
Convention of 1907 was a farce and a deception, by its own 
terms it had no bearing whatever on the proposed appointment 
of Major Stokes as a financial aid to the Treasurer-general. 
First, because the preamble of that document, as published in 
the World, avows that Britain and Russia mutually engage to 
respect the integrity and independence of Persia, and declares 
the sincere desire of the two signatories for the preservation of 
order throughout that country and its peaceful development. 
Yet one of the primary elements of sovereignty is the right of a 
country to manage its internal affairs, at least within the limi- 
tations of the law of nations, and surely the appointment of its 
own officials by any country can be considered as nothing else. 
Secondly, the plain purpose of the Convention was that neither 
signatory power should seek for herself, or support in favor of 
her subjects, any concessions of a political or commercial nature 
— ■ such as concessions for railways, banks, telegraphs, roads, 
transport, insurance, etc. — within the so-called sphere of influ- 
ence of the other power. But this was no case of a " conces- 
sion." Major Stokes is not a bank or a railroad, or a political 
or commercial concession of any kind, and the voluntary tender 
to him of any post in the Persian service could, by no stretch of 
the imagination, be converted into a " seeking " or " support- 
ing " by Great Britain of such a concession. 

The second fallacy in the position of the two powers lay in 
the fact that the British Foreign Office itself never thought of 
construing Major Stokes' appointment into a violation of even 
the so-called " spirit of the Convention " until Russia raised 
the point. The evidence of this has been cited above. 

Without in any manner recognizing the application or valid- 
ity of the Convention as relating to herself, Persia might well 



78 THE STRANGLING OF PEESIA 

have pointed out that where the language of a document is 
plain and clear there is no room for interpretation of the 
spirit. 

Between individuals such action as that taken by the British 
Government towards the Persian Government or the Treasurer- 
general would clearly be considered bad faith. Sir Edward 
Grey, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, has on 
more than one occasion since sought to explain his action in 
failing to keep his plain agreement in regard to permitting 
Persia to utilize the services of Major Stokes, on the grounds 
that Major Stokes' appointment would be a violation of what 
he, Sir Edward Grey, chose to term the " spirit " of the Anglo- 
Russian Convention of 1907. The use of the expression 
" spirit '' would seem to indicate clearly that there was nothing 
in the language of the document itself which could justify any 
such interpretation. Furthermore, if the appointment of Ma- 
jor Stokes would have been a violation of the so-called " spirit " 
of that Convention, might one not inquire why this proposed 
violation was not recognized by the British Foreign Office at 
the very outset of the negotiations, and how was it that the 
British Foreign Office consented to that violation on condition 
that Major Stokes resign his commission in the British-Indian 
Army % The truth is that the Russian semi-official press, and 
particularly the Novoe Vremya, had begun, to bluster about 
the appointment, doubtless inspired by the Foreign Office at 
St. Petersburg, and inasmuch as the tension in Europe over 
the Moroccan affair had greatly increased at this time, Sir Ed- 
ward Grey apparently felt himself compelled to invent some 
pretext for withdrawing from his previous' promise to allow 
Major Stokes' appointment lest he do anything to displease the 
Russian Government to which he undoubtedly looked for some 
form of support in case of unpleasant eventualities with Ger- 
many. Under these circumstances was born that novel and 



THE SPIRIT OF THE CONVENTION 79 

marvelous doctrine of the " spirit of the Convention " under 
which each of the powers signatory might interpret any action 
which the Persian Government contemplated taking as an in- 
fringement of the self-created interests, mentioned but never 
defined with any degree of accuracy in that famous document. 

On Sunday, July 9, the flighty Sipahdar returned quietly 
to Teheran, and locking himself in his house and denying him- 
self to all visitors except a few particular favorites and confi- 
dants, he allowed the rumor to spread that he was contem- 
plating taking some drastic action against the Medjlis and the 
Treasurer-general, who he claimed had shorn him of the power 
and privileges which he had won with his sword at the head 
of the Nationalist forces in 1909. In the meantime the Prince 
Salaru'd-Dawla, brother of the ex-Shah, had entered Persia 
from Asiatic Turkey in the neighborhood of Bagdad, and wa,s 
gathering Kurdish tribesmen about him in what he announced 
to be another attempt to establish himself upon the throne of 
Persia. The Government forces in the neighborhood of Ha- 
madan seemed utterly unable to cope with him and the situation 
was getting so bad that I felt compelled to point out to the 
Regent that if some adequate measures were not taken to 
check this filibustering movement, the most serious conse- 
quences might follow. 

On July 1, Mons. Mornard not having kept his promise to 
turn over his bank balance to me, I both wrote and wired to 
him at his summer residence outside Teheran, where he was 
staying, telling him that if I did not hear that all Customs bal- 
ances had been transferred to my credit in the banks by four 
o'clock that afternoon, I would be compelled to report his re- 
fusal to do so to the Medjlis and to consider his action as a 
breach of faith. Shortly after sending this telegram and be- 
fore the written message which I had despatched by a mounted 
gendarme had reached him, he wired me to take possession of 



80 THE STRANGLING OF PERSIA 

the Customs funds in the bank and to exhibit his message as 
authority for doing so. 

On July 13, fearing that the Russian Bank (Banque d'Es- 
compte de Perse) might endeavor to discredit the new admin- 
istration of the Treasurer-general by failing to transfer from 
the ample balance of Customs receipts, which they had on hand, 
the funds necessary to pay the instalment due on that day of 
the interest and amortization charges on the Russian debt, I 
went to the bank that morning, saw the Acting Manager, Mons. 
Diamantopoulos, and obtained his statement that the transfer 
had been duly made on his books and that the balance of this 
amount, in accordance with the loan agreement, had been 
placed to the credit of the Government in the name of the 
Treasurer-general. 

The Med j lis had by this time approved several proposals 
which I had made to them for the employment, under contract, 
of a number of additional American assistants, and I was en- 
deavoring to select suitable men to bring out for that purpose. 
I received several letters during the next few days from the 
British Legation asking whether I would not be willing to ac- 
cept a Swedish officer to take charge of the Treasury Gen- 
darmerie, or whether I would not agree to employ Major Stokes 
only in the so-called southern sphere of Persia. Neither sug- 
gestion was of any practical value, since the Swedish officer 
was not familiar with the language or the country. As to the 
second suggestion, it was perfectly well known that the Per- 
sian Government had steadfastly refused to recognize any di- 
vision of the country into " spheres of influence." Indeed, one 
of the great difficulties which I had encountered in endeavor- 
ing to secure the authorization of the Med j lis for the employ- 
ment under contract of Major Stokes had been the fear that I 
would do just what England now suggested — send him 
only into the South, thereby tacitly recognizing by my official 







F-PHRAIM KHAN, CHIEF OF THE POLICE AND GENDARMERIE OF TEHERAN. 

He did more than any other to defeat Muhammad All. "Persia's Garibaldi," 

as he is called, was killed In battle May 19, 1912. 



ATTITUDE OF THE POWERS 83 

acts the so-called " spheres of influence " which Russia and 
England had endeavored to impose upon the Persian Govern- 
ment. 

On July 17 I was shown a note which another official of 
the Diplomatic Corps had received from the British Minister, 
conveying the contents of a cabled despatch from the British 
Foreign Office which directed the British Legation to side with 
the Russian Government in the dispute, over the control of the 
Customs funds. I was reliably informed that the British Min- 
ister had received a despatch from Sir Edward Grey, stating 
that the general European situation (meaning thereby the Mo- 
roccan question) was such that the British Government felt 
compelled to take this attitude. I heard that this despatch 
had greatly disturbed the British Minister and. he had felt 
compelled to communicate to one of his colleagues its general 
purport. 

On July 18, when I had just begun to learn the source of 
some of the Government revenues, a new and startling compli- 
cation suddenly arose. Late that night the telegraph brought 
us the news that Muhammad Ali, the ex-Shah of Persia, who 
was supposed to be interned at Odessa under the watchful eye 
of the Russian Government, had landed that day with a small 
following at Gumesh-Teppeh, a port on the Caspian Sea — on 
Persian soil, but very near the Russian frontier. 1 This was 

i The news sent by the London Times' correspondent at Teheran on July 
18 was as follows: 

" The ex-Shah Mohammed Ali has landed at Gumesh Tepe with some 
half-a-dozen followers, said to include his brother Shua-es-Sultaneh and the 
notorious Ameer Bahadur Jang. He is expected to proceed on Thursday to 
Astrabad, which is at present without a Governor. 

" Since the ex-Shah lately left Odessa, ostensibly for Vienna and Carlsbad, 
persistent rumors have circulated here of his approaching return to Persia. 
The Persian Government drew the attention of Russia to these rumors, as 
also to the presence of the Shah's agent, Arshad-ed-Dowleh, who recently 
passed through Baku, rumor says, with a false passport and a large num- 
ber of rifles and cartridges. The Russian Government refused Persia any 
assistance, and Arshad-ed-Dowleh proceeded to the Turcoman country. 

" The ex-Shah's intrigues with the Turcomans now extend over a period 



84 THE STEANGLING OF PEESIA 

the proverbial bolt from the blue, for while rumors of such a 
thing had been current ever since the incursion of his brother, 
Salaru'd-Dawla, into Western Persia, few people in Teheran 
believed that Eussia would have the face to violate so openly 
the solemn stipulation which she had signed with Great Britain 
and with Persia less than two years before. 

of nearly a year. The Persian Government last autumn drew Russia's at- 
tention to them in connection with the question of payment of the quarterly 
instalment of his pension. By the Protocol of 1909 Eussia expressly under- 
took to prevent any such intrigues, and it was stipulated that in such an 
event the ex-Shah should forfeit his pension. The ex-Shah has now reached 
Persia in a Russian boat, and it is widely asserted that his movements 
through Russia must have been known to the authorities. 

" Satisfaction at the prospect of the ex-Shah's return is openly expressed 
in Russian circles here. It appears to be assumed that the country is thor- 
oughly disgusted with the Mejliss. The ex-Shah's agents secured the sup- 
port of the Shahsevens and the Turcomans. His brother, Salar-ed-Dowleh, 
has now declared for him in Kurdistan; the Sipahdar at Teheran is also 
not averse to the return of an autocratic regime, and his recent journey to 
Resht is connected therewith. These calculations overlook the surprising 
unity which the Mejliss and the Press have recently displayed, apparently 
scenting danger. There is no reason to doubt the loyalty to the Mejliss of 
the 1200 Bakhtiari who are at present at Teheran, and should this continue 
the ex-Shah's attempt is not likely to succeed. He will find a difficulty in 
persuading the Shahsevens and Turcomans to operate outside their own 
districts. It is, moreover, unknown what financial resources he commands." 



CHAPTEK IV 

THE ATTEMPT OF MUHAMMAD ALI MIEZA, EX-SHAH OF PERSIA, 
TO REGAIN THE THRONE. RUSSIAN INTRIGUES AND- CON- 
NIVANCE. MILITARY OPERATIONS. AGAINST THE EX-SHAH 
AND HIS BROTHERS. SUCCESS OF THE NATIONALIST TROOPS. 
DEFEAT AND DEATH OF ARSHADu'd-DAWLA. 

THE first despatches regarding the landing of Muhammad 
Ali at Gumesh-Teppeh stated that he would be at the town 
of Astarabad bj the following Thursday, two days later. 

On July 19, the day after the news arrived, all the political 
parties at Teheran came together and a coalition Cabinet was 
presented to the Med j lis and approved. This was composed as 
follows: Sipahdar, Premier (without portfolio), Samsamu's- 
SaUana (the Bakhtiyari chieftain), Minister of War; Wuthu- 
qu'd-Dawla, Minister of the Interior; Ghavamu's-Saltana 
(brother of Wuthuqu'd-Dawla), Minister of Justice ; Mushiru'd- 
Dawla, Minister of Posts and Telegraphs; Hakimu'1-Mulk, 
Minister of Public Instruction; Mauwinu'd-Dawla, Minister of 
Finance; and Mutashamu's-Saltana, Minister of Eoreign. 
Affairs. 

On this same evening the Med j lis passed a rigorous law de- 
claring a state of siege, and placing the execution of martial 
law in the hands of the Council of Ministers and the Minister 
of War. 

Despite this brave show there was an absolute panic in all 
quarters of Teheran. The Nationalists feared that the ex-Shah 
was going to be restored to power by the Russians and that 
the city would be given over to be pillaged by the Turcoman 

85 



86 THE STRANGLING OF PEKSIA 

tribesmen who were accompanying him. The Royalists, or 
reactionary element, equally feared that reprisals would be 
made on them by the Nationalists and that they might be ar- 
rested and dealt with at any moment. 

At this time there was literally no Persian army except on 
paper. The gendarmes and police of the capital did not num- 
ber more than 1800 and they were very inadequately armed and 
equipped. Practically all this force was absolutely necessary to 
maintain order in Teheran. 

Reports continued to come in to the effect that the Turcomans 
on the northeastern frontier of Persia were nocking to the ex- 
Shah's standard, and it was generally feared that he would be 
at the gates of the city within a few weeks. 

Salaru'd-Dawla, his brother, was making headway in the 
Hamadan district, where he was reported to have gathered many 
thousands of the Kurdish tribesmen, and before this double 
danger the newly formed Persian Cabinet fairly quailed. 

Up to this time the Government had acted with a certain 
degree of energy and* Solidarity, but under the strain of in- 
creasing fears the official fabric began to give way, and within 
a few days there was left not a government, but a small group 
of men who had come to the front and shown themselves de- 
termined to uphold the Constitution and to take all steps neces- 
sary to repel the rebels who threatened it. 

Chief among these was Ephraim Khan, the chief of the 
police and gendarmes at Teheran, of whom mention has been 
made before. Ephraim Khan is a Turkish Armenian, who 
had come to Resht several years before and been employed 
there in some very humble trade. Little was known of his 
antecedents, but the general belief is that Ephraim (as he is 
commonly called) was the real head and shoulders of the ex- 
pedition from Resht, and that, the great Sipahdar was largely 
a figurehead. 



•t 

RETURK OF THE EX-SHAH 87 

After the capture of Teheran in 1909 and the restoration 
of the Constitutional Government, Ephraim was made Chief 
of Police of the capital, a post which carries with it much 
more responsibility and dignity than it would in more civilized 
communities. 

In this office Ephraim built up and held together the only 
organized and fairly equipped force which the Constitutional 
Government had ever possessed, and with it he maintained a 
high state of public order in the city. He had the capacity for 
drawing men to him and retaining their loyalty, and despite his 
somewhat limited education he was a man of great resource, un- 
doubted military genius and unflinching courage. 

In the crisis which thus confronted the Persian people 
Ephraim came rapidly to the front. Being a Christian, he 
was haffar, or unbeliever, in the eyes of the Muhammadans, but 
despite this great handicap and the jealousies which his in- 
creased power and influence aroused, it*was recognized that he 
held the safety of the city in his hand, to say nothing of the 
salvation of the Constitutional Government, against the forces 
of the ex-Shah. 

On July 19 the Samsamu's-Saltana, by virtue of the proc- 
lamation of martial law, became, as Minister of War, the 
military governor of Teheran, and as such he practically had 
the power of life and death over all his countrymen. 

One of the first steps suggested was that a considerable num- 
ber of well-known reactionaries and intriguers left behind by 
the ex-Shah should be arrested, principally to prevent them 
from propagating disloyalty to the Constitutional Government. 
A list of thirty or forty of these individuals was drawn up by 
the Cabinet, was shown to the Regent, and put into Ephraim' s 
hands to make the arrests. 

On July 20 the Regent sent for me and we had a long con- 
ference as to the situation. I suggested to him that some force 
s 



88 



THE STRANGLING OF PERSIA 



V 




5 ^ — « e>b l^il ij\*J? 

iyL^ »ib IjSl 
Jl*1ji- aib Igjl Ai* jj\i-yj <j^*«? jTJJl J_j» <^U iLi JGJl£ ■Clf c~«Jj» 




Facsimile of the Proclamation issued by the Persian Constitutional Gov- 
ernment on the 3rd Shaban, 1329 (July 29, 1911), putting a price of 100,000 
tumans (about $90,000) on the head of Muhammad Ali Mirza, ex-Shah of 
Persia, and 25,000 tumans (about $22,500) on the head of each of his broth- 
ers, Princes Shuau's-Saltana and Salaru'd-Dawla. (See opposite page.) 



EETUEN OF THE EX-SHAH 89 

should be despatched at once from Teheran against the ex-Shah, 
principally for the moral effect which it would have on the 
doubting individuals in the capital and elsewhere, who were 
inclined to believe that no resistance would be made by the 
Government. The Regent approved this idea, and directed a 
conference between the Samsamu's-Saltana, Ephraim and my- 
self. I also recommended to the Eegent that the Med j lis should 
pass a law, declaring the ex-Shah and his two brothers who 
were in arms against the Government, to be outlaws, and offer- 
ing a large reward to any one who might deliver them up, dead 
or alive. His Highness thought this a very good idea and 
promised to urge it on the Cabinet and Medjlis. The Eegent 
also stated that a number of the more notorious reactionaries 
would be arrested by Ephraim in a day or so. I advised that 
it should be done at once, as each day increased the fear, doubt 
and confusion in the minds of the general public. 

I had learned that morning, in a very confidential manner, 
that a despatch had come from the British Government to its 
Legation at Teheran, stating that England would protest to Rus- 
sia against the ex-Shah's being allowed to regain the throne in 
violation of his own agreement and promises and of the formal 
stipiilations of the Protocol signed with the Constitutional 

TRANSLATION OF THE PROCLAMATION ON THE OPPOSITE PAGE. 

AN ACT 

relating to the proscription of Muhammad Ali Mirza 
and his brothers. 



ART. 1. As Muhammad Ali Mirza, the ex-Shah, is a " spoiler and cor- 
rupter on the earth," and as his proscription is necessary, The Council of 
Ministers is authorized to pay to such person (or to the heirs of such per- 
son) as destroys or captures Muhammad Ali Mirza, the sum of one hundred 
thousand tumans. 

ART. 2. The Ministry of War is authorized to pay to such person (or 
his heirs) as destroys or captures Salaru'd-Dawla the sum of twenty-five 
thousand tumans; and twenty-five thousand tumans to such person (or his 
heirs) as destroys or captures Shuau's-Saltana. 



90 THE STRANGLING OF PERSIA 

Government by the two powers in September, 1909. I there- 
fore felt safe in informing His Highness that even the British 
Government could hardly overlook the very evident bad faith 
of Muhammad Ali's act and that he might count on its disap- 
proval being expressed in some form. He was greatly encour- 
aged by this. 

That same evening Sipahdar received a telegram from 
Muhammad Ali, directing him to assume charge of the Govern- 
ment at Teheran and to maintain order there until he, Muham- 
mad Ali, could arrive. The Sipahdar gave out to the public 
that he had wired back to the ex-Shah : " The people will 
never endure your yoke." Whether he actually did so has re- 
mained a matter of considerable doubt. 

By this time it had become perfectly evident that some mem- 
bers of the Cabinet, including Sipahdar, Mutashamu's-Saltana 
and Muawinu'd-Dawla, were not putting their whole hearts 
into the preparations for resistance. The Sipahdar remained 
passively outside Teheran at his summer residence at the 
Shimbran, and postponed from day to day the execution by 
Ephraim of the orders for arrest. The people of Teheran 
. promptly grew very suspicious of the Sipahdar's loyalty, and 
the Cabinet practically ceased to exist. 

On July 21 I had a talk with the Samsamu's- Saltan a in 
which he stated that 2000 of the Bakhtiyari tribesmen had 
been ordered to assemble at once at Isfahan, preparatory to 
marching to Teheran, a journey which would consume about 
ten days for a force of that size. I wired funds to the Bakh- 
tiyari Khan who was Governor of Isfahan, to cover the prelimi- 
nary expenses. Samsamu's-Saltana also promised to urge in 
the Council and Medjlis that a price of 100,000 tumans be put 
on the head of Muhammad Ali, and 25,000 tumans on the head 
of each of his brothers, Prince Salaru'd-Dawla and Prince 
Shuau's-Saltana. The Minister of War was so enthusiastic 




PRINCE SHTTAtT'S-SALTANA, BROTHER OF MUHAMMAD ALL 
The confiscation of the Prince's estates by the Constitutional Government was made the subject 
of the first Russian ultimatum. A price of 25,000 tumans ($22,500) was put on his head by the 
Persian Medjlis. 



RETURN OF THE EX-SHAH 93 

over this idea that he declared his willingness to raise the 
money from his personal estates if the Medjlis felt any hesi- 
tancy on that score. 

SainsamuVSaltana was a man in the sixties, very tall and 
straight, of very slight education, but of great personal pride 
and with a very simple, almost childish mind. He had a good 
heart, but soon fell under the influence of his intriguing brothers 
and relatives. He felt keenly at this time the unaccustomed 
responsibilities which had been thrust upon him and was anxious 
to acquit himself of them in a creditable manner. His brother, 
Sardar-i-Asad, had left for Europe a few weeks before, and 
Samsamu's-Saltana therefore remained the real head in Persia 
of the Bakhtiyari clans. 

In this same conversation he told me that he was so devoted 
to the Constitution that he had that very morning offered to 
the Regent to go, ostensibly as an envoy, to Muhammad Ali, 
and gaining his presence, to put a pistol to his breast and kill 
him. " I am an old man," he said, " and I am more than will- 
ing to sell my own life, if I could thus rid my country of that 
cruel tyrant." The Regent, however, had rejected the plan. 

Samsamu's-Saltana then asked whether, as Military Govern- 
or, he had the authority to direct expenditures for the public 
defense, and on my stating that I so understood the law, he asked 
me to employ up to 100,000' tumans to send envoys to kill 
Muhammad Ali and his brothers. I told him that I thought 
such steps had best be taken by the military authorities and 
the police. He expressed his distrust of Sipahdar, Mutash- 
amu's-Saltana and Muawinu'd-Dawla. He likewise agreed that 
thereafter I should pay the so-called " central army " at Teheran 
direct; that is, after actual inspection of the troops, and not 
on payrolls made up and submitted by the War Ministry. 
This meant cutting down the monthly allowance from 42,000 
tumans to about 12,000 tumans. 



94 THE STRANGLING OF PEESIA 

By this time a number of the reactionaries had taken bast or 
refuge in the village of Zargundeh, where the summer quarters 
of the Russian Legation are located, since that territory was 
held by Russia to be free from interference by the Persian 
Government. Prom this secure position these men continued 
to plot against the Constitutional Government throughout the 
ensuing military campaign. 

There was in Teheran a Bakhtiyari force, supposed to be 
about 600 men, who were kept by the Bakhtiyari Khans as 
a guard of honor and dignity, but were actually paid by the 
Government each month. These were now formed into the 
nucleus of an expedition. 

Ephraim explained to me his plan for an expedition against 
the ex-Shah, but said that he dared not confide it to any of the 
Ministers, as he did not trust them. He had his men engaged 
in reloading the fixed ammunition for the Schneider cannon, 
as he did not dare accept it in the shape in which it had been 
delivered to him by the Cossack brigade. He said the Sipahdar 
should he hanged or shot, and was angry with the Med j lis 
because it had not yet voted the small pension which he had 
requested for Major Haase, the German Maxim gun expert, 
who had been wounded while serving Ephraim's orders the 
year before. Haase's services were needed on the coming ex- 
pedition towards Astarabad, but he was dissatisfied with the 
treatment he had received. As he was only employed as an 
artillery instructor, the question of his participation in actual 
fighting rested with him alone. I was able to arrange a pension 
for him shortly afterwards and he agreed to accompany 
Ephraim. 

Perhaps the most patriotic of the real Persian leaders at 
this time was the Nawwab, a man whose character and attain- 
ments would win for him a high place in any land and under 
any conditions. He had served as Minister of Poreign Affairs 




HUSAYN KULI KHAN, NAWWAB. 
Ex-Mlnlster of Foreign Affairs, and leader of the Constitutionalists In Persia. 



KETUKN OF THE EX-SHAH 97 

until he was forced out in December, 1910, by the insulting 
conduct of the British and Russian Legations, and since that 
time, steadfastly refusing any political office, he continued to 
work day and night for the betterment of conditions in Per- 
sia. 

He was a man of about fifty-five, of distinguished appear- 
ance, possessing a thorough European education, speaking Eng- 
lish, Persian and French with equal facility and, what is most 
remarkable of all, he had the reputation of being absolutely 
honest in both his official and personal affairs. He was a 
Democrat in politics, and had become generally recognized as 
the real head of the Democratic party in Persia, though many 
others, both in and out of the Med j lis, were much more prom- 
inent. During my entire acquaintance with him up to the 
day I left Teheran I never found him to be anything but a 
high-minded gentleman and a patriot of unfailing devotion to 
the interests of his country. 

In the conversation which took place at the ISTawwab's house, 
Ephraim explained that he had received an order only that 
morning from the Council of Ministers directing the arrest of 
some twenty reactionaries whose names were given, but that 
an hour later, before the order could be executed, Sipahdar 
(who was still nominally the Premier) had called him on the 
telephone and directed that it be suspended. About this time 
one of Ephraim's officers was brought in and reported that the 
police had arrested a man named Nizamu's-Saltana and a 
number of other* reactionaries, but that they had claimed to 
be organizing a volunteer force by orders of Sipahdar. Ephraim 
said that he would undoubtedly get orders from Sipahdar to 
release these people, and that if he did not do so and defied 
Sipahdar, the latter, who was on good terms with some of the 
mullahs, would brand him as Icaffar (unbeliever) and become 
a hero with a certain class of Muhammadans. He thought that 



98 THE STEANGLING OF PEESIA 

Sipahdar should be arrested, but hesitated to take the step 
himself for the special reasons just stated. 

We discussed my plan for the formation of a Treasury 
Gendarmerie, but it was plain that Ephraim ingenuously 
suspected in it some idea of partitioning Persia between Eussia 
and England, especially if Major Stokes were to be in command. 

At this meeting arrangements were made to raise a special 
force of mounted volunteers to be under Ephraim's orders. 

On the following morning, July 23, Samsamu's-Saltana and 
Arbab Khaikosro came to the Atabak Park to discuss plans. 
The former complained bitterly that Sipahdar was a traitor and 
that the Eegent was weak and vacillating. He stated that he 
had presented to the Cabinet the plan for proclaiming rewards 
for the capture of the ex-Shah and his brothers, but that Minis- 
ters claimed to be afraid to send it to the Medjlis, as it was 
" so unusual.' 7 He said that he had telegraphed to Isfahan for 
3000 more Bakhtiyaris to come to Teheran. Nor was the 
Cabinet willing to put before the Medjlis my proposed bill 
granting to Major Stokes, after the expiration of his services in 
Persia, the pension which he was compelled to give up on 
resigning his commission in the British-Indian Army. 

The situation in Teheran at this time was growing steadily 
worse. The sentiment in certain quarters in favor of the ex- 
Shah was increasing, the new coalition Cabinet, of which so 
much had been expected, was squarely split, the three supposed 
Moderaters, Sipahdar, Mutashamu's-Saltana and Muawinu'd- 
Dawla, being openly antagonistic to their four Democratic col- 
leagues. There had been an utter failure to arrest and punish 
well-known traitors who were openly acting against the Con- 
stitutional Government; and to make matters worse Sipahdar 
still controlled a sufficient number of deputies in the Medjlis to 
prevent any decisive action against him being taken. 

I had given instructions to enlist 500 Treasury gendarmes 



RUSSIAN INTRIGUE 99 

at once, and the next two days were spent in getting uniforms 
and equipment under preparation. During this time I had 
frequent conferences with the leaders of both parties in the 
Med j lis, and they seemed to have begun to realize that some 
positive action must be taken to save the situation. 

On July 25 the deputies in the Med j lis by a large majority 
voted to get rid of Sipahdar and Mutashamu's-Saltana, and 
immediately sent a committee to the Regent to demand that 
he accept the resignation of these two ministers, which was 
done. That cleared the air somewhat and steps were taken to 
form a new Cabinet which should really work for the mainte- 
nance of the Constitutional Government. 

Majdu'd-Dawla, who had been arrested two days before by 
Ephraim's men, having been condemned by military order to 
be hung as a traitor, was to be executed on the 25th, but shortly 
before the appointed time the British Minister, Sir George 
Barclay, wrote to the Persian Government, demanding that 
this man should be given a formal trial, and clearly indicating 
that his execution would be displeasing to the Legation. The 
grounds for this step were that Majdu'd-Dawla was a K. C. M. 
G., an order to which the British Minister also belonged. 

The effect of this intervention, while doubtless not so intended 
by Sir George Barclay, was exceedingly bad, as it convinced a 
number of timorous people that the British Government as well 
as the Russian Government was secretly favoring the plans of 
the ex-Shah. Even Ephraim Khan believed that such was the 
case. While the arrest of Majdu'd-Dawla was being made, one 
gendarme and two servants — one a woman — had been killed. 

On July 26 a new Cabinet was formed as follows : Premier 
and Minister of War, Samsamu's-Saltana ; Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Wuthuqu'd-Dawla ; Minister of Finance, Hakimu'l- 
Mulk; Minister of Justice, Mushiru'd-Dawla (brother of the 
President of the Medjlis, Mutaminu'1-Mulk) ; Minister of Public 



100 THE STRANGLING OF PEESIA 

Instruction, Alau's-Saltana ; Minister of the Interior, Ghava- 
mu's-Saltana ; Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, Dabiru'l- 
Mulk. 

On the next day the news reached Teheran that the advance 
guard of Muhammad Ali's forces had arrived within a few 
miles of the important town of Sharud, to the northeast of the 
capital. My tax-collector at that place also wired that he had 
received an order from Prince Shuau's-Saltana, directing him to 
collect the taxes without delay and to pay them, under pain of 
death, to the governor just appointed by the ex-Shah. This 
loyal Constitutionalist telegraphed the message himself and 
begged me not to reply to it as the receipt of a telegram by him 
from me would cause his death. The day following he again 
wired stating that 400 Turcomans had ridden suddenly into 
Sharud, and had pillaged all the Government offices as well as 
his private house. He had succeeded in escaping with his 
family to the house of an Armenian friend. 

On July 28 all the Ministers had signed the bill providing 
for Major Stokes' contract, so that I was able to purchase a 
sufficient amount of Imperial Bank Loan of 1911 bonds to 
provide for Major Stokes' pension after his resignation should 
be accepted. 

On this same day one of the deputies of the Medjlis brought 
before me a Persian ftdai (whose name is omitted for obvious 
reasons) and informed me that the man had just confessed to 
him that he had come from an interview with a certain Eussian 
Vice-consul at Teheran, who had urged him, as a means of 
gaining Eussian protection and good-will, to shoot or poison me, 
as " I was balking Russia's plans in Persia." The original 
purpose of the interviews was to enable the Russian Consulate 
General to send a secret message to Muhammad Ali, of which 
my informant was to be the bearer. The story seemed not 




SIPAHDAR-I-AZAM (Greatest of the Marshals). 

He was the Prime Minister holding the portfolio of War when Mr. Shuster arrived at Teheran. 

He was a Russian protege and was strongly suspected of conspiring with Muhammad All 

in his attempt to gain the throne. 



RUSSIAN INTRIGUE 103 

improbable, but I had it suppressed, as it could only have com- 
plicated my work. 

On a later occasion a Persian named Earajoolah Khan, at 
one of the " salaams " being held at the Darbar, was heard to 
state that he was a member of a band which had been formed 
for the purpose of killing Mr. Shuster in the same manner as 
Saniu'd-Dawla was assassinated. Some Persians informed 
Ephraim's police agents, and the valiant gentleman was flogged 
and put in chains. 

On July 29 the Medjlis passed the law putting the price 
of 100,000 tumans on the head of Muhammad Ali and 25,000 
tumans on the head of each of his two brothers. The law 
granting Major Stokes' pension was likewise approved. Later 
that afternoon the Russian Minister called at the Eoreign Office 
and demanded that the contract with Major Stokes should not 
be signed, threatening that his Government would exact heavy 
compensation! The Persian Minister of Foreign Affairs was 
so frightened that he sent me a note to the effect that the law 
would not be operative until it was signed by the Regent, which 
we both well knew to be untrue. That, however, in Persia is 
called " keeping up official appearances." 

Some time before this the consignment of Russian rifles and 
ammunition which Sipahdar had contracted for with the Russian 
Legation had arrived at Enzeli and they were being transported 
over the Resht road to Teheran. Their arrival had been so 
timed that there was the gravest danger of their being seized by 
agents of the ex-Shah, but the greater part of the boxes had now 
7000 rifles and 4,000,000 cartridges, and, as it turned out, they 
reached Kasvin and were comparatively safe. These made 
a most welcome addition to the military stores at Teheran. 
Without them the Constitutional Government would have been 
almost without arms. I took 1500 rifles and 600,000 cart- 



104 THE STRANGLING OF PEESIA 

ridges and stored theni in the cellars of our residence at Atabak 
Park, for safe-keeping until the Treasury Gendarmerie had 'use 
for them. Fire-arms have a strange and mysterious way of 
evaporating in Persia, no matter how many official records are 
kept of them, so if one really expects to need them they should 
be kept in sight all the time. 

Up to this time little has been said of the attitude of the 
Russian Government towards the attempt of Muhammad Ali 
to seat himself on the throne of Persia. Russian officials, how- 
ever, had been neither idle nor passive. 

The Russian Government, acting for herself and Great 
Britain, had two years previously assumed the responsibility of 
keeping the ex-Shah to his agreement not to indulge in any 
political agitation against the Constitutional Government of 
Persia. This was in accordance with Article XI of the Protocol 
of September 9, 1909, signed by both powers. By permitting 
Muhammad Ali to escape from Odessa, to cross through Russia, 
to embark on a Russian steamer, traverse the Caspian and land 
on Persian territory, Russia failed utterly " to take efficacious 
measures " to prevent not only political agitation but actual 
hostile steps against the Persian Government. The fact is that 
he traversed the entire Russian passport system with a suite of 
uniformed officers, a false beard and a consignment of guns and 
rapid-fire cannon, said to have been labeled " mineral water." 
This fact, together with his false passport describing him as a 
merchant of Bagdad named " Khalil," was alleged to have been 
sufficient to throw the unsuspecting Russian passport officials 
off their guard. The Russian Government would apparently 
have the world believe it was not at any pains to keep posted as 
to Muhammad Ali's movements. 

He had been in Vienna for some time, buying arms and 
making preparations for his expedition. Some things which 
happened there were afterwards made clear in the ante-mortem 




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RUSSIAN IXTRIGUE 107 

statement of Arshadu'd-Dawla, the ex-Shah's principal general, 
who accompanied him to Persia and was captured and shot by 
the forces under Ephraim Khan. 

Mr. W. A. Moore, 1 the London Times correspondent at 
Teheran, who was present at the military council the night be- 
fore Arshadu'd-Dawla was shot, gives the following account of 
his statements on this point: 

Then Muhammad Ali and I met in Vienna. The Eussian Ambassador * 
came to see us, and we asked for help. He told us that Russia could 
not help us. Russia and England had an agreement with regard to Persia, 
from which neither would depart. They had resolved not to intervene 
in any way, internally, " But, on the other hand," he said, " the field is 
clear. If we can do nothing for you, we equally will do nothing against 
you. It is for you to decide what are your chances of success. If you 
think you can reach the throne of Persia, then go. Only remember we 
cannot help you, and if you fail we have no responsibility." " Well, there 
is something you can do for us," we answered. " Lend us some money." 

i Mr. Moore understands Persian very well, and based on this testimony, 
it seemed safe to state that the Russian Ambassador at Vienna had held 
these reported conversations with the ex-Shah and his general. After I 
had published this statement, however, in my open letter to the London 
Times of October 21, the Russian Government in an official communique 
denied that its Ambassador at Vienna had ever said these things, claiming 
that they were pure invention. This denial, when it was subsequently 
mentioned in the British House of Commons, was greeted with laughter. 

I learned, subsequently, however, that it was very probable that this 
time, at least, the Russian official denial was justified — that is, so far 
as it Avent, — taken literally. It seems that it was not the Russian ambassa- 
dor at Vienna who had held these interviews with the ex-Shah and his 
general. In the Persian language the word for " ambassador " and for 
" minister " is the same, and when Arshadu'd-Dawla had stated in the 
presence of Mr. Moore and the officers of the Persian Nationalists 
the night before his death that these interviews had taken place with the 
Russian "diplomatic representative" (using the common Persian expres- 
sion therefor) at Vienna, Mr. Moore and the others had naturally assumed 
that he was referring to the Russian Ambassador at that place. It seems, 
however, that the Russian diplomatic representative to whom reference 
was made was the famous Mons. de Hartwig who had formerly been Min- 
ister at Teheran and had done everything in his power to retain Muhammad 
Ali on the throne and who, at the time that these Interviews took place 
at Vienna, was accredited as Russian Minister to Belgrade, from which 
place he came up to Vienna on several occasions and had these interviews 
with the ex-Shah and Arshadu'd-Dawla. I did not learn these facts until 
after I had reached Vienna on my way back from Persia last January. 



108 THE STBANGLING OF PEESIA 

" No, it is quite impossible/' he replied. And though we begged much and 
had a second interview, he rejected our proposal. Only he suggested that, 
if Muhammad Ali had a receipt for some jewels which were in the keeping 
of the Russian bank at Teheran, money could be raised on that receipt. 
But Muhammad Ali had not got the document, and so nothing came of 
that. 

The ex-Shah embarked, with his party and munitions of war, 
upon the Eussian steamer Christoforos from a Eussian port just 
north of Baku, and, crossing the Caspian Sea, landed at 
Gumesh-Teppeh. In spite of the improbability of such being 
the fact, the world might give the Eussian Government the 
benefit of the doubt and assume that this escape of the ex-Shah 
was entirely accidental, so far as Eussia was concerned, and 
that the Eussian Cabinet had not been advised by its diplomatic 
representative at Belgrade or at Vienna of Muhammad Ali's 
intentions to take this step, if it were not for other abundant 
evidence which demonstrates that in reality the ex-Shah's 
filibustering expedition to regain the throne of Persia was not 
only known in the highest circles of the Eussian Government but 
that it was well known throughout the entire bureaucracy of that 
country. Ten days before Muhammad Ali landed upon Persian 
soil the Eussian Minister at Teheran took occasion, at a dinner 
party at which a large number of people were present, to state 
that, within a few weeks, the Persian Constitutional Govern- 
ment would cease to exist. The statement created considerable 
surprise at the time, but when, on July 18, the news of Muham- 
mad Ali's arrival reached the capital, those who heard it fully 
understood the reference. It is notorious that the Consular 
representatives of Eussia throughout Persia received the news 
of the ex-Shah's landing with unconcealed joy; they made no 
effort whatsoever to hide their real feelings and sympathies 
and, not content with this, they took united and decided action 
in a dozen different localities to aid and facilitate the forces and 
agents of the ex-Shah in their endeavor to overturn the Con- 



RUSSIAN INTRIGUE 109 

stitutional Government. Muhammad Ali was regarded by Rus- 
sian officials as the best possible means for the forwarding of 
their policy of aggression and assimilation in Persia. They 
had found that the Constitutional Government, principally 
through the existence of an elective body of eighty members, was 
much less tractable than a single despot upon the throne, who 
could be intimidated by threats or bought over to serve the 
purposes of the Imperial Russian Government. 

On July 23 the Persian Government addressed a note to all 
the legations in Teheran informing them of a law which had 
just been passed, declaring a state of siege. Most of the lega- 
tions replied in the usual manner, merely calling attention to 
certain provisions in the Treaty of Turkivanchoy, but the Rus- 
sian Legation adopted from the very outset a far different and 
most unfriendly tone, claiming among other things the right to 
arrest directly, at any time, so-called " illegal Russian subjects," 
defined in the Legation's note, " who might take part in the 
events actually going on in the country." The patent object of 
this claim put forward at this time was to give the Russian 
Legation and Consuls throughout Persia the excuse to arrest, 
on the mere allegation that they were a kind of Russian subjects, 
any Persian fighting-men of known reputation who might take 
the side of the Government against Muhammad Ali. If this 
threat to arrest all Russian subjects " who might take part in 
events " had been literally executed, it would have been neces- 
sary, as things turned out, to have arrested most of the Russian 
Consuls and consular employees themselves. 

At Resht the Russian Consul went further and actually in- 
formed the Persian Government of his intention to arrest any 
one on suspicion of his being a Russian subject, to investigate 
the matter at his leisure, and to hold him until the end of the 
troubles. 

On July 31, when Muhammad Ali had barely put foot on 



110 THE STRANGLING OF PERSIA 

Persian soil and had made no appreciable advance towards 
subjugating the country, Britain and Russia addressed to the 
Persian Government the following indentique de facto recogni- 
tion of the ex-Shah's belligerency : 

" Seeing that the ex-Shah, contrary to the advice frequently given him 
by the Governments of England and Russia, in effect that he should 
forbear from any agitation whatever in Persia, has now landed in Persia, 
the British (Russian) Government declares that the ex-Shah has now 
forfeited his right to the pension fixed by the Protocol. But, on the 
other hand, the British (Russian) Government believes that as the 
ex-Shah is now in Persian territory, the British (Russian) Government 
cannot intervene. Therefore the British (Russian) Government states 
that in the conflict that has unfortunately arisen in Persia they will in 
no icay interfere." i 

The Constitutional Government of Persia was therefore 
plunged into throes of civil strife through the criminal 
negligence or the connivance of at least one government which 
had solemnly pledged itself to prevent exactly this contingency. 
When the fact became known, and the so-called declaration of 
neutrality which has just been described was made by the two 
powers, even then the Persian Government could have speed- 
ily extricated itself from the difficulties thus thrust upon it, 
had that " neutrality " been faithfully observed. How well the 
Russian officials in Persia observed the neutrality which their 
Government had proclaimed, the following incidents may serve 
to show. 

On July 29 the Russian Acting Consul at Isfahan, proceed- 
ing upon his conception of neutrality, wrote to the Persian 
Foreign Office: 

According to information received by this Consulate the Government of 
Isfahan intends to hold a meeting of the clergy, nobles, prominent citizens 
and merchants, for the purpose of framing a telegram to the representatives 

i The italics are the author's. 



RUSSIAN INTRIGUE 111 

of foreign powers to the effect that they, the people, do not desire Muham- 
mad Ali, and to protest against his arrival in Persian territory. I request 
you in advance to inform the proper quarters that as this matter concerns 
Persia and the Persians, it would be useless to give trouble to the Imperial 
Legation and the Consulates of Russia.* 

Later he wrote: 

You must not uselessly give trouble in the matter of Muhammad Ali 
Shah to the Imperial Russian Legation and Consulates. It is the duty 
of the Persian Foreign Office representative and of the Government to 
restrain and prevent any such incidents and they must fulfill it. 

One Rashidu'l-Mulk, a Persian subject, formerly Governor 
of the district of Ardebil, had been placed in command of some 
Government forces. He treacherously fled before an inferior 
number of Shahsevens, tribesmen who had always remained 
supporters of the ex-Shah. He was accused of high treason, 
arrested and confined at Tabriz. On July 27 the Russian 
Consul-general at Tabriz, 1 having demanded his release of the 
Persian Acting Governor, and having been informed that 
Rashidu'l-Mulk was held by orders of the Constitutional Gov- 
ernment, sent 300 Russian soldiers, fully armed, to the 
Governor's palace, beat off the Persian guards, insulted the 
Acting Governor, liberated Rashidu'l-Mulk and took him away. 
Shortly afterwards he joined the rebel forces of Shujau'd- 
Dawla 2 which were threatening Tabriz. 

i To the formal protest lodged by the Persian Government over this 
affair the Russian Legation replied, officially admitting responsibility for 
the orders given to the Russian Consul-general at Tabriz to " take neces- 
sary steps " to prevent certain punishment, which was alleged to be threat- 
ened, from being inflicted on Rashidu'l-Mulk. We have seen what steps 
the Russian Consul-general took, — steps which in the case of two equal 
powers would have meant immediate war. The sole justification attempted 
by the Russian Legation for this outrage was that " the representatives of 
the Government of Russia have accorded a certain protection to Rashidu'l- 
Mulk." As a matter of fact no sentence at all had been passed on Rashi- 
du'l-Mulk, though even if it had the outrage would have been none the less. 

2 Shujau'd-Dawla is the title adopted by the bandit, Rahim Khan, men- 
tioned in the Introductory Chapter. He was protected constantly by the 
6 



112 THE STRANGLING OE PEESIA 

There were numerous other x examples of the hostile inter- 
ference on the part of the officials of the Russian Government 
with the affairs of Persia, a friendly sovereign nation. Almost 
any one of them, occurring between two governments of relative- 
ly equal strength, would have brought about war. In every 
case a diplomatic protest was duly prepared and presented by 
the Persian Government to the Russian Minister at Teheran. 
Similar representations were made by the Persian Legations at 
St. Petersburg and London. But in not a single instance that 
has been recorded was the slightest notice of these protests taken 
by the Russian Government, nor was a single Russian official 
punished for his acts. 

On the afternoon of July 30 I received a visit from a Persian 
military gentleman, of imposing presence, who informed me that 
he had been charged by the Government with leading the first 
expedition against the ex-Shah. His name was Sardar-i-Muhiy, 
though he has formerly been known as Muizzu's-Sultan. He 
had taken part in the advance on Teheran of the Nationalist 
forces under Sipahdar in 1909, and was accounted a brave 
fighter. He came into my office literally covered with automatic 
pistols and cartridges, of which latter 300 or more were 
garlanded in belts across his chest, waist and shoulders. He was 
a large man and wore long, bright yellow boots. He had agreed 
to form and lead several hundred volunteer cavalry against the 
Turcomans at Sharud, and as a preliminary he drew forth and 
presented a requisition signed by the Minister of War calling 
for about 26,000 tumans. This sum was largely made up of 
his salaries as military commander and as governor of the town 
of Astarabad (a place which there was no probability of his 

Russian troops in the neighborhood of Tabriz, and fraternized with the 
Russian officers. Russia made his presence the pretext for keeping her 
soldiers in Azarbayjan. 

1 For further instances see the Author's letter to the London Times- 
contained in Appendix C. 




SARDAR-T-ASAD. 

The Bakhtlyarl chieftain who led the Persian forces from Isfahan in 1 909 and with Sipahdar-1-Azam 

captured Teheran from Muhammad Ali and the Cossack Brigade. 



MILITAKY OPEKATIONS 115 

reaching), as well as a large " contingent fund " to be expended 
by him personally. This gentleman had already been paid by 
the Government the sum of 6000 tumans advance salary as 
Governor of the district of Kirman, for which place he had 
never even started. After some rather warm correspondence 
with the Cabinet, I paid the sum demanded, but soon found that 
this was but the first of a series of onslaughts which were com- 
menced by the Cabinet on the public treasury and continued up 
to the time that I left Teheran over five months later. There 
seemed to be hardly any one with any sort of a pretext for 
demanding money who did not secure the approval of the Cabinet 
or the Ministry of War and present his claim to the Treasury. 
The stream began and never stopped. In truth, it must be said 
that the efforts of the Cabinet to defeat the ex-Shah were tinged 
with a decided desire to see their favorites generously com- 
pensated. 

About this time the Bakhtiyari tribesmen, with their Khans, 
began to arrive at Teheran from the South, and the demands 
which most of them made for money were so preposterous and 
out of all proportion to a just compensation or to what their 
actual needs were that I was forced several times during the 
following months to threaten to resign if the Cabinet continued 
to sanction such wholesale attempts at looting the Treasury. 
Even the Minister of Finance, Hakimu'1-Mulk, expressed his 
shame at the actions of the Bakhtiyari chieftains, and declared 
that he also would resign if the Cabinet continued to support 
them. The first Bakhtiyaris to reach Teheran were com- 
manded by Muin-Homayun, one of the young Khans, who 
later displayed real pai iotism and great bravery in the cam- 
paign. 

By August 3 the Prince Salaru'd-Dawla liad reached the 
town of Kirmanshah in Western Persia, and having ordered the 
merchants to stop paying the Customs taxes, had promptly de- 



J 



116 THE STRANGLING OF PERSIA 

manded of them a " loan " of 50,000 tumans. He made a 
similar demand on the branch of the Imperial Bank there, but 
was refused. 

The Cabinet, including the Premier, Samsamu's-Saltana, now 
began to show marked hostility towards me on account of my 
protests against the official plundering which was going on, and 
the Premier refused to keep his promise to assist in the organiza- 
tion of the Treasury Gendarmerie by allowing me to have bar- 
racks and other equipment in the possession of the Ministry of 
War. 

The Government's forces at this time consisted of an indefinite 
number of unorganized Bakhtiyaris who were distributed in 
Isfahan, on the road to Teheran, and at Teheran, and 1200 
police and 500 gendarmes at the capital. There were also 500 
gendarmes under one of Ephraim's lieutenants at Kasvin, and 
some 200 Armenian volunteers, or " professional fighting-men," 
as they were called. 

On August 8 the news came that Arshadu'd-Dawla had de- 
feated a force of Government troops which had been stationed 
at Damghan, to the northeast of Teheran. A number of the 
Government troops on this occasion deserted to the ex-Shah. 
The Sipahdar, while he was Minister of War, had stationed 
these men there, with two cannon. These cannon, together with 
the other supplies and munitions, had fallen into the hands of 
the ex-Shah's troops. There were many who believed that the 
unfortunate affair was the result of a pre-arrangement by 
Sipahdar, whose treachery to the Constitutional Government 
was now generally acknowledged. 

During the month of August a number of Nationalist expe- 
ditions were sent out against the ex-Shah and his lieutenants 
in Northern Persia. The first substantial success which the 
Government troops obtained was at Eiruzkuh, in the mountains 
to the northeast of Teheran. Here, in a narrow pass, the 



MILITAKY OPERATION'S 117 

young Bakhtiyari chieftain, Muin-Homayun, defeated and cap- 
tured Rashidu's-Sultan and killed sixty of his men. 

On the night of August 15, 800 horsemen of Prince Salaru'd- 
Dawla's force occupied the town of Hamadan. There was no 
resistance by the Government troops of the regular army who 
were supposed to be stationed there. 

The movements and whereabouts of the ex-Shah himself were 
at this time a matter of great uncertainty. He was reported 
to have become panic-stricken on learning that a price of 100,000 
tumans had been put upon his head, and rumor had it that 
he immediately reembarked on the steamer which he had kept 
anchored off the coast ever since his landing. Ephraim had in 
the meantime been despatching small forces of picked men to 
guard the mountain passes leading to Teheran, and was hoping 
to get a force in Muhammad Ali's rear and cut him off from 
the sea. Ephraim himself, in view of the critical situation in 
Teheran, had decided not to go out against the ex-Shah's main 
forces until they were within striking distance of the capital. 

On August 11, I went to Gulhak to a dinner given by Colonel 
IT. P. Beddoes, the representative of Messrs. Seligman Bros, 
of London. The other guests were Sir George Barclay, the 
British Minister, his Russian colleague, Mons. S. Poklewski- 
Jvoziell, and Mr. W. A. Moore, correspondent of the London 
Times. The conditions in Persia were freely discussed and 
the Russian Minister was at no pains to conceal his belief that 
the ex-Shah would shortly be victorious and capture Teheran. 
The question of Major Stokes' appointment was gone into at 
length. After dinner we had several rubbers of bridge, and 
my good fortune in that game seemed to impress the Russian 
Minister with the ability of American financiers. 

During the course of the evening the Russian Minister and 
I strolled out on the balcony of the house. Mons. Poklewski- 
Koziell was a very engaging man. He again referred to the 



118 THE STRANGLING OF PERSIA 

incapacity of the Constitutional Government and asked me 
bluntly whether I would not be willing to remain under Muham- 
mad Ali, when he was restored to power, and be Treasurer- 
general or Vazir with full powers such as I then possessed. He 
assured me that if I would do so, I would have the full support 
of the Russian Government and would be suitably compensated. 
All that I needed to do in order to signify my acceptance of this 
offer was to remain passive until the change took place. The 
proposal was delicately worded, but its import was unmistak- 
able. I am quite sure that the Russian Minister regarded it 
as a highly proper suggestion, and that no insult was intended. 
Stripped of all diplomatic trimmings and phraseology, how- 
ever, it was plainly proposed that I should cease to aid or 
advise the existing Persian Government, allowing it to hurry 
into bankruptcy and ruin, and take service under a cruel and 
vicious monster who would be the cringing slave of the St. 
Petersburg cabinet. I told the Minister that I had agreed to 
serve the Persian Government to the best of my ability, and 
that whatever the outcome might be, I would not think of re- 
maining under Muhammad Ali. 

It has occurred to me since that the Russian diplomats at 
Teheran and Vienna displayed too much active interest in 
the success of the ex-Shah for the representatives of a govern- 
ment which the British Foreign Office officially declared to 
have been innocent of either knowledge of, or participation in, 
the violation of the Protocol of September, 1909. 

On August 15, in a long conversation, the Regent painted a 
very gloomy picture of the situation of Persia. He expressed, 
however, his satisfaction at the manner in which the Govern- 
ment's finances were being controlled, and stated that there 
were always loud complaints in Persia when any effective 
supervision of the funds was attempted. 

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MILITARY OPERATIONS 121 

Government arrived at the capital to take up their duties with 
the Ministry of the Interior in instructing the gendarmerie of 
that department. 

After several long debates which I had been having with the' 
Cabinet, it was now agreed that the payment of the troops of 
the so-called " central army " should be effected by the Treasury 
direct instead of by the Ministry of War. This enabled me to 
effect decided economies. 

On August 20 the Prince Salaru'd-Dawla was reported to 
be at Hamadan with 10,000 men preparing to march on Tehe- 
ran. At that time the total Nationalist forces in and about 
the capital did not exceed 3000 and there was another panic. 

Tuesday, August 22, was the young Shah's fourteenth birth- 
day, in honor of which a great salaam, or public reception, was 
held at his summer palace outside Teheran. I was unable to 
attend, but my principal assistant, Mr. Cairns, made the trip 
and presented His Majesty with a narwhal tusk, which Admiral 
Peary had brought back from his last polar expedition. It was 
signed with the famous discoverer's name, and had been sent 
to the Shah through the Persian Charge d' Affaires at Wash- 
ington, who had entrusted the valuable souvenir to Mr. Cairns 
for delivery. 

Sultan Ahmad Shah had never before seen Mr. Cairns, and 
through some mistake of the interpreters he for some time 
labored under the impression that Mr. Cairns was the discoverer 
of the North Pole who had come to present the tusk in person. 
The proper explanations were finally made, much to Mr. Cairns' 
relief. 

Life in Teheran at this time was not particularly pleasant. 
The heat, though dry, was quite severe, but the most annoying 
feature was the thick dust which arose early in the morning 
when traffic on the streets and roads began, and never settled 
until late at night. Fortunately, the Atabak palace was pro- 



122 THE STRANGLING OF PEESIA 

vided, as most large Persian houses are, with underground 
chambers which duplicated the entire first floor. These were 
always cool, even during the hottest part of the day, and in 
them I had established my personal offices. During the entire 
summer, from the middle of June until the end of September, 
all the foreign legations, most of the European residents of 
Teheran, and many wealthy Persians, move out of the city to 
the different summer resorts eight or more miles away on the 
slopes of the mountains, but as I had just started the work of 
organizing the Treasury, I felt it incumbent upon us to remain 
in town where the Government offices were located. 

During the latter part of August the demands for money 
made by the Bakhtiyari chieftains at Teheran became so out- 
rageous that I was compelled to refuse to honor any further 
requisitions in their favor until some definite military opera- 
tions had been conducted by them. They realized that the 
Government, through the utter incompetency of its regular 
army, was in a very tight place, and they evidently proposed 
to make the most of the situation. Their purely mercenary 
attitude was so plainly apparent that a great deal of bitter feel- 
ing was aroused against them at Teheran. 

In the course of visits from the Russian and British Minis- 
ters, we talked of the loan of £4,000,000 which I had been 
discussing for some time with the representatives of Messrs. 
Seligman Bros., of London. 

Later, Sir George Barclay spoke of the embarrassment which 
the condition of the southern trade routes was causing his Gov- 
ernment, and asked whether something could not be done to 
better things. I explained to him that the withdrawal of the 
Bakhtiyari tribesmen from these districts as a result of their 
being called to Teheran to take part in the defense of the Consti- 
tutional Government against the attacks of the ex-Shah had of 
course left many portions of the trade routes unguarded, a, 



MILITAEY OPERATIONS 123 

thing for which the Persian Government could hardly be held 
morally responsible under the circumstances. Sir George Bar- 
clay then proposed that I should take charge of the policing of 
these roads or should at least furnish from the newly organized 
Treasury Gendarmerie a sufficient force to restore order there. 
He stated that if he could cable his Government that I would 
undertake this task, it would relieve the British Foreign Office 
of great embarrassment as it was being constantly questioned 
and attacked in the House of Commons for the failure to prop- 
erly look out for British commercial interests in that portion 
of Persia. I replied that if the British Government would 
assist in the speedy formation of an adequate force of Treasury 
Gendarmes I would be entirely willing, with the approval of 
the Persian Cabinet, to undertake this work, but that the main 
factor in the organization of this gendarmerie was the services 
of Major Stokes, and that so long as his valuable assistance 
was denied the Treasury we did not see how we could under- 
take an additional difficult task of this kind, however desirous 
the British Government might be of seeing it accomplished. 

During this conversation I referred to what I considered the 
unjustifiable attitude of the British Government in refusing 
to keep its promise with regard to Major Stokes' services and 
in siding openly with the Russian Government in its attempt 
to interfere with Persia's most elementary sovereign rights. I 
laughingly suggested that since the attitude of these two powers 
was so manifestly hostile to Persia's welfare, it might be found 
advisable to offer certain concessions to German interests, which 
had for sometime previously been seeking an entry into the 
western part of Persia. The British Minister's horror at this 
grim joke was so real that I hastily changed the subject. 

At this time there was a force of Bakhtiyari tribesmen under 
the command of Amir-i-Mufakhkham, located near Hamadan for 
the purpose of opposing the advance of Salaru'd-Dawla's troops. 



124 THE STKANGLING OF PEKSIA 

The Bakhtiyaris of this force had already been paid for their 
services, but the chieftains at Teheran — and especially one of 
the brothers of Sanisamu's-Saltana, named Sardar-i-Jang — 
demanded the payment of a further amount of 60,000 tumans; 
before they would give the orders for Amir-i-Mufakhkham to 
take the field. This attempt to gouge the bankrupt Persian 
Government was so flagrant that I felt compelled to inform the 
local press of the situation, and it was soon known in Teheran, 
to the great discomfiture of the Bakhtiyari chieftains. 1 

On August 28 the Turcomans under the command of 
Arshadu'd-Dawla advancing along the road to Teheran had 
reached the town of Aiwan-i-Kaif, where they met and defeated 
a smaller force of irregular troops of the Government. This 
was about fifty-six miles from the capital. Some reinforce- 
ments were immediately despatched under the command of 
Amir-Mujahid, a younger brother of Samsamu's-Saltana. 

On September 4 word came that Arshadu'd-Dawla was 
advancing upon Teheran and that he was very near the town 
of Imamzadeh-JafTar, about forty miles to the southeast of 
Teheran. Ephraim left Teheran immediately with 350 picked 
men, accompanied by Major Haase, the German artillery 
instructor, in charge of a Maxim gun and three Schneider quick- 
firers. The report was that the Bakhtiyari forces under Amir- 
Mujahid had been defeated. Messrs. Moore and Moloney, the 
correspondents of the London Times and of Reuter's JSTews 
Agency, respectively, and Mr. J. 1ST. Merrill, an American 
assistant who had shortly before arrived at Teheran and was in 

1 In addition to this the loyalty of Amir-i-Mufakhkham himself was a 
matter of serious doubt. Two years before, in 1909, he had taken the side 
of the ex-Shah against the Nationalist forces. Sometime later these sus- 
picions as to his real intentions were confirmed by his cowardly actions in 
an engagement which took place between a portion of Salaru'd-Dawla's 
troops and the Bakhtiyaris under his command, in which the Government 
forces were utterly routed and fled without offering any real resistance to 
the' rebels. 



A NATIONALIST VICTORY 127 

charge of the Treasury Gendarmerie, left in an endeavor to 
catch up with the Government forces and see the engagement. 

On Tuesday, September 5, at 11 o'clock in the morning, the 
Nationalist forces under the command of Ephraim attacked the 
ex-Shah's forces composed of about 2000 Turcomans and Per- 
sians under Arshadu'd-Dawla. Fourteen hundred of the enemy 
were mounted. The Government forces consisted of about 500 
Bakhtiyaris, about 180 Armenian volunteers and gendarmes, 
three Schneider cannon and one Maxim gun. The Bakhtiyari 
cavalry were under the direct command of Sardar-i-Buhadur 
and Sardar-i-Mutashem. The other Government forces, under 
Amir-Mujahid, were still facing Arshadu'd-Dawla about two 
miles south of Imamzadeh-JafTar. They consisted of about 400 
Bakhtiyaris and a few gendarmes. An hour before noon 
Arshadu'd-Dawla was posted on a hill about one-half mile 
square, defended by four cannon. He had sent 300 Turcomans 
into the village of Veramin to create a panic there. When the 
Government troops under Ephraim had reached the neighbor- 
hood early that morning they had heard firing between the 
troops of Amir-Mujahid and the Turcomans. 

Ephraim sent Major Haase with the Maxim g.in and Sardar- 
i-Buhadur and his cavalry to an elevation around the right 
flank of Arshadu'd-Dawla's forces. They reached a command- 
ing position unobserved and opened fire with the Maxim gun 
on the Turcomans. According to the story of Arshadu'd-Dawla 
himself (who was subsequently captured), the barking of the 
Maxim gun frightened the Turcomans terribly and threw them 
into confusion. Their commanders were unable to restore order 
and when the Bakhtiyari cavalry led by Sardar-i-Buhadur 
charged them, they broke and fled in confusion. Arshadu'd- 
Dawla was wounded in the foot and was unable to escape. He 
was captured by a party of Bakhtiyaris. 

The Turcomans left 60 or 70 dead and between 300 and 400 



128 THE STRANGLING OF PERSIA 

prisoners and wounded. The rest fled precipitately to the 
south, to gain the Meshed Road and return to their territory on 
the northeastern frontier. The fight was over at one in the 
afternoon of Tuesday. The Bakhtiyaris did not pursue the 
enemy, it is said because they were exhausted by the long ride 
of the previous night and morning. 

Arshadu'd-Dawla was brought to Ephraim's headquarters 
about midnight Tuesday and was treated with extreme polite- 
ness by the Nationalist chiefs. He received medical attention 
for his wound, was made comfortable and supplied with food, 
drink and cigarettes. He reclined in the midst of a circle com- 
posed of Ephraim, Major Haase, the Bakhtiyari chiefs, and 
Messrs. Moore, Moloney and Merrill. 

Arshadu'd-Dawla was then asked about the movements of 
the ex-Shah in Vienna and after leaving there. He replied 
that at Vienna Muhammad Ali Mirza and he had twice inter- 
viewed the Russian Ambassador there, who had told them that 
neither Russia nor England could take any part in the internal 
struggle which would result from Muhammad Ali's entering 
Persia to regain the throne, but that if he was able to do so 
the road was clear. Arshadu'd-Dawla said Muhammad Ali 
asked for men, arms and money, but the Russian Ambassador 
replied that this could not be granted. The Russian Ambassa- 
dor, however, apparently gave them some assurances, since they 
were able to take with them three Austrian cannon, packed in 
boxes, through Russia, from Vienna to Baku, without any dif- 
ficulty made either on the score of their passports or their bag- 
gage. When asked how these boxes of heavy war materials 
were taken all the way across Russia without detection, he 
explained that they were marked " mineral water." He also 
stated that Muhammad Ali had traveled with a false passport 
describing him as a merchant of Bagdad named Khalil. 

Arshadu'd-Dawla had quantities of ammunition, his men 



DEFEAT OF ARSHADU'D-DAWLA 129 

were armed with Austrian carbines of good type and he had 
a case containing a considerable sum of Persian money. 

During his talk with the chiefs he pleaded very strongly, 
though not in so many words, for his life. He asked pitifully 
not to have the meeting break up, but they assured him that he 
could have a good night's sleep and be ready for the morrow. 

Early the next morning, some twenty gendarmes, under 
orders, led him, unbandaged, up against a wall and fired' upon 
him. He fell forward throwing up his hands in a dramatic 
manner, but upon examination was found to be still alive, only 
one bullet having hit him. He was left on the ground for a 
short time while a file of Armenian volunteers was marched 
up, the Persian troops had proven suspiciously poor marks- 
men. A donkey which had strolled in between him and the wall 
was driven off. While this was happening Arshadu'd-Dawla 
got upon his knees and exclaimed in Persian : " Zindabad 
Muhammad Alt Shah!" (Long live Shah Muhammad Ali!) 
When the second volley was fired he was hit in a number of 
places and instantly killed. 

Neither Ephraim nor any of the chiefs were present at the 
execution, but Messrs. Moore, Moloney and Merrill were. 

Arshadu'd-Dawla died without fear or any sign of regret for 
his actions against the Government. He requested that his 
body be sent to Teheran to his wife and that the golden locket 
and necklace, which he wore, should be buried with him. His 
body was brought to Teheran on September 6, and on the next 
day was exposed publicly in the Maidan (public square). It 
was propped up against an ordinary cart, and a large crowd of 
people viewed the spectacle. The reason for this rather unusual 
proceeding was the necessity which the Government felt of con- 
vincing the people that this well-known general had actually 
been killed and his Turcomans defeated. Ephraim afterwards 
told me that the reason for having him executed at once on the 



130 THE STRANGLING OF PEESIA 

field of battle was that, if he had been brought to Teheran, some 
pretext would undoubtedly have been found by the Russian 
Legation for interceding in his behalf. 

This defeat was generally regarded as a death blow to the 
ex-Shah's chances of capturing Teheran. Arshadu'd-Dawla 
was his bravest and most skilful general, and had succeeded by 
a very remarkable and courageous dash in getting within forty 
miles of the capital. If he had not been intercepted and 
defeated by Ephraim's forces, Teheran would have fallen into 
his hands without effectual resistance of any kind, and the city 
would have been given over to the Turcomans to plunder and 
pillage. The results of turning several thousand barbarians 
into the city with permission to wreak their wills would have 
been too frightful to contemplate. A large number of Turco- 
man prisoners — many of them old men with white beards — 
were brought to Teheran within the next few days, as well as 
the four captured cannon and a considerable number of rifles. 
The main body of the Turcomans who escaped retreated up the 
Meshed Road at full gallop. They evidently expected to be 
pursued by the Bakhtiyari cavalry, and although not a single 
horseman went in pursuit of them they pushed on until a large 
number of their horses dropped with fatigue. There are a 
number of small telegraph stations along this road belonging to 
the Meshed branch of the Indo-European Telegraph Company. 
The British telegraph official at Teheran in charge of this 
branch, learning immediately of the defeat of the Turcomans, 
had instructions wired to his operators all along the road to 
inform the Turcomans as they passed that the Bakhtiyaris were 
" just behind them." As a result of this trick the rebels were 
kept in full flight and prevented from pillaging the country 
people and small villages along the road, as they had been doing 
and would doubtless have done upon this occasion. 

At this time the city of Tabriz was reported to be seriously 



DEFEAT OF AKSHADU'D-DAWLA 133 

threatened by Shujaju'd-Dawla with a large force of Shah- 
sevens. With the defeat of Arshadu'd-Dawla, however, the 
only remaining force upon which the ex-Shah and his followers 
could base their political hopes was that of his brother, Prince 
Salaru'd-Dawla, in the district of Hamadan. 



CHAPTEE V 

MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST PRINCE SALARu'd-DAWLA. HIS 
DEFEAT BY THE GOVERNMENT PORCES. THE INCIDENT ARIS- 
ING FROM THE CONFISCATION BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE 
ESTATES OF PRINCE SHUAIj's-SALTANA. MY LETTER TO THE 
LONDON " TIMES." 

DURING the early part of September the Government 
forces under the Bakhtiyari chieftain, Amir-i-Mufakh- 
kham, had been defeated near the town of Malayer by the troops 
of Prince Salaru'd-Dawla. The Bakhtiyaris lost in killed and 
captured, 200 men and a number of rifles, cannon and cartridges. 
Their treacherous commander claimed also to have lost the sum 
of 15,000 tumans which he had shortly before received from the 
branch of the Imperial Bank at Hamadan. Another Govern- 
ment general, Amir-Nizam, had also surrendered, under very 
suspicious circumstances, to Salaru'd-Dawla, several big guns 
which the Government had entrusted to him for the defense of 
Hamadan. 

On September 11 another engagement occurred between the 
government forces at Sabatkuh under Muin-Homayun and the 
troops which were accompanying the ex-Shah and his brother 
Shuau's-Saltana. The ex-Shah's forces were completely routed 
and he and his brother escaped with great difficulty under cover 
of a thick fog. He was reported at this time to have fled to 
Gumesh-Teppeh with only seven followers. 

By September 18 Prince Salaru'd-Dawla was advancing from 
Hamadan towards Teheran apparently unopposed by any Gov- 
ernment forces. In his proclamations to the people he styled 

134 



DEFEAT OF SALARU'D-DAWLA 135 

himself " King/' and telegraphed from one place to both the 
Med j lis and Council of Ministers, addressing them as " my 
Medjlis " and " my Ministers." On September 27 the Bakhti- 
yari forces of the Government, having been joined by Ephraim 
with his volunteers and artillery, met and defeated the main 
army of Prince Salaru'd-Dawla at a small village called Bagh- 
i-Shah between the towns of Qum and Nuvaran, about ninety 
miles to the southeast of Teheran. With Ephraim were the 
Bakhtiyari chiefs Sardar-i-Buhadur, Sardar-i-Mutashem, and 
Sardar-i-Jang. The Prince Salaru'd-Dawla had about 6000 
men, all told. He lost 500 in killed and wounded and 200' pris- 
oners. The Nationalist forces were less than 2000 men. Their 
losses were reported to be the surprisingly small number of two 
killed and six wounded. Six cannon and a large quantity of 
ammunition were captured. The Prince Salaru'd-Dawla 
retreated in full flight toward the southwest, and his chances of 
capturing Teheran and establishing himself upon the throne 
promptly vanished. Had he been energetically pursued by the 
Government forces, he would undoubtedly have been captured, 
as at one time he was but a few miles in the lead. 

By the early part of October, therefore, the Nationalists had 
been successful in two campaigns, as a result of which both the 
ex-Shah and his brothers were in flight and their forces com- 
pletely shattered. 

The credit for these two victories is almost entirely due to 
the skill, energy and courage of Ephraim Khan. On his return 
to Teheran he was presented by the Medjlis with a gem-studded 
sword, was given a pension of 300 tumans a month, and the 
post of " Commander of the Army of the North." 

There still remained some small bodies of the ex-Shah's fol- 
lowers near Astarabad, and against these Muin-Homayun was 
despatched with 500 Government troops about October 8. 

The famous old bandit, Naib Husayn, was again making trou- 



136 THE STRANGLING OF PERSIA 

ble for the Government near the town of Kashan, which lies 
directly south of Teheran, between Qum and Isfahan. Against 
him the Government at my suggestion, sent 250 troops of the 
Cossack Brigade with some Russian officers, to cooperate with a 
Bakhtiyari force of 300 coming up from Isfahan. The Cos- 
sacks, however, finally returned to Teheran without accomplish- 
ing any practical results. 

On October 4 the Council of Ministers transmitted to me an 
order for the confiscation and seizure of the estates and prop- 
erty of Princes Shuau's-Saltana and Salaru'd-Dawla, directing 
that I, as Treasurer-general, should execute the same, and con- 
vert the properties into the Persian Treasury. 

The issuance of such an order was, of course, perfectly law- 
ful and proper, as the three persons against whom it was directed 
had not only violated their agreements with the Constitutional 
Government, but had engaged, at the head of armed forces, in 
open and notorious rebellion. 

When the Persian Government decided to take this step it 
sent an official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to notify the 
British and Russian Legations of the contemplated measures, 
as a mere matter of courtesy, with the information that if any 
foreign interests should be found to exist in connection with 
these estates, all rights of foreigners would be fully safeguarded 
and guaranteed by the government. Neither Legation offered 
the slightest objection. 

The order of confiscation contained a clause to the same 
effect. 

On Monday, October 9, I gave the necessary instructions for 
its execution. Not anticipating the slightest difficulty in the 
actual seizure of the estates, under these circumstances, I 
despatched in all six parties, each composed of a civilian official 
of the Treasury, an officer of the Treasury Gendarmerie, and 
five gendarmes. They were ordered to seize, in the name of 




THE MOUNTAIN GUN DETACHMENT STARTING ON AN EXPEDITION. 
Major Haase, the German artillery Instructor, is in the center on horseback. 




THE QUICK-FIRING GUNS OF EPHRAIM 'S GENDARMES AT TEHERAN. 



THE SHUAU'S-SALTANA INCIDENT 139 

the Government, the different properties in and about the city 
of Teheran. 

The principal estate was the park and palace of Prince 
Shuau's-Saltana, situated in the city proper, not very far from 
Atabak Park. It was a very magnificent building, filled with 
rare and costly furniture, tapestries, rugs and bric-a-brac, and 
surrounded by a large garden, enclosed with a massive wall. In 
it some of the wives and children and the mother of Prince 
Shuau's-Saltana continued to reside. 

What happened upon the arrival of the seizure parties at 
these different properties can be best shown by the following 
translation of the official report which I made on the affair to 
the Council of Ministers on October 10. The translation, from 
the French original, is as follows: 

Teheban, October 10, 1911. 
To the Council of Ministers: 

I have the honor to present to the Council of Ministers the following 
report of the incidents connected with the execution of the order of con- 
fiscation, dated October 4, 1911, transmitted to me by the Council of Min- 
isters, whereunder I was to take possession of all the properties of the 
rebels Shuau's-Saltana and Salaru'd-Dawla, in the name of the Imperial 
Government. 

In conformity with this order I gave the necessary instructions to six 
parties of gendarmes, each composed of a civilian official, an officer of the 
Treasury Gendarmerie, and five gendarmes, indicating to them the six 
properties belonging to these two rebels, and the spot to which each party 
should proceed. 

There were first four properties belonging to Shuau's-Saltana, to-wit, 
a garden situated in the city of Teheran, a garden near Gulhak, called 
" Chizeh/' and two estates situated outside Teheran, called Dawlatabad 
and Mansuriabad, respectively; there were also two properties belonging to 
Salaru'd-Dawla, to-wit, one situated in the district of " Chariar," and the 
other called " Mardabad." 

The instructions given to my agents were to the effect that they should 
take peaceable possession of these properties in the name of the Imperial 
Government, making known to the persons who might be found in actual 
charge of the estates the terms and conditions of the order of confiscation 



140 THE STRANGLING OF PERSIA 

issued by the Council of Ministers, and calling special attention to the 
fact that any contracts which might exist with foreign subjects would be 
fully respected by the Imperial Government, but that in case there sbould 
be a rental agreement with any foreign subject, the rent for the property 
to be paid in accordance with the agreement should be remitted to the 
Treasurer-general of the Government until the expiration of the term. 

I also informed my agents, in the clearest possible way, that in case 
any unforeseen incident should arise, they should act with the greatest 
discretion, and display all possible patience, and that tbey should under 
no circumstances use violence without having obtained from me further 
instructions. 

Yesterday, October 9, about ten o'clock in the morning, one of these 
parties, composed of a civilian official, two agents of the Cadastre, an 
officer of the Treasury Gendarmerie and four soldiers, proceeded to the 
gate of the park of Shuau's-Saltana, situated in the city of Teheran. 

I insert here the translation of the report dated October 9 and signed 
by Ali Asghar, officer of the Treasury Gendarmerie, and by Muhammad 
Nazar, the civilian official: — 

To Mr. Shuster, 

Treasurer-general of Persia. 

This 15th of Chawal, at 10 o'clock in the morning, I, the undersigned, 
accompanied by Mirza Ali Asghar Khan, two agents of the Cadastre, and 
four gendarmes, proceeded to the park of Shuau's-Saltana. Arrived before 
the gate of the park some Persian Cossacks told us not to enter. After 
having communicated to them the order to confiscate all the property of 
Shuau's-Saltana, we entered the garden, placed a gendarme at the gate, 
and commenced to open the rooms and make an inventory of the furni- 
ture. 

In the meantime one of the Cossacks had communicated by telephone 
with the Cossack Brigade, and we next saw two Russian officers enter the 
apartments, saying with fury that we had no right to enter the park and 
that we should depart immediately. 

As soon as Mirza Ali Asghar Khan had stated in Russian that we had 
received the order of the Government to be there, they commenced to 
threaten us, declaring that if we did not leave at once, they would have 
us beaten by the Cossacks ; in fact, they called up a dozen Russian Cossacks 
who were waiting behind and gave them the order to attack us. In vain 
Mirza Ali Asghar wished to telephone. 

Not being authorized to resist beyond this point, we called our men and 



THE SHUAU'S-SALTANA INCIDENT 141 

left the garden. Nevertheless the Russian officers and Cossacks followed us 
to the end of the street, threatening us if we did not hasten our departure. 

(Signed) Muhammad Nazak, 
Au Asghab. 

According to the details furnished by these two officials in their verbal 
report, their lives were threatened by the two officers of the Russian 
Consulate (who were in full uniform) and by the armed Russian Cossacks 
who were under their orders. 

On leaving the garden the Persian officials came to give me their report 
of the affair. About 11:30 A. m. I sent to His Excellency, Mr. Poklewski- 
Koziell, Russian Minister, the following telegram in English: — 

His Excellency, 

S. Poklewski-Koziell, 

Russian Minister, Zargundeh. 
I regret to have to inform you that this morning about nine o'clock 
I sent my representatives to seize the properties of Shuau's-Saltana in 
accordance with the order of confiscation given by the Imperial Government, 
and that after my representative had taken possession of the garden and 
while he was making an official inventory two Russian officers from your 
Consulate with ten Russian Cossacks appeared at the garden and ordered 
my representative and guard to leave, threatening to fire on them if they 
did not do so ; and to fire on them if they again appeared in the neighboring 
street. My representatives then left under menace of being fired on. I feel 
sure that your Excellency will recognize that this action by your Consular 
officers is wholly unwarranted and unlawful and I therefore request you 
in this friendly manner to give immediate orders to your Consulate to 
have their force withdrawn and to inform me of their withdrawal. 

W. Morgan Shtjster, 

Treasurer-general. 

After having dispatched this telegram I wrote a letter to Mons. 
Poklewski-Koziell, confirming my telegram and adding the following para- 
graph which I insert here in its original English text: 

As the order given me by the Council of Ministers is explicit and impera- 
tive, and as I have no alternative but to execute the same at once, I feel 
that I should inform you that I will send my representatives there to- 
morrow morning at ten o'clock to take possession of the garden in question, 
and I sincerely trust the necessary arrangements will have been made to 
avoid the possibility of any unpleasant incident of any description. 

Again expressing my personal regret that any misunderstanding should 



142 THE STKANGLING OF PEKSIA 

have arisen on this matter, I beg to remain, dear Mr. Minister, with kindest 
regards, etc. . . . 

Towards eleven o'clock in the evening I received from Mons. Poklewski 
the following reply to my telegram: 

Private. 

Mons. Morgan Shuster, Teheran. 

Your wire, letter received. Dawlatabad is a property rented by two 
Russian subjects and no measures against it ought to have been taken with- 
out previously assuring Consulate-general that all rights of Russian subjects 
will be safeguarded and their contract not interfered with. It is on this 
explicit condition that measures taken by Persian Government against 
property of Shuau's-Saltana will not be opposed by Russian Legation 
which will also hold Persian Government responsible for any claims sub- 
jects may have against Shuau's-Saltana. 

(Signed) Poklewski. 

I invite the special attention of the Council of Ministers to the fact 
that not only did His Excellency the Russian Minister not reply at all 
to the request which I had made in my telegram concerning the with- 
drawal of the force sent into the garden of Shuau's-Saltana in Teheran, 
but he referred in his reply to the estate of Dawlatabad, which is out- 
side the city and of which I had made no mention in my two communi- 
cations. 

After having notified His Excellency the Russian Minister that at 
10 o'clock this morning I was going to send my representatives to the 
garden of Shuau's-Saltana in Teheran, to take possession of the prop- 
erty, and had received no reply on this subject, nothing remained but 
to carry out that intention. 

This morning then, at 10 o'clock, I sent my representative, Mr. Cairns, 
with a force composed of fifty Treasury gendarmes, commanded by five 
Persian officers, and fifty gendarmes of the city police, commanded by 
three officers. This force was placed under the direct orders of one of 
my American assistants, Mr. Merrill. 

I had given personally to Mr. Merrill and to the other officers strict 
instructions by the terms of which they were to take possession of the 
garden of Shuau's-Saltana, peaceably, if possible; if forcible opposition 
was made to the execution of the orders, they were under no circum- 
stances to fire the first shot, but on the contrary to allow the Cossacks 
to fire first upon them. Under any circumstances, they were to carry 
out their orders and take possession of the property. 




COMPANY OF "AMNIEH," PERSIAN ROADGUARDS, WITH THEIR OFFICERS. 




EPHRAIM KHAN AND SARDAR-I-BAHADTJR DURING THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST 

THE SHAHSEVENS. 



THE SHUAU'S-SALTANA INCIDENT 145 

After having received these instructions, and having arrived in front 
of the garden, Mr. Cairns and Mr. Merrill entered the Russian Consulate, 
which was near by, with an officer of the Treasury Gendarmerie who speaks 
Russian, and having been received by Mons. Pokhitanof, the Russian 
Consul-general, Mr. Cairns explained to him the object of their visit, 
reading to him the order of confiscation and repeating the instructions 
which he had received, at the same time assuring him that the rights 
of any foreigners would be respected, etc. Mr. Cairns then requested 
the Consul-general to withdraw the force which had been placed in the 
garden. 

After some discussion the Russian Consul-general refused absolutely 
to withdraw this force. I should state here that the Consul-general 
during the entire conversation gave Mr. Cairns and Mr. Merrill the im- 
pression that the force which was in the garden was stationed there 
by the instructions of the Consul-general himself, and, I repeat, the 
Consul refused absolutely to withdraw it. Mr. Cairns thereupon noti- 
fied him that he would take possession of the garden by force. 

The necessary orders having been given, the Government gendarmes 
proceeded to an iron gate of the garden and saw inside some six or 
seven Persian Cossacks, armed with rifles. Demand was made upon them 
to open the gate and they were told that if they did not allow the 
Government gendarmes to enter peaceably, force would be employed. The 
Persian Cossacks replied that they did not have the key; the Govern- 
ment gendarmes, not wishing any further delay, went to another gate 
which they found a short distance away, and by this entered the garden. 
They took the arms from the Persian Cossacks and informed them that 
if they would withdraw without resistance, they might do so in peace. 
The Persian Cossacks accepted, and their arms having been surrendered, 
they departed, leaving the Treasury gendarmes in complete possession 
of the garden. 

Strict orders were given concerning the taking of an inventory of 
the furniture, etc., and the superintendent was informed that the women 
who were living in the Anderun would not be incommoded and that 
they could either remain there or leave at their convenience. Further- 
more, I sent a member of the family which resided in the Anderun to 
express regrets at the necessity of taking any steps which might incon- 
venience them, but that they might be sure of not being annoyed in 
any manner and that they might remain there a sufficient time to permit 
them to make new arrangements. 

This afternoon, about 2:30 o'clock, I received a telephone message from 
the Persian officer who had been left in charge of the garden, informing 
me that a few minutes previous three officers in uniform and armed, two 



146 THE STEANGLING OF PEESIA 

of whom seemed to be from the Russian Consulate, the other being Ayoub 
Khan, a " Sarhang " of the Cossack Brigade, drove up before the gate. 
The sentries signaled to them with their hands that no one could enter. 
The Cossack officer having stepped out of the carriage, the Russians 
called to him, saying, " They are going to fire on you," to which the 
Cossack officer replied, " No," and the sentries likewise said that they 
were not going to fire. The Russian officers, according to my informa- 
tion, then began to insult and threaten the officers and gendarmes of the 
Government. After some time they went away from the gate without 
further incident. 

Yesterday evening, about 6 o'clock, I received the verbal reports of 
the officers and officials who had been sent to take possession of the 
properties of Dawlatabad and Mansuriabad. 

After having arrived with their respective detachments at these two 
places and after having read the order of confiscation to the persons 
whom they found there, the representatives of the Government took peace- 
able possession of the two properties, and the two officers, after posting 
sentries, entered the houses; but, sometime later, two officers of the 
Russian Consulate, in uniform, arrived with fourteen or fifteen Russian 
Cossacks and suddenly entered the house at Dawlatabad; one of the 
Consular officers seized the Treasury Gendarmerie officer by one arm, 
while a Russian Cossack seized the other, and demanding to know whether 
he carried any weapons, they searched him. The Cossacks thereupon 
made the gendarmes prisoners, one after another, at their different posts, 
and took possession of their arms. They were then locked in a room 
under a guard of three Cossacks. The detachment of Cossacks then went 
to Mansuriabad, about two kilometers away, where the same scene was 
enacted. Having assembled the prisoners, the Russian Consular officials 
made the officers enter carriages with them, caused the gendarmes to 
mount donkeys, and conducted the party under arrest, surrounded by 
Cossacks, to the Russian Consulate in Teheran. 

There the Russian Consular officials warned them not to repeat their 
actions in connection with the properties of Shuau's-Saltana and 
Salaru'd-Dawla, " who are Russian subjects." After having further en- 
joined them, they gave back to the gendarmes their arms and cartridges 
and allowed them to go. 

Regarding the property of "Chizeh," near Gulhak, the party which 
was sent there to take possession informs me that they executed the 
order without difficulty; at the present time they are in peaceable 
possession. 

Regarding the properties of Salaru'd-Dawla, which are some distance 
away, I have not yet received any news. 



THE SHUAU'S-SALTANA INCIDENT 147 

I cannot conclude this report without expressing my clear conviction 
that, in this entire affair, the Russian Consulate-general and its officials 
have acted in a totally unjustifiable manner and absolutely contrary to 
the laws and the sovereignty of the Imperial Government. At the same 
time I should state that in my opinion my representatives have comported 
themselves throughout in a thoroughly proper and dignified way, under 
peculiarly difficult conditions. 

After this incident took place there was a Russian com- 
munique to the press, suggesting that Mr. Cairns had broken off 
a conference with the Russian Consul-general or that a " con- 
ference " was going on when the final seizure was made. 

There was of course no " conference " whatever in the sense 
evidently intended in that statement. There was a courteous 
call by Mr. Cairns on Mons. Pokhitanof, in an endeavor to pre- 
vent what might have been very regrettable occurrences. Find- 
ing, however, that no possible explanations or assurances could 
dissuade this insubordinate official from the attitude he was 
bent on adopting, Mr. Cairns departed, expressing the hope 
that there would be no trouble when he took the property. 

It will be noted that two hours after the Treasury officials 
were in peaceable possession of this place, MM. Petroff and 
Hildebrand, the same two Russian Vice-consuls who had led 
the first assault by the Russian Cossacks the day before, drove 
up to the gate and commenced abusing the Persian sentries 
there, telling them that they would be killed, and employing vile 
insults — all in an endeavor to provoke these ignorant guards 
into losing their temper and taking some action which these 
Consular officials could construe into an insult to the Russian 
Government. In other words, finding that they had been 
thwarted in their effort to obtain, however illegally, the posses- 
sion of these properties, these Russian officials deliberately 
sought to involve their Government in the dispute. 

Eortunately, the Treasury gendarmes had received such strict 
instructions that they kept perfect control of themselves and 



148 THE STRANGLING OF PERSIA 

refused to be entrapped into noticing the insults and impre- 
cations which were addressed to them by these valiant Consuls, 
who thereupon drove away and reported, with absolute falsity, 
that the affront had actually occurred which they had gone 
there to provoke. 

These false statements were reported to St. Petersburg by 
Mons. Pokhitanof independently of his Minister, who, I have 
the strongest reason to believe, entirely disavowed the Russian 
Consul-general's actions in the whole affair. The position offi- 
cially taken by the Russian Government shortly thereafter, how- 
ever, showed the truly remarkable absence of all discipline or 
coordination in the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Here 
was a plain case calling for careful investigation and recom- 
mendation by the diplomatic representative at Teheran, yet, dis- 
regarding every element of truth and justice, the St. Peters- 
burg Cabinet, in which the " forward party " had obtained the 
complete ascendancy with the appointment of Mons. Kokovtsoff, 
now upheld its insubordinate Consul-general, to the notorious 
discredit of its Minister, merely because it suited the secret pur- 
poses of the Cabinet to act on Pokhitanof s false reports. 

The low esteem in which Mons. Pokhitanof was held both by 
his own Minister and by the British Minister was notorious 
in Teheran. Sir George Barclay would not receive him so- 
cially and declared his actions in the Shuau's-Saltana affair to 
have been those of a crazy man. Relations between Pokhitanof 
and Mons. Poklewski-Koziell thereafter became so strained that 
neither the Consul-general nor his staff nor family attended the 
annual official ball given at the Russian Legation on December 
19, although practically every other member of the European 
colony was present. 

The afternoon of the day that Pokhitanof's Cossacks drove 
out the Treasury gendarmes from Shuau's-Saltana's garden, 
Mons. Poklewski-Koziell, who was at his summer quarters in 




ARTILLERY BELONGING TO EPHRAIM'S GENDARMERIE AT TEHERAN. 




SIPAHDAR-I-AZAM WITH HIS STAFF. 



THE SHUAU'S-SALTANA INCIDENT 151 

Zargundeh some miles outside the city, called the Consul-gen- 
eral on the telephone and demanded to know why he had inter- 
fered in the matter. A heated argument took place over the 
wire, at the conclusion of which the Russian Minister demanded 
to know what justification Pokhitanof had for his actions. The 
latter replied that he had his reasons. Poklewski then said that 
if he (Pokhitanof) had no excuse, he had better find one very 
shortly, as I had telegraphed a complaint. Pokhitanof then 
stated that he would " send up some papers." l 

A messenger was at once despatched by Pokhitanof to the 
Banque d'Escompte to get a certain fictitious obligation which 
Shuau's-Saltana had executed to the Bank several years before 
at the time when the terms of Muhammad Ali's deposition were 
being arranged. Shuau's-Saltana had given this instrument in 
the hope that the Russian Bank, acting in collusion with him, 
would be able to collect some 225,000 tumans from the Con- 
stitutional Government on the grounds that Shuau's-Saltana 
(the deposed Shah's brother) was indebted to the Bank to that 
extent. It was notorious, however, that far from owing the 
Bank anything, he was its creditor to a considerable extent — 
a fact which I was subsequently enabled to prove by an au- 
thenticated copy of his will made just before he left Persia. 
This attempt by the Russian State Bank to defraud the Persian 
Government of a large sum was so flagrant that the British Min- 
ister took sides with the Persians, and the scheme failed. It 
was this same fraudulent paper which Pokhitanof relied on to 
establish his contention that the Banque d'Escompte held a 
mortgage on Shuau's-Saltana's garden. The exact status of the 
Bank's accounts with Shuau's-Saltana was immediately con- 
veyed to me from a confidential source, as well as the fact that 
Pokhitanof had obtained from the Bank that day the paper in 

i This entire conversation was reported to me that same evening by a Per- 
sian telephone employee — who understood Russian and had overheard the 
discussion. 



152 THE STRANGLING OF PERSIA 

question. The Russian Government never presented the slight- 
est evidence in support of its claim that the Banque d'Escompte 
had any interest in the Shuau's-Saltana's property. 1 

Ever since the 8th of August when the British and Russian 
Governments had attempted to intimidate the Persian Govern- 
ment into renouncing any effort to secure the services of Major 
Stokes for the organization of the Treasury Gendarmerie, I had 
been carrying on very friendly but purely informal negotia- 
tions with both Mons. Poklewski-Koziell and Sir George Bar- 
clay in the endeavor to bring their Governments to see the ben- 
efits which would accrue from the withdrawal of their opposi- 
tion, as well as the injustice of their attitude, toward Persia. 
I think that it is not going too far to say that both these gentle- 
men became thoroughly convinced that my request was a most 
reasonable one and that it arose from no other motive than a 
desire to secure efficient help for a rather difficult task. The 
St. Petersburg Cabinet, however, had far different things in 
mind than the rapid reorganization of Persia's finances. The 
Russian Government had become convinced by one or two inci- 
dents, which I somewhat doubt the propriety of my mention- 
ing at this time, that it could not expect the American finance 

i Articles IV and VI of Shuau's-Saltana's last will and testament read as 
follows : 

IV. " A cette date, je possede a la Banque d'Escompte une somme de 
18.000 Tumans au eomptant, en compte courant, et je possede egalement 
une somme de pres de 20.000 tumans a la Banque Imperiale, qui, a cause 
d'une certaine difference, ne me l'a pas payee et qui retient injustement 
mon solde crediteur. Mes executeurs testamentaires tacheront evidemment 
a poursuivre cette affaire et a ne point laisser se perdre le droit de mes 
heritiers mineurs." 

VI. " Mon unique dette, a cette date, consiste en une obligation de 
46.000 tumans envers ma mere Nozhat-es-Saltana, sur laquelle obligation 
j'ai deja paye 3.000 Tumans. II reste done un solde de 43.000 tumans 
dont je suis redevable a ma mere d'apres cette meme obligation imprimee 
et redigee de la main de Montakhab'd-Dawla ( le . . . ) . 

Outre cette dette due a ma mere, je ne dois plus rien absolument a per- 
sonne a quelque titre que ce soit. Et si une obligation venait a etre ex- 
liibee par une personne quelconque, elle doit etre reconnue comme fausse et 
falsifiee. 

Je suis absolument quitte detoutes dettes outre celle relatee ci-dessus." 



THE LONDON " TIMES " LETTER 153 

officials in Persia to follow the lines marked out for themselves 
by the Belgian Customs officials. 

On October 15 Mons. Poklewski-Koziell wrote me finally that 
his Government would not withdraw its opposition to Major 
Stokes' appointment. This step, coupled with the attitude 
adopted by Russia in the Shuau's-Saltana affair, to say nothing 
of her having taken steps which defeated all chance of Persia 
securing on satisfactory terms the loan of the £4,000,000 which 
I had been informally negotiating with the representatives of 
Messrs. Seligman Bros., convinced both the leaders of the Medj- 
lis and myself that Russia had determined to take full advan- 
tage of the still disturbed European situation and the only too 
apparent weakness of the British Foreign Office in all its 
relations with Russia concerning Persian affairs. 

The loss of Major Stokes' services and the blocking of the 
permanent improvements and revenue-producing expenditures 
which were to be financed with the funds derived from the 
proposed loan of £4,000,000 practically nullified all hope of my 
accomplishing any constructive financial work in behalf of Per- 
sia. I deemed it but fair that these facts should no longer 
remain hidden, and, on October 17, in the course of an inter- 
view with the correspondents of the London Times and Reuter's 
News Agency, I took occasion to say that the final refusal of 
Russia to withdraw from her unwarranted attempt to coerce 
the Persian Government in the case of Major Stokes and the 
complete acquiescence of England in the coercion plainly showed 
that there was no genuine friendly feeling on the part of those 
two Governments towards the financial reformation and the 
general progress of Persia. This seemed a very mild state- 
ment of the facts to those on the ground who were really 
acquainted with what had been done to thwart our efforts, but 
the London Times, in its issue of October 19, chose to character- 
ize my statements as unjust and unfounded. As this well- 



154 THE STRANGLING OF PERSIA 

known journal is commonly recognized as the semi-official organ 
of the British Foreign Office, I felt obliged to defend myself 
from this attack and actually to give the facts to the British 
public, in the hope that the British Government might still be 
persuaded to insist upon Persia's being allowed that independ- 
ence and sovereignty which both powers had solemnly bound 
themselves to respect. 

I therefore prepared a partial statement of the situation, and 
on October 21, after consultation with a number of prominent 
Persians, and with the unofficial sanction of the Cabinet, I 
mailed an open letter x to the Times with a request for its pub- 
lication. 

The letter was printed in two sections in the Times of Novem- 
ber 10 and 11. When the press despatches from London on 
the former date brought word of the publication of this com- 
munication, the British Minister sent over and asked me for 
a copy, which I immediately sent him. This communication 
was received with varying comments by the British press, and 
was made the basis for a number of questions put to the Secre- 
tary of State for Foreign Affairs in the House of Commons. 

i See Appendix C. 



CHAPTER VI 

THE FIRST RUSSIAN ULTIMATUM TO PERSIA. THE BRITISH GOV- 
ERNMENT ADVISES PERSIA TO ACCEPT. THE PERSIAN GOVERN- 
MENT APOLOGIZES. THE SECOND ULTIMATUM. 

BY the end of October the Russian Government was land- 
ing troops at Enzeli, and assembling a still larger force 
at Baku. England at this time notified the Persian Govern- 
ment that she was sending two squadrons of Indian sawars to 
Bushire, on the Gulf, whence they would proceed to Shiraz as 
" Consular guards." 

The yellow-booted military gentleman, Sardar-i-Muhiy, who 
had presented to me the first requisition for war funds, was 
defeated by the Turcomans at Bender Djez, and both Russian 
gun-boats and the Russian Consul openly aided the rebel forces. 

On November 2 Mons. Poklewski-Koziell, the Russian Min- 
ister, called at the Persian Foreign Office and made a verbal 
demand, in the name of his Government, that the Treasury gen- 
darmes should be immediately withdrawn from the park of 
Shuau's-Saltana, and that Persian Cossacks from the Cossack 
Brigade should be put in possession of the estate. He also 
demanded an apology for the -" insult " which his Government 
alleged had been offered to its Consular officers. He refused to 
pay any attention to Persia's protest against the violation of 
her sovereignty and the interference with her internal affairs, 
and actually returned the written protest lodged by the Persian 
Government, though he had previously received and acknowl- 
edged the same. 

The Russian Minister stated that his instructions were to 

157 



158 THE STEANGLING OF PEESIA 

obtain an immediate answer, " yes " or " no," from the Persian 
Cabinet. 

The Persian Minister of Foreign Affairs stated that he could 
not take action in such an important matter without consulting 
his colleagues. 

After two days' discussion the Cabinet consulted me as to 
their best course, and while disclaiming any desire to intervene 
in purely political affairs, I gave my opinion that Eussia was 
without law or justice in her demands, and that if the Cabinet 
was going to stand at all on the rights of Persia, this seemed a 
very strong case for them. 

On the same day that this verbal ultimatum was presented 
another incident took place. 

After many fruitless attempts to get certain wealthy grandees 
in Teheran to pay their taxes, I sent small parties of Treasury 
gendarmes to exact them by force, as had always been the pro- 
cedure in Persia. One of the most flagrant tax-evaders was 
Prince Alau'd-Dawla, a member of the royal family and former 
governor of Shiraz. 

After he had insulted and driven out the last tax-collector 
sent to his house, I had the latter return there, accompanied by 
five Treasury gendarmes, who posted themselves at the gates and 
informed the prince that his property was seized until he paid 
his dues to the Government. Alau'd-Dawla left by another 
gate and rushed to the house of Samsamu's-Saltana, the Bakhti- 
yari Premier, who lived near by. With tears in his eyes the 
Prince described the brutal treatment which he had received 
from the Treasury officials, and he so played on the feelings of 
his friend, the Premier, that the latter's brother, Amir Mujahid, 
a Bakhtiyari chieftain, was sent to drive away the Treasury 
gendarmes. Amir Mujahid had become my bitter enemy, prin- 
cipally because I had refused to honor a number of heavy 
demands for money for his forces. He went to the residence 



THE RUSSIAN ULTIMATUM 159 

of Alau'd-Dawla, with the latter's son, a colonel in the regular 
army, and some Bakhtiyari guards, and rushing upon the un- 
suspecting gendarmes, beat them with his heavy stick and had 
their guns wrested from them. This was late in the after- 
noon. 

The next morning I received a note from the Premier, advis- 
ing me of the step he had taken. I replied at once, demanding 
a full written apology for the affair, the punishment of the 
guilty parties and the immediate payment of the taxes. The 
following day the Premier made a very manly apology in the 
Council, sent me a written one, and said that he was an excit- 
able old man and " had gone quite out of his head when the 
great Prince Alau'd-Dawla had rushed in with tears in his 
eyes." 

The guns of the Treasury gendarmes were restored to them 
publicly by the Premier's military aide, and the taxes were paid 
in full. The effect of this incident was most valuable, as the 
prestige of the Treasury was greatly enhanced, and a number 
of other grandees and princes who had hoped to continue evad- 
ing the law, promptly paid their taxes. If the insult to the 
Treasury force had been allowed to pass unnoticed, we might 
as well have closed up the office. Such little incidents are 
given great importance in Persia, where above all things a 
man or a government must keep prestige. 

After some days of discussion, the Cabinet, on November 6, 
sent a Foreign Office official to the Russian Legation to con- 
vey the verbal reply to Russia's ultimatum. The reply was a 
dignified exposition of the attitude of the Persian Government, 
coupled with an offer to abide by an impartial and complete 
investigation of the facts of the Shuau's-Saltana incident. 

In the meantime the press despatches described a sinister 
threat by Russia to seize the Province of Ghilam and the dis- 
trict of Talich, in Northern Persia. The Russian Government 

8 



160 THE STRANGLING OF PERSIA 

was undoubtedly surprised by Persia's firm attitude and the 
tenor of ber reply. 

On November 7 I received a note from Sir George Barclay, 
tbe British Minister, stating that he desired to call and read me 
a telegram from his Government. He did so the next day. 
The telegram was from Sir Edward Grey and instructed Sir 
George to inform me that my assignment of Mr. Lecoffre, a 
British subject, to Tabriz to inspect the finances there would 
result in a protest by Russia " to preserve her interests there," 
and would create the danger of her seizing Northern Persia. 
It was perfectly apparent, even from the British Minister's man- 
ner, that Russia had instigated this action by the British For- 
eign Office. As a matter of fact I had, some weeks previously, 
decided to send Mr. Lecoffre to Tabriz to investigate the misap- 
propriation of nearly 1,000,000 tumans of the taxes there 
during the preceding two years. He was one of my few Euro- 
pean assistants who could speak Persian, who understood the 
intricacies of the Persian taxation system, and he had been 
at Tabriz before and knew the situation there. I frankly con- 
fess that I was surprised to find that even Russia had raised 
any objection, since Mr. Lecoffre had been in the Ministry of 
Finance at Teheran for nearly two years, and was occupying 
a rather important and influential position there. Teheran, of 
course, is in the so-called " Russian " or " Northern Sphere " 
of Persia, and by sending Mr. Lecoffre to Tabriz on a special 
mission I was merely transferring him from one point in North- 
ern Persia to another. 

I replied to Sir George Barclay that I always had been and 
was still most anxious to observe all the legitimate interests of 
Russia and the other powers in Persia, but that I could not, as 
he well knew, in this case any more than in the Stokes' case, 
recognize the existence in Persia of foreign " spheres of influ- 
ence " — a thing which the Persian Government had officially 



ENGLAND ADVISES ACCEPTANCE 161 

refused to do, and had actually forbidden me to do on more 
than one occasion. I added that if the Eussian Government 
would show a single friendly action towards my work in Persia, 
I could guarantee that it would be reciprocated to the fullest 
extent. 

Sir George went through the delivery of his message like a 
man taking medicine, and left without entering into any argu- 
ment. 

On November 11 the Medjlis unanimously passed a law 
authorizing me to employ under contract ten more Americans 
as financial assistants. 

At noon the same day Mons. de Giers, the Oriental Secre- 
tary of the Russian Legation, presented a written renewal of 
the original demands of the Eussian Government on Persia. 
Mons. de Giers stated that if the demands were not complied 
with within forty-eight hours, diplomatic relations between the 
two countries would be broken off. 

The London Times published an editorial on my open letter, 
accusing me at the end of having " thrown in my lot " with the 
Persian Nationalists. I am unable to understand with whom 
the Times thought I should have thrown in my lot while I was 
working in the service of the Constitutional Government. 

It was about this time that my letter to the Times was printed 
in Persian, in the form of a pamphlet, and circulated quite 
widely. A local newspaper, Tamadun, publicly admitted hav- 
ing printed and circulated this pamphlet as soon as I was 
charged with having done so — which I had not. 

By November 11 the Persian Cabinet, having been thor- 
oughly frightened by the extensive preparations which Russia 
was evidently making for occupying Northern Persia, consulted 
the British Government as to what course should be pursued. 
Sir Edward Grey promptly cabled his advice to accept the 
Russian ultimatum, and apologize as was demanded. 



y 



162 THE STEANGLING OP PEESIA 

The Premier, Samsamu's-Saltana, sent me a letter demand- 
ing that I should remove all my gendarmes from the park of 
Shuau's-Saltana. I should mention that this simple-minded 
old chieftain had been subjected for several days to some very 
strong Eussian influences, and some suspicion of his entire loy- 
alty had already been aroused among the deputies of the 
Med j lis. 

When, therefore, I received this order, but signed only by 
him as Premier, instead of by the entire Council of Ministers, 
as the original order of confiscation had been, I had no choice 
but to reply that the order of the Council could be revoked 
only by a similarly authoritative document. I insisted either 
that my agents should be left in charge of the properties, or 
that I should be relieved of all responsibility for them. 

The usual Cabinet " crises " were occurring during these 
days. One might meet the Einance Minister on the street 
and hear from him that he had " resigned," but he would be 
found at the Council chamber the following morning. 

On November 18 the Eussian Legation informed the Persian 
Government that as the ultimatum had not been accepted, diplo- 
matic relations were thereby broken off, but that commercial 
matters would continue to be handled by the Eussian Consuls. 
It was reported that 4000 Eussian troops were en route from 
the Caucasus for Persia. 

The Cabinet, having reflected on Sir Edward Grey's advice 
to yield to the Eussian demands, decided to do so and accord- 
ingly sent me a written order to deliver the estates of Shuau's- 
Saltana to their representatives and to recall my gendarmes. I 
had this order executed, taking receipts in full for everything 
that we had seized. 

It was evident by this time that the British Foreign Office had 
become alarmed by Eussia's threatening attitude and that the 



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PEESIA APOLOGIZES 165 

advice to Persia to yield at once was actuated by a desire to 
stay the advance of Russian troops lest Parliament should crit- 
icize Eussia's violation of the Convention of 1907. 

In the meantime a new Persian Cabinet had been formed and 
it was voted to apologize to Eussia. 

On November 24, therefore, the Persian Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Wuthuqu'd-Dawla, drove in full uniform to the Eus- 
sian Legation. Seizing the Eussian Minister by the hand he 
said : " Your Excellency, I am instructed by my own Govern- 
ment to apologize in its name for the affront put upon the Con- 
sular officers of Your Excellency's Government in the Shuau's- 
Saltana affair." Then followed the grim diplomatic jest which 
only a Russian Cabinet with its utter disregard for fairness or 
decency would think of perpetrating. 

The Persian Ministers evidently believed that their self- 
abasement and the delivery of the estates would appease even 
Eussian anger and settle the whole affair. They reckoned, 
however, without knowledge of the true plans of Eussian bureau- 
cracy. A compliance by Persia with Eussia's demands was 
the very last thing that the Eussian Cabinet desired. Had 
Eussia merely been seeking to uphold the dignity of her insub- 
ordinate Consular officials, Wuthuqu'd-Dawla's apology would 
have ended the affair. What Eussia plainly wanted was to 
have some pretext for continuing to occupy Northern Persia 
with her troops — a thing which she had started to do before 
her ultimatum to Persia had even been presented. Sir Edward 
Grey had assured the Persian Cabinet, through the British Le- 
gation at Teheran, that if an apology was made to Eussia, the 
Eussian troops which were already entering Persia would be 
withdrawn. It was upon this assurance made by Sir Edward 
Grey — with what authority has not been disclosed — that 
Persia yielded to Eussia's demands. 



166 THE STEANGLING OF PEKSIA 

Thus we understand clearly why the Bussian Minister, in 
replying to Wuthuqu'd-Dawla's apology, stated that Persia's 
agreement to the demands of the first ultimatum was accepted, 
but that he was instructed to give notice that in the meantime 
another ultimatum was being prepared! 

It should not be difficult to picture the surprise on the face 
of Persia's representative at this bit of ghastly humor. The 
meeting had been arranged by the British Minister. Absolute- 
ly nothing new had occurred in the interior to give grounds 
for such a novel procedure. It was only too plain that Bussia 
proposed to keep pouring her Cossacks into Northern Persia, 
whatever the British or the Persian Governments might do or 
say. The long-expected chance to start the outflanking move- 
ment on India and to edge towards the Persian Gulf had ar- 
rived. The embers of the Moroccan diplomatic conflagration 
still glowed sufficiently to make her sure that no serious protest 
would be made by England. 

True to its promise, on November 29, at noon, the Eussian 
Government presented to Persia its second ultimatum, demand- 
ing its acceptance within the space of just forty-eight hours. 

The language of this remarkable document is important 
enough to be quoted in full: 

TRANSLATION OF THE TEXT OF THE SECOND RUSSIAN 
ULTIMATUM. 

In the course of our interview on Friday (November 24) I had the 
honor of explaining to Your Excellency the reasons which impelled the 
Imperial Government of Russia to put several further proposals before 
the Persian Government, and I have been waiting for my Government's 
instructions on the subject. 

Those instructions have now reached me and I have the honor to 
make on behalf of the Russian Government the following proposals: 

(1) The dismissal of Mr. Shuster and Mr. Lecoffre; the status of the 
other persons who have been invited into service by Mr. Shuster will be 
determined in accordance with the second proposal. 



THE SECOND ULTIMATUM 167 

(2) An undertaking by the Persian Government not to engage in the 
service of Persia foreign subjects without first obtaining the consent of 
the Russian and British Legations. 

(3) The payment by the Persian Government of an indemnity to defray 
the expenses of the present despatch of troops to Persia. The amount 
and manner of payment and compensation will be fixed after the receipt 
of the Persian Government's reply. 

(EXPLANATIONS BY RUSSIAN MINISTER) 

I consider it my duty to explain that the reasons for these measures are: 

(1) The absolute necessity of obtaining compensation owing to the 
fact that the Imperial Government had been forced to send troops to 
Persia and owing to the recent insulting acts of Mr. Shuster towards 
Russia. 

(2) The earnest desire of the Imperial Government is now to remove 
the principal source of conflict which has arisen and in the future to 
lay the foundations upon which the two Governments can firmly build up 
friendly and stable relations, and to give a prompt and satisfactory 
solution to all the Russian matters and questions still pending.* 

(3) In addition to the above facts I have to point out that the Im- 
perial Government will not wait longer than forty-eight hours for the 
execution of the aforesaid proposals, and during this interval the Russian 
troops will remain at Resht. If no reply or an unsatisfactory reply be 
received at the expiration of the said period, the troops will advance 
and it is evident that this will increase the indemnity to be paid by 
Persia to Russia. 



The impression which the modest " proposals " made on the 
Persian Cabinet, Med j lis and general public can be better 
imagined than described. 

The language of the document, which was Persian, is pur- 
posely ambiguous, especially in those parts speaking of " com- 
pensation " and " prompt and satisfactory solution to all 
Russian matters and questions still pending." 

At the same time that this ultimatum was handed in, a note 
was presented by the Russian Minister informing the Persian 
Government that " in consideration of a telegram sent by the 

i The italics are the author's. 



168 THE STEANGLING OF PEESIA 

Lady Nizatu's-Saltana, the mother of Shuau's-Saltana, to 
Their Imperial Majesties, the Czar and Czarina of All The 
Eussias, the aforesaid Lady and her 'property are henceforth 
placed under the protection of the Government of Eussia." 

The lady in question was a Persian subject. The Eussian 
Government relieved her of this disability by telegraph. 



CHAPTEK VII 

THE BEEAD RIOTS. THE MEDJLIS REJECTS RUSSIA'S TJLTIMA- 
TUM. INVASION" BY RUSSIAN TROOPS. PERSIA PLANS FOR 
RESISTANCE. PART PLAYED BY PERSIAN WOMEN. ABOLISH- 
MENT OF THE MEDJLIS BY COUP D'ETAT, DECEMBER 24. 

I 1ST the Russian ultimatum of November 29 the name of the 
British Government was used, though the British Minister 
apparently had nothing to do with the affair. The acceptance 
by Persia of the demands thus made upon her would have been 
almost tantamount to a cession of her sovereignty to Russia 
and Great Britain. Shortly after the presentation of this 
ultimatum Sir Edward Grey was asked in Parliament to ex- 
plain why the name of the British Government was used. He 
replied that he agreed with the Russian demands, with the 
possible exception of the indemnity clause, to pay which might 
cripple Persia's force for policing the southern trade route, thus 
prejudicing British commerce. This was apparently the only 
possible objection which the British Eoreign Office could see, 
or urge against the ultimatum. In the course of his remarks 
Sir Edward Grey accused me of having endeavored to " set the 
clock back " in Persia. This, he said, was the reason of my 
failure, and I must go. 

The Regent sent for me in the early afternoon of the 29th, 
some two hours after the ultimatum had been delivered. I 
found him surrounded by the Cabinet, including my old friend, 
Mutashamu's-Saltana, who had in some mysterious manner 
succeeded in gaining favor with the Premier, Samsamu's- 
Saltana. 

169 



170 THE STRANGLING OF PEKSIA 

The Regent said that the Government was very nervous about 
the " bread situation." In Persia cheap and plentiful bread 
is the test by which administrations and Cabinets stand or fall. 
Wheat bread is the principal food of the people, especially in 
the cities and large towns. It is not, as a rule, baked at home, 
but in public bakeries, of which in Teheran there are several 
hundred. The bread comes out in large strips, about half an 
inch thick. These strips are handled very much as if they 
were wrapping paper. A Persian on the road is very apt to 
wrap up his bit of cheese and fruit in his strip of bread. 

When the wheat is harvested in the summer the Government 
collects a proportion of it in taxes. In the districts around the 
capital and other large towns, this government wheat is sup- 
posed to be brought in and stored in public granaries, in order 
that the people may have a plentiful supply of good cheap 
bread during the winter. The Persian Government has been 
doing this from time immemorial. If it did not do so, and 
sold its wheat when collected, the grandees and rich owners of 
wheat-producing districts would combine, control the supply 
sent each day to the public markets for sale to the bakers, and 
force up the price. Bread would immediately become scarce 
and dear, and there would be a serious chuluh or riot. To 
prevent this it was the custom of the Government to deal out, 
commencing in the fall, a certain amount of wheat at a fair 
price to the bakers ; this procedure, together with the knowledge 
that the Government had wheat in reserve, kept the price rea- 
sonable and, as a rule, prevented private combines. 

It was the wheat or bread situation which was causing the 
Regent and the Cabinet trouble at this time. There had been 
a poor crop in Northern Persia, especially around Teheran. 
This was due partly to a drought and partly to the general 
disorders, destruction of crops and pillaging which had been 
going on ever since Muhammad Ali had made his entry into 



THE BREAD EIOTS 171 

Persia. Then the fighting which had been going on during the 
summer, and the continued presence of large numbers of 
Bakhtiyaris and other irregular troops in the neighborhood of 
the capital, had frightened away the muleteers and camel- 
drivers on whom every one depended to bring the wheat into 
the city. 

The regular function of the Treasury in regard to wheat was 
merely to see that the taxes payable in this grain, as those pay- 
able in rice, barley, cotton and straw, were collected, and that 
the wheat was transported to the cities and stored. Foreseeing 
a serious situation, however, and knowing that the government 
wheat stores had always been a fruitful source of graft for the 
Governor and other officials of the capital, the Cabinet had asked 
me to keep a close watch on the supply and on its destina- 
tion. 

I had accordingly been making extraordinary efforts to get 
wheat in from the outlying districts before the roads should be- 
come blocked. I was also endeavoring to prevent the Teheran 
municipal officials from making their usual annual fortunes at 
the expense of the bread supply. A " ring " had been formed 
by a number of reactionary grandees for the two-fold purpose 
of enriching themselves and embarrassing the Constitutional 
Government. 

I told the Begent and the Cabinet that if they desired me to 
deal with the situation and would appoint an honest Governor 
of Teheran, I would accept the responsibility. They promised 
to make the changes needed, but as usual procrastinated until 
matters grew much worse. There were a number of small 
bread riots from time to time, but they had been easily sup- 
pressed. 

In connection with the bread supply a rather gruesome inci- 
dent occurred. The chief baker in Teheran was one of the prin- 
cipal grafters in the " municipal bread-ring " and a great trou- 



172 THE STRANGLING OF PERSIA 

ble-maker for the Treasury. He was a man of evil record, and 
reputed to have baked an offending subordinate to death in his 
own oven on more than one occasion. Speaking of him and his 
intrigues one day to several prominent Nationalists I remarked 
that he was the cause of most of the trouble with the bread 
supply in the capital, was feeding inferior bread to the people, 
and that he should be " gotten rid of." A morning or so after- 
wards, on entering my office rather late, I was informed by one 
of my Persian assistants that " the chief baker had been killed 
in accordance with my wishes ! " I -leave the reader to im- 
agine my surprise and feelings. As a matter of fact he had 
been assassinated, and though I have no reason to believe that 
my own remarks had anything to do with his taking off,, I de- 
termined thenceforth to be more cautious and precise in my 
language. The unfortunate man was a murderer, and had 
waxed wealthy by stealing from the poor, often starving people 
of the city, so no great injustice was, perhaps, done, but the in- 
terpretation put by my young Persian friend on his untimely 
end gave me quite a shock. From that time on the control of 
the bread became much easier. 

The afternoon of November 29 an unusual incident occurred 
in the Medjlis. The Premier, Samsamu's-Saltana, after leav- 
ing the Regent's palace went to the Parliament to present for 
approval a new Cabinet which he had formed. Among the 
names was that of Mutashamu's-Saltana, designated as Minis- 
ter of Justice. Even deputies long accustomed to approving 
ministers of threadbare reputation revolted at this. The 
Premier had been growing very friendly with the Russian 
Legation and his insistence, against the advice of his colleagues, 
on having Mutashamu's-Saltana in the Cabinet was due to the 
latter's close relations with well-known Russian emissaries and 
proteges. 

When the aged Premier in reading his list of names came to 




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THE ULTIMATUM REJECTED 175 

the new Minister of Justice things commenced to happen in that 
dignified assemblage. 

Prince Sulayman Mirza, the leader of the Democrats, 
mounted the tribune and declared that the Premier possessed 
the confidence of the deputies, but that the Democrats could not 
accept a member of the traitorous Cabinet of the Sipahdar. 
Amid cries of anger from the Moderates, the Premier ascended 
the platform and commenced a violent harangue against the 
Democrats. He was called to order by Mutaminu'1-Mulk, the 
President, whereupon he rushed from the Chamber declaring 
that he would call his Bakhtiyaris and kill all the Democrats. 
The chief priest of Teheran then attacked the President and the 
Democrats. The President then employed the Persian 
equivalent of the sergeant-at-arms and the mace; he solemnly 
called the chief priest to order three times, the utterance of the 
last word meaning imprisonment for the offender. At this 
point the assemblage broke up in an uproar and the one really 
undignified session of Persia's Parliament was recorded. 

This scene and the reports of the Russian ultimatum threw 
the capital into tumult. Nothing but the fact that Ephraim 
was in charge of the police and gendarmes saved an outbreak 
by the disorderly and fanatical elements. At this time the 
Treasury Gendarmerie consisted of about 800 men, — practi- 
cally all stationed in Teheran. They were well drilled, fully 
equipped and in charge of four American officers, three of whom 
had recently arrived. 

The Premier's attempt to get Mutashamu's-Saltana into the 
Cabinet and his threats to use the Bakhtiyaris against the 
Democrats had convinced the latter that Russian intrigues had 
been at work on the Ministers, and that the Constitutional Gov- 
ernment was again to be threatened. It had been discovered 
that Prince Alau'd-Dawla, who had refused to pay his taxes 
until force was used, was plotting with a number of well-known 



176 THE STRANGLING OF PERSIA 

reactionaries to ask the Russian Government to restore Muham- 
mad Ali to the throne. The police seized a formal petition to 
that effect bearing the signature of this grandee and a number 
of others. 

On the day after the ultimatum was presented I received a 
call from the Nawwab and Ephraim. They asked my advice 
on the situation. I told them that they could inform the 
Medjlis and the Cabinet that I desired them to take whatever 
decision they considered best for the Persian people, without 
any thought of myself or of my American assistants. During 
the afternoon and evening a large number of deputies called and 
asked my advice. To all I made this same reply, explaining 
that as the action which the Government might take would so 
vitally affect my own reputation and future, I did not care to 
influence them in any manner. I promised that the Americans 
would abide loyally by the decision of the Medjlis as to the 
Russian ultimatum, whatever that decision might be. 

The next morning, December 1, on entering my office I 
learned that Prince Alau'd-Dawla had just been shot as he was 
leaving his house, by three men who were on a neighboring 
balcony watching for him. He died shortly thereafter. 

Another attempt at assassination was directed against 
Mushiru's-Saltana, a former prime minister of Muhammad Ali, 
while he was out riding. He was wounded in the leg, but his 
nephew who was with him was killed. 

These crimes were undoubtedly the result of the conviction 
which had taken possession of the members of the secret 
anjumans (societies) in Teheran that a well-organized cam- 
paign was on foot to strangle the Constitutional movement in 
Persia and restore despotism and vengeance in the form of 
Muhammad Ali. The fact that the reactionaries were known 
to be practically selling the country to Russia only increased 
the bitterness of the Nationalists. The anjumans, which had 



THE ULTIMATUM REJECTED 177 

in previous years played such, an important and even heroic part 
in Persia's struggle towards free institutions, had not ceased 
to exist. They were passive while the Constitution seemed in 
no danger, but they sprang vigorously into action the moment 
that their ideal was threatened. Their members were in many 
cases known as fidais (self -de voted), and they were always pre- 
pared to take up arms in defense of their principles. 

The effect of the killing of Prince Alau'd-Dawla was 
tremendous, and before the shock of horror which the assas- 
sination caused had subsided, a panic seized every public 
official and grandee who felt that his conscience was not en- 
tirely clear in his actions towards the land of his birth. 

When the Samsamu's-Saltana learned of the death, of his 
friend, the Prince, he broke into tears and swore an impassioned 
oath to annihilate the elements which he believed were respon- 
sible for the act. " I will kill twenty Democrats for this ! " he 
said. 

The last Russian ultimatum was claimed to be based on two 
pretexts which were at best rather puerile, even if true. In- 
cidentally the facts alleged, namely, that I had appointed Mr. 
Lecoffre, a British subject to be a tax-collector in the Russian 
sphere of influence, and that I had caused to be printed and 
circulated a Persian translation of my letter to the Times, 
were totally devoid of truth. 

Nevertheless, the Russian demands, with all the hypocritical 
attempts made to justify them, fairly stunned the people of 
Persia. Accustomed as the Constitutional Government had 
been in recent years to the high-handed and cynical actions of 
the St. Petersburg Cabinet, the Ministers had not looked for 
such a blow as this. 

The Cabinet had been realizing dimly that the peace of 
Europe was being jeopardized by the open and increasing hos- 
tility between England and Germany, and that the tension over 



178 THE STRANGLING OF PERSIA 

the Moroccan affair, while subsiding, was still very marked. 
They felt also that Sir Edward Grey's preoccupation with the 
European crisis had driven from his mind whatever conception 
he might have had of the importance of Asiatic problems to the 
British Empire. This situation, it was clear, was leaving 
Russia absolutely free to push forward her long-cherished plans 
for the absorption of Persia and the establishment of a naval 
base on the Persian Gulf. Russia could work her will in Persia 
so long, at least, as she even pretended to acknowledge the 
Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, and by this patent sub- 
terfuge relieved the British Eoreign Office of the embarrassment 
of explaining in Parliament why Russia had not been held to 
her signed agreement. 

Despite all this the Persians, as events have shown, had far 
too much confidence in the sacredness of treaty stipulations and 
the solemnly pledged words of the great Christian nations of the 
world to imagine that their whole national existence and liber- 
ties could be thus menaced overnight, and on a pretext so shal- 
low and farcical. 

Their disillusionment came too late, though it is difficult to 
see what they could have done, even had they realized the truth 
earlier than they did. If Russia had not adopted the pretext 
which she did, she would have soon found or manufactured 
others. The trap which closed around Persia had been set by 
the hands or by the fate which brought about an unexpected 
move on the European chess-board during the summer of the 
year 1911, and the Bear's paw had been skilful enough to spring 
the trap before the opportunity was lost. 

In the sudden crisis which now confronted the Persian Gov- 
ernment nearly every man began to suspect his neighbor. The 
administration split immediately into two factions. The 
Cabinet, under Samsamu's-Saltana, adopted one course, and 
more or less carried the Regent with it. The deputies of the 




GROUP OF AMERICAN AND PERSIAN OFFICIALS OF THE TREASURY. 
Taken at the entrance to the office-building next to Atabak Palace. 



THE ULTIMATUM REJECTED 181 

Medjlis, on the other hand, sincerely believing themselves to 
represent the patriotic aspirations and sovereignty of the 
Persian people, were inclined to meet their responsibilities 
face to face. 

The Persian statesmen and chieftains who formed the 
• Cabinet at this time, whether because they perceived the naked 
steel behind Russia's threats more clearly than their legislative 
compatriots, or whether they suffered from that abandon and 
tired feeling which comes from playing an unequal and always 
losing game, quickly decided that, despite the betrayal of their 
trust thereby involved, they would accept this second ultimatum 
with all its future oppression and cruelty for their people. 

On December first, therefore, shortly before the time limit 
of forty-eight hours fixed by Russia for the acceptance of the 
terms had expired, the Cabinet filed into the Medjlis to secure 
legislative approval of their intended course. 

It was an hour before noon, and the Parliament grounds 
and buildings were filled with eager, excited throngs, while the 
galleries of the chamber were packed with Persian notables of 
all ranks and with the representatives of many of the foreign 
legations. At noon the fate of Persia as a nation was to be 
known. 

The Cabinet, having made up its mind to yield, overlooked 
no point, which would increase their chances of securing the 
approval of the Medjlis. Believing, evidently, that the ridicu- 
lously short time to elapse before the stroke of noon announced 
the expiration of the forty-eight-hour period would effectually 
prevent any mature consideration or discussion of their pro- 
posals, the Premier, Samsamu's-Saltana, caused to be presented 
to the deputies a resolution authorizing the Cabinet to accept 
Russia's demands. 

The proposal was read amid deep silence. At its conclusion 
a hush fell upon the gathering. Seventy-six deputies, old men 

9 



182 THE STRANGLING OE PERSIA 

and young, priests, lawyers, doctors, merchants, and princes, 
sat tense in their seats. 

A venerable priest of Islam arose. Time was slipping away 
and at noon the question would be beyond their vote to decide. 
This servant of God spoke briefly and to the point : " It may 
be the will of Allah that our liberty and our sovereignty shall 
be taken from us by force, but let us not sign them away with 
our own hands ! " One gesture of appeal with his trembling 
hands, and he resumed his seat. 

Simple words, these, yet winged ones. Easy to utter in 
academic discussions; hard, bitterly hard, to say under the eye 
of a cruel and overpowering tyrant whose emissaries watched 
the speaker from the galleries and mentally marked him down 
for future imprisonment, torture, exile or worse. 

Other deputies followed. In dignified appeals, brief because 
the time was so short, they upheld their country's honor and 
proclaimed their hard-earned right to live and govern them- 
selves. 

A few minutes before noon the public vote was taken; one 
or two faint-hearted members sought a craven's refuge and 
slunk quietly from the chamber. As each name was called the 
deputy rose in his place and gave his vote ; there was no secret 
ballot here. 

And when the roll call was ended every man, priest or lay- 
man, youth or octogenarian, had cast his own die of fate, had 
staked the safety of himself and family, and hurled back into 
the teeth of the great Bear from the North the unanimous 
answer of a desperate and down-trodden people who preferred 
a future of unknown terror to the voluntary sacrifice of their 
national dignity and of their recently earned right to work out 
their own salvation. 

Amid tears and applause from the spectators, the crest-fallen 
and frightened members of the Cabinet withdrew, while the 



INVASION BY RUSSIAN TROOPS 183 

deputies dispersed to ponder on the course which lay darkly 
before their people- 
By this vote the Cabinet, according to the Constitution, 
ceased to exist as a legal entity. 

Great crowds of people thronged the Lalezar, one of the 
principal streets of Teheran, shouting death to the traitors and 
calling Allah to witness that they would give up their lives for 
their country. 

A few days later, in a secret conference between the deputies 
of the Medjlis and the members of the deposed cabinet, a 
similar vote was given to reject the Russian demands. Mean- 
while thousands of Russian troops, with Cossacks and artillery, 
were pouring into Northern Persia, from Tiflis and Julia by 
land and from Baku across the Caspian, to the Persian port 
of Enzeli, whence they took up their 220-mile march over the 
Elburz mountains towards Kasvin and Teheran. 

In the Government at Teheran conference followed confer- 
ence. Intrigues against the deputies gave way to threats. 
Through it all, with the increasing certainty of personal injury, 
the members of the Medjlis stood firmly by their vote. 

It is impossible to describe the days and nights of doubt, 
suspense and anxiety which followed one another during this 
dark month of December in the capital. There was a lurking 
dread in the very air, and the snow-covered mountains them- 
selves seemed afflicted with the mournful scenes through which 
the country was passing. 

A boycott was proclaimed by the Islamic priests against Rus- 
sian and English goods. In a day the old-fashioned tramway 
of the city was deserted on the mere suspicion that it was owned 
in Russia, while an excited Belgian Minister rained protests 
and petitions on the Persian Foreign Office in an endeavor to 
show that the tramway was owned by his countrymen. The 
cars ran absolutely empty for the day. Crowds of youths, 



184 THE STRANGLING OF PERSIA 

students and women filled the streets, dragging occasional 
absent-minded passengers from the trams, smashing the 
windows of shops which still displayed Russian goods, seeing 
that no one drank tea because it came from Russia, although 
produced in India, and going in processions before the gates of 
foreign legations to demand justice of the representatives of 
the world powers for a people in the extremity of despair. 

One day the rumor would come that the chief mullahs at 
Madjef had proclaimed the jihat or holy war against the Rus- 
sians; on another that the Russian troops had commenced to 
shoot up Kasvin on their march to Teheran. 1 

The boycott of English goods in the South became so serious 
that at Shiraz it was exceedingly difficult for the British Indian 
troops to obtain food supplies, and the chief-priests having de- 
clared the notes of the Imperial Bank of Persia — a British 
corporation ■ — to be unclean, they were turned into the bank for 
redemption in government-minted coins at the rate of 20,000 
tumans a day. 

At one time two men were arrested by the secret police, who 
had been informed of a conspiracy to kill the Treasurer-general. 
Their house was raided and a bomb-making plant found, to- 
gether with a number of nitroglycerin bombs. Under police 
examination they confessed that they had been paid by cer- 
tain Persian reactionaries to blow me up while I was driving 
through the streets. . 

Life in Teheran during this period did not seem to me to be 
particularly healthful. It was not uncommon while sitting in 
my office to hear bullets whistling over the garden from the 

i On December 13 the chief mujtahid at Najaf, Mullah Muhammad 
Kazim al-Khorasani, died suddenly, under very suspicious circumstances as 
he was on the eve of starting for Teheran, as it was rumored, to preach the 
" holy war " against the Russians. He was commonly believed to have 
been poisoned by Russian agents. He and his two colleagues, Hajji Husayn 
ibn Khalil and Mullah Abdullah al-Mazandarani, had been foremost among 
the Islamic clergy in supporting the Nationalist cause in Persia. 




TYPICAL PERSIAN AND ARMENIAN "FIGHTING MEN. 




PERSIAN ARTILLERY LEAVING TEHERAN TO TAKE THE FIELD. 



INVASION" BY RUSSIAN TROOPS 187 

different street fights which were taking place in the neighbor- 
hood. A Mauser pistol serenade occurred nearly every night. 
Russian officers, from the additional detachment of Cossacks 
which had arrived from Kasvin, reconnoitered Atabak Park in 
the early morning hours and made faces at the guards at the 
gates. Of course the fact that Russia had sent a large army 
into Persia for the express purpose of expelling me, coupled 
with the virulent attacks directed against me by the Russian 
semi-official press, was a virtual invitation to numerous bad 
characters and political renegades from the Caucasus (of which 
there were hundreds in Teheran) to do me harm in the belief, 
whether justified or not, that they would thereby regain the 
Russian Government's favor and protection, as had the assassins 
of Saniu'd-Dawla. 

One evening, just as I was preparing to go to a small dinner 
party with my wife, I was brought word that three Caucasians 
were on the watch for me in a neighboring street. The informa- 
tion proved to be accurate, and I thought it advisable to remain 
indoors. 

About this time some of the Persian Nationalists asked me 
to allow them to organize a personal bodyguard to protect me 
against attempts on my life. I consented and from that time 
on these volunteer protectors never allowed me out of their sight 
day or night, except when I retired to sleep. 1 

On December 14 Major Stokes left Teheran to return to 
his regiment in India. 

The next day the Russian Legation informed the Persian 
Government that if within six days the conditions of the ulti- 
matum had not been complied with, the Russian troops at Kas- 
vin, about 4000 in number, would start for Teheran. A few 
days later, under cover of the Russian advance to Kasvin, some 

i One of these men, I greatly regretted to hear, was hung some weeks 
after my departure, on the ground that he was a dangerous fidai. 



188 THE STRANGLING OF PEKSIA 

2000 Turcomans advanced towards the capital from Mazan- 
daran, and actually got as far as Damghan, whence they threat- 
ened the city. Teheran at the time could not spare more than 
600 men to oppose them. A force of this size was sent out 
under one of Ephraim's lieutenants to hold them in check. 

Telegrams and messages of encouragement and sympathy 
from Muhammadan societies all over the world poured into 
Teheran. Some of them must have heaped coals of fire on the 
heads of the devoted Cabinet which had from the outset favored 
a surrender to Russia. 
/ The Persian Defense Society of Calcutta telegraphed the Cab- 
inet as follows: 

" Do not submit to the new proposals, but take advantage of 
the impression produced in Manchester and among the Mos- 
lems of the world. Even the Indian women are excited. Tne 
pressure from the North is for a railroad concession. Have no 
confidence in the advice of the South. Increase the relation 
with America." * 

At one time a touch of grim humor was added to the situa- 
tion by a declaration of the Turkish Minister of Foreign Af- 
fairs at Constantinople, in reply to a question in the Parlia- 
ment. This Ottoman wag replied that Persia's independence 
could not be in danger, because it was guaranteed by the Anglo- 
Russian Agreement. At the time some 12,000 Russian troops 
were occupying the entire northern part of the Empire. 

Various proposals were considered by the Medjlis as a way 
out of the apparent impasse. One of the most novel ideas pre- 
sented was that of affording the United States Government a 
pretext for taking a hand in Persia. One night a number of 

i This semi-cryptic message showed a remarkable grasp of the actual sit- 
uation in England, Teheran and elsewhere. It was commonly believed in 
Persia that if the Medjlis granted Eussia certain railroad concessions, she 
would withdraw her troops and come to some more favorable settlement of 
the ultimatum The last sentence refers to the Author. 



PLAN'S POP RESISTANCE 189 

the party leaders and prominent members of the Med j lis came 
to my office with a request that I should draft a short law, giv- 
ing a concession to build a number of important railways which 
had been discussed. The name was to be left blank, the law was 
to be passed immediately, and I was to fill in the name of some 
American capitalist or of some group of capitalists, telegraph 
the concession to New York, and have the American concession- 
aires demand the protection of their Government. I admired 
the breadth of the conception, but explained tfcat I could not; 
take part in such a transaction. 

Mushiru'd-Dawla, who was nominally Minister of Justice, 
although he had kept entirely out of the Cabinet's proceedings 
since the ultimatum, sent to me to ask whether I would under- 
take to arrange terms with Russia and England, if the Medjlis 
granted me full powers. He said that his brother, the Presi- 
dent of the Chamber, was anxious to present such a measure, 
and that the majority of the deputies favored it. I thanked 
him, but said that I thought such affairs properly belonged to the 
Cabinet and not the Treasurer-general, particularly as I was 
one of the subjects of the ultimatum. Several of the deputies 
also proposed that the Government should comply with Russia's 
demand for my dismissal as Treasurer-general, but that I should 
be retained as a " general adviser " to the Medjlis. 

When the Medjlis, in desperation, sent a committee of twelve 
to wait on the Regent and inform him that, having no confi- 
dence in the personnel of the Cabinet, the Medjlis was about to 
adopt a resolution authorizing the Regent to enter into negotia- 
tions with Russia and England, and to make terms with those 
powers in behalf of Persia, His Highness turned deathly pale, 
flew into a panic, and threatened to call his carriage and start 
for Enzeli in half an hour, if they dared to mention such a 
thing again. 

At one time all four political parties in Persia — Democrats, 



190 THE STRANGLING OF PERSIA 

Moderates, Union and Progress and the Dashnaktiyoon, or 
Armenian party — met, through representatives, and decided to 
resist the further advance of the Russian troops towards the 
capital. The total available forces which Persia could have 
sent on this errand were some 2000 Bakhtiyaris, about 300 
Armenian fighting-men, with a few machine-guns, and perhaps 
some 3000 fidais or " faithful ones " — patriotic volunteers who 
had sworn to uphold and defend the Constitutional Government 
of Persia. The entire force would have been an unorganized 
and unequipped body of brave men. That they would have 
been able to hold successfully the mountain passes leading to 
Teheran, even against 15,000 Russian troops, there can be no 
doubt, and that the fidais were more than anxious to meet the 
Russians was fully shown by the heroism and gallantry of their 
brothers who but a few weeks later sustained for six days an 
equal conflict at Tabriz against Russian troops and artillery at 
odds of one to five, with two batteries of modern artillery 
against them and none in their possession. 

In addition to these forces, there were now 1100 Treasury 
gendarmes, instructed by four brave and skilful American 
officers. They were the pick of the Young Persia patriots who 
really desired to serve their country, and I had taken care that 
they should be well-drilled, equipped and armed. When, 
later on, the thirty-five Persian officers who commanded them 
heard of the overthrow of the Med j lis, they came and begged 
to be allowed to fight for their country, and I had ample evi- 
dence that they were more than eager to go against the Russian 
troops. 

Late on the night that the decision was taken by the leaders 
of the four political parties to resist the Russian advance I was 
visited by a committee of safety who sought my advice as to the 
best means of carrying out their purpose. I recall very well 
the unreality of the interview. A dozen men, of different 



THE PERSIAN WOMEN 191 

walks in life, the chosen leaders of a strange and wholly alien 
people, consulting one whom they considered an " infidel " as to 
whether they should take a step obviously heroic and dramatic, 
yet which would spell danger and death for thousands of their 
people and incredible physical disaster in the end. 

We spent three hours in conference, and they finally com- 
pelled me to express the reluctant opinion that if a single 
hostile move were made against the Eussian troops north of 
Teheran, the 50,000 Cossacks who would be poured into Persia 
when the snows melted the following spring would crush out 
the last spark of Persian liberty and leave, perhaps, not even 
widows and orphans to mourn at soldiers' graves. 

It was a strange, sad talk. Probably they had no right to 
place the responsibility for such a decision on a foreigner, but 
I am glad to recall that I pointed out to them the unavoidable 
distress which would follow any aggressive action on their part. 

When they filed out, having yielded to the idea of only pas- 
sive opposition to Russian demands, another humble chapter had 
been written among many which mean little to the world at 
large yet which are potent with consequences for those to whom 
the drama is very real. 

It was at this time, when rumors were flying about Teheran 
that the Medjlis would yield to the threats and bribes which 
well-known Russian emissaries were employing with many of 
the deputies, that the Persian women performed the crowning 
act of the noble and patriotic part which thousands of their sex 
had been playing since Persia's risorgimento began. 

The Persian women since 1907 had become almost at a bound 
the most progressive, not to say radical, in the world. That 
this statement upsets the ideas of centuries makes no difference. 
It is the fact. 

It is not too much to say that without the powerful moral 
force of those so-called chattels of the oriental lords of creation 



192 THE STRANGLING OF PERSIA 

the ill-starred and short-lived revolutionary movement, however 
well conducted by the Persian men, would have early paled into 
a mere disorganized protest. The women did much to keep the 
spirit of liberty alive. Having themselves suffered from a 
double form of oppression, political and social, they were the 
more eager to foment the great Nationalist movement for the 
adoption of constitutional forms of government and the in- 
culcation of Western political, social, commercial and ethical 
codes. Equally strange is the fact that this yearning by the 
people received the support of large numbers of the Islamic 
priests, — a class which stood to lose much of its traditional in- 
fluence and privilege by the contemplated changes. - 

During the five years following the successful but bloodless 
revolution in 1906 against the oppressions and cruelty of 
Muzaffaru'd-Din Shah, a feverish and at times fierce light has 
shone in the veiled eyes of Persia's women, and in their struggle 
for liberty and its modern expressions, they broke through some 
of the most sacred customs which for centuries past have bound 
their sex in the land of Iran. 

I had ample opportunity to observe the frequent manifesta- 
tions of the influence and high purposes of the Muhammadan 
women. 

We of Europe and America are long accustomed to the in- 
creasingly large role played by Western women in business, in 
the professions, in literature, in science, and in politics, but 
what shall we say of the veiled women of the Near East who 
overnight become teachers, newspaper writers, founders of 
women's clubs and speakers on political subjects ? What, when 
we find them vigorously propagating the most progressive ideas 
of the Occident in a land until recently wrapped in the hush 
and gloom of centuries of despotism? Whence came their de- 
sire to play a part in the political and social regeneration of 
their country and their unwavering faith in our political and 



THE PERSIAN WOMEN 193 

social institutions % That it came and still exists there can be 
no possible doubt, and with it was born the discriminating in- 
telligence which is as a rule acquired only by long years of 
practical experience. 

The Persian women have given to the world a notable ex- 
ample of the ability of unsullied minds to assimilate rapidly 
an absolutely new idea, and with the elan of the crusader who 
has a vision, they early set to work to accomplish their ideals. 

I had been fortunate enough shortly after reaching Persia 
to win the confidence of the National Assembly, or Med j lis, a 
body which fairly represented the hopes and aspirations of the 
great mass of the Persian people. This point gained, I was 
soon made aware that another great, though secret, influence 
was watching my work with jealous but kindly eyes. It was 
well known in Teheran that there were dozens of more or less 
secret societies among the Persian women, with a central 
organization by which they were controlled. To this day I 
know neither the names nor the faces of the leaders of this 
group, but in a hundred different ways I learned from time to 
time that I was being aided and supported by the patriotic 
fervor of thousands of the weaker sex. 

A few examples may suffice. While sitting in my office one 
morning last summer, I was told that one of the Persian clerks 
in the Treasury department wished to see me on an important 
matter. Information comes unexpectedly and from such 
curious sources in the Orient that no offer can be safely re- 
jected. This young man came in. I had never seen him. We 
spoke in French, and after receiving permission to talk freely, 
with many apologies he said that his mother was our friend; 
that she had commissioned him to say that my wife should not 
pay a visit to the household of a certain Persian grandee, by 
whose family she had been invited, since he was an enemy to the 
Constitutional Government and my wife's visit would make 



194 THE STRANGLING OF PEESIA 

the Persians suspect me. I thanked him, and at the time 
did not myself know of the contemplated call, but soon learned 
that it was planned, and, of course, advised against it. I called 
the young Persian again and asked him how his mother knew 
of this purely private social affair of my wife's; he said that 
it had been known and discussed in the secret society to which 
his mother belonged, and that it was decided to warn me against 
it. 

On another, more recent occasion, a large crowd of poor 
women came to the Atabak Park to demonstrate against me 
because the Treasury had been unable to pay the Government 
pensions, on which there was over a million dollars then due. 
The available funds had been necessary for the volunteer troops 
who had been fighting against the ex-Shah. I sent one of my 
Persian secretaries to see these women and ask who had told 
them to come and make this demonstration. He returned 
mentioning the name of a famous reactionary grandee who was 
at the time well known to be favoring the cause of Muhammad 
Ali. I had them told that they would be given an answer on 
the following day if they dispersed quietly, which they did. 

I then sent to one of the women's societies a simple explana- 
tion of our financial straits and the impossibility of paying 
these pensions because of the needs of the Constitutional Gov- 
ernment, with a request that they prevent any further agitation 
against the Treasury. Though it did not become possible to 
pay the pensions, there was never another demonstration by 
women on this account. 

They have a saying in Teheran that when the women take 
part in a chuluh (riot) against a Cabinet of the Government, 
the situation has become serious. 

When the confiscation of the properties of the estates of 
Shuau's-Saltana took place, the Russian Government, finding 
that its Consul-general had had no excuse, either in law or 




A PERSIAN WOMAN. 



THE PERSIAN WOMEN 197 

in fact, for his conduct, concocted and gave out the pretext 
that the park of Shuau's-Saltana in Teheran was mortgaged to 
the Russian Bank at Teheran, and that its former owner owed 
the bank some $225,000. Every one knew that the claim was 
both false and absurd, but as there is no recognized system for 
recording mortgages and as the rebel Prince himself would 
doubtless have sworn to the transaction in order to save his 
property from confiscation, I was at a loss how to disprove this 
claim. To all demands that the Russian Bank should produce 
its books and other proofs of the debt a deaf ear was turned. 

It was then that I received a striking proof of the courage 
and patriotism of a Persian woman, and of the practical value 
of her support. 

One of my principal Persian assistants, a very highly 
educated and patriotic man, came to see me and said that his 
sister was one of the wives of the Prince Shuau's-Saltana, and 
that she had obtained one of the copies of the Prince's last will 
and testament, executed within the year, just before he had 
left Persia, and in compliance with all the ceremony and 
formality required by law and the Muhammadan religion for 
a man of that rank. 

She had informed him that this document, as was required, 
contained full lists and inventories of all the Prince's lands and 
property, and a statement of all debts due to him or by him — 
in fact, a complete and solemn report of his financial situation. 
The sister of my informant had told him to bring me this 
document — though at enormous risk to the lives and property 
rights of herself and her children — because she believed it was 
her duty to her country. I received the document, and with it 
was able to refute the last falsehood on which the Russian Gov- 
ernment had depended to justify the hostile and unlawful acts 
of her Consular officials in this affair. 

With the dark days when doubts came to be whispered as 



198 THE STRANGLING OF PERSIA 

to whether the Med j lis would stand firm, the Persian women, 
in their zeal for liberty and their ardent love for their country, 
threw down the last barriers which distinguished their sex and 
gave striking evidence of their patriotic courage. It was 
4 rumored more than once that in secret conclave the deputies had 
decided to yield to Russia's demands. The bazars and people 
of the capital were torn with anxiety. What could the Nation- 
alists do to hold their representatives to their duty ? 

The Persian women supplied the answer. Out from their 
walled courtyards and harems marched three hundred of that 
weak sex, with the flush of undying determination in their 
cheeks. They were clad in their plain black robes with the 
white nets of their veils dropped over their faces. Many held 
pistols under their skirts or in the folds of their sleeves. 
Straight to the Medjlis they went, and, gathered there, de- 
manded of the President that he admit them all. What the 
grave deputies of the Land of the Lion and the Sun may have 
thought at this strange visitation is not recorded. The Presi- 
dent consented to receive a delegation of them. In his recep- 
tion-hall they confronted him, and lest he and his colleagues 
should doubt their meaning, these cloistered Persian mothers, 
wives and daughters exhibited threateningly their revolvers, 
tore aside their veils, and confessed their decision to kill their 
own husbands and sons, and leave behind their own dead bodies, 
if the deputies wavered in their duty to uphold the liberty and 
dignity of the Persian people and nation. 

Though the Medjlis was destroyed by a coup d'etat executed 
by Russian hirelings a week or two later, it passed out of being, 
stainless of having sold its country's birthright. 

May we not exclaim: All honor to the veiled women of 
Persia ! With the constraining traditions of the past around 
them ; with the idea of absolute dependence upon the fancy and 
caprice of men ever before them; deprived of all opportunity 



THE MEDJLIS ABOLISHED 199 

to educate themselves along modern ideals; watched, guarded 
and rebuffed, they drank deep of the cup of freedom's desire, 
and offered up their daily contribution to their country's cause, 
watching its servants each moment with a mother's jealous eyes, 
and failing not, even in that grim, tragic hour when nien's hearts 
grew weak and the palsying dread of the prison and its tortures, 
the noose and the bullet had settled on the bravest in the land. 

When neither threats nor bribes availed against the Med j lis, 
Russia decreed its destruction by force. 

In the early afternoon of December 24, the deposed Cabinet, 
having been themselves duly persuaded by well-known methods 
to take the step, executed a coup d'etat against the Medjlis, and 
by a demonstration of gendarmes and Bakhtiyari tribesmen, 
succeeded in expelling all the deputies and employees who were 
within the Parliament grounds, after which the gates were 
locked and barred, and a strong detachment of the Guard 
Homayoon, the so-called Royal Regiment, left in charge. The 
deputies were threatened with death if they attempted to return 
there or to meet in any other spot, and the City of Teheran 
immediately passed under a de facto government and military 
control. The self-constituted directoire of seven who ac- 
complished this dubious feat, had first ascertained that the 
considerable force of Bakhtiyari tribesmen, some 2000 in num- 
ber, who had gathered in the capital after the defeat of the ex- 
Shah's forces in September last, had been duly " fixed " by the 
same Russian agencies who had so early succeeded in persuad- 
ing the members of the ex-cabinet that their true interests lay 
in siding with Russia. It is impossible to say just what 
respective proportions of fear and cupidity decided the members 
of the deposed Cabinet to take the aliens' side against their coun- 
try, but both emotions undoubtedly played a part. The 
Premier was one of the leading chiefs or Khans of the Bakhti- 
yaris, and another chief, Sardar-i-Mutashem, was the self-styled 



200 THE STRANGLING OF PERSIA 

Minister of War. These chieftains have always been a strange 
and changing mixture of mountain patriot and city intriguer 
— of loyal soldier and mercenary looter. The mercenary 
instincts, possibly aided by a sense of their own comparative 
helplessness against Russian Cossacks and artillery, led them to 
accept the stranger's gold and fair promises, and they ended 
their somewhat checkered, but theretofore relatively honorable 
career, by selling their country for a small pile of cash and the 
more alluring promise that the " Grand Viziership " (i.e., post 
of Minister of Finance) should be perpetual in their family 
or clan. When they had decided to take arms against the 
Med j lis, which had always distrusted them, the other armed 
force of the Constitutional Government — the gendarmes of 
Teheran — • headed by Ephraim Khan, had apparently lost 
heart, and this brave Armenian fell in with the plans of the 
Cabinet. Between the two forces, they abolished the last 
vestige of constitutional rule in Persia, and left their country 
at the mercy of seven oriental statesmen who had already sold 
out to the Russian Government. It was a sordid ending to a 
gallant struggle for liberty and enlightenment. 

That same afternoon a large number of the " abolished " 
deputies came to my office. They were men whom I had grown 
to know well, men of European education, in whose courage, 
integrity and patriotism I had the fullest confidence. To 
them the unlawful action of their own countrymen was more 
than a political catastrophe; it was a sacrilege, a profanation, 
a heinous crime. They came in tears, with broken voices, with 
murder in their hearts, torn by the doubt as to whether they 
should kill the former Ministers and drive out the traitorous 
tribesmen who had made possible the destruction of the Gov- 
ernment, or adopt the truly oriental idea of killing themselves. 
They asked my advice, and, hesitating somewhat as to whether 
I should interfere to save the lives of notorious betrayers of 




THE MEDJLIS BUILDING. 
After its bombardment by the Cossack Brigade under the Russian Colonel Liakhoff. 




ENTRANCE TO THE PARLIAMENT (MEDJLIS) GROUNDS. 



THE MEDJLIS ABOLISHED 203 

their country, I finally persuaded them to do neither the one 
nor the other. There seemed to be no particular good in as- 
sassinating even their treacherous countrymen, as it would only 
have given color to the pretensions of Kussia and England that 
the Persians were not capable of maintaining order. 

When the last representative element of the Constitutional 
Government, for which so many thousands had fought, suffered, 
and died, was wiped out in an hour without a drop of blood 
being shed, the Persian people gave to the world an exhibition 
of temperance, of moderation, of stern self-restraint the like 
of which probably no other civilized country could show under 
similar trying circumstances. 

I have often been asked whether the Persians were really 
capable of reforming their government; whether they were not 
mere degenerates, and if there was any true national spirit 
among them. We all know how easy it is to give forth patriotic 
utterances in piping times of peace, in the heart of a conven- 
tional and orderly community, when there is no danger involved 
in the most fiery defiance of the powers of evil. But when a 
body of seventy Muhammadan representatives, in momentary 
dread of the prison or a worse fate at the hands of an over- 
whelmingly superior force, withstood day by day the intrigues, 
bribes and threats which the agents of a powerful nation were 
freely employing, and when these seventy men went down into 
oblivion and private terror still refusing to sign away the 
honor and sovereignty of their nation, I think the question as 
to national spirit may be considered to have been thereby fairly 
answered. 

ISTo one who knew these representatives of a stricken race in 
those dark days could fail to love the Persian people, or to 
sympathize with their just aspirations. Their faults are well 
known; they are principally those of environment and tradi- 
tion. 



204 THE STRANGLING OP PERSIA 

The very capacity of the Persians to govern themselves has 
been speciously attacked in those quarters where the denial 
outstrips the query. That the Persians were unskilful in 
the practical politics and in the technique of representative 
constitutional government no one could deny ; but that they had 
the full right to develop along the particular lines of their 
customs, character, temperament and tendencies, is equally 
obvious. Eive years is nothing in the life of a nation ; it is not 
even long as a period for individual reform; yet, after a bare 
five years of effort, during which the Persian people, with all 
their difficulties and harassed by the so-called friendly powers, 
succeeded in thwarting a despot's well-planned effort to wrest 
from them their hard-earned liberties, the world is told by two 
European nations that these men were unfit, degenerate and 
incapable of producing a stable and orderly form of government. 

With a knowledge of the facts of Persia's downfall the scales 
drop from the eyes of the most incredulous, and it is clear that 
she was the helpless victim of the wretched game of cards which 
a few European powers, with the skill of centuries of prac- 
tice, still play with weaker nations as the stake, and the lives, 
honor and progress of whole races as the forfeit. 



CHAPTEK VIII 

MY BELATIONS WITH THE DE FACTO GOVERNMENT OE PEESIA. 
MASSACEES AT TABEIZ, EESHT AND ENZELI BY ETTSSIAN 
TEOOPS. MY DEPAETUBE FEOM TEHEEAN. 

FEOM the time that the Cabinet of Samsanm's-Saltana 
had, on December 1, proposed to the Medjlis the accept- 
ance of Russia's ultimatum, the attitude of the Ministers 
toward me had noticeably changed. Having apparently made 
up their minds not to resist the Russian demands in any manner, 
they were anxious that I should make that course easy for 
them by resigning at once, thus making it unnecessary for 
them to obtain the consent of the Medjlis. 

While, personally, I was entirely willing to take this step, 
the idea had not even been suggested to me until the Medjlis 
had twice, by a formal vote, resolved to reject the Cabinet's 
proposal. For me then to have resigned would have clearly 
been a usurpation by me of the right of the Medjlis to decide 
a question vitally affecting the sovereignty of the country. 
Nevertheless, I held frequent conferences with leading deputies 
and other prominent officials, in which I plainly told them 
that I had come to Persia to aid the Persian Government, 
and that if I could better assist them by resigning, I was more 
than ready to do so. The invariable reply was that I was 
the employee of the Medjlis and that if I forced their hand 
by resigning, they would be compelled to regard it as a breach 
of faith. I received daily visits from great numbers of 
Persians, officials and private individuals, who all implored 
me not to resign under any circumstances, as in their opinion 

205 



206 THE STRANGLING OF PERSIA 

it would mean the end of all hope of a constitutional govern- 
ment in Persia. 

Under the law, the Cabinet of Samsamu's-Saltana ceased 
to have any legal status at noon on December 1, in view of the 
overwhelming vote of lack of confidence given by the deputies. 
Nevertheless, as the Bakhtiyari chieftains had been tasting 
power for many months through the possession of the Pre- 
miership by their chief, Samsamu's-Saltana, they were most 
indisposed to retire again to private life. Furthermore, there 
had recently been a decided rapprochement between the 
Bakhtiyari chieftains and the Russian Legation, and it was 
perfectly evident that the Russian Government had persuaded 
them to take its view of the case. 

After the formal rejection by the Medjlis of the Russian 
demands — an event which the Russian Government probably 
did not really anticipate — the Russian officials and well- 
known emissaries in Teheran tried other means to bring about 
at least a colorable acceptance of their ultimatum. During the 
[days of excitement and ferment large sums of money were 
v/ spent among the poor people in the name of the Russian Gov- 
ernment. In several mosques where numbers of people had 
congregated, as they are accustomed to do during winter, espe- 
cially if the bread supply is short, meals were served to thou- 
sands of Persians with the information that Russia was fur- 
nishing the money to do so, and that only the hostility of the 
Medjlis to Russia was the cause of the scarcity of bread. It 
was said that no less than 100,000 roubles was expended for 
this purpose. 

The afternoon of December 1, after the assassination of 
Prince Alau'd-Dawla and the rejection of the Cabinet by the 
Medjlis, I was informed that several of the more bitter and 
hostile Bakhtiyari Khans, inspired by Amir Mujahid, Sardar- 
i-Jang and the treacherous Amir Mufakhkham, had discussed 




AMIR-I-MUFAKHKHAM. 



SARDAR-I-ZAFFAR. 




AMIR MUJAHID. SARDAR-I-JANG. 

Four Bakhtlyarl Khans at Teheran who took part in bringing about the destruction of the 
Medjlis on December 24, 1911. 



RELATIONS WITH THE GOVERNMENT 209 

making an attack on my residence and offices at Atabak Park, 
with a view to seizing the Treasury, burning the records, and 
driving the Americans from their posts. Amir Mujahid and 
several others had received large sums of money for military 
purposes during the preceding summer, and I had' been seek- 
ing to obtain an accounting from them. 

When this news reached me, I sent a Persian friend to the 
Bakhtiyari headquarters to inform the Khans that if they 
contemplated anything so foolish, they had better think twice 
about it. My purpose, of course, was to let them know that I 
was aware of their attitude. I had the guard of Treasury 
gendarmes at Atabak Park increased by fifty men, making a 
total of one hundred and fifty on duty there. The Bakhti- 
yaris never came. 

Shortly after this, grave dissensions occurred between Eph- 
raim and the Bakhtiyari chieftains, and for several days an 
armed collision between Ephraim's police and gendarmes was 
hourly expected. Ephraim then resigned as head of the city 
police. It was rumored that the Bakhtiyaris, who were each 
day showing themselves more completely under Russian influ- 
ence, were plotting to disarm Ephraim's men and take charge 
of the policing of Teheran, with the assistance of the Cossack 
brigade under the Russian Colonel Vadbolski. This sinister 
suspicion greatly increased the unrest and disorder in the city. 
Serious rioting and bloodshed were momentarily expected, and 
the fidais, to the number of 2,000, gave out that they were pre- 
pared to take part in the proceeding. 

The dispute between Ephraim and the Bakhtiyaris was sub- 
sequently patched up and the former resumed charge of the 
police. 

At Atabak Park we had the honor of being reconnoitered 
from time to time by Russian officers, one of whom, on Decem- 
ber 4, endeavored to insult the guards at the gate. 



210 THE STRANGLING OF PERSIA 

In the attitude of Wuthuqu'd-Dawla, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, and his brother, Ghavamu's-Saltana, Minister of the 
Interior, I now noticed a marked coldness, though these two 
had previously been friendly to me. The change occurred 
when they learned that I had despatched Mr. Lecoffre to 
Tabriz to investigate the gross frauds and malversations of 
the revenues which had been going on there for a year before 
and ever since my arrival in Teheran. The revenues of this 
province of Azarbayjan were computed to be about 1,000,000 
tumans. Yet for months before I took charge, and during 
the entire summer while I was Treasurer-general, not a single 
cent had been collected there for the Government, according 
to the Persian pishgar, or tax-collector. This was the more 
remarkable as the summer is a favorable time for collecting 
the revenues. Private information came to me that the tax- 
collector had already made his fortune, and that he sneered at 
the Central Government at Teheran, including the Treasurer- 
general. That he thought himself safe in so doing was per- 
haps due to his being the father of the two ministers just re- 
ferred to: Wuthuqu'd-Dawla and Ghavamu's-Saltana. That 
they should become suddenly hostile to me on learning of Mr. 
Lecoffre's mission to Tabriz, is perhaps explainable by that 
same relationship. 

Intrigues are so deep and personal interest so strong in Per- 
sia that it is perfectly easy to conceive how these two ministers 
were favorably inclined even to the acceptance of the Russian 
ultimatum, when we remember that one of its clauses demanded 
" the immediate dismissal of Mr. Lecoffre " from the Persian 
service ! 

The above facts are cited to show the situation between the 
Cabinet and myself after their coup d'etat was executed against 
the Medjlis on December 24. 

The Medjlis was m£ employer. That body had directed my 



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KELATIONS WITH THE GOVEKNMENT 213 

engagement, approved the contract under which I undertook the 
financial work, and had on June 13 passed a law, one of the ex- 
press objects of which was to make me in my task independent 
of the influence or control of any Cabinet which might come 
into being. The same idea and motives brought about this 
step as produced the status of the officials of the " Ottoman 
Debt." 

When, therefore, the Medjlis was destroyed by force, the 
Americans were left without an employer or status, unless 
they chose to recognize the purely de facto Cabinet, which had 
merely arrogated to itself police powers, as the lawful govern- 
ment of Persia. I neither felt authorized nor desired to take 
such a step. With the abolition of the Medjlis the last hope 
of doing any effective work in behalf of the Persian people had 
gone, and I was compelled to regard our task as at an end. 

Prior to December 24, the Cabinet had several times pro- 
posed to me, through various emissaries, that I should resign. 
As inducements to this course they offered me personally, in 
addition to the compensation due me under my contract with 
the Government, the " Order of the Lion and the Sun " of the 
first class (theretofore given only to potentates), a formal testi- 
monial as to my services to the people of Persia, the privilege 
of nominating my successor, and varying honorariums. To 
these proposals I replied that unless and until I could obtain 
some authentic expression (even though unofficial) to the effect 
that the deputies of the Medjlis would not consider my resign- 
ing to be a betrayal of their interests, I would not resign, and 
that as to the other inducements I was content to forego the dia- 
mond-studded " Order," the parchment, and other rewards, un- 
less they should come from the lawful representatives of the 
Persian people, to whom alone I was content to look for any 
recognition of my services. I was informed that my reply 
was not favorably received by the members of the Cabinet, 



214 THE STRANGLING OF PERSIA 

Several days before the coup d'etat of December 24, the 
Cabinet adopted an attitude of open hostility, and the Bakhti- 
yari Khans renewed their threats to attack my residence and 
pillage the Treasury. 

The destruction of the Medjlis was the end of the Constitu- 
tional Government in Persia. 

On the afternoon of the next day, Christmas, I received a 
call from the Chef de Cabinet of the Ministry of Eoreign Af- 
fairs, who delivered to me a letter in Persian of which the 
following is a translation: 

The Honorable Mr. Shuster: 

As you are aware, the Commission elected on the eve of the 29th of Jil- 
harjeh, 1329, and. invested with plenary power by the Medjlis for the pur- 
pose of dealing with the question of the ultimatum of the Russian Govern- 
ment, decided, on the last day of the same month, with the cooperation of 
the Council of Ministers, on the acceptance of the terms of the ultimatum, 
and the purport of the said decision has been duly communicated to the 
Russian Legation. 1 

Seeing that the stipulations of the aforesaid ultimatum necessitate the 
recall of your honorable person from the service of the Persian Government 
and the severance of your connection with matters financial, we hereby in- 
form you of the situation, and as regards the office of the Treasury-general 
and the individual to whom you will hand over the books and the service, 
as well as the status of the American functionaries who have been invited to 
the service of the Persian Government, the decision of the Government will 
be transmitted to you later. 

This was signed by seven former Ministers, including the 
Samsamu's-Saltana and the Wuthuqu'd-Dawla. 

On receipt of this entirely illegal order of dismissal, I 
had one of three courses open to me: to accept it, to forcibly 

i This Commission was never legally elected, nor was any such decision 
ever taken by the body of men who were said to compose the Commission. 
The author has the entire documentary history of the matter, but the most 
striking proof that no such authority was granted by the Medjlis is the fact 
that the Ministers felt it necessary to destroy the Medjlis before attempting 
my dismissal. 



EELATIONS WITH THE GOVEENMENT 215 

resist it, or to make no reply, leaving the next move to the de 
facto Cabinet. Had I chosen the latter course, I might have 
been in Persia still, on one pretext or another. To have re- 
sisted the order of the Cabinet, however illegal as regards me, 
would have meant severe rioting and bloodshed in Teheran. 
The people were terribly incensed at the destruction of the 
Medjlis, and if I had adopted an attitude of open defiance of 
the directoire who pretended to exercise the powers of govern- 
ment, it is impossible to say what the consequences would 
have been. 

A large majority of the deposed deputies were planning to 
meet and declare the dissolution of the Medjlis to be uncon- 
stitutional, the Eegent to be false to his oath, and the Ministers 
to be traitors. Nothing but the most stringent police meas- 
ures taken by Ephraim, and the presence in Teheran of over 
2,000 Bakhtiyaris, large bodies of whom were patroling the 
streets, kept the people from breaking out into serious disor- 
ders. Ephraim and the Ministers, especially the Wuthuqu'd- 
Dawla, had large guards around their residences, and nothing 
but the thought of the Cossack brigade and a large recent addi- 
tion of Eussian troops to the Consular force in the capital, 
together with the existence of a Eussian army only eighty miles 
away at Kasvin, kept the people from attacking the Ministers 
and others whom they felt had betrayed them. 

Under these circumstances, and after careful consideration, 
I decided that it was my duty to eliminate myself from the 
situation, and that no good could come from the Americans re- 
maining longer in Persia. I accordingly notified the direc- 
toire, on December 26, as follows: 

In reply I have the honor to state that the notification of the termination 
of my contract with the Imperial Government of Persia to serve as Treas- 
urer-general of Persia will be acted on by me in proper form and manner 
upon the settlement of the question of the individual to whom I am to trans- 



216 THE STRANGLING OF PERSIA 

fer the official responsibilities of my office and upon the arrangement of the 
question of the status of my fourteen American assistants,! as to which 
matters it is stated that I will receive a further communication from the 
Honorable Council. The future status of my American assistants is at 
present the principal object of my solicitude. 

Some days before Christmas I had been notified that the 
American instructors and Persian officers of the Treasury 
Gendarmerie desired to call in a body and pay their respects 
on the day. This was before there was any suspicion that 
the Cabinet was going to take the action which it did against 
the Med j lis on December 24. 

I received the officers early Christmas afternoon, at the time 
appointed, but realizing what a rumor-loving place Teheran 
was, and the excitement over the Cabinet's action the day be- 
fore, I was careful to inform them in a little address that they 
should be scrupulously mindful of the fact that they were offi- 
cials of a purely financial administration, and that they should 
refrain from all acts or public dissensions of a political nature. 
This was in the presence of a number of servants and onlook- 
ers. Nevertheless, as I had feared, the news immediately 
spread that I had called the Treasury Gendarmerie to arms and 
intended employing them to restore the Med j lis. A few hours 
later I received the communication from the Ministers which 
has been referred to above. 

On December 24 a message was received from the Acting 
Governor at Tabriz, stating that the Russian troops stationed 
there had started to massacre the inhabitants. Shortly after 

i In addition to Messrs. Charles I. McCaskey and Bruce G. Dickey, who 
went with me to Teheran, and Mr. F. S. Cairns, who arrived on June 19, the 
following Americans, whose engagement by me under contract had been 
authorized by the Medjlis at different times, had arrived: Messrs. Loring 
P. Jordon and Robert E. Brott, secretaries; Messrs. Frank G. Whitney and 
P. J. Fitzsimmons, accountants; Messrs. J. N. Merrill, Oscar Preuss, John 
F. Green and E. P. Lowry, Treasury Gendarmerie instructors ; and Messrs. 
W. J. O'Donovan, Turin B. Boone and D. J. Waters, office assistants. The 
majority of these men did not reach Teheran until November and the early 
part of December. 






THE "ARK." A CITADEL IN TABRIZ. 

THIS was attacked and bombarded by 4000 Russian troops In December, 1911. It was 

defended by 1000 Persian "ndais" (self-devoted) who held out for four days. 

The American Consulate General (see flag) was In the line of Are. 




VIEW OF THE CITY OF TABRIZ. 

Capital of the province of Azarbayjan. 



MASSACRES BY RUSSIAN TROOPS 219 

this the Indo-European lines were cut (by bullets, it was after- 
wards alleged) and news ceased. Additional Russian troops 
were on the way to Tabriz from Julfa. The exact origin of the 
fighting at Tabriz is not clear. It was reported that some Rus- 
sian soldiers claiming to be stringing a telephone wire, mounted 
the roof of the police headquarters about 10 o'clock at night, 
on December 20, were challenged by the Persian sentries, and 
replied with shots. Serious street fighting commenced the next 
morning, and continued for several days. The Acting Governor 
reported that the Russian troops indulged in terrible brutality, 
killing women and children in the streets and hundreds of 
other non-combatants. There were about 4,000 Russian 
troops and two batteries of artillery around the city. About 
1000 of the Tabriz fidais took refuge in an old citadel, called 
the " Ark." They were without artillery and poorly armed. 
The Russians bombarded the place for some time, killing a 
large number of the fidais. The superior numbers and the ar- 
tillery of the Russians finally conquered, and there then ensued 
a period of terrorism during which no Persian's life or honor 
was safe. At one time Mons. Poklewski-Koziell, the Russian 
Minister at Teheran, telegraphed to the General in command of 
the Russian troops at Tabriz, telling him to stop fighting, as 
matters were being arranged at the capital. The General re- 
plied to the Minister that he (the former) took his orders 
from the Viceroy of the Caucasus at Tiflis, and not from Te- 
heran. 

On ISTew Year's Day, which was the 10th of Muharram, a 
day of great mourning and held sacred in the Persian religious 
calendar, the Russian Military Governor, who had hoisted 
Russian flags over the Government buildings at Tabriz, hung 
the Sikutu'l-Islam, who was the chief priest of Tabriz, two 
other priests, and five others, among them several high officials 
of the Provincial Government. As one British journalist put 



220 THE STRANGLING OF PERSIA 

it, the effect of this outrage on the Persians was that which 
would be produced on the English people by the hanging of 
the Archbishop of Canterbury on Good Friday. From this 
time on the Russians at Tabriz continued to hang or shoot any 
Persian whom they chose to consider guilty of the crime of be- 
ing a " Constitutionalist." When the fighting there was first 
reported a prominent official of the Foreign Office at St. Peters- 
burg, in an interview to the press, made the statement that Rus- 
sia would take vengeance into her own hands until the " revo- 
lutionary dregs " had been exterminated. 

Many on reading this gruesome threat shuddered to recall 
Russian vengeance in Turkestan, where in 1881 Skobeloff 
massacred 8,000 defenseless Turcomans at Denghil Tepe on the 
principle that with Asiatics the duration of peace is in direct 
proportion to the number slain. And the fate of the Chinese 
settlement at Blagovestchenk on the Amoor, where in 1900, 
the Russians, desiring to strike terror into the Chinese and 
save trouble in dealing with them in the future, told the inhab- 
itants that they should move. When the Chinese explained 
that they had no steamer 'or other means of conveyance, the 
Russian humorists told them to move into the river, and there- 
upon drove the entire population into the water to drown. 

With these incidents in mind it is not difficult to understand 
the semi-official Novoe Vremya's utterance that " in this case 
true humanity requires cruelty. The whole population of 
Tabriz must be held responsible and punished. . . . There is 
a limit even to Russian indulgence." 

Experience has amply demonstrated that the Russian Gov- 
ernment, having the power, never does less than it promises 
in cases of this kind. It is safe to say that the horrors of 
Tabriz will never become fully known. The Russians saw well 
to that. Unrestrained shootings, hangings, tortures, blowing 
of men from cannon, and the cynical butchery of women and 




SULTAN AHMAD SHAH, THE PRESENT RULER OF PERSIA. 
He succeeded to the throne on July IS, 1909, alter the deposition of his father, Muhammad All. 
Behind him on the left is the Crown Prince. The others are royal teachers. 



MASSACRES BY RUSSIAN TROOPS 223 

children in the streets of their town — and even worse things — 
make a fair record for the officers and troops of a nation whose 
ruler promotes peace tribunals and poses as the friend of man- 
kind. 

One significant fact: at the same time that the fighting 
broke out at Tabriz, the Russian troops at Resht and Enzeli, 
hundreds of miles away, shot down the Persian police and 
many inhabitants without warning or provocation of any kind. 
And the date happened to be just after the Persian Cabinet 
had definitely informed the Russian Legation that all the de- 
mands of Russia's ultimatum were accepted, — a condition 
which the British Government had publicly assured the Per- 
sians would be followed by the withdrawal of the Russian in- 
vading forces, and which the Russian Government had offi- 
cially confirmed, "unless fresh incidents should arise in the 
meantime to make the retention of the troops advisable." 

In the light of these events is it probable that it was the 
comparatively helpless and foredoomed Persians who at 
Tabriz, Resht and Enzeli started simultaneous attacks upon 
vastly superior bodies of Russian soldiers ? 

During the interval between December 25 and the 7th of 
January there had been a steadily rising tide of indignation 
against the traitorous ministers who had sold their people. 
Protests by telegraph poured in from the provinces, denounc- 
ing the Regent and the Cabinet, for their attack upon the 
Constitutional representatives. I had sent word to the min- 
isters time and again that their order of dismissal left affairs 
in the Treasury in chaos, and that if they did not promptly 
take the next step, I would turn over my office to my senior as- 
sistant, Mr. Cairns, designating him under the law of June 
13, and leave Teheran. The Cabinet had promised, as had 
the Regent, that Mr. Cairns should succeed me as Treasurer- 
general, although he had no particular desire to remain. The 



224 THE STRANGLING OF PERSIA 

British and Russian Legations, however, threatened the Per- 
sians with severe measures if they allowed any one but Mons. 
Mornard, the Belgian Administrator of the Customs, to suc- 
ceed me. After two weeks of a vain endeavor to get the Cab- 
inet to take some proper step, I delivered over my office to Mr. 
Cairns on January 7, having notified them two days previously 
that in the absence of their providing, within forty-eight hours, 
some business-like method for my relief, I would take that 
step. 

By afternoon the transfer to Mr. Cairns was formally made, 
the necessary receipts given, and the Ministers and banks noti- 
fied. I left my power of attorney with Mr. McCaskey to act 
for me in any and all matters pertaining to my official papers 
and accounts as Treasurer-general of Persia. 

Some hours later a representative from the Ministers tele- 
phoned that he was coming with an important communication. 
Later he arrived and read to me a manifestly pre-dated decree 
from the Regent and communication from the Ministers, ap- 
pointing Mons. Mornard as " Acting Provisional Treasurer- 
general." I turned the communications over to Mr. Cairns, 
who had assumed the duties of Treasurer-general. This was 
a typical Persian method, though it came a little late in the 
day. The Ministers knew, of course, that I would not have 
turned over my office, under any circumstances, to Mons. 
Mornard, a man whose character was more than notorious and 
of whose gross irregularities in the conduct of his administra- 
tion I had already become aware. 

Mr. Cairns promptly informed the Ministers that he stood 
ready to turn over the Treasury to his successor and that he 
and his thirteen American associates, in view of the admitted 
violation of their contracts by the Persian Government, were 
desirous of leaving the country. 

On January 9 the Regent sent word to me that he desired to 



DEPASTURE EEOM TEHERAN 225 

say farewell on the following day and that the young Shah de- 
sired to receive me in audience and thank me for my services. 

On the following day I drove for the last time to the Darbar 
where His Majesty was to receive me. Arrived at the palace, 
I passed through long lines of aged and melancholic courtiers, 
glistening officers and obsequious attendants. The young Shah 
was very nervous, as is usually the case when giving a private 
audience. He spoke through an interpreter and thanked me 
very gravely for what I had sought to do for his country. I 
wished him success and prosperity, though the career of 
" merry monarch " hardly seemed in store for him. 

His Majesty promised to send me a specially framed por- 
trait of himself as a souvenir, but I hardly expect to see it. 

From there I drove to the Eegent's private residence and 
spent several hours with His Highness, who expressed great re- 
gret at my departure and much anxiety as to the future of the 
country. 

In the meantime, Mr. Cairns had been in communication 
with the Russian and British Legations, whose Ministers both 
agreed that the contracts of the American assistants had been 
violated by the acceptance of the ultimatum and that they had 
a right to depart. As Mr. Cairns knew perfectly well that the 
Persian Ministers were merely executing the orders of the 
Russian Legation, he preferred to save time and settle all re- 
maining questions direct. 

My preparations for the journey having been completed, I 
left Atabak Park for Enzeli on the morning of Thursday, Jan- 
uary 11. The Regent had placed at my disposal the new 
automobile which had but recently arrived for the use of the 
Shah and himself. In our party were Mrs. Shuster, our two 
little daughters and governess, and Mr. Edward Bell, the Sec- 
retary of the American Legation at Teheran, who was travel- 
ing to Paris on a short leave. Our trunks had gone on ahead 



226 THE STKANGLIKG OF PEKSIA 

and the only question remaining was whether we would get 
over the high mountain passes between Teheran and the Cas- 
pian before they became blocked with snow. 

It was a beautiful morning. The mountains behind Te- 
heran were white with snow; the sun shone brightly in a 
clear blue sky, and there was life tonic in the air. Nature fa- 
vored, but our hearts were sad, for our task in Persia, to which 
we had looked forward with both pleasure and pride, had 
come to a sudden and very unpleasant end. 

As I stood in a circle of gloomy American and Persian 
friends, about to step into the autmobile, I ®suld not help re- 
calling the evening of my arrival at the same spot just eight 
months before, and there swept over me the realization that 
the hopes of a patient, long-suffering Muhammadan people of 
reclaiming their position in the world had been ruthlessly 
stamped out by the armies of a so-called civilized and Chris- 
tian nation. 

We passed out the Kasvin gates of Teheran at half-past nine 
o'clock, with Mons. Varnet, the Shah's French chauffeur at the 
wheel. 

I shall never forget my emotions as we left the busy streets 
of Teheran and came out upon the more quiet highroad. Mem- 
ories of the preceding eight months crowded fast upon me. 
One cannot leave forever the scene of a frustrated ambition 
without a pang at the mere physical realization that it is all 
over. I had been ambitious to serve the Persian people. 
When the inhabitants of Teheran learned the day on which 
we were going they sent several of their deputies to me to say 
that a great crowd of them wished to come and say farewell. 
I requested that no such demonstration should be made, and 
when word of it reached the Cabinet, the police notified the 
leaders of the different societies that no gathering of the kind 
would be permitted. The companies of Treasury gendarmes 




ME. SHTJSTER, MRS. SHUSTER AND THEIR TWO LITTLE DAUGHTERS. 
Entering the automobile at Atabak Park to take leave of Persia. 




LOADING THE AUTOMOBILE FOR Mr. SHUSTER AND HIS FAMILY TO LEAVE 
TEHERAN ON JANUARY 11, 1912. 



DEPARTURE FROM TEHERAN 229 

at the Bagh-i-Shah barracks were drilling as our car passed by. 
They were a body of men not to be despised, and bad the or- 
ganization been allowed to develop many of Persia's most seri- 
ous problems would have been promptly solved. 

Reaching Kasvin at 3 : 30 that afternoon, we passed through 
the town, which was thronged with Russian troops. As we 
were leaving the further gate where there was a group of fifty 
or more Russian soldiers, some stopped and ostentatiously 
picked up stones, but if they threw them as we passed at a good 
rate of speed, none hit the machine. Beyond this incident no 
discourtesy was shown us on the trip. 

When we reached Buinak, a little road station fifteen miles 
beyond Kasvin, we ran into a snow tempest and in ten minutes 
the road was completely obliterated by the dry snow blowing 
down in dense clouds from the near-by mountains. We 
stopped at this little stone hut and passed the night. The fol- 
lowing morning the road was reported completely blocked and 
we were warned that we could not get over the passes. Two 
hours were necessary to thaw out the engine, the car having 
been half covered by drifting snow. We got away about 10 :30 
and on approaching the highest pass found the road packed 
with four feet of snow. It was only with the assistance of 
large road gangs, who dug us out several times, and Mons. 
Varnet's skilful handling of the powerful fifty-horsepower car, 
that we were enabled to get through and reach the road-station 
of Menjil at 5 o'clock that evening. A pleasant run of five 
hours brought us to Enzeli early the following afternoon. 
We passed several bodies of Russian troops on the road. There 
was a Russian cruiser in the harbor, and the town was under 
the control of the Russian Consul there. The next day, Jan- 
uary 14, was the Russian New Year, and the cruiser and gun- 
boats engaged in salutes. That afternoon we embarked on the 
Russian steamer Teheran for Baku, and at 5 : 30 o'clock of a 



230 THE STRANGLING OF PERSIA 

raw, blustery day on the Caspian the coast of Persia and the 
lights of Enzeli had sunk from view. The brief and disap- 
pointing chapter of American financial administration in that 
ancient land had been written. 



CHAPTER IX 

CHARACTER OF THE REGENT, OF THE DIFFERENT GOVERNMENT 
OFFICIALS AND OF THE MEDJLIS. CHARACTER AND CAPACITY 
OF THE PERSIAN PEOPLE. 

THE present Regent of Persia, Abu'l Qasim Khan ISTasiru'l- 
Mulk, is a native of the district of Hamadan. He pursued 
his advanced studies at Oxford University and was a classmate 
of Sir Edward Grey, the present Secretary for 'Foreign Affairs 
in England. He is also a personal friend of Lord Curzon. 
Shortly after the reign of Muzaffaru'd-Din Shah, Nasiru'1-Mulk 
was appointed Minister of Finance. He held this portfolio dur- 
ing the Grand Viziership of the late Aminu'd-Dawla for about 
six months, after which he was appointed Governor of the Prov- 
ince of Kurdistan, an office which he filled for four years. A 
year later, and from the time of the proclamation of the first 
Constitution, he was made President of the Council of Min- 
isters, holding the portfolio of Finance. He had hardly un- 
dertaken certain reforms in his department when he was ar- 
rested by the then-reigning Shah, Muhammad Ali, and was 
under threat of execution when freed through the intervention 
of the British Legation. The day that he was set at liberty 
he left for Europe, where he sojourned until the deposition of 
Muhammad Ali and the restoration of the Constitution in July, 
1909. Returning to Teheran shortly after this event, he re- 
fused all offers of public positions and contented himself with 
lending his moral assistance to the Nationalists, giving his 
counsels to the Ministers and Deputies. Sometime later he 

again went to Europe, ostensibly on account of his own health 

231 



232 THE STRANGLING OF PEESIA 

and that of his son. Soon after the death of the late Regent, 
Azudu'1-Mulk, he was elected Eegent by the Med j lis, and, on 
February 8, 1911, returned to Teheran to take up the duties 
of his position. 

From the very first time that I met His Highness, Nasiru'l- 
Mulk, he showed himself most favorably disposed towards the 
American finance administrators and towards me personally. 
During the eight months that I spent in Teheran — with the ex- 
ception of the month of December, during which I had practi- 
cally no direct relations with the Persian Government — I had 
frequent and lengthy interviews with him, usually at his re- 
quest, and discussed freely with him the various problems, fi- 
nancial and others, which confronted the country. The Eegent 
is a man of most pleasant and dignified appearance; he speaks 
English perfectly, as well as French, and has sufficiently broad 
education and experience to realize to the full the difficulties 
which confronted the Persian people in their endeavor to estab- 
lish a successful form of constitutional government. He has a 
most persuasive manner, and could discourse learnedly upon the 
defects of his countrymen and the needs of the situation. The 
general feeling which he left with me in our earlier conversations 
was that I had been talking to an intelligent, broad and well-edu- 
cated gentleman. After a number of interviews, however, in 
which I had sought to impress upon him certain financial plans 
and secure his active personal assistance and the influence and 
prestige of his name in carrying them out, I found, to my regret, 
that His Highness was decidedly more fond of describing ob- 
stacles and difficulties than of making any practical attempt to 
overcome them. He left me frequently under the impression 
that I had been talking with a dying physician diagnosing his 
own malady. One could not but admire the skill of the diagnosis 
while regretting the imminent dissolution of the learned diagnos- 
tician who was making it. Time and again I went away from 




ABU'L-QASIM KHAN, NASIRU'L-MULK, THE PRESENT REGENT OF PERSIA. 



GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS 235 

a two hours' interview with IsTasiru'l-Mulk filled with a vague 
dissatisfaction, although I was unable to put my finger upon any- 
particular thing that he had said which did not seem to be rea- 
sonable and accurate. Many others, both Europeans and Per- 
sians, with whom I talked, told me that they had gained the same 
impression from him. 

Perhaps the greatest defect of Nasiru'1-Mulk, after this tem- 
peramental one, was the violent obsession, which he had from 
the very beginning and never lost to the day that I saw him last, 
that his Regency was being opposed and his life itself endangered 
by what he described as the " central secret societies " in Te- 
heran. He told me once that when he went to Europe a second 
time he had not expected to return. He had been offered the 
Regency before Azudu'1-Mulk had been elected, and had de- 
clined it, having made up his mind to retire from public life. 
At that time the offer was made to him unanimously by the 
deputies of the Medjlis. After the death of Azudu'1-Mulk, how- 
ever, in September, 1910, the proposal to elect him Regent 
came directly from the elements in the Medjlis which were after- 
wards grouped under the name of the Moderate party, and those 
more radical elements, who afterwards became known as the 
Democratic party, did not favor the election of !Nasiru'l-Mulk. 
They had a candidate of their own, a man of high reputation and 
great ability, named Mustawfi'l-Mamalik. After some discus- 
sion, however, the Regent was elected, and his selection subse- 
quently made unanimous by both elements in the Medjlis. It 
was known that Nasiru'1-Mulk was highly esteemed in Europe, 
and particularly by Sir Edward Grey, and it was believed that 
his selection as Regent would do much to win for Persia the 
friendly support of the European powers. Before the Regent 
returned to Teheran, however, he received from some unknown 
and irresponsible parties, several letters threatening his life if 
he returned, and, in addition to delaying his trip, this event so 



236 THE STRANGLING OF PERSIA 

preyed upon his mind that he was in the gravest doubts as to 
whether he should go back to Persia at all. From various points 
along the trip back from London and Paris, he sent long tele- 
grams to the Med j lis laying down certain conditions precedent to 
his assuming office. Principal among these was the requirement 
that the Medjlis should divide itself into parties and that the 
party having the majority should form a cabinet which would 
be responsible to that party so long as it maintained the majority, 
and should carry out the program laid down by that majority. 
There can be no doubt that Nasiru'1-Mulk was correct in theory 
in bringing about this innovation, which the Medjlis accepted. 
Representative forms of government do require the rule of the 
majority and an attitude of mutual consideration for their 
respective rights between the majority and the minority in the 
legislative branch of the government. The Persians, however, 
are a peculiar people, and being totally inexperienced in the tech- 
nique of democratic forms of government, once the line of polit- 
ical cleavage was established, there quickly developed an intense 
and bitter rivalry and even personal animosity between the mem- 
bers of the Moderate party — which, upon the count of noses, 
had the majority — and the Democratic party which was in the 
minority. Previous to this division the deputies of the Medjlis, 
while many of them held differing views as to the program and 
procedure which should be adopted to reorganize the Constitu- 
tional Government and produce a stable administration in Per- 
sia, had always considered themselves to be Nationalists or Con- 
stitutionalists. Their energies were expended directly in the 
really patriotic endeavor to solve the problems which confronted 
their country. The strife and bitterness of party rivalry had 
not entered into their proceedings to any very great extent. 
Nasiru'1-Mulk was the father of factional hatred in the Persian 
Parliament. This is said, not as a reproach, but merely as an 
historical fact. His intentions were undoubtedly of the best, 



GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS 237 

but he failed to take into consideration the defects and weak- 
nesses of his own countrymen when he insisted upon them group- 
ing themselves on the right and on the left as the best means of 
carrying out a practical plan for the reorganization of the govern- 
ment. I have many times heard him decry party jealousies and 
the bitter animosities which undoubtedly existed in the Med j lis 
and point to them as one of the reasons why greater progress 
was not made. He never seemed to realize the part which he 
had played in bringing them to an acute stage. 

When he reached Kasvin on his journey to Teheran to assume 
office, so strong was his belief that he was about to be the victim 
of political assassination that he dismounted from his carriage 
for a short rest at the road-station there, clasping in both hands 
a large Mauser automatic pistol, of the use of which he was 
entirely ignorant. 

After assuming office he transmitted to the Medjlis a number 
of messages, most of which were well thought out and expressed 
in a scholarly manner. In these he proclaimed in unmistakable 
terms that while he did not see the wisdom of the extremely 
limited and, in fact, almost nominal powers of the Regency, he 
would nevertheless keep strictly within the bounds laid down by 
the Constitution and not seek to exercise any power which was 
not granted to him thereunder. I believe that during his entire 
service as Regent he faithfully kept this pledge. Certainly, a 
stronger or more ambitious man with his prestige and influence 
could have easily made himself the absolute dictator of the coun- 
try on more than one occasion. During the early months of my 
stay in Teheran the Regent expressed the belief that he should 
not remain, that his enemies were opposing him so violently that 
he could accomplish nothing by staying and that he should be 
allowed to go to Europe upon a leave of absence and present the 
cause of Persia to the European powers. It was generally recog- 
nized that his departure would have had a most disastrous ef- 



238 THE STRANGLING OF PERSIA 

feet upon the situation; and although he was still in Teheran 
"when I left, eight months later, he had never ceased to insist 
that he should be allowed to go. His insistence became so vio- 
lent at times that some most lamentable — though ludicrous — 
scenes took place between him and different members of the 
Cabinet. He would summon a number of the deputies to his 
palace and, after haranguing them for hours on their incapacity 
and failure to solve the problems concerning Persia, he would 
announce that he intended to depart for Europe. 

In the latter part of September, before the defeat of Prince 
Salaru'd-Dawla by Ephraim Khan and the Bakhtiyaris, the 
Regent called a number of deputies, principally Democrats, to 
Chalharz, his summer residence outside Teheran, and after one 
of his dramatic talks, exclaimed, baring his breast : " Why don't 
you kill me ! " and " I will kill myself then ! " He made as if 
to rush from the room to get a pistol, but was seized and pre- 
vented from doing so until he had become calmer. On another 
occasion during the same month, several deputies were called 
by the Regent to his palace in the Gulistan in Teheran at 10 
o'clock at night. On their arrival the Regent started to com- 
plain bitterly of an article criticizing him which had appeared 
in the Ruski Slovo (a Russian newspaper) and stating that the 
Democrats had written these fasehoods about him. Sulayman 
Mirza, the leader of the Democrats in the Medjlis, who was 
present, took a paper from his pocket, stating that it contained 
the views of the Democrats as to the Regent and that the article 
in question was not written by them. The Regent said : " This 
is not enough; you must state publicly that what the Ruski 
Slovo says is false." Sulayman Mirza replied : " I will never 
do that, as it is not the business of the Democrats to do such 
things." At this the Regent jumped up, shouting and beating 
his breast and crying : " You want to kill me ; why don't you 
kill me % I will leave to-night ! " After two hours of incoher- 



GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS 239 

encies of this kind, to which the servants and soldiers outside 
the room were practically witnesses, the Regent called for a 
scribe and dictated his resignation, adding the statement at the 
bottom : " I do this because the Democrats are against me and 
hate me." He then said : " You must all sign this and guarantee 
me a safe conduct out of the country." When the deputies and 
ministers present refused, the Regent started to rush from the 
room, calling for his coachman, but was seized and dragged back. 
The gathering broke up about 3 o'clock in the morning, after five 
hours of this hysterical procedure. 

Nasiru'1-Mulk was, in my opinion, a most unfortunate choice 
for Regent. The situation of the Persian people demanded a 
strong, just hand at the helm, and, however great his intelligence, 
the Regent was not strong, and, on some subjects, he was not 
just. A profound egoist, he could look at no question except 
in its bearing upon him and his dignity. His familiar accusa- 
tion against the Med j lis and the Ministers was that they were 
endeavoring to drag him into politics, and that the Regent should 
be sacrosanct and respected by every one, as is the King of 
England. The conclusion is inevitable that he was more con- 
cerned with his own welfare and peace of mind than with the 
success of the difficult and complicated task which he had under- 
taken. 

The Cabinet ministers and other high executive officials with 
whom I came in contact during my stay in Persia, with few ex- 
ceptions, did not impress me favorably. Many of them were 
men of good education and great intelligence, but they invariably 
lacked the ability to regard their power and office purely as a 
means of serving their country. I am aware that, tested by this 
standard, many public officials in other countries would leave 
something to be desired, but the defects of selfishness, of purely 
personal ambition, of seeking pecuniary profit at the expense of 
the Government, were more than usually prevalent among the so- 



240 THE STRANGLING OF PERSIA 

called governing classes in Persia. These men were invariably 
chosen from the aristocracy — and a very degenerate aristocracy 
— and they were either unwilling or unable to oppose seriously 
corruption in the Government where it might even faintly affect 
themselves or their friends. 

The deputies of the Persian Medjlis were a very different 
type of men. Among them were some few of the grandee ele- 
ment, of the wealthy landowners and nobles. But as a rule they 
were nearer to the people ; many had studied law or medicine ; 
some had been clerks and inferior public officials. A number 
of the deputies were priests or mullahs, and, whatever their walk 
in life, they seemed to feel that the fact of their being chosen 
by a popular vote, instead of being merely appointed through 
some form of influence, made them the guardians of the rights 
of their countrymen. Most of these men sincerely believed that 
they embodied the dignity and ideals of the Persian people 
in their struggle to establish a representative form of govern- 
ment. 

As to the Medjlis itself, varying opinions have been and doubt- 
less will be expressed. The British and Russian Governments 
have asserted that it was a most incompetent and unbusinesslike 
body. Doubtless they had good reason at times to regard it 
with distaste. Their diplomatic representatives at Teheran 
found on more than one occasion that it was not quite so easy 
to give orders or threatening hints to a body of eighty elected 
representatives as to whisper a word in the ear of a servile and 
corrupt court favorite in the time of the former Shahs. 

I believe that there has never been in the history of the world 
an instance where a people changed suddenly from an absolute 
monarchy to a constitutional or representative form of govern- 
ment and at once succeeded in displaying a high standard of 
political wisdom and knowledge of legislative procedure. Such 
a thing is inconceivable and not to be expected by any reasonable 



THE MEDJLIS 241 

person. The members of the first Medjlis were compelled to 
fight for their very existence from the day that the Parliament 
was constituted. Their unequal struggle against Muhammad Ali 
Shah and the foreign powers who largely aided him terminated 
when their Chamber was bombarded by Colonel Liakhoff and 
his Cossacks. They had no time for serious legislative work, 
and but little hope that any measures which they might enact 
would be put into effect. 

The second and last Medjlis, practically all of whose members 
I knew personally, was doubtless incompetent if it were to be 
judged by the standards of the British Parliament or the Ameri- 
can Congress. It would be strange indeed if an absolutely new 
and untried government in a land filled with the decay of ages 
should, from the outset, be able to conduct its business as well 
as governments with generations and even centuries of experi- 
ence behind them. We should make allowance for lack of tech- 
nical knowledge; for the important question, of course, is that 
the Medjlis in the main represented the new and just ideals 
and aspirations of the Persian people. Its members were men 
of more than average education ; some displayed remarkable tal- 
ent, character and courage. Nearly all believed that the salva- 
tion of their country depended upon their efforts to place the 
Constitutional Government upon a firm and lasting basis, and 
that by such means alone would they be able to restore peace, 
order and prosperity, and check both the sale of their country 
to foreigners and the future political encroachments of Russia 
and England. The deputies of the second Medjlis, with com- 
paratively few exceptions, were sincerely devoted to that aim. 
They responded enthusiastically to any patriotic suggestion 
which was put before them. They themselves lacked any great 
knowledge of governmental finances, but they realized the situa- 
tion and were both willing and anxious to put their full confi- 
dence in any foreign advisers who showed themselves capable of 



242 THE STRANGLING OF PEESIA 

resisting political intrigues and bribery and working for the 
welfare of the Persian people. 

ISTo Parliament can be rightly termed incompetent when it 
has the support of an entire people, when it recognizes its own 
limitations, and when its members are willing to undergo great 
sacrifices for their nation's dignity and sovereign rights. 

The Medjlis was the only permanent check in the govern- 
mental fabric on the reactionary tendencies of numbers of the 
grandees and cabinet officials, as well as on corruption among 
many Persian officials of all ranks. So long as the Medjlis ex- 
isted it was felt that there was a body to which the people could 
appeal against reaction, gross peculation and the betrayal of 
their personal and political rights. The Medjlis stood for an 
honest and progressive administration of Persia's affairs. On 
the day that this body was destroyed, with the connivance of the 
foreign powers, the last hope of honest or representative govern- 
ment in Persia disappeared. The Persian people refused to 
acquiesce in the coup d'etat which snuffed out the Medjlis, be- 
cause they recognized that with it went their liberties, their 
rights, their nationality, and their future as an independent 
state. 

The Medjlis was remarkably expeditious in transacting busi- 
ness. It showed heated partizanship on some occasions, but 
older legislative institutions have not been free from this defect. 

While the Medjlis was not ideally representative in the polit- 
ical sense, that is, only a small proportion of the population had 
participated in the election of its members, it more truly repre- 
sented the best aspirations of the Persians than any other body 
that had ever existed in that country. It was as representative 
as it could be under the difficult circumstances which surrounded 
the institution of the Constitutional Government. It was loyally 
supported by the great mass of the Persians and that alone was 
sufficient justification for its existence. The Russian and Brit- 




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THE PEESIAN PEOPLE 245 

ish Governments, however, were constantly instructing their Min- 
isters at Teheran to obtain this concession or to block that one, 
failing utterly to recognize that the days had passed in which 
the affairs, lives and interests of twelve millions of people were 
entirely in the hands of an easily intimidated and willingly 
bribed despot. With a popularly elected parliament in control 
of railroad, mining and other concessions, the old-time facility 
for getting certain things done for the time had disappeared. 
In other words, the Med j lis was inconvenient to the secret pur- 
poses, whatever they may have been, of the two powers which 
were so constantly proclaiming that their " interests " in Persia 
were in danger. s 

As to the Persian people themselves, it is difficult to general- 
ize. The great mass of the population is composed of peasants 
and tribesmen, all densely ignorant. On the other hand ? many 
thousands have been educated abroad, or have traveled after 
completing their education at home. The Persians are as a 
rule kind and hospitable. They have an undue respect for 
foreigners. French, and some English, is spoken among the 
wealthier classes. They, or at least certain elements among 
them which had had the support of the masses, proved their 
capacity to assimilate western civilization and ideas. They 
changed despotism into democracy in the face of untold obstacles. 
Opportunities were equalized to such a degree that any man of 
ability could occupy the highest official posts. As a race they 
showed during the past five years an unparalleled eagerness for 
education. Hundreds of schools were established during the 
Constitutional regime. A remarkable free press sprang up over 
night, and fearless writers came forward to denounce injustice 
and tyranny whether from within their country or without. The 
Persians were anxious to adopt wholesale the political, ethical 
and business codes of the most modern and progressive nations. 
They burned with that same spirit of Asiatic unrest which per- 



246 THE STRANGLING OF PEESIA 

vades India, which produced the " Young Turk " movement, 
and which has more recently manifested itself in the establish- 
ment of the Chinese Republic. The East has awakened. Per- 
sia unfortunately awoke too late. Her futile struggles towards 
the light were quickly suppressed by a power whose own strength 
lies only in the path of darkness. 



CHAPTER X 1 

THE EUEOPEAN DIPLOMATIC FIELD IN 1911. BEITISH AND RUS- 
SIAN POLICIES. THE POTSDAM AGEEEMENT AND THE SECEET 
UNDEESTANDING BETWEEN EUSSIA AND GEEMANY. STRATE- 
GICAL VALUE OF PEBSIA. SIE EDWAED GEEy's CHAEGES 
AGAINST THE TEEASUEEE-GENEEAL. THE ANGLO-EUSSIAN 
AGEEEMENT. 

EVER since the destruction of the Med j lis the old trick of 
the ostrich sticking its head in the sand to escape pursuit 
has been receiving a new application in Persia. Russia and 
England have apparently thought that by maintaining a 
" dummy " Persian government at Teheran they could evade 
responsibility in the eyes of the world for what is going on in 
that stricken country. 

As a gentleman styling himself " No Ruz " wrote from Te- 
heran to the Near East under date of March 21, 1912 : 

By leaving a Persian Government in existence the Powers evade all re- 
sponsibility, while at the same time successfully paralysing the Government 
they tolerate. 

I would suggest that the Powers (meaning England and Rus- 
sia) may have thought that they thus escaped all responsibility 
for what goes on in Persia, but the world has long since grown 
familiar with such methods. Mere cant, however seriously put 
forth in official statements, no longer blinds educated public 
opinion as to the facts in these acts of international brigandage. 
The truth is that England and Russia have been playing a hand 
in the game of medieval diplomacy. Le Prince is still their text- 

i The views) expressed in this Chapter are of the situation on April 30, 
1912. 

247 



248 THE STRANGLING OF PERSIA 

book, but they fool no one — 'not even the Persian tools and 
Judases who compose the so-called government and take Russian 
roubles and rulings with equal alacrity. 

It is doubtful whether the British public is very much de- 
ceived, either. Englishmen have grown a bit tired of Sir Ed- 
ward Grey's mysterious solemnity whenever a thoughtless M. P. 
asks an obvious question as to Russia's actions or British policy 
in Persia. Sir Edward has worn that coat threadbare in the 
past five years. " Situations " are always " delicate " or 
" grave " with him ; and " negotiations " are always " proceed- 
ing." That is about all the inquisitive M. P. gets, be he Liberal 
or be he Unionist. How long the British people will permit 
their foreign affairs to be bungled is a question. If there had 
been no serious internal problems intimately wrapped up with 
the fortunes of the present Liberal Cabinet, it would probably 
have been already answered. A referendum on the success of 
Sir Edward Grey as Secretary for Foreign Affairs or on the 
diplomatic triumphs obtained under the foreign policy of the 
Liberal Government during the past two years would show an 
interesting result. One has only to ask the Liberals themselves 
about this. 

Last summer Persia's fate was definitely sealed by Russia. 
The long-expected European crisis had arrived, and the Bear had 
therefore acquired a practically free hand in Asia. What made 
the tension in Europe so acute as to cause Asia to be forgotten ? 

Ask the admiral in command of the German North Sea Fleet 
which was found cruising off the coast of Scotland in the dawn 
of a September day. A British cruiser discovered the German 
dreadnaughts by the merest chance. They were in battle forma- 
tion, with scouts in advance, and torpedo destroyers steaming 
actually within English waters. 

Ask the two high English naval officers who were put on the 
retired list because they lost track of this fleet for a few hours. 



BRITISH AND RUSSIAN POLICIES 251 

Ask the Czar of Russia whether he promised at Potsdam that 
the Anglo-Russian Convention would not be interpreted by Rus- 
sia as binding herself to any act inimical to Germany in the 
case of hostilities between the latter country and England. 

By the answers to these questions, if they were truthfully 
given, the sudden onslaught on Persia last autumn by the Rus- 
sian radical Cabinet would be fully explained. The puerility of 
talking of Persia having affronted Russian Consular officers and 
of Persia's Treasurer-general having appointed a British sub- 
ject to be a tax-collector at Tabriz, as the reasons for Russia's ag- 
gressive and brutal policy in Persia, is only too apparent. And 
this, in spite of the fact that volumes would not contain the bare 
record of the acts of aggression, deceit and cruelty which Rus- 
sian agents have committed against Persian sovereignty and the 
Constitutional Government since the deposition of Muhammad 
Ali in 1909. 

Since when has " lack of tact " by an officer in one govern- 
ment given another nation the right to send 18,000 troops into 
friendly territory, to massacre peaceful inhabitants, to shoot 
down, torture, blow from guns and hang non-combatants, and 
to destroy by force the established forms of a friendly sovereign 
nation? Would the Hague Tribunal, so ostentatiously pro- 
moted and encouraged by His Imperial Majesty the Czar of all 
the Russias, approve that course as in accord with the law of 
nations, or with the dictates of justice and humanity ? Can any 
self-respecting nation have a treaty with, or join a peace con- 
ference at the invitation of, a government like that of Russia ? 

The trouble with British foreign policy during the past five 
years is that there has been no statesman to direct it. Sir Ed- 
ward Grey is a man of good birth, manners and splendid classi- 
cal education. He would make an excellent Eoreign Minister 
for Switzerland or Belgium, or even for Anthony Hope's Ruri- 
tania. The British Empire, however, is a different affair. Its 



252 THE STRANGLING OF PERSIA 

interests extend beyond Europe, and beyond the grasp of a de- 
cidedly provincial gentleman whose longest sea-voyage was across 
the English channel and whose most tangible accomplishment 
during a lengthy public career is an authoritative treatise on 
dry fly-fishing. More than half the British Empire lies in 
Asia, and Sir Edward Grey is not accused by his most ardent 
supporters of having any oriental conception or imagination. 

Since the Anglo-French entente consummated by Lord Lans- 
downe in 1905, British foreign policy has been greatly modified. 
It was plainly the belief of that distinguished statesman that 
England should emerge from what had been termed her splen- 
did isolation in European politics. Germany's remarkable 
program of naval construction may have had something to do 
with this. 

When the present Liberal Government in England came into 
power it was confronted abroad by a complicated European and 
Asiatic diplomatic situation. The Russo-Japanese war had left 
Russia decidedly weak. She heeded money to rebuild her navy, 
to promote industries, to build railroads. France was just a 
trifle slow in coming forward. Then appeared the brilliant 
statesman who suggested that it was good policy for England 
to strengthen Russia, and to pour London capital into St. Peters- 
burg. Why ? Because Germany was growing stronger and the 
Anglo-French entente was not deemed a sufficient barrier to 
German ambitions and hostility. To build up the war-spent 
Russia, therefore, and to make an entente with her which should 
do for England on the north of Germany what the understand- 
ing with the French had done on the south — that was the plan. 
Some called it " drawing a circle around Germany." The Ger- 
mans evidently regarded it in that light. 

The pretext for carrying out this plan was not lacking. The 
affairs of England and Russia in Asia needed settling. Behold 
the Anglo-Russian Convention, published in September, 1907, 



THE DIPLOMATIC FIELD IN 1911 253 

whereby Sir Edward Grey hoped to establish his fame as a 
worthy successor to Lansdowne. It was denied, as is customary, 
that there were any secret clauses to this agreement. Maybe 
there were not. 

Did this Convention settle the questions between Russia and 
England in this part of Asia ? Not for very long, at least. 

During the time that the formation of the Triple Entente 
was going on the Germans had not been entirely asleep. They 
had a feeling that in some way this startling eruption of Eng- 
land into purely continental politics was connected with them- 
selves. Germany had begun to take a very decided interest in 
Asiatic Turkey. There has been for years past a very active 
German diplomat at Constantinople, Baron Marschall von Bie- 
berstein by name. 1 He had something to do with obtaining the 
Bagdad railway concession for Germany. The world may hear 
at any time that he had something to do with a change to be 
announced in the status of the Dardanelles. Admiral Chester 
and his associates who have been seeking a concession for an 
American railroad in Turkey have probably come into contact 
with von Bieberstein. Up to a few years ago, British influence 
at Constantinople was predominant. Now it is negligible, and 
German influence reaches throughout the Ottoman Government. 
The Turks believe that Germany is neither afraid nor deca- 
dent. 

Germany, however, had only begun her operations in the 
Middle East. In the autumn of 1910 the Czar and the Kaiser 
met at Potsdam. From that meeting sprang the so-called 
" Potsdam Agreement " — a perfectly harmless document as any 
one can easily see by reading the various versions of it which 
have been officially given out for publication. Were there any 
secrets behind it — any undisclosed clauses ? None. We know 

i On May 6, the press announcement was made that this eminent diplomat 
had been assigned to the German Embassy at London. 



254 THE STRANGLING OF PERSIA 

this, for both the Russian and German foreign offices have said 
so to the public. Sir Edward Grey likewise informed the Brit- 
ish Parliament to this effect. 

From the beginning there has been considerable mystery about 
the scope of this agreement. Its existence was believed to have 
been prematurely disclosed to the public. 

On January 14, 1911, Baron Marschall von Bieberstein de- 
clared to the Turkish Government that the Russo-German nego- 
tiations concern exclusively railway construction and railway 
junctions in Persian territory. 

It is generally understood the agreement contains the follow- 
ing provisions : 

Germany and Russia each undertakes to remain aloof from 
any combination of Powers that has any aggressive 1 tendency 
against the other. 

Germany recognizes that Northern Persia is a Russian sphere 
of influence, and that Russia can claim all the railway conces- 
sions granted by the Persian Government in that region. By 
way of supporting Russian policy in Northern, Persia, German 
capital will be provided to assist in the construction of a railway 
from Teheran to Khanikin, on the Turco-Persian frontier. This 
line will thus be financed partly by German and partly by Rus- 
sian capital, but will remain under the control of the Russian 
concessionaires. 

Russia recognizes Germany's commercial interests in Northern 
Persia, and guarantees the maintenance of the " open door " 
policy in that sphere of Russian political influence. 

Russia recognizes Germany's rights, granted by concession, in 
the Bagdad Railway, and undertakes to give diplomatic support 
to the completion of that enterprise. 

i The ambiguity contained, in the qualification " aggressive " is approved 
diplomatic style. 







FPHR\IM KHAN (WITH FUR-COLLARED OVERCOAT), AMIR MUJAHID (LEANING 
^^ ON CANE) AND MR. SHUSTER. 

Inspecting the Nationalist forces about to be dispatched against Muhammad Ali. 




EPHRAIM KHAN. 

With his private bodyguard and favorite horse. 



THE DIPLOMATIC FIELD IN 1911 257 

A railway will be constructed by German concessionaires from 
Bagad to Khanikin, on the Persian frontier, to connect the Bag- 
dad line with the Russo-German line from Khanikin to Teheran 
and with other lines which are to be constructed by the Russian 
concessionaires in Northern Persia. 

Certain tariff questions connected with the transport of goods 
on the Bagdad Railway and on the projected lines in Northern 
Persia are regulated by the agreement. The construction of 
these lines, together with the freight and tariff arrangements, 
will facilitate the transport of German exports into Northern 
Persia, while, on the other hand, there will be a route for Rus- 
sian products to Asia Minor and the Mediterranean. The agree- 
ment contains a guarantee of the maintenance of the status quo 
in the Near East, intended to allay any Turkish suspicions re- 
garding the ultimate effect of Russo-German cooperation in those 
regions. 

No one believes, unless it is Sir Edward Grey, that these 
provisions embody all the points as to which an agreement was 
reached. 

Even the disclosed clauses, however, were sufficient to show 
that Russia was no longer, if she had ever really been, a member 
of the Triple Entente, the creation of which was urged in Eng- 
land as the chief justification for the Anglo-Russian Convention 
of 1907. 

We know that Russia is a vast country without a single seaport 
which is open during the winter. On the one side the Baltic 
ports are ice-bound; on the other, Vladivostok, on the sea of 
Japan, is equally useless for the same reason. In the center the 
Russian ports on the Black Sea are closed to war vessels by the 
Convention regarding the passage of the Dardanelles. This 
situation was relieved somewhat when Russia obtained Port 
Arthur, but its capture by the Japanese again compelled her to 



258 THE STRANGLING OF PEESIA 

seek elsewhere for a port or ports where she could anchor her 
navy at any time of the year, instead of being compelled to have 
her ships either cruise in the open sea or be frozen up for an 
indefinite period. 

There are several fairly good ports on the Persian Gulf, some 
of them in the neutral sphere, and the Gulf is never blocked by 
ice. 

Eor many years the German nation has been slyly urging 
Russia to undertake adventures in the Middle East, just as 
she encouraged Austria to adventures in the Near East, and 
Erance to adventures on the Mediterranean, in Africa — the 
German object always being to occupy these nations, both their 
forces and their money, in those different directions, while she 
developed unhampered and became the greatest European 
power. 

Some say that this policy of Bismarck's is still in full force, 
and that in any forward movement in Asia Russia has and will 
have the secret support of Germany. 

Now suppose that in the conferences at Potsdam a little 
friendly understanding was reached along the following lines: 
Despite the general trend and moral effect of the Anglo-Russian 
Convention of 1907, Russia will not do anything to embarrass 
Germany should the latter become engaged in hostilities with 
England. In return for this, Germany recognizes Russia's 
predominant influence in Persia (not in Northern Persia), and 
Germany will support Russia, morally and otherwise, in her 
measures to exert and increase this control. Lastly, for the 
mutual benefit of both nations, Russia and Germany will see to 
it that the Bagdad Railway is linked up, at its contemplated 
terminus at Khanikin, on the Turco-Persian frontier, with 
another line to be built by Germany from Khanikin to Hamadan 
(Persia), and thence southward to Khoramabad, through the 
Karun valley, to Ahwaz and Mohammerah, which means the 



THE POTSDAM AGREEMENT 259 

Persian Gulf. Russia agrees to obtain 1 the necessary " con- 
cession " from Persia for this purpose. 

Would not these things be very interesting to England, if 
they were among the undisclosed clauses of the Potsdam Agree- 
ment? In a very agreeable interview which I had with Sir 
Edward Grey at his request in London, last February, I had the 
pleasure of asking him such a question. Naturally, I cannot 
give his answer. It occurred to me that Lord Haldane might 
have been interested in the matter during his visit to Berlin a 
few days later. 

Let us consider, then, the splendid results which have flowed 
from the Anglo-Russian Convention. The signing of it, fol- 
lowing upon the Anglo-Erench entente, put Germany very much 
on the qui vive, and the Potsdam Agreement was the outcome. 
That agreement undoes, so far as England is concerned, every 
moral advantage that Sir Edward Grey ever hoped to obtain 
by the entente with Russia in 1907., and leaves Russia with the 
benefits of the notoriously unequal " partition " of Persia into 
Russian and British spheres of influence. Indeed, Russia al- 
most got the " Lion's share." What is far worse, however, 
Russia has come to a newer and fresher understanding with 
Germany (which, by the way, is the only nation in Europe 
which she fears), whereby Germany — 'in return, we may be 
sure, for something — has agreed to support the Russian " for- 
ward " policy in Asia. Is there any reason why Germany 
should not do this ? It annoys England, not to say frightens 
her. It means that the Persian Gulf will no longer be mare 
clausum — a status which Lord Curzon was at such pains to 
emphasize in 1903. In Lord Curzon's own words: 

Our [the British] position in the Gulf depends on very much more than 
on any treaties we may have concluded. It depends upon the unassailable 

i Her ability to do so, since the destruction of the Med j lis on December 
24, 1911, can hardly be questioned. 



260 THE STRANGLING OF PEESIA 

ground of our trade in the Gulf; upon our services for the last hundred 
years; upon the capital sunk there; upon the naval position we keep up; 
upon the political predominance we maintain; and most of all, upon the 
fact that the Gulf is part of the maritime frontier of India in the security of 
which is involved the security, integrity, and peace of India itself. 

Despite this brave show, the Potsdam Agreement means that, 
with the completion of the Bagdad Railway and its Persian ex- 
tension, Germany will have a short rail route to the Orient. It 
shows how Adamzad, " the bear that walks like a man," still 
clings to the hope of drawing a circle around India and finally 
pulling the string. 

The clever part of this complicated web of intrigue is that 
Russia picked out the one nation whose alliance with her for the 
opening up of the Persian Gulf would make it absolutely im- 
possible that England should go to war over the matter. If 
Russia alone had attacked this watery British sphere by seeking 
a port on the Gulf there might have been war, but by involving 
Germany in the plan, through a Persian railroad concession, 
England is rendered helpless unless she is prepared to fight 
Russia and the " Teutonic horror " at the same time — a sug- 
gestion which would probably give the British public an attack 
of " nerves." Par ignobile fratrum, John Bull might well 
exclaim. 

We read with increased interest, then, the following excerpt 
from a despatch from the Government of India to the Secre- 
tary of State for India in Council, dated September 21, 1899, 
relating to British policy in Persia: 

Simla, September 21, 1899. 
We desire to address your Lordship, and through your Lordship, Her 
Majesty's Government, on the subject of the relations of Great Britain with 
Persia. 

(Paragraph 5) 

The strategical interests of Great Britain in Persia arise from conditions 
with which India is most intimately concerned. Long before the boundaries 



STRATEGICAL VALUE OF PEESIA 261 

of British India had been extended to their present limits, or before Russia 
had become a great Central Asian power, approaching or impinging at many 
points upon the Indian frontiers, the fortunes of Persia, though not at that 
time a coterminous country, had become a matter of vital concern to the 
British dominion in India. In the early years of the present century, when 
the ambitions of France were the main source of apprehension, it was 
through Persia that a blow at British supremacy was expected to be struck 
and that an invasion of India was planned. The same idea has reappeared 
at intervals since. Now that the boundaries of Afghanistan, which have 
been demarcated and guaranteed by Great Britain, march for many hun- 
dreds of miles with those of Persia; that the Persian territory is also coter- 
minous for hundreds of miles with Beluchistan, a State under a British 
Protectorate, and in large measure actually administered by the officers of 
the Government of India; and that the sea which washes the southern coast 
of Persia is one in which, both from its proximity to the Indian Ocean and 
as a result of the exertions of the past century, Indian interests and influ- 
ence have become supreme, it is clear that Persia has assumed a strategical 
importance in relation to British India, which might not be serious were 
the resources or designs of that country alone to be considered; but which 
is indisputably great when it is remembered that closely pressing upon 
Persia and upon Afghanistan is the ever-growing momentum of a power 
whose interests in Asia are not always in accord with our own, and that the 
Persian Gulf is beginning to attract the interests of other and sometimes 
rival Nations. 

May the officially dead British Indian strategists who so ably 
formulated this traditional warning not turn too often in their 
graves at the interpretation of the " spirit of the Anglo-Russian 
Convention " so debonairly put forth by Sir Edward Grey last 
August when the Moroccan situation arose and the question of 
Persia employing Major Stokes was first raised. It became pain- 
fully apparent then that the British Foreign Office could not 
carry more than one idea in its head at a time. " Throw Per- 
sia overboard " was the official command that went forth, and 
sauve qui peut on the German sea. Russia was quick to see the 
opportunities of the situation, and the well-trained bluster of the 
St. Petersburg semi-official press, followed by a timely diplo- 
matic " feeler " in London, drove the advantage home. 

One of the results is that there is no longer a " buffer " state 



262 THE STRANGLING OF PERSIA 

between the Caucasus and the southwestern Indian frontier. 
The overland route to India is no longer safeguarded against 
Russia. The British control of the Persian Gulf is seriously 
threatened. 

Another is, that the 72,000,000 Muhammadans in India, who 
have always been a neutralizing influence between the British 
Government and the Hindoos, have, as a result of the attacks 
made with England's acquiescence by Russia and other so-called 
Christian nations of Europe on the Muhammadan states — Mo- 
rocco, Tripoli (Turkey) and Persia — lost much of their loyal 
enthusiasm for the home government. A recent letter from the 
Muhammadan high priest of India to a former British-Indian 
official of importance states that after the Persian affair the 
Muhammadans decided to send representatives to the next Hin- 
doo Congress, — a thing which they had previously declined to 
do. British political problems in India have not lessened any 
as a result of the downfall of Persia. 

British prestige has suffered all over the world, and the Eng- 
lish people are openly dissatisfied because they can no longer 
appear as the friend of weak and struggling nations. 

In Turkey, England had already lost her influence. Through 
the part recently played by her in Persia British trade and 
commerce, which had a practical monopoly of the Persian 
markets as far north as Isfahan, has received a tremendous blow. 

From a strategical standpoint the effects are even worse. 
England's hereditary foe is now marching confidently toward 
the Persian Gulf. She will be there before many years, and 
the British-Indian Government will have an opportunity of 
demonstrating its ability to protect the territory included in the 
so-called " British sphere " — the limits of which were fixed by 
Kitchener as being all the Persian soil which could be success- 
fully defended from India. To defend even Southern Persia 
against the Cossacks will mean a heavy additional burden upon 



STRATEGICAL VALUE OF PEESIA 263 

the Indian Government. It may mean keeping half a million 
British troops in India instead of one-fifth that number. An- 
other feature — perhaps somewhat less important as international 
affairs go — is that in aiding Eussia in her sinister designs on 
Persia's independence and integrity England has not performed 
a moral or humane act. She has failed utterly to play the part 
which history taught us to expect from her, and though the great 
mass of the British people must be acquitted of the faults and 
negligence of their Government, the sting will always remain. 

Perhaps even Sir Edward Grey will now admit that in di- 
plomacy a given policy must be either moral or successful. 
His has been neither, to any appreciable extent. Take the at- 
titude of Germany, for instance. If a year ago she had any 
doubts about the British Government's fear of her, they have 
now been removed. Germany has been Sir Edward Grey's 
bete noire, but hatred of her in England is the only thing which 
holds him in power, despite the disastrous effects of his di- 
plomacy. 

It may be asked what England could have done to stay Eus- 
sia's hand in Persia. Great Britain is a naval power, but what 
could her fleets do against Eussia ? Where could they attack 
her, unless and until she came down to the Persian Gulf ? Eng- 
land is not able to oppose successfully Eussian arms in North- 
ern Persia. She is not a military power, in the sense that sev- 
eral great continental powers are, and the entire British Army 
could not attack the vast forces which Eussia could pour into 
Persia from the Caucasus. 

The answer, however, is not far to seek. Either England 
is still a first-class power in the world or she is not. Up to the 
present she has been so considered. Eussia has so rated her. 
When, therefore, it became clear last July that Eussia was 
openly seeking to violate the Anglo-Eussian Convention by in- 
terfering with Persia's independence, which both England and 



264 THE STRANGLING OF PERSIA 

Russia had mutually engaged to respect, it was England's ob- 
vious right and duty to protest against such a step, and to warn 
Russia that her actions could be taken only as a repudiation of 
the Anglo-Russian Convention. This •would at least have kept 
British faith with Persia, and with the world. It might well 
have prevented Russia from going any further. A nation 
which voluntarily signs a treaty must be prepared to face a 
deliberate violation of it by the other party. When such a 
contingency arises both justice and expediency demand some 
show of national dignity. Sir Edward Grey preferred to 
evade his plain responsibility over both the Stokes incident and, 
later, over the Shuau's-Saltana affair by publicly glossing over 
Russia's actions and pretending to believe that Persia's sov- 
ereignty has not been violated. Subsequently Sir Edward Grey 
took the remarkable ground that England had not guarantesd 
the integrity and independence of Persia. It is interesting to 
note, however, that one of England's greatest authorities on 
Asiatic problems, Lord Curzon, in a debate on Persian Affairs in 
the House of Lords on March 22, 1911, made the following 
unchallenged statement : 

I am convinced that the integrity and independence of Persia, which was 
guaranteed by his Majesty's Government, in the preamble to the Anglo- 
Russian Convention of 1907, has no more substantial supporter than his 
Majesty's Government. 

Lord Morley was present, representing the Liberal Govern- 
ment, and never questioned the accuracy of the statement. 
These pretexts about Russia's actions last summer, so shallow 
and absurd as to cause any Englishman to blush, served only 
to show Russia and the rest of the world in what craven dread 
the Liberal Government stood of Germany. 

The remarkable attitude adopted by the British Government 
leads one to inquire what is the great change which has ap* 



6- > 



S H 

> W 
= K 



o a 

:- a 




STRATEGICAL VALUE OF PERSIA 267 

parently came over a nation which but a short time ago claimed 
to possess the deciding vote in most European and Asiatic af- 
fairs. Can it be that British ships have lost their efficiency, and 
British sailors their skill and courage ? Was the British Army 
really " reformed " after the terrible disclosures of the South 
African war? 

The seeds of medieval decay still abound in several plague 
spots on this earth, and it behooves modern governments to ex- 
terminate them, each within its confines. Eor the sake of hu- 
manity and the world's progress England should do her part. 

It is clear, therefore, that the unfortunate fate of Persia as 
an independent nation was not brought about by anything which 
her Government or her people did or left undone. The destruc- 
tion of her independence was written down in the book of history 
at Potsdam in 1910. Secure in the knowledge of Germany's 
support, Russia could afford to bide her time. The Anglo-Rus- 
sian Convention was already morally " scrapped," a worn-out 
and useless instrument, so far as Russia was concerned. Rus- 
sia proposed to carry out her oft-announced policy of controlling 
Persia and " the waters which bathe its shores." She awaited 
only a favorable opportunity to take active steps. The tension 
in Europe over the Moroccan affair last July gave her the 
chance, and she was not slow to take advantage of it. Sir Ed- 
ward Grey flew into a panic, and apparently forgot in an in- 
stant everything but the Kaiser's dreadnaughts. Russia real- 
ized this, and the trick was turned. The succeeding Russo- 
Persian incidents leading up to the destruction of the Persian 
Constitutional Government on December 24, 1911, were the 
merest pretexts, created and fabricated by Russia herself, pos- 
sibly " to save Sir Edward Grey's face " before the British 
public. 

Russia is now 1 the sovereign power in Persia. She is the 

i April 30, 1912. 



268 THE STRANGLING OF PERSIA 

practical and effective ruler of the country. The whole of 
Persia is to-day a satrapy. The people, however brutally 
treated, have no means of protest. Fear, daily sickening fear 
of the prison, noose and torture, is the force with which Russia 
governs. A gloomy silence has set in as to what is happening in 
the land of Cyrus. The American finance administrators at 
Teheran last year were a mere incident. The Bear has de- 
voured another slice of the Asiatic pasty. 

Sir Edward Grey at various times charged me with a number 
of faults : lack of tact ; that I was endeavoring to " Anglicize " 
the Persian service; and that I was unwilling to recognize the 
Russian and British spheres of influence. 

The best reply which I can make to the first charge is to pub- 
lish, as I would not otherwise have done, the semi-official cor- 
respondence between the Russian and British ministers and 
myself concerning the Stokes incident, the proposed loan of 
£4,000,000, and the payments for the arms sold to Persia by 
Russia, and for the Cossack Brigade. 1 

As to the second charge, it is based on the fact that I employed 
at different times three British subjects in the Persian Treasury. 
They were stationed at Teheran, Isfahan and Shiraz. It is 
true that in seeking for employees on the ground who were 
familiar with modern accounting methods and possessed a 
knowledge of the Persian language and customs I found several 
British subjects available. In the same manner and for the 
same reasons I employed two Belgians. Had any Russian sub- 
jects possessing the necessary qualifications presented them- 
selves, I should have gladly engaged them. Sir Edward Grey's 
baseless accusation against me of political bias, however, com- 
pelled me, in the interests of Persia, to discharge from the Per- 
sian Treasury all three British subjects — including Mr. 

i See Appendix D. 



SIR EDWARD GREY'S CHARGES 269 

Lecoffre — leaving only Mr. George E. New, who was under 
contract approved by the Med j lis. 

The third charge was even more absurd and unjustified than 
the others. The Persian Government had formally notified the 
two powers after the publication of the Anglo-Russian Conven- 
tion in 1907, that it did not recognize or consider itself in any 
manner bound thereby. The Med j lis was insistent from the 
very first that I should do nothing which would either directly 
or otherwise recognize the existence of so-called spheres of in- 
fluence within Persia. 

This I gave them my promise at the outset not to do. For me 
to have done so would have been to break faith with the Govern- 
ment which employed me and to betray a trust which had been 
placed in me. My refusal to do this — a thing which the 
powers had encountered no difficulty in persuading the Bel- 
gians to do — was the real source of Russia's opposition to my 
work. 

Nevertheless, I sought in every way possible to recognize and 
respect all legitimate foreign interests in Persia, and endeavored 
to ascertain from the two Legations just what they considered 
their " special interests " in Persia, to be — that is, what they 
considered the language of the Anglo-Russian Convention to 
mean. 

As that cynical political writer, Dr. E. J. Dillon, so well 
phrases it in one of his articles on the Potsdam Agreement : 

If you want to keep your faith in foreign Governments, be suspicious. 
For the language of diplomacy was not invented to reveal the thoughts of 
those that employ it, nor is there any known herb that will enable us to 
discern them. 

This writer must have had a premonition of the bizarre in- 
terpretation which was later going to be placed on the perfectly 



270 THE STRANGLING OF PERSIA 

plain wording of the Anglo-Russian Convention by Sir Edward 
Grey, at Russia's behest, in the summer of 1911. 

As for myself I neglected no possible means to find out just 
what England and Russia did mean when they executed and 
promulgated that document. 

I said in an address under the auspices of the Persia Com- 
mittee in London on January 29, 1912 : 

... I would say a word in my own defense which I had not thought of 
saying, because after all it does not make much difference whether I per- 
sonally was right or wrong in any discussions which have taken place over 
Persia, but the particular charge which has been laid against me is one 
which may or may not be true: that I lacked a certain finesse in recog- 
nizing that words do not mean what they say, and that diplomatic agree- 
ments sometimes have a secret code by which they must be read. If that 
be true, I must plead innocent in this case, on the ground that the govern- 
ments which expected me to read into their solemn agreements meanings 
which did not appear from the words used, should have informed me of the 
code by which they translated them. They did not. I was after a very 
short time on the best of terms with both the Russian and British Ministers 
at Teheran. I esteemed them greatly as men of honor and of high ideals 
of justice. I cannot say anything more on this, except that from the time 
I arrived to the time I left, I never had an unpleasant word or an un- 
pleasant discussion with them; we never even had a serious disagreement. 
They were Ministers Plenipotentiary in Teheran, and if I was tactless in 
discussing and arriving at conclusions, with Ministers Plenipotentiary, then 
I suppose I must plead guilty, but it goes no further than that; and if I 
was indiscreet in finally giving publicity to things which were happening 
there and which had been happening there, without the world at large or 
the people of the governments who were participating in them knowing it, 
to that also I plead guilty, but I did what I did, inasmuch as it concerned 
an interest far more important than me personally or my staying in or 
departing from Persia, after consulting the representatives, the elected rep- 
resentatives, of the Persian people, and asking them whether they preferred 
to be slain in a dark alley or to have the crime committed in the public 
square; and their verdict was: in the public square. 

The London Times, the well-known organ of the British 
Foreign Office, in several editorial articles, notably in one "Writ- 
ten two days after my address was delivered, urged as a criti- 



THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN AGREEMENT 271 

cism against me that I had expected England and Russia to 
assent to my plans for the reorganization of the finances of 
Persia " irrespective of their own interests and as a matter of 
course." 

The plain implication is that something in the financial plans 
initiated by me either did or would have prejudiced some Brit- 
ish or Russan interest in Persia. I took the opportunity a day 
or so later to ask this distinguished journal to state or specify 
what British or Russian interest any financial plan advocated by 
me would have injured, in order that the public might examine 
the question more intelligently. So far no such interest has 
been specified and in view of this silence it seems impossible to 
escape the conclusion that, either there was no such interest 
subjected to prejudice by my plans, or that if any there was, it 
was not of such a nature as could be disclosed. The fact is that 
there was no word or act in connection with the Persian finance 
law of June 13, 1911, which either did, or could, in any manner 
prejudice or injure any legitimate interest of any foreign power 
whatsoever in Persia ; quite the contrary, the execution of that 
law could not have failed to foster and benefit any legitimate in- 
terest of Great Britain or Russia, or of any other foreign nation 
having relations with the Persian Empire. 

This same journal, however, throws a little more light upon 
the thoughts in the mind of its editor in the following sentence, 
" It never seems to have crossed his [my] mind, until he had 
gained it, that the exercise by him of arbitrary and drastic con- 
trol of finance might possibly prove inconvenient or undesirable 
to the Powers with ' special interests.' " Again the question 
leaps to the eye, what were these oft-mentioned but never de- 
fined special interests ? Where were they mentioned or indi- 
cated except in the terms of the Anglo-IJussian Convention of 
1907 ? And this brings us to the real point at issue, which is, 
whether that law or my execution of it violated the terms or, 

13 



272 THE STRANGLING OF PERSIA 

adopting the vague phraseology of a certain class of diplomacy, 
the " spirit " of that agreement. Admitting then the existence 
of a spirit, as distinguished from the plain meaning of the lan- 
guage contained in this document, what light could the Persian 
Government or any one of its officials, either native or foreign, 
have been expected to find upon this subject % Speaking for 
myself, I can only say that after having read the agreement it- 
self several times with great care, and perused the contempora- 
neous Blue Books of the British Foreign Office as to the same, I 
found but one other source of information as to the real meaning 
of this document which was destined to play so important a part 
in the future of the Persian people. In Professor Browne's 
magnificent work, " The Persian Revolution, 1905-1909," at 
page 190, appears a copy of a communication addressed on Sep- 
tember 5, 1907, by Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, the then British Min- 
ister at Teheran, to the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
This is a most important and interesting document, which so 
far as I could learn at that time was and is the only extant de- 
tailed official explanation of the interpretation and so-called 
spirit of the Anglo-Russian Convention. 1 Appearing in so au- 
thoritative a work as that of Professor Browne, it was naturally 
assumed by the public to be authentic, and perhaps even to rep- 
resent the real views of the two powers in concluding the agree- 
ment which they had, a few days before, signed in reference to 
their " interests " in Persia. It is true that I did not find it in 
the British Foreign Office Blue Books, but I read this com- 
munique of Sir Cecil Spring-Rice with the greatest care and, in 
fact, it went far in convincing me that the real purposes of the 
two powers in Persia were those which naturally appeared from 
the language of the Convention itself, and not ulterior and un- 
disclosed ones. t 

i A translation of this communication will be found in the Introductory 
Chapter. 




AZADU'L-MULK. ELECTED REGENT AT THE BEGINNING OF THE REIGN OF 

SULTAN AHMAD SHAH. 

He died on September 22, 1910, and was succeeded by Naslru'1-Mulk, the present Regent. 



THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN AGREEMENT 275 

To the best of my ability, therefore, I had carefully ac- 
quainted myself in January, 1911, before sailing from the 
United States for Persia, with the only official detailed explana- 
tion of the spirit and purpose of the Anglo-Russian Convention 
of 1907 and of its distinguished framers, which I was then or 
have since been able to discover. Despite my efforts in good 
faith, to put myself au courant with Persia's general political 
status, I have been more than once charged with having 
blundered hastily into a delicate situation which I had been at 
no pains to study or understand, and with being either igno- 
rant of, or ignoring the spirit of the Anglo-Russian Convention. 
Statements to this effect have been made from very authoritative 
sources on the floor of the British House of Commons. 

Yet on December 14, 1911, in answer to a question by a Mem- 
ber of the House, the Secretary of State for Eoreign Affairs, de- 
clared that he had never seen the above described communique of 
Sir Cecil Spring-Rice to the Persian Government, from which 
the Member in question had a few minutes before made a quo- 
tation. On the next day, I am informed, a member of Parlia- 
ment addressed to the Eoreign Office a letter enclosing a photo- 
graph of the original document sent, in the Persian language, by 
Sir Cecil Spring-Rice to the Persian Government on Septem- 
ber 5, 1907. To this the Eoreign Office replied, in effect, that 
the British Eoreign Office knew nothing of the document. Six 
weeks later, on February 1, 1912, the Eoreign Office wrote to 
this same member, stating that the English text of Sir Cecil 
Spring-Rice's communique had just then been received at the 
Eoreign Office and that the translation into English made by 
Professor Browne (published in his book) was substantially 
correct. 1 

It appears, therefore, that at the time that I was being charged 

i This striking exhibition of official carelessness or ignorance on the part 
of the British Foreign Office had its counterpart in the Stokes affair. 



276 THE STRANGLING OF PEESIA 

with having displayed ignorance of the spirit of the Anglo-Rus- 
sian Convention of 1907, and for months before that date, I was 
familiar with an important official exposition of the views of the 
British and of the Russian Governments formulated by the 
British Minister Plenipotentiary at Teheran. Yet the British 
Foreign Office Officials who presented these charges of igno- 
rance or negligence against me were themselves at that very time 
in ignorance even of the existence of this important paper which 
they have only since come to peruse. Is it at all possible that 
a department of the Government, so conducted as to permit such 
a lapse in delicate and important affairs of this nature, may 
have been equally uninformed as to the real facts or other in- 
cidents arising during my administration of the finances of 
Persia, although this department of the British Government saw 
no hesitation in promptly endorsing Russia's demand for my re- 
moval and dismissal from the port of Treasurer-general ? 

England and Russia were and are to-day unwilling to define 
what they consider to be the nature and scope of their respective 
interests in Persia. They claimed the right to pass on any par- 
ticular act of the Persian Government, or any one of its officials, 
in the purely internal administration of the country, and to 
prevent that act by force, if it did not suit their views. It can 
hardly be claimed that this is not the exercise of sovereignty in 
Persia, or, at least, of the rights of a protectorate. How then 
do these facts accord with the preamble of the Anglo-Russian 
Convention and with Sir Cecil Spring-Rice's official explana- 
tion of that document ! 

Anent the action of the British Government throughout the 
recent Persian affair there have been no clearer nor more pa- 
triotic views expressed than those put forth in a series of articles 
in The Nation — a publication which, if it lacks all the prestige 
and semi-official authority of the Times is none the less a 
liberal organ of high standing and literary character. 1 

i Two of these articles may be found in Appendix F. 



CHAPTEE XI 

THE TAXATION" SYSTEM OF PEESIA. MY PLANS FOE THE EE- 
OEGANIZATION OF THE FINANCES. POSSIBILITIES OF EAIL- 
EOAD DEVELOPMENT. POTENTIAL WEALTH AND EESOUECES 
OF PEESIA. 

THE general system of levying taxes in Persia is practically 
the same to-day as it was in Biblical times. The basis of 
land taxation is the tithe, or tenth part of the product or crop. 
The revenues are not all collected in cash, but a large part of 
them in kind; that is, the Government demands and receives 
from the landowners and peasants in Persia wheat, barley, 
straw, cotton, oats, rice, and other agricultural produce. The 
principal effect of this archaic procedure is to make it extremely 
difficult for the Government to keep any adequate system of 
accounts or to know with any reasonable degree of accuracy 
what its revenues from any given district, town or village 
should be during the year. Furthermore, once in possession — 
through its hundreds of different tax-collectors and sub-collec- 
tors throughout the provinces — of the taxes in kind which are 
due, the Government is supposed to find the means of trans- 
porting this produce, storing it safely, and either converting it 
into money by sale or paying it out in kind for the expenses 
of the Government. 

There has never been in Persia a tax-register or "Doomsday 
Book " which would give a complete, even if somewhat inac- 
curate, survey of the sources of internal revenue upon which 
the Government could count for its support. Persia is divided 
for taxation purposes into seventeen or eighteen taxation dis- 

277 



278 THE STRANGLING OF PERSIA 

tricts each containing a large city or town as its administrative 
center. For instance, the province of Azarbayjan, which is the 
most important and richest province in the Empire, is generally 
supposed to produce a revenue in money and in kind, for the 
Central Government at Teheran, amounting to about 1,000,000 
tumans, or $900,000 a year. There was, during my service in 
Persia, a chief tax-collector, or pislihar, at Tabriz, the capital 
of the province and second city of importance in the Empire. 
The province itself is divided into a number of sub-districts, 
each in charge of a sub-collector, and these sub-districts are in 
turn divided up into smaller districts, each in charge of a tax 
agent. Within the third class of districts the taxes are col- 
lected by the local town or village headmen. The chief collector 
at Tabriz, for example, is called upon to collect and place to 
the credit of the Central Government at Teheran a given sum 
in money and a given sum in wheat, straw, and other agricul- 
tural products each year. Beyond a very indefinite idea in the 
heads of some of the chief mustawfis, or " government account- 
ants," at Teheran as to what proportion of these amounts should 
come from the first class of districts within the province, the 
Central Government knows nothing as to the sources of the 
revenue which it is supposed to receive. Its sole connecting 
link with the taxpayers of the province of Azarbayjan is through 
the chief collector at Tabriz. The latter official, in turn, 
knows how much money and produce should be furnished by 
each of the sub-collectors under him within the province, but 
he has no official knowledge of the sources from which these 
sub-collectors derive the taxes which they deliver to him. The 
chief collector has in his possession what is termed the hitdbcha 
[little book] of the province, and each of the sub-collectors has 
the kitabcha of his particular district. These little books are 
written in a peculiar Persian style, on very small pieces of paper, 
unbound, and are usually carried in the pocket, or at least kept 



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THE TAXATION SYSTEM 281 

in the personal possession, of the tax-collector. They are pur- 
posely so written as to make it most difficult, if not impossible, 
for any ordinary Persian to understand them. There is in 
Persia, and has been for many generations past, a particular 
class of men who are known as mustawfis. The profession or 
career of mustawfi is, in many cases, hereditary, passing from 
father to son. These men understand the style in which the 
JcitabcJia are written, and the complicated and intricate system 
by which the local taxes are computed and collected. Whether 
one of them is a chief collector of a province, or the collector 
of a taxation district, he considers the corresponding hitabcha 
to be his personal property, and not as belonging to the Govern- 
ment. He resents most bitterly any attempt on the part of any 
one to go into details or to seek to find out whence the taxes 
are derived or what proportion of them he himself retains. At 
Teheran, when I arrived, I found in the Ministry of Finance 
a branch which was called the Bureau of the Chief Mustawfis. 
There were seven or eight of these gentlemen, each having under 
his charge two or more provinces or districts. They were sup- 
posed to see that the tax-collectors throughout the Empire per- 
formed their duties and placed to the credit of the Central 
Government the sums which it was expected to receive. They 
came nearer to being permanent employees than any other offi- 
cials of the Government because of their peculiar training and 
knowledge of the complicated taxation system of the country. 
From the first they regarded our advent as a blow to their 
prestige and as threatening the undisturbed enjoyment of their 
perquisites. Their salaries were ridiculously small compared 
to the responsibilities which they were supposed to have. The 
highest paid mustawfi at Teheran received about $135 a month, 
but it is very safe to say that the fortunes which every one of 
them was known to have accumulated after a few years' serv- 
ice did not result from the savings from this stipend. Their 



282 THE STRANGLING OF PEESIA 

attitude toward me was one of insolence- and they refused to 
give out any information about their duties. I took out of 
their hands, almost from the date of the passage of the law of 
the 13th of June, their nominal control over the chief tax-col- 
lectors throughout the Empire, and announced to the latter, in 
circular telegrams which I caused to be signed by the Prime 
Minister and the Cabinet, followed by detailed instructions from 
myself, that thereafter the chief tax-collectors would communi- 
cate with the Treasurer-general direct and would receive all 
their instructions from the newly created Treasury. The 
mustawfis were thus left to finger their hitdbcha and reflect upon 
the error of their ways. I purposely allowed them to remain 
in the Ministry of Finance, even after a number of other de- 
partments had been abolished as useless and unnecessary, be- 
cause I desired to use them, when they arrived at a proper 
frame of mind, in a general plan for re-districting and making 
a rough tax survey of the Empire, with a view to having 
some definite basis upon which to prepare for the Med j lis a 
simple internal tax law. Before I could make any serious 
headway along these lines the arrival of the ex-Shah and the 
ensuing four months of active military operations, with its 
consequent confusion in Teheran, and the subsequent political 
events resulting in my departure from the country, took place. 

It is clear, therefore, that in Persia the Central Government 
has but a most meager knowledge either of the revenues which 
it could expect to receive, or of the justice or injustice of the 
apportionment of the taxes among the people of Persia. Noth- 
ing is easier than for a chief tax-collector to say, as the agent 
at Tabriz constantly did during the time that I was in Teheran, 
that, due to the disturbed condition of the province, it had 
been impossible to recover the taxes and, having said this, not 
to send them. The Central Government might well know that 
these statements were false, and that at least a portion of the 



REORGANIZATION OF THE FINANCES 283 

taxes were being collected, but it was limited in its remedies 
either to discharging or imprisoning the collector upon this 
justifiable but none the less general suspicion, or to accepting 
his explanation. 

It was my intention to establish, gradually, starting with 
the more important provinces, a sub-treasury in each provincial 
center, in charge of an American or European assistant who 
would have under him a European traveling inspector with 
the necessary Persian employees, and a European officer in 
command of the body of Treasury gendarmes assigned to assist 
the sub-treasurer in collecting the taxes in that province. In 
addition to carrying on the actual work of collection and local 
disbursements of the Government, under the orders of the Treas- 
urer-general, these sub-treasurers were to make a careful study 
of the different sources of revenue within their provinces, 
coupled with a general estimate of the population, crops, in- 
dustries, etc., and to get possession, if possible, of the Jcitabcha 
and other data held by the sub-collectors and their various sub- 
ordinates, as a basis for a general taxation scheme. This work 
would probably have required between one and two years, but 
so far as Persia was concerned there was no insurmountable 
obstacle to its accomplishment. 

One of the striking defects in the Persian taxation system is 
that even the hitabcha are out of date and do not afford a just 
basis for the levying of the duties. Most of them were pre- 
pared over a generation ago, and since that time many villages 
which were prosperous and populous have became practically 
deserted, the people having moved to other districts. Yet the 
hitabcha are never changed, and a few hundred inhabitants 
remaining in some village which has before harbored a thou- 
sand or more are called upon to pay the same taxes which were 
assessed on the entire community when it was three or more 
times as large. In like manner, a village, which, when the 



284 THE STRANGLING OF PERSIA 

hitabcha were prepared many years ago, had only a few in- 
habitants, is still called upon to pay, so far as the Central Gov- 
ernment is concerned, only the amount originally fixed in the 
hitabcha, although the agent who collects the taxes in the name 
of the Government never fails to exact from each man in the 
community his full quota. 

One of the first rules put into force when I established the 
Persian Treasury was that all transactions in money should be 
carried on through the Imperial Bank of Persia or some other 
reputable bank. The Imperial Bank of Persia, which was in 
reality the Government depository, has branches established in 
most of the important cities of Persia, and under an arrange- 
ment which I concluded with its chief manager, the tax-collect- 
ors at these places were required to pay all revenues in money 
collected by them into the local branch of the Imperial Bank, 
through which it was immediately credited to the account of the 
Treasurer-general in Teheran on a telegraphic transfer. In 
the same manner all payments of every description by the Treas- 
ury were made by check. No cash transactions whatever were 
allowed, and in this manner a full and independent record of 
both receipts and disbursements was established outside the 
Persian Treasury. Other administrations of the Central Gov- 
ernment, such as the Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs, the 
Passport Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the 
Customs, while under the general control of the Treasury, were 
required to make their deposits in the bank direct and to send 
to the Treasury the credit notes instead of the cash. 

I soon found that most of the chief tax-collectors, while pro- 
fessing their entire willingness to submit to the rules and regu- 
lations laid down by the Treasurer-general, were not depositing 
their revenues with the branch banks as I had directed. In 
failing to do this they were simply following the universal rule 
in Persia, which is to hold on to money through thick and thin 



REORGANIZATION OF THE FINANCES 287 

until one is absolutely forced to give it up. The prompt dis- 
missal, however, of one or two of the more prominent and in- 
fluential offenders in this respect, and the news of it which was 
transmitted to the others with a polite warning as to what they 
might expect, had a most salutary effect, and the revenues com- 
menced to come in despite the disorder into which the whole 
country was thrown by the news of the return of the ex-Shah 
and the local disturbances which in many parts of Persia, 
particularly in the great province of Fars in the South, had 
been going on for a year before our arrival. The province of 
Azarbayjan, duing the entire time that I was in control of the 
Persian treasury, was in such a state of confusion, due largely 
to Russian troops which were constantly being sent there, and 
to the outbreaks of the Shahsevens whose chiefs had found that 
they could count absolutely upon Russian support and protec- 
tion, that not a dollar of revenue was ever sent from this prov- 
ince to the Treasury at Teheran. On the contrary, the Central 
Government transmitted large sums to the local Governor at 
Tabriz for the police and the military forces in that province, 
in an endeavor to restore order there. 

I found also, on taking charge of the Treasury, that the tax- 
collectors were paid but nominal salaries in many instances and 
the fact that they were perfectly contented to receive such in- 
significant compensation while occupying these responsible posi- 
tions was pretty clear proof that they were deriving a satisfac- 
tory reward in some way other than through the pay-roll. I 
therefore fixed generous salaries for these men in accordance 
with the importance of their districts, and informed them that 
the retention of their posts and future increased compensation 
would depend directly upon the practical results which they 
showed in the way of collecting the taxes. While these steps, 
due to entirely outside causes, were never allowed to produce 
the results which were anticipated, the Treasury did succeed in 



288 THE STRANGLING OF PERSIA 

collecting, during a period of five months, while the country was 
in a state of civil war, more of the internal taxes, or maliat, 
than the Government had, so far as the records showed, been 
able to collect during the entire year preceding our arrival. 

The question of getting possession of the wheat, barley, oats, 
straw, cotton and other agricultural products which the Gov- 
ernment received in lieu of cash was a much more difficult one. 
In the first place, taxes in this form were collected principally 
in the smaller towns and outlying districts, more or less dis- 
tant from the provincial centers. The products were compelled 
to pass through so many hands and to be cared for and trans- 
ported under such difficult circumstances that, except in those 
provinces lying within a hundred miles or so of Teheran, it 
was impossible to make any headway. If a few tons of wheat 
or straw eventually reached a provincial center, it could not be 
transported to Teheran by telegraph, like money, and if put up 
at public auction, the price obtained for it would be but a frac- 
tion of its value. 

Indeed, in past years, the produce thus collected by the 
Government in the different districts has constituted one of 
the principal sources of Government graft. Instances have 
been reported to me where more than $100,000 profit was 
cleared in a day or so by a fraudulent sale of the taxes in kind 
of a single province. 

When, in the fall of 1911, I took charge of the work of ac- 
cumulating a reserve supply of wheat and other grain in Te- 
heran in the Government store-houses, in order that the price of 
bread might be in a measure controlled during the winter, I 
found how difficult it was to handle this question, and it was 
only by the most extraordinary methods that I was able to 
gather 5000 or 6000 tons of wheat and barley. 

Under the term maliat are grouped the internal taxes, com- 
prising land taxes, local municipal dues, and revenues derived 



REORGANIZATION OF THE FINANCES 289 

from various other sources, such as the Crown lands, mines 
and industrial enterprises. The taxes approximate in many- 
instances our poll or head tax. There are also duties levied 
upon the manufacture and consumption of opium, upon lamb- 
skins and the entrails of the same animal. A considerable reve- 
nue is also derived by the Persian Government from the con- 
sumption of wines, spirits and other intoxicants. The use of 
intoxicants is, of course, forbidden by the Muhammadan reli- 
gion, and duties of this kind cannot, in theory, be imposed 
by the Medjlis, or by official sanction of the Persian Govern- 
ment. As a matter of fact, however, such duties are both im- 
posed and collected by the central administration, with the 
double object of restricting the sale of alcoholic beverages and 
deriving a revenue from them. 

Outside the maliat the only other definite sources of revenue 
in Persia are the Customs duties, a small revenue from the 
Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs, and a small sum from the 
Passport Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 

The Customs administration is in charge of some twenty- 
seven Belgian employees whose chief, Mons. Mornard, with 
several assistants, was stationed in Teheran. This administra- 
tion also collected, through its agents on the frontiers, a certain 
proportion of the passport fees. The net receipts of the Cus- 
toms during the Persian year of It-Il — which corresponds 
roughly to the calendar year 1910 — were about 3,400,000 tu- 
mans. 1 For the two preceding years approximately (1909 and 
1908) they were about 3,185,000 tumans and 2,733,000 tu- 
mans, respectively. This entire revenue, however, was mort- 
gaged to the Russian and British Governments under a series 
of loan contracts and agreements which called for a minimum 
annual payment amounting, at the time of the conclusion of 

i The tuman, while varying in value according to the exchange, is equal 
to about 90 cents in American money. 



290 THE STRANGLING OF PERSIA 

the Imperial Bank Loan of £1,250,000, to about 2,832,000 
tumans. 

When the Imperial Bank Loan went into effect, as the amor- 
tization did not begin for five years, this sum was reduced by 
about 31,000 tumans a year for the intervening period. Tak- 
ing, therefore, the maximum Customs revenues collected in 
recent years as the basis of future collections, the Persian Gov- 
ernment can only expect to receive from that important source 
of taxation about 568,000 tumans annually, and under the 
loan contract made with the Russian Government in 1910, these 
surplus Customs revenues are held by the Banque d'Escompte, 
a branch of the Russian State Bank in Teheran, for a period of 
six months and only placed to the credit of the Persian Govern- 
ment twice a year. 

In addition to this, the interest and amortization upon the 
Russian loan is payable in roubles, and the Banque d'Escompte 
has the valuable privilege of fixing each month the rate of ex- 
change at which the Customs revenues collected in Persian 
tumans shall be applied to the purchase of roubles. It is safe 
to assert that, in exercising this arbitrary right given it under 
the loan contract, the Russian Bank takes care not to lose 
anything on the exchange. 

One of the large fixed charges included in the above total 
secured upon the Customs is the expense of maintaining in 
Persia the notorious Cossack Brigade. This amounted, during 
the time that I was in Teheran, to a regular monthly demand 
of 30,000 tumans, plus an unknown and indefinite sum which 
the colonel of the brigade or the Russian Legation might de- 
mand from the Persian Government On the ground of " extraor- 
dinary expenses," " costs of expeditions," etc. In one year 
these additional demands amounted to more than 70,000 tumans. 
This famous organization was created in 1882, in the reign 
of Nasiru'd-Din Shah, under a Russian colonel named Char- 




NASIRU'D-DIN SHAH. 

He succeeded to the throne on September 17, 1848, and was assassinated on May 1, 1896, by Mirza 

Muhammad Rlza, a fanatic of the town of Kirman. 



REORGANIZATION OF THE FINANCES 293 

kovsky, who was appointed by the General Staff of the Caucasus 
for this work, assisted by a number of commissioned and non- 
commissioned officers of the Russian army. The idea of Na- 
siru'd-Din Shah, or of his Russian advisers, in establishing this 
corps of foreign mercenaries was, of course, to protect him- 
self against any acts growing out of the just indignation of his 
cruelly oppressed subjects. The brigade brought into being 
under such questionable auspices has more than once lived up 
to its evil standards, and it has constantly been, as it is to-day, 
the chief weapon of Russian intrigue and oppression in Persia. 
It is supposed to consist of 1500 or 1600 men, and the payments 
required to be made by the Persian Government for its up-keep 
are based upon the enrollment of the maximum number. As 
a matter of fact, at no time while I was in Teheran, was the 
brigade within many hundreds of its full strength, yet the 
amounts demanded and received from the impoverished Per- 
sian Government never varied, nor was there any accounting 
had of the large sums which were paid over from time to time 
to the colonel and other officers of the organization. At one 
time, during the military operations against Muhammad Ali, 
I was asked by Samsamu's-Saltana, the Premier, to pay certain 
amounts which were demanded by the colonel of the brigade as 
extraordinary expenses. I agreed to do so and wrote a letter 
to the colonel asking him for a statement of the accounts for 
the period mentioned in order that I might assure myself that 
I was not paying a sum for expenses which had already been 
met by the Government. The colonel of the brigade absolutely 
refused to furnish any information at all as to how the money 
was expended, and continued his protests to the Russian Lega- 
tion against the nonpayment of his demands, alleging that I 
had refused to pay him. 

One of the principal obstacles which we encountered in the 
endeavor to collect the Government revenues in Persia was the 



294 THE STRANGLING OF PERSIA 

absolute lack of any penal statutes covering fraud or peculation, 
or similar crimes. A tax-collector, or any Persian Government 
official having public money or property in bis possession, might 
freely make way with the same with little prospect of ever being 
brought to justice. The absence of any means of punishing 
crime of this kind was of course in a large measure responsible 
for the widespread graft and corruption which pervaded the 
Persian administrations. It can be readily imagined what the 
situation would be, even in more modern and civilized countries, 
if all criminal statutes punishing frauds against the Government 
were wiped off the books. The tribunals of justice in Persia, 
where they existed at all, were in an even more disorganized 
condition than the rest of the Government, and far from being 
a check upon the criminally inclined, they formed an important 
part of the Empire-wide organization of grafting public officials 
who lived and waxed fat upon the products of the toil and suf- 
fering of millions of peasants and ignorant tribesmen. Such 
little attempt as was made by the Persian Government to punish 
dishonest officials took the form of purely police or administra- 
tive measures. If the local political conditions seemed to de- 
mand it, or there was enough public sentiment in favor of it, 
the Government directed the arrest of a dishonest official, gave 
him a drumhead hearing, and consigned him to jail, which was 
usually the police headquarters. I speak more particularly of 
the situation in Teheran. In the provinces the local Governors 
dispensed their brands of justice with heavy hands, but the 
net result of the arrest and trial of a man charged with crime 
is, as a rule, that he or his family and friends are forced to 
raise a purse sufficiently large to satisfy the demands of the 
Governor, who is sheriff, prosecutor and judge rolled into one. 

This situation and the absolute necessity of exercising some 
moral influence over the employees of the Government service 
and over recalcitrant taxpayers who could but would not bear 



REORGANIZATION OF THE FINANCES 295 

their share of the burden of government, compelled us to estab- 
lish " private lockups " in Teheran where, after due investiga- 
tion by a board of Treasury officials, the criminally inclined 
who ran foul of the tax regulations could be temporarily de- 
tained. 

On assuming charge of the Treasury I notified the different 
Persian Ministers to the effect that no funds would be paid 
out except upon a written requisition, to be made upon a printed 
form prescribed by me. This form was addressed to the Treas- 
urer-general in French and Persian, and called for detailed 
explanation of the amount demanded. The plan was received 
by most of the Cabinet Officers with marked enthusiasm. They 
evidently believed that on filling out a requisition form their 
task was done, and that nothing remained but for the Treasurer- 
general to furnish the amount requested. Demands for requi- 
sition forms were immediately made, and for weeks my office 
was bombarded with requests for money based upon claims and 
arguments of the most fantastic description. It is needless to 
say that in time the urgent requisitioners discovered that the 
Treasurer-general was not convinced of the legality and pro- 
priety of making a certain payment merely because a Minister 
had expressed his desire for it upon a treasury blank. A few 
of the demands made were so amusing that they will bear men- 
tioning. Two French citizens who were making a tour of the 
world stopped in the course of their travels at Teheran and 
called upon His Highness the Regent. On the following day 
I was surprised to receive a requisition from the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs asking me, by direction of His Highness, to pay 
these enterprising gentlemen a hundred tumans as a token of 
the royal esteem. Not desiring at that time to raise an inter- 
national question with the great French Republic, I paid the 
sum, warning the Minister, however, that under the new Treas- 
ury rules there must be some legal justification for the expendi- 
14 



296 THE STRANGLING OF PEESIA 

ture of the public moneys. On another occasion I was visited 
by the grave and dignified mustawfi of the Ministry of the 
Interior, who, with many salaams, handed me a requisition 
signed by His Excellency the Minister, a literal translation of 
which was as follows : " Requisition for 100 tumans to be paid 
to Sayyid x Fathu'llah, who fell from his ass and broke his leg." 
The unfortunate religious gentleman who had met with this 
deplorable accident was greatly surprised and grieved at learn- 
ing that the foreign Treasurer-general was unable to see the 
justice of his claim. 

The Minister of the Court once came forward with two requi- 
sitions, — one for the purchase of " oil for the Royal camels," 
the other for " straw for His Majesty's automobile service." 
This was too much for my official gravity. Only in Persia 
would one see the Government furnishing oil for camels and 
straw for automobiles. The demands were perfectly serious 
however, as a certain kind of oil is rubbed on the camels to 
keep their skin soft, and the employees of the Royal garage 
received pensions payable in straw. Both requisitions were 
honored. 

As soon as it became clear, in the latter part of September, 
that Muhammad Ali would not be able to reach Teheran, I 
laid before the Cabinet an outline of the financial measures 
which I deemed most important and feasible at that time. 

Except for the risk which we would have run, of never being 
allowed to take up our work at all, if we had not succeeded in 
obtaining authority from the Medjlis while that body was en- 
thusiastic for financial reforms, we might have pursued either 
of the two following plans: First, to devote six months or a 
year to a study of the situation in Persia, and then prepare and 
present detailed laws covering the collection of taxes, the crea- 
tion of new revenues, and the expenditure of public moneys. 

i A " Sayyid " is a holy man. 



KEOKGANIZATION OE THE FINANCES 297 

Secondly, to do as we did, and secure the immediate passage 
of a simple law, in general terms conferring on the Treasurer- 
general the necessary authority to take practical charge of 
Persia's finances. This latter course was naturally attended 
with considerable risk, since we were assuming heavy responsi- 
bilities and there was always the chance that we might be 
" swamped " by jumping into the middle of a number of ab- 
solutely disorganized and corrupt administrations, but having 
had one or two previous experiences of a similar nature, I 
deemed it wiser to adopt the latter course. 

In other words, the sands of Persia's financial life were run- 
ning out so fast that if something practical was not immediately 
done to diminish the drain, there would soon have been an 
utterly hopeless state of bankruptcy, confusion and brigandage, 
both at Teheran and throughout the Empire. 

The first step, therefore, was to secure an honest central 
control of the funds, and, with that as a point d'appui, work out- 
ward into the other administrations and departments, seeking 
to check fraud and negligence, and to bring about a reasonably 
honest collection and expenditure of the existing revenues, — 
pending the study of new legislation and the building up of a 
modern system of accounting and audit. 

As soon as the law of June 13 was passed by the Medjlis 
I endeavored to create a " respect for law " among both for- 
eigners and Persians. There was already a very decent respect 
for money — for power, influence, prestige and courage — but 
absolutely none for the laws as being the embodiment of the 
rights of the public. Laws, in Persia, and more especially fi- 
nancial laws, were lightly regarded. I found that the Medjlis, 
several months before I assumed charge, had adopted a " hoi 
de Comptcibilite," which had been fashioned by throwing to- 
gether a number of sections taken from the Erench legisla- 
tion on this subject. This law had been nominally in force for 



298 THE STRANGLING OF PEKSIA 

several months, but I was unable to find a single official who 
either knew what it meant or had made the slightest effort to 
apply it. They pointed with pride to its existence, and con- 
tinued calmly on their predatory ways. 

It was for the purpose of educating the Persian people to 
have a respect for law that, as soon as the excitement and con- 
fusion of the civil war last summer began to abate, I demanded 
the payment of taxes by a number of prominent but notoriously 
corrupt grandees like Alau'd-Dawla, Prince Farman Parma and 
the Sipahdar. v^ 

With the Alau'd-Dawla incident, readers are already fami- 
liar. When Prince Parman Parma at last saw that I was in 
earnest about his actually paying taxes, he went before the 
Council of Ministers, recounted his valiant services to the 
Constitutional Government, both as a general of the army and 
as Minister of War, and finished by sobbing on the Premier's 
shoulder. The members of the Council were so overcome that 
they wrote me a polite letter stating that the Prince would 
not have to pay any taxes until they could look into the ques- 
tion. Parman Parma brought the letter in person, and I told 
him that he could take his choice between continuing his valiant 
services to the Constitution by paying all his overdue taxes the 
next day, and having me seize his grain warehouses and save 
him the trouble. I wrote the Council that if they would kindly 
attend to the rest of the Government, I would endeavor to look 
after the collection of taxes. The Prince paid most of his taxes 
the following day, though we had to seize some of his wheat in 
the case of one estate. He had saved several millions of dollars 
during his official service as provincial governor, general, and 
cabinet officer. 

I found one item of 72,000 tumans of back taxes which the 
Sipahdar owed the Government. As a set-off he presented a 
claim for one million tumans for his patriotic services and ex- 



REORGANIZATION OF THE FINANCES 301 

penses in equipping the " Army of Resht," -which formed part of 
the National force which took Teheran from Muhammad Ali in 
1909. He said that he thought a grateful Government should 
exempt him and his descendants from all taxation for ten gen- 
erations. As he was worth many millions and claimed title to 
immense estates in Northern Persia, and as he had at that 
time a large number of descendants who would probably not 
let the ancient line die out, it might well happen that the Sipah- 
dar's descendants 250 years from now would own most of the 
taxable property in Persia. He finally agreed to pay his back 
taxes, and had actually sent one of his sons to prepare the 
orders for grain from his estates, when the Russian Govern- 
ment commenced delivering its ultimatums and gave him re- 
newed courage to resist the Treasurer-general. 

Without the authority conferred by the law of June 13 
absolutely nothing could have been accomplished. It is safe to 
say that without it the means could not have been found to 
finance the Bakhtiyari and other military forces which the 
Government sent against Muhammad Ali and Salaru'd-Dawla 
during the summer. The control given me by that law enabled 
me to check, to a certain extent at least, onslaughts on the Treas- 
ury which would have emptied it in two weeks. The Regent 
told me on more than one occasion that he considered that the 
fight which I had been able to make during the summer months, 
against the reckless and corrupt methods of the Cabinet and 
the Bakhtiyari Khans had saved the Government more than 
2,000,000 tumans, in addition to enabling the Government to 
keep forces in the field until the rebels were defeated. 

The London Times, during my visit to England last Febru- 
ary, having exhausted nearly every other source of criticism, 
took the ground that I ought not to have expected the powers to 
agree to my control of Persian finances under the law of June 
13, as it might not be convenient for their " special interests./'' 



302 THE STRANGLING OF PERSIA 

This attack was apparently based on the assumption that there 
was something in that legislation which was, or might have 
been, prejudicial to some foreign interests, financial or other- 
wise. This is, of course, the exact opposite of the truth. All 
foreign loans in Persia are fully guaranteed and protected by 
formal conventions entered into between the Persian Government 
and the lenders of the money, and no legislation of any char- 
acter could avail to weaken or in any manner prejudice those 
guarantees. 

The need for somewhat unusual control of the finances in 
Persia was not in order to effect any change in the guarantees 
of the foreign loans, but to enable the Treasurer-general to stamp 
out the widespread corruption and dishonesty which prevailed 
among the Persian officials themselves, and, by causing the in- 
ternal taxes to be paid to the Government, actually to better the 
position of all foreign creditors whose loans in the last instance, 
in case the specific guarantees should at any time be insufficient, 
would have had to be paid out of the general revenues and re- 
sources of the Persian Government. 

In other words, efficient financial control was necessary for 
purely internal reasons and had nothing whatever to do with 
the foreign loans except to increase their security. Had some 
such legislation not been passed, it would have been utterly im- 
possible for any progress whatsoever to have been made toward 
practical financial reorganization, and the Treasurer-general and 
his American associates would have spent their time in fruit- 
less battles against the corrupt cliques of Government officials, 
whose selfish interests lay in maintaining the status quo of 
chaos and confusion in fiscal matters. 

There is absolutely no possible manner in which even drastic 
control of the finances of Persia, however fully exercised, could 
have had any effect on foreign creditors except to increase the 
general security for their loans. 



KEOKGANIZATION OF THE FINANCES 303 

The previous experiences of other foreign finance officials had 
shown how utterly impossible it was for them to make any 
progress along the lines of serious, practical work in the absence 
of authority and control superior to that of the constantly 
changing bodies of native officials, who from time to time, either 
as Cabinet officials or other administrative officers, deemed them- 
selves to be in charge of Persian finances. 

Although there has never been any modern budgetary system 
in Persia we were able to ascertain, shortly after assuming 
charge, that there was a current annual deficit of about '6,000,- 
000 tumans, assuming that all the maliat, or internal taxes, were 
collected. As, during the year preceding, there was nothing to 
indicate that more than one-fifth of the maliat — which is- -sup- 
posed to produce about 5,000,000 tumans annually in money 
and grain — had been received by the Central Government, this 
minimum annual deficit of 6,000,000 would quickly mount to 
11,000,000 tumans, unless we could get in a very much larger 
share of the maliat. 

On the other hand, many of the allotments demanded by the 
different Ministries were absurdly large; not at all too large 
for the conduct of an efficient government, but exorbitant in 
view of the purely nominal benefits conferred on the people by 
the majority of the branches of the public service. It there- 
fore became necessary to adopt some heroic measures to diminish 
the immense chasm or gap between the revenues actually re- 
ceived by the Government from all sources and the public 
expenditures. 

To this end I early proposed to the Cabinet and the Medjlis 
a program of rigid economy in all branches of the Government, 
central and provincial, to the fullest extent not incompatible 
with reasonably efficient public service. For months I labored 
with the different Ministers to get them to prepare simple 
budgets of their needs, in order that they might serve as a 



304 THE STRANGLING OF PERSIA 

guide to me in approving or disapproving the requisitions for 
funds which were being made on the Treasury. They uniformly 
failed to do so, on one pretext or another, always postponing 
and explaining, until I gave up in disgust and adopted in my 
own office an arbitrary total monthly expense for the regular 
needs of each Ministry, and refused to exceed the amounts so 
fixed no matter how great the complaint or pressure. I finally 
prepared a model budget for the Ministry of War, which was 
the worst offender and loudest in its complaints and threats of 
mutiny. I demonstrated that with an annual expenditure of 
about 2,000,000 tumans an efficient army of 15,000 men — in- 
fantry, cavalry, and artillery, could be properly equipped and 
maintained, with better pay for both officers and men than they 
were even supposed to receive. Yet the annual amount de- 
manded by the Ministry of War, which could not muster 5000 
ragged and underfed troops in the entire Empire, was 7,000,000 
tumans! The evidences of corruption and waste in the War 
Ministry which I presented in connection with this proposed 
budget were so overwhelming that the Council of Ministers 
were compelled to approve my estimate. The Samsamu's-Sal- 
tana, however, who held the portfolio in question, influenced by 
his mercenary relatives among the Bakhtiyari Khans, and by 
our old friend Amir Azam, who was still Vice-minister of War, 
refused to give the necessary orders for putting into effect 
my budget, though he repeatedly promised to do so. The result 
was that I declined to pay the central administration of the 
War Ministry at all, and saw that such troops as there were in 
Teheran, in the barracks, were paid by the Treasury paymasters 
direct, without the intervention of the Ministry. I scratched 
off the military rolls the names of about one hundred " general 
staff officers, military councillors, tactical experts, judge advo- 
cates, military instructors, and professors of strategy," form- 
ing a camarilla of rascals who not only attempted to collect 



REORGANIZATION OF THE FINANCES 305 

tens of thousands of dollars from the Government by way of 
salaries, but were the chief manipulators of graft throughout 
the entire department. They swore many oaths to have my 
life and attempted to provoke mutinies among the troops, but 
the fact that the latter had been paid by the Treasury their 
full wages, without deduction, for the first time in their lives, 
prevented any serious disturbance. 

The second method which I proposed for bridging the chasm 
between income and even the necessary annual outlay was the 
adoption of certain new tax laws. I therefore recommended to 
the Council of Ministers the following changes: 

(1) An increase in the tax upon opium. It should be noted 
that in theory this tax is prohibitive in Persia, but, as a matter 
of fact, it is by no means prohibitive, and by following out 
the ostensible intention of the law the tax could be increased 
and, at the same time, additional revenue be derived therefrom. 
This would justify to a greater extent the collection of such a 
tax by means of the rather expensive organization which was 
necessary to control the opium traffic. 

(2) An increase, to be made administratively, in the tax on 
liquors, as a police measure, since it was not possible, apparently, 
to depend upon the sanction of the Medjlis 1 for this tax. 

(3) A new tax of one hran [$0.09] per 'batman [6.2 lbs.] 
on all tobacco produced in the Empire, with an additional tax 
on all cigars and all other forms of prepared tobaccos. 2 

(4) The repeal of the tax on entrails \boyaux] 3 and the 
substitution therefor of a tax of one Tcran per carcass for each 
small animal slaughtered, such as sheep, lambs, etc., with a 
higher tax upon beef. 

i The official religion of Persia being Muhammadanism, the Medjlis could 
not by any law take official cognizance of a tax on wines and liquors, the 
use of which is prohibited to Muhammadans. 

2 This new tax would have produced about 1,200,000 tumans per annum. 

3 This tax was collected in kind, with great expense, loss and inconven- 
ience to the Government. 



306 THE STRANGLING OF PEESIA 

(5) A revision of the law fixing a stamp tax on certain docu- 
ments, so that the same might cover all commercial paper, con- 
tracts, receipts, etc. 

(6) That steps should be taken to secure the consent of the 
foreign powers to a revision of the Customs schedule, and to a 
raising or modification of the existing prohibition contained in 
the Customs law against the imposition of internal taxes on 
any imported articles. 

(7) A plan for the redemption of the pensions, payable by 
the Persian Government, amounting to nearly three million (3,- 
000,000) tumans per year, whereby these pensions should be 
bought up with Treasury Bonds, running for a period of forty 
years, and bearing interest at five per centum per annum; the 
bonds to be payable to bearer, interest to be collectible through 
coupons, and the amount of the bonds to be issued in favor of 
each pensioner to be determined in accordance with a sliding 
scale based upon a classification of the pensions in units of 
hundreds of tumans per annum. 

(8) A loan of four million (£4,000,000) pounds sterling, 

to be used in part for the redemption of the Russian Bank 

Loan, amounting to, approximately, one million one hundred 

thousand (£1,100,000) pounds sterling, and the balance for 

certain revenue-producing public works only. ]STo portion of 

this money was to be used for any current expenses of the 

Government. 1 

i £4,000,000 worth of bonds, if they netted the Persian Government 87 y 2 , 
as did the bonds issued under the last Imperial Bank Loan of £1,250,000, 
would have produced £3,500,000, or (at 5.20) 18,200,000 tumans. The con- 
version of the Banque d'Escompte loan would have required about 5,670,000 
tumans, leaving a balance of 12,530,000 tumans, which I proposed to employ- 
as follows: for a cadastre, with a simultaneous rough census, and forestal, 
mining and crown lands survey, 3,500,000 tumans; irrigation projects and 
systems, 2,000,000 tumans; repair and construction of roads, 4,000,000 tu- 
mans; barracks and equipment for the Treasury Gendarmerie 1,500,000 
tumans; total 11,000,000 tumans, leaving a balance for contingencies of 
1,530,000 tumans. The execution of these projects in three years would 
have given the Government, directly and indirectly, an increased revenue of 
from six to eight million tumans a year. 



RAILBOAD DEVELOPMENT 307 

With the funds derived from this loan there were to be under- 
taken the following revenue-producing public works, to wit : 
a cadastre; a rough census of the population by cities and dis- 
tricts, for taxation purposes ; a survey of the forests and mines ; 
a survey of the public domains (Khaleseh) ; the building of 
barracks and purchase of equipment for the Treasury Gen- 
darmerie; the repair and improvement of existing roads and 
the building of certain important new roads ; the construction 
of irrigation systems at various points in Persia. In connec- 
tion with these plans it is to be noted that one of the gravest 
criticisms that has been made against the Constitutional Gov- 
ernment was the fact that it had done but little practical work 
for the benefit of the people at large. 

I also recommended that the Government should pass a law 
announcing its intention to build at the proper time the follow- 
ing eight railway lines (or to grant suitable concessions for 
the building thereof), in whole or in part, from time to time. 

Eirst line: Mohammerah to Khoramabad to Hamadan. 

Second line: Khanikin to Kirmanshah to Hamadan. 

Third line: Hamadan to Kasvin. 

Eourth line: Bandar-i-Abbas to Kirman to Yezd to Tehe- 
ran; branch to Isfahan. 

Eifth line: Bushir to Shiraz to Isfahan. 

Sixth line: Julfa to Tabriz to Zindjan to Kasvin to Te- 
heran; branch from Kasvin to Caspian ports. 

Seventh line: Zindjan to Hamadan. 

Eighth line: Bandar-i-Abbas to Shiraz. 

I urged the passage of a law prohibiting the cornering by 
private individuals of grain and other prime necessities of 
life. 

I estimated that a net increased revenue of about 5,000,000 



308 THE STEANGLING OF PEESIA 

tumans per annum would have been derived from the passage 
of the tax laws recommended, and no hardship would have 
resulted. 

In addition to this there would have been an annual saving 
for the Government under my pension redemption plan of 
nearly 2,000,000 tumans. 

The Council of Ministers approved these plans on Septem- 
ber 30, 1911, and I was engaged in the preparation of the 
drafts of the necessary laws for submission to the Medjlis when 
the Eussian ultimatums were presented. 

One of the most remarkable examples of Persia's peculiar 
financial chaos was this system of " pensions." According to 
the loosely kept records of the different Ministries the Gov- 
ernment was expected to pay out each year to nearly 100,000 
different people throughout the Empire the sum of about 3,090,- 
000 tumans, in money and grain. 

The greater part of this strange burden had been inherited 
by the Constitutional Government from the regime of the 
former Shahs. Some pensions had, however, been decreed by 
the Medjlis, to priests and others who had served the National- 
ist movement, and to the relatives of men who had been 
killed while fighting for the Constitution. 

In former days, if a Shah was feeling in good spirits, or 
liked the wit, verse, or compliment of some court official, he gave 
him the revenue of a village, or of a dozen villages, as a token 
of the royal esteem; or he directed that the name of the 
favored one be placed on the civil list for a pension of so many 
hundreds or thousands of tumans per year, or for so many 
khavars 1 of wheat or barley or straw. In a few cases these 
pensions were granted for public services really rendered. All 
the Shah's menials received pensions, which passed from father 
to son. Fully nine tenths of the pensions allotted were pure 

i A Jchavar is about a third of a ton. 



2 c ^ 

la >> 
_tra ' 




REORGANIZATION OF THE FINANCES 311 

graft. All the grandees enjoyed large pensions. No province 
failed to have its pension roll. The largest was, of course, 
at Teheran. 

The Constitutional Government had never been able to pay 
these pensions, nor any great part of them. The system of- 
fered a splendid chance for favoritism, and for private specu- 
lation by Ministers of Finance and other prominent public of- 
ficials. As the pension warrants which were issued with con- 
siderable regularity during the year could hardly ever be con- 
verted into cash at the Treasury, the pensioners discounted 
them wherever they could, often accepting as little as fifteen 
per cent of the face value, to get cash. Numbers of small shop- 
keepers, and, at times, wealthy merchants bought up these war- 
rants for a song and put them into the hands of professional 
" pension-collectors." These men, having accumulated a num- 
ber of warrants, would hire crowds of miserable-looking men 
and women to stand around the Treasury pay-office and shout, 
moan, beat their breasts, tear their hair, and roll on the 
grounds in well-feigned fits — all the while waving their pen- 
sion warrants and calling on Allah to save them and their chil- 
dren from starving. Some women would bring babies and lie 
groaning on the ground with them, both mother and child ap- 
parently starving to death. The actors received a few pennies 
a day for performances of this kind. 

The Finance Ministers, however, had grown rather callous 
and used to these scenes, and unless a serious disturbance, or 
cliuluk, was arranged, they paid little attention. 

The payment of the pension warrants for the current year 
and several preceding years was one of the pleasant preroga- 
tives which fell to me as Treasurer-general. 

More than one Finance Minister had found it very con- 
venient to buy up large numbers of pension warrants at about 
twenty cents on the dollar, and, awaiting a moment when, by 



312 THE STRANGLING OF PEESIA 

accident, there were some thousands of tumans in the Treasury, 
had cashed the warrants in at their face value. This produced 
a scandal even in Persia, and loud cries and protests of right- 
eous indignation from public officials who were not in the com- 
bination. 

There was no hope of there being money to pay those pen- 
sions, but there were so many people and interests and the 
pressure against the abolishment of them was so great that the 
Medjlis did not dare to take such a step. 

I therefore proposed to the Government a " pension redemp- 
tion plan," and drafted a report and law setting forth my 
ideas. The project was held up by the Council of Ministers, 
but I sent it to the individual deputies and it was being favor- 
ably discussed when the political storm broke. It was neces- 
sary to compile a very complete set of statistics in order to get 
a working basis for the plan. 

In brief, the Government was to buy up the pensions, after 
an examination into their validity, by issuing Treasury bonds 
to each pensioner to such amount as, at five per cent interest, 
would give the owner in the case of small pensions, an annual 
income equal to one-half his nominal pension, for a period of 
forty years, with payment of principal at the end of that time. 
In the case of the larger pensions, the proportion to be re- 
ceived from the interest on the bond diminished, class by class, 
down to about one quarter of the nominal pensions. 

The Government would have issued about 21,500,000 tumans 
worth of Treasury bonds, on which the annual interest charged 
would have been 1,075,000 tumans, as against a total annual 
charge of 3,000,000 tumans under the existing system. The 
new obligation the Government could have promptly met, thus 
giving the bonds a value. No injustice would have been done 
the pensioners, since, with the exception of men who had spe- 
cial influence, and speculators, no pensioner receives from the 



POTENTIAL RESOURCES 313 

Government more than one third or one quarter of the face 
value of the pension warrants. Any additional amount ob- 
tained from the Government goes to the middleman. 

Another advantage of the plan would have been the putting 
into circulation in Persia of a considerable amount of negoti- 
able paper. This is badly needed, as the bank-notes and 
silver are totally inadequate to the requirements of com- 
merce. 

In some instances the cost of transferring Persian money 
from Teheran to other cities and towns in Persia is as high 
as eight per cent. It is never less than one per cent. In ad- 
dition to this the Persian Government is compelled to make 
good any losses sustained by the foreign banks in sending bank- 
notes or coin through the mails. 

The free circulation of Treasury bonds of this nature, by 
establishing confidence in the Government among the people, 
would also have opened the door for the successful flotation 
within Persia itself of other bond issues, which otherwise would 
have been necessarily sold in foreign markets and under more 
or less onerous political conditions. 

The existing Customs tariff in Persia is an interesting monu- 
ment to the insincerity of Persia's neighbor on the North. The 
rates of duty are fixed under stipulations between the Per- 
sian Government and the European Powers, and cannot be 
changed except by their consent. The schedules of this tariff 
were established in the time of Mons. Naus, a Belgian of- 
ficial then in the employ of the Persian Government. Mons. 
]NTaus was, as his fellow countrymen in the Persian service are 
now known to be, a notorious protege and agent of the Russian 
Government. One result of Mons. Naus' Russophil tenden- 
cies is that the Customs tariff in force in Persia to-day is abso- 
lutely prejudicial to the interests of Persia, and is so grossly 
partial to Russian interests and trade as to render it the most 



314 THE STRANGLING OF PERSIA 

conspicuously unsuccessful tariff in the world, from the view- 
point of the people in whose behalf it is supposed to be framed. 
The principal fault of the Persian tariff — and in this it un- 
duly favors Russian interests to the loss and detriment of Per- 
sian interests — is that the average rate of duty is too low — 
so low, in fact, as to make the actual collection of the revenues 
and the proper safeguarding of the frontiers an unreasonably 
heavy burden on the Persian Government, when compared with 
the returns obtained. 1 While the Customs admittedly produce 
a stable and regular income, the net revenues might easily, in 
all fairness and perfect justice to all legitimate commercial in- 
terests, foreign or domestic, amount to double the actual sum 
through an advance in the rates. The existing tariff, however, 
was unloaded upon an inexperienced and unsuspecting people 
as the result of taking the advice of their foreign financial 
advisers, whose personal interests led them to look elsewhere 
than to the welfare of the nation which they were employed 
to serve. The framing of these schedules under Mons. Naus 
was, in fact, a typical example of the " friendly spirit " which 
the St. Petersburg Government has been smugly proclaiming for 
the past fifteen years as the mainspring of Russia's relations 
with her weaker sister, Persia. Even the British Government, 
with its usually watchful eye for English commercial interests, 
was taken unawares when the Persian tariff was manipulated in 
the interests of Russian trade. Not having a Mons. Naus of 
its own on the spot and in power, the British Government was 
compelled to drain to the bitter dregs the tariff decoction pre- 
pared by Russia. The result is that, despite the admitted in- 

i According to the Customs statistics available, the total value of Persian 
imports and exports for 1909-1910 was 81,395,470 tumans, upon which the 
import and export duties collected were 3,634,032 tumans, or slightly less 
than iy 2 per cent. Russia is credited with imports and exports amounting 
to 48,910,404 — more than half the total. The rates of duty on Russian 
merchandise are exceptionally low. The principal articles of importation 
from that country into Persia are sugar, on which the rate of duty is about 
3 per cent, and refined petroleum, on which the rate is about ^ per cent. 



POTENTIAL RESOURCES 313 

feriority of Russian goods of every description — with the pos- 
sible exception of caviar — the trade of the entire northern half 
of Persia is wholly in the hands of Russian merchants. This 
predominance is strengthened by the medieval policy followed 
by Russia in refusing transit in bond to goods coming from 
Europe for consumption in Persia. 

This privilege is accorded by nearly every other civilized 
country in the world, in the case of goods in transit through 
its territories, and is recognized by modern Governments as 
both fair and necessary. The absence of such an arrangement 
in Russia renders it necessary for goods from Europe to be 
conveyed over long and often impassable or dangerous caravan 
routes from the ports on the Persian Gulf. The only alterna- 
tive is for the British or other foreign exporter to suffer the 
handicap of paying the Russian Customs duties and the delays 
and annoyances of the Russian Customs officials for the mere 
privilege of transporting the goods through Russia in order to 
reach Northern Persia. 

It is curious, however, that in carrying out even a high- 
handed and arbitrary policy of this kind Russia could not avoid 
making a blunder at some point. A year or so ago the Gov- 
ernment suddenly awoke to the fact that it was one of the 
signatories to the International Postal Convention, under which 
it is agreed that parcels sent by post should pass through Rus- 
sian territory unopened and free of Customs duties. Due to 
this oversight on the part of the Russian Government the 
amount of foreign merchandise from European countries which 
is to-day passing into Persia by means of the parcels post, via 
Russia, is increasing rapidly, to the intense disgust and chagrin 
of the Russian officials and merchants. 

Persia has suffered in many ways from the foreigner during 
the past thirty years. Her hands have been tied by treaties and 
stipulations, by loan contracts, concessions and agreements, all 
is 



316 THE STRANGLING OF PERSIA 

signed by vicious and selfish rulers or ministers, that they 
might indulge in debauches abroad at the expense of their peo- 
ple and their national safety. Russia has been a constant 
panderer to the vices of the Shahs, plying the drunkard with 
rum that he might sign away his birthright. Concession after 
concession has been exacted by foreign interests until the re- 
sources of the whole country are so tied up that the Government 
itself cannot develop them to any extent. 

Starting with the famous tobacco monoply of 1891, railroad 
grants, oil and mining concessions, and loans have followed in 
swift succession. If Persia seeks to develop herself, some de- 
cree of a former Shah is produced to show why she cannot do 
so. Claims to an unknown number of millions are filed against 
her. Russian subjects claim anything, and their Government 
gives to their demands its official support and backing. One of 
Russia's principal objections to the proposed loan of £4,000,000 
was that I would not agree to the Banque d'Escompte at Te- 
heran (a branch of the Russian State Bank) exercising a 
supervisory control of the expenditures, a thing which would 
have been tantamount to telling Russia to conduct the Persian 
Government. 

When I assumed charge of the Persian Treasury, in addition 
to the banking overdraft of 440,000 tumans, the principal 
central and provincial administrations were unpaid for several 
months ; the diplomatic representatives of Persia abroad had re- 
ceived no pay for years, 1 and I was constantly in receipt of truly 

1 The Government had not a penny in cash at the time I took charge. 
There was an unknown sum due on outstanding checks, drafts, treasury 
promises to pay, et cetera, all issued by previous Ministers of Finance. 
Despite the civil war which commenced in July, 1911, and required for ex- 
traordinary military expenditures alone more than 1,500,000 tumans, and 
despite the diminution in the revenues caused by the disorders throughout 
the Empire, the banking overdraft of 440,000 tumans was paid, the neces- 
sary funds to conduct the Government were furnished, payments were made 
to the diplomatic corps and all foreign obligations were promptly met. The 
only extraordinary receipt during this time was the net proceeds of the 
Imperial Bank Loan, which after liquidating the converted debt and other 



o.-iT 



POTENTIAL RESOURCES 317 

pathetic appeals from officials who were marooned in Europe, 
nnable to get back to Persia because of their debts incurred for 
living expenses, and protected from arrest only by diplomatic 
immunity. 

The credit of Persia abroad would have required many years 
to restore, but I was careful throughout the entire time that I 
was in charge of her finances not to put my name to any order 
or check unless I had funds to meet it on presentation. No 
check of the American Treasurer-general was ever refused pay- 
ment, and the Persians, on learning this, actually kept 'Treasury 
checks instead of bank-notes, whereas any former order or obli- 
gation of the Persian Government had been cashed or passed 
off, even at a discount, without an instant's delay. In the 
Treasury under our charge was the only set of central books 
which the Persian Government had ever known. These books 
balanced exactly with the different banks with which the Treas- 
ury transacted business, and a permanent record was kept of 
every receipt or disbursement. Persia never had this before — 
nor desired it. 

Soon after taking charge I organized a Persian secret serv- 
ice, which did yeoman service in reporting frauds and occa- 
sional attempts at dishonesty by Treasury employees. This 
service likewise kept me informed of the secret plans of the 
different officials of the Government. 

The coinage system in Persia is simple. There are no gold 
coins in circulation. The standard coin is the kran, worth 
about $0.09, or less, according to the rate of exchange. Ten 
krans make a tuman, but there are no tumans in circulation, 
the largest coin being the two-kran piece. 

advances made on its credit prior to my arrival, amounted to about 2,000,000 
tumans. On my relinquishing charge of the Treasury on January 7, 1912, 
there was standing to the credit of the Government in money and grain a 
balance of over 600,000 tumans, including the excess Customs revenues up 
to January 13, 1912. 



318 THE STRANGLING OF PERSIA 

The Imperial Bank of Persia (a British corporation) is- 
sues, under its charter, bank-notes redeemable in krans. 

Until a comparatively recent date some of the provincial 
governments in Persia struck off very crude kran pieces which 
were little more than flattened balls of silver and alloy. The 
Imperial Mint at Teheran has antiquated and uneconomical 
machinery. It coined at the rate of about 700,000 tumans a 
month when running at full capacity. 

The question of railroad development in Persia is a com- 
plicated one. Russia and England desire roads which would 
tend to carry out their strategical purposes, or benefit some 
particular class of trade, irrespective of the economic develop- 
ment of Persia as a whole. It is generally believed by impar- 
tial persons that the first main line which should be built 
should run approximately from Julfa (Russia) through Tabriz, 
Zindjan, Kasvin, Hamadan, Khoramabad, to Mohammerah on 
the Persian Gulf. This would be a North to South trunk line, 
would tap many of the richest sections of the Empire, and 
would greatly hasten Persia's economic development. It would 
have branches, such as from Kasvin to Teheran. It was my 
intention to have the Persian Government declare its intention 
of building this line, in sections, and authorize loans for its 
construction and operation, by a syndicate whose capital 
should be purely private. There is little question but that 
such a line would be profitable, if properly managed. The 
other lines of which mention has been made will be built some 
day, but they are not so important at present. 



CHAPTER XII 



A POSTSCRIPT 



THE incidents which marked the departure of my American 
assistants from Teheran were what might have been ex- 
pected from a government composed of men who had been willing 
to sell their country to foreign powers. The very next day 
after I left the capital Mons. Mornard, 1 the Belgian Customs 
official who, at the behest of the Russian and British Legations, 
had been named by the Persian Cabinet Ministers to take charge 
of the Treasury, presented himself to the acting Treasurer-Gen- 
eral, Mr. Cairns, and exhibited an order from the Cabinet 
threatening the American finance officials with discharge and 

i Throughout the entire affair, Mons. Mornard lost no opportunity to 
demonstrate his malice and general unfitness for any responsible position. 
He had not been named as Treasurer-General, but merely as Acting Treas- 
urer, and although he had at first refused to accept the latter designa- 
tion, he finally decided to take what he could get as a means of furthering 
his candidacy for the permanent post. Shortly after taking possession of 
the offices, in a manifest attempt to curry favor with the St. Petersburg 
Government, he sent a despatch to Belgium to be given to the press, crit- 
icizing the American administration of Persia's finances and insinuating 
that there was a deficit of 2,000,000 francs in the current account of the 
Treasury with the different banks at Teheran. He gave similar state- 
ments to the Russian newspaper correspondents at the capital informing 
them that he would have the Americans who were still in Persia detained 
until this matter was explained. When this charge was brought to my 
attention in London, I of course promptly denied the statements of Mons. 
Mornard, adding that he was well known in Persia to be a mere Russian 
tool and decidedly irregular in his fiscal methods. 

As I knew the exact status of the current banking accounts of the 
Treasury on the day that I left Teheran, I was unable to imagine what 
could have caused Mons. Mornard to make a charge which was not only 
absolutely false, but even absurd. It was sometime later that I learned 

319 



320 THE STRANGLING OF PEESIA 

punishment, if they did not immediately turn over the offices. 
In view of the fact that I had been trying for weeks to have 
the Cabinet provide some businesslike method of transfer, and 
that I had formally notified the Cabinet several days prior to 
my departure that I had transferred the office to Mr. Cairns, 
and that he stood ready and was anxious to make a transfer 
of the Treasury affairs without delay, the threat employed was 
a gratuitous insult which the Americans promptly resented. 
When the communication in question was read in the presence of 
Mons. Mornard, they left the offices in a body and refused to 
have any further dealings with either Mornard or the Persian 
Cabinet. Mr. Cairns then sent written protests to both the Rus- 
sian and British Legations, and to the Persian Ministers who 
had adopted this impertinent attitude. Seeing that they had 
gone too far, the two Legations promptly informed the Cabinet 
that its action was improper, and the latter body, in true Persian 
style, hastily forged a similar letter which they sent to Mr. 
Cairns, claiming that it was the original one transmitted 
through Mornard. The second letter contained no threat or 
improper language. 

In view of this conciliatory attitude, Mr. Cairns took up the 
question of the status and departure of the Americans with the 
Russian and British Legations, which were openly controlling 
the actions of the Persian Cabinet. At the request of the Rus- 
sian Minister the Americans agreed to remain and assist the 
Belgians in taking charge of the affairs of the Treasury, provided 
an equitable adjustment of their own contract rights should be 

how he came to give out the statement which he did. It seems that in 
his anxiety to cast discredit upon the Americans in Persia and thereby 
bolster up his own reputation with the Eussian Government and the press 
at St. Petersburg, he had committed a truly laughable blunder. When 
he and the Persian Cabinet had dispossessed the Americans from the 
Treasury offices, the current account of the Persian government with the 
Imperial Bank of Persia showed a book overdraft of several thousand 
tumans. Against this nominal overdraft there was more than 300,000 
tumans standing to the credit of the Treasury at the Banque d'Escompte. 



A POSTSCEIPT 323 

made. The Cabinet Ministers, having made one faux pas in 
their eagerness to do what they thought would please the Lega- 
tions, were careful thereafter to obey strictly the line of con- 
duct marked out for them by the Eussian Minister. Some days 
later Mr. Cairns and most of the other American Treasury 
assistants left Teheran. Mr. .McCaskey, my second assistant, 
who had been in charge of the Banking Department of the 
Treasury, remained and gave the Belgian officials every assist- 
ance in taking over the books and accounts. Mr. Dickey agreed 
to remain in charge of the Imperial Mint until his successor 
should arrive from Belgium. By March all the Americans had 
left, except Col. Merrill, who had decided to remain, at the re- 
quest of the Legations, as an instructor in the Gendarmerie. 

This amount was the surplus from the Northern Customs receipts for 
the six months period which, according to the terms of the loan stip- 
ulations with Russia, ended on the last day of the Eussian year, — Jan- 
uary 13, 1912. The money did not therefore become actually available 
for expenditure by the Persian Government until two days after I left 
Teheran, but it was revenue collected during the six months period prior 
to my departure and against this the Imperial Bank has made the small 
advances which constituted the book overdraft which has been mentioned. 
Shortly after taking charge of the office of Treasurer, Mons. Mornard de- 
manded a statement from the Imperial Bank of the accounts of the Treas- 
ury with that institution, evidently for the purpose of comparing it with 
the books of the Treasury. The Imperial Bank, in turn, had certain un- 
liquidated claims against the Persian Government amounting to more 
than 350,000 tumans. These claims originated long before I assumed 
charge of Persia's finances. The Chief Manager of the Bank had spoken 
to me several times regarding their settlement, but on my explaining that 
the Treasury was at that time in no position to liquidate the obligation, 
he had consented to let the question rest. As soon, however, as the Amer- 
icans ceased to be responsible for the Treasury and Mons. Mornard as- 
sumed control, the Imperial Bank, having no confidence in him or in his 
financial methods, promptly charged up the full amount of these claims 
against the account of the Persian Government. This action, which would 
be considered somewhat unusual in normal countries, was the only method 
which the Bank had of collecting its claim. When, therefore, Mons. 
Mornard called for a statement of the Treasury accounts in the Bank, 
he was given one which included this 350,000 tumans as an overdraft with 
the Imperial Bank. It is not difficult to imagine Mons. Mornard and his 
Belgian associates comparing this statement with the books of the Treas- 
ury which showed the overdraft with the Imperial Bank to be a few 
thousand tumans. The average business man, to say nothing of a finance 
administrator, would have probably stopped to inquire whether there was 



324 THE STRANGLING OF PEESIA 

Two days after my departure from. Teheran, Major Preuss, 
one of the American instructors in the Treasury Gendarmerie, 
was fired on from the window of a house in the city while he 
was riding from the barracks to Atabak Palace. Eumors had 
been current that some one of the American officials was to 
be assassinated. Investigation showed that the shots had been 
fired by certain " terrorists " belonging to a Busso- Armenian 
secret society which believed in accomplishing its political ends 
by that means. The assailants, four in number, had promptly 
fled from Teheran. Their leader was found to be a former 
officer of the Gendarmerie. A week after the incident he re- 
turned to Teheran and surrendered himself, making a full 
confession of the plot. He declared that he had not partici- 
pated personally in the attack on Major Preuss, but that he 
knew the four members of the society who had been chosen by 
lot for this purpose. He pointed out the vacant house from 
which the shots were fired, and described how the two men who 
actually did the shooting had their legs tied together so that 
neither could escape in case of pursuit. He made the interest- 
ing statement that the secret society in question had no enmity 
whatever against Major Preuss, or the other Americans, but had 
decided to sacrifice some one of them in order to create an inci- 
dent which might cause the American Government to interfere 
in Persian affairs in some manner favorable to that country. 
The informant was promptly imprisoned by the Persian Cabinet 
and his fate was undetermined when the Americans left. It 

any explanation of this surface discrepancy. No so Mornard; the differ- 
ence shown on the face of the statement was sufficient for his purposes 
and he immediately decided to proclaim that the American Treasury offi- 
cials had made off with the sum of 2,000,000 francs. It probably was not 
long before he discovered his absurd and foolish mistake. He apparently 
has not been heard from on this subject since. Some time after the orig- 
inal statement was published in the European press, the Belgian Finance 
Minister denied, in an interview, that he had ever received such a de- 
spatch as Mons. Mornard was alleged to have sent. 



A POSTSCRIPT 325 

was fortunate for Major Preuss that this truly remarkable plan 
did not succeed. 

ISTot long after the destruction of the Med j lis, Russia com- 
menced to agitate the question of building the long-discussed 
" Trans-Persian Railway." That Russia should bring forward 
this proposal again was not surprising, but that the British 
Government should for an instant give countenance to the 
scheme was indeed remarkable. Yet a number of British 
capitalists actually went to St. Petersburg, among other pur- 
poses to discuss ways and means for financing such a road, and 
in this they had the apparent approval and support of the 
British Foreign Office. This road, as planned, would traverse 
Persia from northwest to southeast, connecting with the Rus- 
sian lines at Julfa and stopping only at the Indian frontier. 
It was a truly sinister proposal in every respect. Ordinary 
decency should have prevented talk of " obtaining a concession 
from the Persian Government " for such a purpose, at least 
while Russian and British troops were overrunning the entire 
country, while Russian flags were flying over the largest and 
richest provinces in Northern Persia, and while the sword and 
the noose in Russian hands were being put to their grim 
use in the stricken city of Tabriz. Even the Government of 
India, whose traditional policy for the defense of the Empire 
has apparently been tempered in recent years with the advent of 
Lord Hardinge as Viceroy, 1 must have balked at the prospect 
of a line of steel running down from the barracks and store- 
houses of the Russian army in the Caucasus, directly to the 
very borders of the Indian Empire. The Indian Government 
was moved, in giving its approval to the plan for the construc- 
tion of this road to demand, with great show of prudence, a 

i Lord Hardinge obtained his finishing touches as a British diplomat at 
St. Petersburg, where as British Ambassador, he became an ardent Rus- 
sophile. 



326 THE STRANGLING OF PEKSIA 

change of gauge at the Indo-Persian frontier, but modern mili- 
tary strategy is believed to have now reached the point where 
it can successfully accomplish the transfer of troops and sup- 
plies from one train to another with considerable alacrity, and 
Russian troops, once transported to the Indian frontier on a 
hostile mission, might not be unwilling to continue their journey 
even over a road of a different gauge. 

One of the principal objects which the Russian and British 
Governments apparently sought to obtain by this scheme was 
the permanent and complete crippling and mortgaging of all 
Persia's financial resources. It was suggested at the time by 
Mons. Mornard, — doubtless not of his own initiative, — that 
this road should be built under a guarantee to be given by the 
Persian Government. For sheer impudence and audacity this 
proposal is unique. Persia has no need whatever for such a 
railroad. It would be purely strategic in character and, com- 
mercially speaking, impossible. If Persia should be forced to 
guarantee the bonds for the construction of this road, her whole 
financial resources for the next century would be absorbed to 
meet this charge alone. In addition to this, if we may judge 
by what has occurred in other somewhat similar cases, Russian 
railroad construction materials would be forced on the helpless 
Persians at greatly inflated prices, at least for the portion of 
the line between Julfa and Isfahan. Were the road to be 
constructed only as far as the latter point, the advantages to 
Russia's influence and purely selfish interests would be enor- 
mous, and if it should be built to the Indian frontier, the 
strategical advantages for Russia would be incalculable. This 
type of Trans-Persian Railway would not pay as an investment 
for many generations to come. Its raison d'etre would be 
purely political and it could have no economic advantage to 
Persia at all comparable with its cost. 

Of much the same ilk has been the " great constructive pro- 




FRONT VIEW OF ATABAK PALACE TAKEN FROM ACROSS THE LAKE. 
Mr. Sinister, Ills family and the American Treasury assistants resided here during their stay in 

Teheran. 




A CORNER OF THE LARGE SALON AT ATABAK PALACE. 



A POSTSCEIPT 329 

gram " so frequently referred to by the British Government 
during the last three months as being about to be launched in 
Persia under the friendly auspices of the two Powers. Despite 
this latest attempt by Sir Edward Grey to gull the British 
public, this product of statesmanship is found, on examination, 
to be nothing more than turning over to the puppets who now 
compose the " Imperial Government of Persia " the sum of 
£200,000 recently advanced by the two Legations at Teheran 
at the generous interest rate of 7 per cent, per annum. Par- 
turiunt montes, nascetur ridiculus mus. The loan in question 
is coupled with a number of vaguely worded but none the less 
ominous political conditions, which the Persian Cabinet has 
already " accepted." As an example of shallow pretense, this 
Joint Note which was presented by the two Legations on March 
18, 1912, is well worth perusal. Let us see by it how far 
since the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, Persia has 
traveled along the path of independence, progress and pros- 
perity: 

Animated by the desire to place upon a solid basis of friendship and 
confidence the relations between the Government of His Britannic Majesty, 
the Imperial Government of Russia, and the Imperial Government of Per- 
sia, and desirous of assisting the Persian Government as far as possible in 
their task of re-establishing and maintaining order and tranquillity in the 
country, the Russian and British Legations have the honour, by instruction 
of their Governments, to make to the Persian Government the following 
proposals: — 

1. The two Governments are prepared, in order to meet urgent expendi- 
ture, to advance to the Persian Government a sum of 100,000?. each. The 
Imperial Bank and the Banque d'Escompte will each open an account for 
this sum as soon as the two legations have received a favourable reply to 
the present note, and it is understood that the sum paid into the account 
by the Banque d'Escompte will be placed at the disposal of the Persian 
Government in roubles, amounting to the sum of 945,750 roubles. 

2. The above-mentioned sums will be lent at a rate of interest of 7 per 
cent, per annum, and will be repayable out of the first proceeds of the forth- 
coming loan of the Persian Government, and until then the surpluses of 
the northern and southern customs revenues, which have hitherto been 



y 



330 THE STEANGLING OF PEESIA 

placed by the two banks at the disposal of the Persian Government, will 
be wholly and respectively assigned to the amortisation of and to the pay- 
ment of interest on the Russian and British portions of the present ad- 
vance. 

3. The advance will be expended under the control of the treasurer- 
general, in accordance with a programme prepared by him in agreement 
with the Cabinet and approved by the two legations. It is understood that 
a considerable part will be assigned to the organisation of the Government 
gendarmerie with the assistance of the Swedish officers. In making this 
proposal, and in order to attain the ends indicated at the beginning of this 
note, the two legations hope i that the Persian Government will undertake 
(1) to conform their policy henceforth with the principles of the Anglo- 
Russian Convention of 1907; (2) as soon as Mohamed Ali Shah and Salar- 
ed-Dowleh have left Persia, to dismiss the fedais and irregular forces now 
in the Persian service; (3) to discuss with the two legations a scheme 
for the organisation of a small regular and effective army; (4) to come to 
an agreement with Mohamed Ali Shah on the subject of his departure from 
Persia, of his pension, and of a general amnesty to his followers. 2 

Hoping i to receive a favourable reply, we avail, &c. 

G. Barclay. 

POKLEWSKY-KOZIEIX. 

The " hopes " of the two Legations were fulfilled, and on 
March 20, 1912, two days after the receipt of the Joint Note, 
the tried and true Minister of Foreign Affairs, our old ac- 
quaintance Wuthuqu'd-Dawla, " being deeply sensible of the 
good intentions of the two neighboring Powers," accepts. One 

i The italics are the author's. 

2 In August, 1911, the two Powers formally declared to the Persian Gov- 
ernment that by entering Persia in an attempt to regain the throne, the ex- 
Shah, Muhammad Ali, had forfeited all right to the pension of 100,000 
tumans which he had been receiving from the Persian Government under 
the stipulation signed by the Powers with Persia in September, 1909. De- 
spite this declaration made in August, we find the two Governments on 
February 18, 1912, forcing the so-called Persian Government to restore 
to Muhammad Ali his pension and to grant his plundering followers a 
general amnesty. This unjustifiable action casts a strange light on the oft- 
repeated protestations of the Russian Government and the frequent declara- 
tions made by Sir Edward Grey in the House of Commons to the effect that 
the Russian Government had no sympathy with, or participation in, the ex- 
Shah's attempt to overthrow the constitutional government of Persia and 
seat himself upon the throne. The plain truth is that his filibustering 
expedition was initiated, executed and financed with the full connivance of 
the St. Petersburg Cabinet. 



A POSTSCRIPT 331 

more link is forged in the chain which shall bind Persia forever 
to at least one of her two kind neighbors. 

The fact that the recent destruction of Persian nationality 
by Russia and England is no novelty in history takes nothing 
from the sadness of the story. In some cases where the inde- 
pendence of a people has been wiped out there has been at least 
a quasi-justification for the act, — such as the advancement of 
civilization or the creation of better political institutions. In 
Persia's case no such excuse existed. No serious claim can be 
made that Russia will further the cause of civilization and 
progress in Persia. 

Throughout the entire controversy between the Persian Gov- 
ernment and the two Powers there has never been more than a 
weak pretense that what was being done was to benefit the Per- 
sian people. Every utterance and claim has been based on a 
cynical selfishness that shocks all sense of justice. It is in 
the pursuit of " Russian interests " or " British trade " that 
innocent people have been slaughtered wholesale. Never a 
word about the millions of beings whose lives have been jeopar- 
dized, whose rights have been trampled under foot and whose 
property has been confiscated. 

The very recent publications of two British Blue Books on 
Persia, 1 despite the official editing and the expurgation of any- 
thing which it was thought might discredit the two Powers, will 
enable the public to realize the cold-blooded attacks which were 
made on Persia's sovereignty. Not a single line in these smug 
documents would ever lead one to believe that Persia was a 
friendly nation whose sovereignty had been actually proclaimed 
and guaranteed by the two Powers who destroyed it in Decem- 
ber, 1911.* 

i " Further Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Persia," Nos. 3 and 
4 (1912), presented to Parliament in March, 1912. 

2 In this connection the following official version (Persia No. 1, 1912) 
of a Joint Note sent by Russia and England to the Persian Government on 
Sept. 11, 1907, is of interest: (See next page.) 



332 THE STRANGLING OF PERSIA 

The Anglo-Russian condominium in Persia has arrived. 
True, it is decidedly more Russian than English in its char- 
acter, but that is due merely to England's weakness and the 
effect on the Persians will be the same. They are doomed to 
political annihilation and economic servitude. The world can- 
not heed their moral appeal, because they are weak and 
Asiatic, and under the shadow of the Caucasus. Morroco, 
Tripoli and Persia, three Moslem states, have been destroyed in 
one year by their enlightened Christian neighbors. It is not 
a pretty spectacle. Can one blame the hundreds of millions of 
Muhammadans in the world for being deeply resentful ? 
Can they help regarding the events of the year 1911 as part of 

" The Governments of Great Britain and Russia, desiring to avoid any 
cause of conflict between their respective interests in certain regions in 
Persia contiguous to, or in the immediate neighbourhood of, the frontiers 
of Afghanistan and Baluchistan on the one hand, and the Russian frontier 
on the other hand, have signed a friendly agreement on the subject. 

In that agreement the two Governments mutually agree to the strict in- 
tegrity and independence of Persia, and testify that they sincerely desire 
the pacific development of that country as well as the permanent establish- 
ment of equal advantages for the commerce and industry of all other na- 
tions. Each of the two States further engages, in case the Persian Govern- 
ment grants concessions to foreigners, not to seek concessions adjoining, 
or in the neighbourhood of, the frontiers of the other. In order to prevent 
misunderstandings in future, and to avoid creating an order of things which 
might place the Persian Government in an embarrassing situation in any 
respect whatever, the above-mentioned regions are clearly defined in the 
arrangement. In mentioning the revenues which are affected to the loans 
concluded by the Persian Government with the Discount and Loan Bank 
and the Imperial Bank of Persia, the Russian and British Governments 
recognise that these revenues will be in future affected to the same pur- 
pose as in the past, and the two Governments equally engage, in the case of 
irregularities in the amortisation of or in the payment of interest on the 
above-mentioned loans, to enter on a friendly exchange of views in order to 
determine by common agreement the measures which, in conformity with 
the law of nations, it would be necessary to take in order to safeguard the 
interests of the creditors and to avoid all interference which would not be 
in conformity with the principles of that arrangement. 

In signing that arrangement the two States have not for a moment lost 
sight of the fundamental principle of absolute respect of the integrity and 
independence of Persia. The arrangement has no other object than that of 
avoiding any cause of misunderstanding between the contracting parties on 
the ground of Persian affairs. The Government of the Shah will convince 
itself that the agreement arrived at between Russia and Great Britain can 
but contribute in the most efficacious manner to the security of the pros- 
perity and the ultimate development of Persia." 



A POSTSCRIPT 333 

a concerted plan on the part of the Christian Powers of Europe 
to leave not a single Muhammadan nation % 

The Muhammadans, in Persia at least, were beginning to 
have a very real respect for Christianity and its teachings. 
They had begun to accept Western ethical codes, and to seek to 
imitate both our commerical systems and our political institu- 
tions. They knew the general trend of the Decalogue. But 
what answer can the Christian world make to Muhammadanism 
to-day, if a question is put as to the value of the Ten Command- 
ments, when the doctrine of " Thou shalt not steal " is inter- 
preted, as it has been in the cases of Morocco, Tripoli and 
Persia ? 

The writer has no illusions about altruism in international 
affairs. There is, of course, no excuse for self-deception. But 
one of the lessons to be learned from the overthrow of Persia 
is that the civilized world has far to travel before it may rise 
up and call itself blessed. The Persian people, fighting for a 
chance to live and govern themselves instead of remaining the 
serfs of wholly heartless and corrupt rulers, deserved better of 
fate than to be forced, as now, either to sink back into an even 
worse serfdom or to be hunted down and murdered as " revolu- 
tionary dregs." British and Russian statesmen may be proud 
of their work in Persia ; it is doubtful whether any one else is. 

Kipling has intimated that you cannot hustle the East. This 
includes a warning and a reflection. Western men and Western 
ideals can hustle the East, provided the Orientals realize that 
they are being carried along lines reasonably beneficial to them- 
selves. As a matter of fact, the moral appeal and the appeal 
of race-pride and patriotism, are as strong in the East as in 
the West, though it does not lie so near the surface ; and natu- 
rally the Oriental displays no great desire to be hustled when it 
is along lines beneficial only to the Westerner. 

Persia's sole chance for self-redemption lay with the reform 



334 THE STRANGLING OF PEESIA 

of her broken finances. It might have been possible in the past 
to create a strong central government, without sound financial 
operations — indeed, several of the old Shahs succeeded in 
maintaining a strong control throughout the Empire — but in 
recent years the time had gone by when Persia could be put 
in order except through an efficient handling of her taxation 
and other financial problems. The Persians themselves real- 
ized this, and with the exception of the corrupt grandees and 
dishonest public servants, all desired that we should succeed. 
Russia became aware of this feeling, and unwittingly paid us 
the compliment of fearing that we would succeed in our taslc. 
That she never intended to allow; the rest of the controversy 
was detail. 



APPENDIX 



76 



(I) THE FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF DECEMBER 30, 1906. 

The Fundamental Lato of Persia, promulgated in the reign of the late 
AIuzaffaru'd-Din Shah, and ratified by him on Dhu'l-Quada Uf, A.H. 
132J, (— December SO, 1906). 

In the Name of God the Merciful, the Forgiving. 

Whereas in accordance with the Imperial Farman dated the fourteenth 
of Jumada the Second, A.H. 1324 (= August 5, 1906), a command was 
issued for the establishment of a National Council, to promote the progress 
and happiness of our Kingdom and people, strengthen the foundations of 
our Government, and give effect to the enactments of the Sacred Law of 
His Holiness the Prophet, 

And Whereas, by virtue of the fundamental principle [therein laid 
down], we have conferred on each individual of the people of our realm, 
for the amending and superintending of the affairs of the commonwealth, 
according to their degrees, the right to participate in choosing and appoint- 
ing the Members of this Assembly by popular election, 

Therefore the National Consultative Assembly is now opened, in accord- 
ance with our Sacred Command; and we do define as follows the principles 
and articles of the Fundamental Law regulating the aforesaid National 
Council, which Law comprises the duties and functions of the above-men- 
tioned Assembly, its limitations, and its relations with the various depart- 
ments of the State. 

On the Constitution of the Assembly. 

Article 1. The National Consultative Assembly is founded and estab- 
lished in conformity with the Farman, founded on justice, dated the four- 
teenth of the Second Jumada, A.H. 1324 (= Aug. 5, 1906). 

Art. 2. The National Consultative Assembly represents the whole of 
the people of Persia, who [thus] participate in the economic and political 
affairs of the country. 

Art. 3. The National Consultative Assembly shall consist of the Mem- 
bers elected in Teheran and the provinces, and shall be held in Teheran. 

Art. 4. The number of elected Members has been fixed, in accordance 

i Translation made by Professor E. G. Browne, of Cambridge Universitv, 
England. See "The Persian Revolution, 1905-1909." 

337 



338 APPENDIX— A 

with the Electoral Law separately promulgated, at one hundred and sixty- 
two, but in ease of necessity the number above mentioned may be increased 
to two hundred. 

Art. 5. The Members shall be elected for two whole years. This period 
shall begin on the day when all the representatives from the provinces 
shall have arrived in Teheran. On the conclusion of this period of two 
years, fresh representatives shall be elected, but the people shall have the 
option of reelecting any of their former representatives whom they wish 
and with whom they are satisfied. 

Art. 6. The Members elected to represent Teheran shall, so soon as 
they meet, have the right to constitute the Assembly, and to begin their 
discussions and deliberations. During the period preceding the arrival 
of the provincial delegates, their decisions shall depend for their validity 
and due execution on the majority [by which they are carried]. 

Art. 7. On the opening of the debates, at least two-thirds of the Mem- 
bers of the Assembly shall be present, and, when the vote is taken, at 
least three-quarters. A majority shall be obtained only when more than 
half of those present in the Assembly record their votes. 

Art. 8. The periods of session and recess of the National Consultative 
Assembly shall be determined by the Assembly itself, in accordance with 
such internal regulations as itself shall formulate. After the summer 
recess, the Assembly must continue open and in session from the fourteenth 
day of the Balance (October 7), which corresponds with the festival of 
the opening of the First Assembly. 

Art. 9. The National Consultative Assembly can sit on occasions of 
extraordinary public holidays. 

Art. 10. On the opening of the Assembly, an Address shall be presented 
by it to His Imperial Majesty, and it shall afterwards have the honor of 
receiving an answer from that Royal and August quarter. 

Art. 11. Members of the Assembly, on taking their seats, shall take 
and subscribe to the following form of oath: 

[Form of the Oath) 

" We the undersigned take God to witness, and swear on the Qur'an, 
that, so long as the rights of the Assembly and its Members are observed 
and respected, in conformity with these Regulations, we will, so far as 
possible, discharge, with the utmost truth, uprightness, diligence and en- 
deavor, the duties confided to us; that we will act loyally and truthfully 
towards our just and honored Sovereign, commit no treason in respect of 
either the foundations of the Throne or the Rights of the People, and will 
consider only the advantage and well-being of Persia." 

Art. 12. No one, on any pretext or excuse, shall have any right, with- 
out the knowledge and approval of the National Consultative Assembly, 



APPENDIX— A 339 

to molest its Members. Even in case of a Member committing some 
crime or misdemeanor, and being arrested flagrante delicto, any punishment 
inflicted upon him must be with the cognizance of the Assembly. 

Art. 13. The deliberations of the National Consultative Assembly, in 
order that effect may be given to their results, must be public. Accord- 
ing to the Internal Regulations of the Assembly, journalists and spectators 
have the right to be present and listen, but not to speak. Newspapers may 
print and publish all the debates of the Assembly, provided they do not 
change or pervert their meaning, so that the public may be informed of 
the subjects of discussion and the detail of what takes place. Every one, 
subject to his paying due regard to the public good, may discuss them 
in the public Press, so that no matter may be veiled or hidden from any 
person. Therefore all newspapers, provided that their contents be not in- 
jurious to any one of the fundamental principles of the Government or 
the Nation, are authorized and allowed to print and publish all matters 
advantageous to the public interest, such as the debates of the Assembly, 
and the opinions of the people on these debates. But if any one, actuated 
by interested motives, shall print in the newspapers or in other publica- 
tions anything contrary to what has been mentioned, or inspired by slander 
or calumny, he will render himself liable to cross-examination, judgment 
and punishment, according to law. 

Art. 14. The National Consultative Assembly shall organize and ar- 
range, in accordance with separate and distinct Regulations called " the 
Internal Code of Rules," its own affairs, such as the election of a President, 
Vice-presidents, Secretaries, and other officers, the arrangements of the 
debates and divisions, etc. 

On the Duties of the Assembly and its Limitations and Bights. 

Art. 15. The National Consultative Assembly has the right in all 
questions to propose any measure which it regards as conducive to the 
well-being of the Government and the People, after due discussion and 
deliberation thereof in all sincerity and truth; and, having due regard to 
the majority of votes, to submit such measure, in complete confidence and 
security, after it has received the approval of the Senate, by means of the 
First Minister of the State, so that it may receive the Royal Approval and 
be duly carried out. 

Art. 16. All laws necessary to strengthen the foundations of the State 
and Throne and to set in order the affairs of the Realm and the estab- 
lishment of the Ministries, must be submitted for approval to the National 
Consultative Assembly. 

Art. 17. The National Consultative Assembly shall, when occasion 
arises, bring forward such measures as shall be necessary for the creation, 
modification, completion or abrogation of any Law, and, subject to the 



340 APPENDIX— A 

approval of the Senate, shall submit it for the Royal Sanction, so that due 
effect may thereafter be given to it. 

Art. 18. The regulation of all financial matters, the construction and 
regulation of the Budget, all changes in fiscal arrangements, the acceptance 
or rejection of all incidental and subordinate expenditure, as also the new 
Inspectorships [of Finance] which will be founded by the Government, 
shall be subject to the approval of the Assembly. 

Art. 19. The Assembly has the right, after the Senate has given its 
approval, to demand from the Ministers of State that effect shall be given 
to the measures thus approved for the reform of the finances and the 
facilitation of cooperation between the different departments of the Govern- 
ment by division of the departments and provinces of Persia and their 
governments. 

Art. 20. The Budget of each Ministry shall be concluded during the 
latter half of each year for the following year, and shall be ready fifteen 
days before the Festival of the Nawruz.i 

Art. 21. Should it at any time be necessary to introduce, modify or 
abrogate any Fundamental Law regulating the [functions of the] Min- 
istries, such change shall be made only with the approval of the Assembly, 
irrespective of whether the necessity for such action has been declared by 
the Assembly or enunciated by the responsible Ministers. 

Art. 22. Any proposal to transfer or sell any portion of the [National] 
resources, or of the control exercised by the Government or the Throne, or 
to effect any change in the boundaries and frontiers of the Kingdom, shall 
be subject to the approval of the National Consultative Assembly. 

Art. 23. Without the approval of the National Council, no concession 
for the formation of any public Company of any sort shall, under any plea 
soever, be granted by the State. 

Art. 24. The conclusion of treaties and covenants, the granting of com- 
mercial, industrial, agricultural and other concessions, irrespective of 
whether they be to Persian or foreign subjects, shall be subject to the 
approval of the National Consultative Assembly, with the exception of 
treaties which, for reasons of State and the public advantage, must be kept 
secret. 

Art. 25. State loans, under whatever title, whether internal or external, 
must be contracted only with the cognizance and approval of the National 
Consultative Assembly. 

Art. 26. The construction of railroads or chaussees, at the expense of 
the Government, or of any Company, whether Persian or foreign, depends 
on the approval of the National Consultative Assembly. 

Art. 27. Wherever the Assembly observes any defect in the laws, or any 

iThe Ka/wruz, or Persian New Year's Day, falls about March 21 in each 
year. 



APPENDIX— A 341 

neglect in giving effect to them, it shall notify the same to the Minister 
responsible for that department, who shall furnish all necessary explana- 
tions. 

Art. 28. Should any Minister, acting under misapprehension, issue on 
the Royal Authority, whether in writing or by word of mouth, orders con- 
flicting with one of the laws which have been enacted and have received 
the Royal Sanction, he shall admit his negligence and lack of attention, and 
shall, according to the Law, be personally responsible to His Imperial and 
Most Sacred Majesty. 

Art. 29. Should a Minister fail to give a satisfactory account of any 
affair conformably to the laws which have received the Royal Sanction, 
and should it appear in his case that a violation of such law has been 
committed, or that he has transgressed the limits imposed [on him], the 
Assembly shall demand his dismissal from the Royal Presence, and should 
his treason be clearly established in the Court of Cassation, he shall not 
again be employed in the service of the State. 

Art. 30. The Assembly shall, at any time when it considers it necessary, 
have the right to make direct representations to the Royal Presence by 
means of a Committee consisting of the President and six of its Members 
chosen by the Six Classes. This Committee must ask permission, and the 
appointment of a time for approaching the Royal Presence through the 
Master of the Ceremonies (Wazvr-i-Darbar) . 

Art. 31. Ministers have the right to be present at the Sessions of the 
.National Consultative Assembly, to sit in the places appointed for them, 
and to listen to the debates of the Assembly. If they consider it neces- 
sary, they may ask the President of the Assembly for permission to 
speak, and may give such explanations as may be necessary for purposes 
of discussion and investigation. 

On the representation of affairs to the National Consultative Assembly. 

Art. . 32. Any individual may submit in writing to the Petition Depart- 
ment of the Archives of the Assembly a statement of his own case, or of 
any criticisms or complaints. If the matter concerns the Assembly itself, 
it will give him a satisfactory answer; but if it concerns one of the 
Ministries, it will refer it to that Ministry, which will inquire into the 
matter and return a sufficient answer. 

Art. 33. New laws which are needed shall be drafted and revised in 
the Ministries which are respectively responsible, and shall then be laid 
before the Assembly by the responsible Ministers, or by the Prime Min- 
ister. After being approved by the Assembly, and ratified by the Royal 
Signature, they shall be duly put into force. 

Art, 34. The President of the Assembly can, in case of necessity, either 
personally, or on the demand of ten Members of the Assembly, hold a 



342 APPENDIX— A 

private conference, consisting of a selected number of Members of the 
Assembly, with any Minister, from which private meeting newspaper 
correspondents and spectators shall be excluded, and at which other Mem- 
bers of the Assembly shall not have the right to be present. The result 
of the deliberations of such secret conference shall, however, only be 
confirmed when it has been deliberated in the said conference in presence 
of three quarters of those selected [to serve on it], and carried by a 
majority of votes. Should the proposition [in question] not be accepted 
in the private conference, it shall not be brought forward in the Assembly, 
but shall be passed over in silence. 

Art. 35. If such private conference shall have been held at the demand 
of the President of the Assembly, he has the right to inform the public 
of so much of the deliberations as he shall deem expedient; but if the 
private conference has been held at the demand of a Minister, the dis- 
closure of the deliberations depends on the permission of that Minister. 

Art. 36. Any Minister can withdraw any matter which he has pro- 
posed to the Assembly at any point in the discussion, unless his statement 
has been made at the instance of the Assembly, in which case the with- 
drawal of the matter depends on the consent of the Assembly. 

Art. 37. If a measure introduced by any Minister is not accepted by 
the Assembly, it shall be returned supplemented by the observations of 
the Assembly; and the responsible Minister, after rejecting or accepting the 
criticisms of the Assembly, can propose the aforesaid measure a second 
time to the Assembly. 

Art. 38. The Members of the National Consultative Assembly must 
clearly and plainly signify their rejection or acceptance of measures, and 
no one has the right to persuade or threaten them in recording their 
votes. The signification by the Members of the Assembly of such rejec- 
tion or acceptance must be effected in such manner that newspaper corre- 
spondents and spectators also may perceive it, that is to say their 
intention must be signified by some outward sign such as [the employment 
of] blue and white voting-papers, or the like. 

The proposal of measures on the part of the Assembly. 

Art. 39. Whenever any measure is proposed on the part of one of the 
Members of the Assembly, it can only be discussed when at least fifteen 
Members of the Assembly shall approve the discussion of that measure. 
In such case the proposal in question shall be forwarded in writing to the 
President of the Assembly, who has the right to arrange that it shall be 
subjected to a preliminary investigation in a Committee of Inquiry. 

Art. 40. On the occasion of the discussion and investigation of such 
measure as is mentioned in Article 39, whether in the Assembly or in the 
Committee of Inquiry, notice shall be given by the Assembly to the re- 



APPENDIX— A 343 

sponsible Minister, if any, concerned in the measure, that if possible he 
himself, or, if not, his Assistant Minister, shall be present in the Assembly, 
so that the debate may take place in the presence of one or other of 
them. 

The draft of the [proposed] measure, with its additions, must be sent 
from ten days to a month before the time (with the exception of matters 
added at the last moment) to the responsible Minister; and so likewise the 
day of its discussion must be determined beforehand. After the measure 
has been discussed in the presence of the responsible Minister, and in case 
it should, by a majority of votes, receive the approval of the Assembly, it 
shall be officially transmitted in writing to the responsible Minister, so 
that he may take the necessary steps [to put it in force]. 

Art. 41. If the responsible Minister cannot, for any reason, agree with 
the Assembly about a measure proposed by it, he must offer his excuses 
to it and give it satisfaction. 

Art. 42. Should the National Consultative Assembly demand explana- 
tions on any matter from the responsible Minister, the Minister in question 
must give an answer, which answer must not be postponed unnecessarily 
or without plausible reason, save in the case of secret measures, the secrecy 
of which for some definite period is to the advantage of the State and the 
People. In such cases, on the lapse of the definite period the responsible 
Minister is bound to disclose this measure in the Assembly. 

On the Conditions regulating the formation of the Senate. 

Art. 43. There shall be constituted another Assembly, entitled the 
Senate, consisting of sixty Members, the sessions of which, after its con- 
stitution, shall be complementary to the sessions of the National Con- 
sultative Assembly. 

Art. 44. The ^Regulations of the Senate must be approved by the Na- 
tional Consultative Assembly. 

Art. 45. The Members of this Assembly shall be chosen from amongst 
the well-informed, discerning, pious and respected persons of the Kealm. 
Thirty of them shall be nominated on the part of His Imperial Majesty 
(fifteen of the people of Teheran, and fifteen of the people of the Prov- 
inces), and thirty by the Nation (fifteen elected by the people of Teheran, 
and fifteen by the people of the Provinces). 

Art. 46. After the constitution of the Senate, all proposals must be 
approved by both Assemblies. If those proposals shall have been origi- 
nated in the Senate, or by the Cabinet of Ministers, they must first 
be amended and corrected in the Senate and accepted by a majority of 
votes, and must then be approved by the National Consultative Assembly. 
But proposals brought forward by the National Consultative Assembly 
must, on the contrary, go from this Assembly to the Senate, except m 



344 APPENDIX— A 

the case of financial matters, which belong exclusively to the National 
Consultative Assembly. The decision of the Assembly, in respect to the 
above-mentioned proposals, shall be made known to the Senate, so that 
it in turn may communicate its observations to the National Assembly, 
but the latter, after due discussion, is free to accept or reject these 
observations of the Senate. 

Art. 47. So long as the Senate has not been convoked, proposals shall, 
after being approved by the National Consultative Assembly, receive the 
Royal assent, and shall then have the force of Law. 

Art. 48. If any proposal, after undergoing criticism and revision in 
the Senate, be referred by a Minister to the National Consultative Assem- 
bly, and be not accepted, such disputed proposal shall, in case of its 
being of importance, be reconsidered by a third Assembly composed of 
Members of the Senate and Members of the National Consultative Assem- 
bly elected in equal moieties by Members of the two Assemblies. The 
decision of this [third] Assembly shall be read out in the National 
Council. If it be then accepted, well and good. If not, a full account 
of the matter shall be submitted to the Royal Presence, and should the 
Eoyal judgment support the view of the National Consultative Assem- 
bly, it shall become effective; but if not, orders will be issued for a 
fresh discussion and investigation. If again no agreement of opinion 
results, and the Senate, by a majority of two-thirds, approves the dis- 
solution of the National Consultative Assembly, this approval being sepa- 
rately affirmed by the Cabinet of Ministers, then the Imperial Command 
will be issued for the dissolution of the National Consultative Assembly, 
and at the same time orders shall be given for the holding of fresh 
elections, the people, however, having the right to reelect their former 
representatives. 

Art. 49. The new representatives of Teheran must present themselves 
within the space of one month, and the representatives of the provinces 
Avithin the space of three months. When the representatives of the 
Capital are present, the Assembly shall be opened, and shall begin its 
labors, but they shall not discuss disputed proposals until the provincial 
representatives shall arrive. If, after the arrival of all its Members, the 
new Assembly shall by a clear majority confirm the first decision, His 
Most Sacred and Imperial Majesty shall approve that decision of the 
National Consultative Assembly, and shall order it to be carried into 
effect. 

Art. 50. In each electoral period, which consists of two years, orders 
for the renewal of representatives shall not be given more than once. 

Art. 51. It is agreed that the kings of our successors and posterity 
phall regard as a duty of their sovereign state and an obligation incum- 
bent upon them the maintenance of these laws and principles, Tfvhich we 



APPENDIX— A 345 

have established and put into force for the strengthening of the edifice 
of the State, the consolidation of the foundations of the Throne, the 
superintendence of the machinery of Justice, and the tranquillity of the 
Nation. 

Dhu'1-Qada 14, A.H. 1324 
( = December 30, 1906). 
These Fimdamental Laws of the National Consultative Assembly and the 
Senate, containing fifty-one Articles, are correct. 

" DhuT-Qada 14, A.H. 1324 " 
(= December 30, 1906). 

[Underneath the concluding words is the signature of the late Shah, 
Muzaffaru'd-Din, and on the back of the page are the seals of the then 
Crown Prince or Wali-ahd (the deposed Shah, Muhammad Ali) and of 
the late Mushiru'd-Dawla.] 

(II) THE SUPPLEMENTARY FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF OCTOBER 

7, 1907. 

The original Fundamental Law, containing Fifty-one Articles, was promul- 
gated on Dhu'l-Qada 14, A.H. 1324 (= December 30, 1906) by the late 
Muzaffaru' d-Dim, Shah. The following supplementary laws were rati- 
fied by his successor, the now deposed Shah, Muhammad Ali, on 
Shaban 29, A.H. 1325 (= October 7, 1901). 

In the Name of God the Merciful, the Forgiving. 
The Articles added to complete the Fundamental Laws of the Persian 
Constitution ratified by the late Shahinshah of blessed memory, Muzaf- 
faru'd-Din Shah Qajar (may God illuminate his resting-place!) are as 
follows : 

General Dispositions. 

Article I. The official religion of Persia is Islam, according to the 
orthodox Jafari doctrine of the Ithna Ashariyya (Church of the Twelve 
Imams), which f aith i the Shah of Persia must profess and promote. 

Art. 2. At no time must any legal enactment of the Sacred National 
Consultative Assembly, established by the favor and assistance of His 
Holiness the Imam of the Age ( may God hasten his glad Advent ! ) ,2 the 

i The Shitite form of Islam includes the " Church of the Twelve " 
(Ithna ashariyya) and the "Church of the Seven" (Sabiyya). Both 
agree as to the sequence of their Imams down to the sixth, Jafar as-Sadiq 
(from whom the epithet "Jafari" is derived), but diverge from this 
point. Both are regarded as heterodox by the Sunnis, but the " Church 
of the Twelve " is orthodox in. Persia. 

2 I.e., the Twelfth Imam, ©r Imam-Mahdi, who is believed to have 
disappeared in the year A.H., 260 (=A. D, 873-4) and who is expected 
to return at the end of time^ f to fill the e?i.rth with justice after it has 
been filled with iniquity." 



346 APPENDIX— A 

favor of His Majesty the Shahinshah of Islam (may God immortalize 
his reign ! ) , the care of the Proofs of Islam i ( may God multiply the 
like of them ! ) , and the whole people of the Persian nation, be at variance 
with the sacred principles of Islam or the laws established by His Holi- 
ness the Best of Mankind 2 ( on whom and on whose household be the 
Blessings of God and His Peace ! ) . 

It is hereby declared that it is for the learned doctors of theology 
(the ulama) — may God prolong the blessing of their existence! — to de- 
termine whether such laws as may be proposed are or are not conformable 
to the principles of Islam; and it is therefore officially enacted that 
there shall at all times exist a Committee composed of not less than five 
mujtahids or other devout theologians, cognizant also of the require- 
ments of the age, [which committee shall be elected] in this manner. 
The ulama and Proofs of Islam shall present to the National Consul- 
tative Assembly the names of twenty of the ulama possessing the attri- 
butes mentioned above; and the Members of the National Consultative 
Assembly shall, either by unanimous acclamation, or by vote, designate 
five or more of these, according to the exigencies of the time, and recog- 
nize these as Members, so that they may carefully discuss and consider 
all matters proposed in the Assembly, and reject and repudiate, wholly 
or in part, any such proposal which is at variance with the Sacred Laws 
of Islam, so that it shall not obtain the title of legality. In such mat- 
ters the decision of this Ecclesiastical Committee shall be followed and 
obeyed, and this article shall continue unchanged until the appearance 
of His Holiness the Proof of the Age (may God hasten his glad Advent! ).s 

Art. 3. The frontiers, provinces, departments and districts of the 
Persian Empire cannot be altered save in accordance with the Law. 

Art. 4. The capital of Persia is Teheran. 

Art. 5. The official colors of the Persian flag are green, white and 
red, with the emblem of the Lion and the Sun. 

Art. 6. The lives and property of foreign subjects residing on Persian 
soil are guaranteed and protected, save in such contingencies as the laws 
of the. land shall except. 

Art. 7. The principles of the Constitution cannot be suspended either 
wholly or in part. 

Eights of the Persian Nation. 
Art. 8. The people of the Persian Empire are to enjoy equal rights 
before the Law. 



i I.e., the ulama, or doctors of theology, especially the mujtahids. 

2 I.e., the Prophet Muhammad. 

3 I.e., until the Imam Mahdi shall return and establish the reign of 
perfect Justice. 



APPENDIX— A 347 

Art. 9. All individuals are protected and safeguarded in respect to 
their lives, property, homes, and honor, from every kind of interference, 
and none shall molest them save in such case and in such way as the 
laws of the land shall determine. 

Art. 10. No one can be summarily arrested, save flagrante delicto in 
the commission of some crime or misdemeanor, except on the written 
authority of the President of the Tribunal of Justice, given in con- 
formity with the Law. Even in such case the accused must immediately, 
or at latest in the course of the next twenty-four hours, be informed and 
notified of the nature of his offense. 

Art. 11. No one can be forcibly removed from the tribunal which is 
entitled to give judgment on his case to another tribunal. 

Art. 12. No punishment can be decreed or executed save in conformity 
with the Law. 

Art. 13. Every person's house and dwelling is protected and safe- 
guarded, and no dwelling-place may be entered, save in such case and 
in such way as the Law has decreed. 

Art. 14. No Persian can be exiled from the country, or prevented from 
residing in any part thereof, or compelled to reside in any specified 
part thereof, save in such cases as the Law may explicitly determine. 

Art. 15. No property shall be removed from the control of its owner 
save by legal sanction, and then only after its fair value has been 
determined and paid. 

Art. 16. The confiscation of the property or possessions of any person 
under the title of punishment or retribution is forbidden, save in con- 
formity with the Law. 

Art. 17. To deprive owners or possessors of the properties or pos- 
sessions controlled by them on any pretext whatever is forbidden, save 
in conformity with the Law. 

Art. 18. The acquisition and study of all sciences, arts and crafts 
is free, save in the case of such as may be forbidden by the ecclesias- 
tical law. 

Art. 19. The foundation of schools at the expense of the Government 
and the Nation, and compulsory instruction, mvist be regulated by the 
Ministry of Sciences and Arts, and all schools and colleges must be 
under the supreme control and supervision of that Ministry. 

Art. 20. All publications, except heretical books and matters hurtful 
to the perspicuous religion [of Islam] are free, and are exempt from 
the censorship. If, however, anything should be discovered in them con- 
trary to the Press law, the publisher or writer is liable to punishment 
according to that law. If the writer be known, and be resident in Persia, 
then the publisher, printer and distributor shall not be liable to 
prosecution. 



348 APPENDIX— A 

Art. 21. Societies (anjumans) and associations (ijtimaat) which are 
not productive of mischief to Keligion or the State, and are not injurious 
to good order, are free throughout the whole Empire, but members of 
such associations must not carry arms, and must obey the regulations 
laid down by the Law on this matter. Assemblies in the public thor- 
oughfares and open spaces must likewise obey the police regulations. 

Art. 22. Correspondence passing through the post is safeguarded and 
exempt from seizure or examination, save in such exceptional cases as 
the Law lays down. 

Art. 23. It is forbidden to disclose or detain telegraphic correspond- 
ence without the express permission of the owner, save in such cases as 
the Law lays down. 

Art. 24. Foreign subjects may become naturalized as Persian sub- 
jects, but their acceptance or continuance as such, or their deprivation 
of this status, is in accordance with a separate law. 

Art. 25. No special authorization is required to proceed against gov- 
ernment officials in respect of shortcomings connected with the discharge 
of their public functions, save in the case of Ministers, in whose case 
the special laws on this subject must be observed. 

Powers of the Kealm. 

Art. 26. The powers of the realm are all derived from the people; and 
the Fundamental Law regulates the employment of those powers. 

Art. 27. The powers of the Eealm are divided into three categories: 

First, the legislative power, which is specially concerned with the mak- 
ing or amelioration of laws. This power is derived from His Imperial 
Majesty, the National Consultative Assembly, and the Senate, of which 
three sources each has the right to introduce laws, provided that the con- 
tinuance thereof be dependent on their not being at variance with the 
standards of the ecclesiastical law, and on their approval by the Members 
of the two Assemblies, and the Koyal ratification. The enacting and 
approval of laws connected with the revenue and expenditure of the 
kingdom are, however, specially assigned to the National Consultative 
Assembly. The explanation and interpretation of the laws are, moreover, 
amongst the special functions of the above-mentioned Assembly. 

Second, the judicial power, by which is meant the determining of 
rights. This power belongs exclusively to the ecclesiastical tribunals in 
matters connected with the ecclesiastical law, and to the civil tribunals 
in matters connected with ordinary law. 

Third, the executive power, which appertains to the King — that is to 
say, the laws and ordinances — is carried out by the Ministers and 
State officials in the august name of His Imperial Majesty in such man- 
ner as the Law defines. 



APPENDIX— A 349 

Art. 28. The three powers above mentioned shall ever remain distinct 
and separate from one another. 

Art. 29. The special interests of each province, department and dis- 
trict shall be arranged and regulated, in accordance with special laws 
on this subject, by provincial and departmental councils (anjumans). 

Rights of Membees of the Assembly. 

Art. 30. The deputies of the National Consultative Assembly and of 
the Senate represent the whole nation, and not only the particular 
classes, provinces, departments or districts which have elected them. 

Art. 31. One person cannot at one and the same time enjoy member- 
ship of both Assemblies. 

Art. 32. As soon as any deputy accepts any lucrative employment in 
the service of one of the departments of the Government, he ceases to 
be a member of the Assembly, and his reacceptance as a member of the 
Assembly depends on his resigning such government appointment, and 
being reelected by the people. 

Art. 33. Each of the two Assemblies has the right to investigate and 
examine every affair of state. 

Art. 34. The deliberations of the Senate are ineffective when the 
National Consultative Assembly is not in session. 

Rights of the Persian Thbone. 

Art. 35. The sovereignty is a trust confided (as a Divine gift) by the 
people to the person of the King. 

Art. 36. The constitutional Monarchy of Persia is vested in the per- 
son of His Imperial Majesty Sultan Muhammad Ali Shah Qajar (may 
God prolong his sovereignty ! ) and in his heirs, generation after 
generation. 

Art. 37. The succession to the Throne, in case of there being more 
than one son, passes to the eldest son of the King whose mother is a 
Princess and of Persian race. In case the King should have no male 
issue, the eldest male of the Royal Family who is next of kin shall rank 
next in succession to the Throne. If, however, in the case supposed 
above, male heirs should subsequently be born to the King, the succession 
will de jure revert to such heir. 

Art. 38. In case of the decease of the Sovereign, the Crown Prince 
can only undertake in person the functions of the Throne, provided that 
he has attained the age of eighteen years. If he has not reached this 
age, a Regent shall be chosen with the sanction and approval of the 
National Consultative Assembly and the Senate, until such time as the 
Crown Prince shall attain this age. 

Art. 3!). No King can ascend the Throne unless, before his corona- 



350 APPENDIX— A 

tion, he appears before the National Consultative Assembly, in pres- 
ence of the Members of this Assembly and of the Senate, and of the 
Cabinet of Ministers, and repeat the following oath: 

" I take to witness the Almighty and Most High God, on the glorious 
Word of God, and by all that is most honored in God's sight, and do 
hereby swear that I will exert all my efforts to preserve the independ- 
ence of Persia, safeguard and protect the frontiers of my Kingdom and 
the rights of my People, observe the Fundamental Laws of the Persian 
Constitution, rule in accordance with the established laws of Sover- 
eignty, endeavor to promote the Jafari doctrine of the Church of the 
Twelve Imams, and will in all my deeds and actions consider God Most 
Glorious as present and watching me. I further ask aid from God, from 
Whom alone aid is derived, and seek help from the holy spirits of the 
Saints of Islam to render service to the advancement of Persia." 

Art. 40. So in like manner no one who is chosen as Kegent can enter 
upon his functions unless and until he repeats the above oath. 

Art. 41. In the event of the King's decease, the National Consultative 
Assembly and the Senate must of necessity meet, and such meeting must 
not be postponed later than ten days after the date of the King's decease. 

Art. 42. If the mandate of the deputies of either or both of the As- 
semblies shall have expired during the period of the late King's life, 
and the new deputies shall not yet have been elected at the time of 
his decease, the deputies of the late Parliament shall reassemble, and the 
two Assemblies shall be reconstituted. 

Art. 43. The King cannot, without the consent and approval of the 
National Consultative Assembly and the Senate, undertake the govern- 
ment of any other kingdom. 

Art. 44. The person of the King is exempted from responsibility. The 
Ministers of State are responsible to both Chambers in all matters. 

Art. 45. The decrees and rescripts of the King relating to affairs of 
State can only be carried out when they are countersigned by the re- 
sponsible Minister, who is also responsible for the authenticity of such 
decree or rescript. 

Art. 46. The appointment and dismissal of Ministers is effected by 
virtue of the Royal Decree of the King. 

Art. 47. The granting of military rank, decorations and other hon- 
orary distinctions shall be effected with due regard to the special law 
referring to the person of the King. 

Art. 48. The choice of officials as heads of the various government 
departments, whether internal or foreign, subject to tbe approval of the 
responsible Minister, is the King's right, save in such cases as are spe- 
cifically excepted by the Law; but the appointment of other officials does 



APPENDIX— A 351 

not lie with the King, save in such cases as are explicitly provided for 
by the Law. 

Art. 49. The issue of decrees and orders for giving effect to the 
laws is the King's right, provided that under no circumstances shall he 
postpone or suspend the carrying out of such laws. 

Art. 50. The supreme command of all the forces, military and naval, 
is vested in the person of the King. 

Art. 51. The declaration of war and the conclusion of peace are 
vested in the King. 

Art. 52. The treaties which, conformably to article 24 of the Funda- 
mental Law promulgated on Dhu'l-Quada 14, A.H. 1324 (= December 
30, 1906), must remain secret, shall be communicated by the King, with 
the necessary explanations, to the National Consultative Assembly and 
the Senate after the disappearance of the reasons which necessitated such 
secrecy, as soon as the public interests and security shall require it. 

Art. 53. The secret clauses of a treaty cannot in any case annul the 
public clauses of the same. 

Art. 54. The King can convoke in extraordinary session the National 
Consultative Assembly and the Senate. 

Art. 55. The minting of coin, subject to conformity with the Law, is 
in the name of the King. 

Art. 56. The expenses and disbursements of the Court shall be deter- 
mined by law. 

Art. 57. The Eoyal prerogatives and powers are only those explicitly 
mentioned in the present Constitutional Law. 

Concerning the Ministers. 

Art. 58. No one. can attain the rank of Minister unless he be a Mussul- 
man by religion, a Persian by birth, and a Persian subject. 

Art. 59. Princes in the first degree — that is to say the sons, broth- 
ers and paternal uncles of the reigning King — cannot be chosen as 
Ministers. 

Art. 60. Ministers are responsible to the two Chambers, and must, 
in case of their presence being required by either Chamber, appear before 
it, and must observe the limitations of their responsibility in all such 
matters as are committed to their charge. 

Art. 61. Ministers, besides being individually responsible for the af- 
fairs specially appertaining to their own Ministry, are also collectively 
responsible to the two Chambers for one another's actions in affairs of a 
more general character. 

Art. 62. The number of Ministers shall be defined by law, according 
to the requirements of the time. 

Art. 63. The honorary title of Minister is entirely abolished. 



352 APPENDIX— A 

Art. 64. Ministers cannot divest themselves of their responsibility by 
pleading verbal or written orders from the King. 

Art. 65. The National Consultative Assembly, or the Senate, can call 
Ministers to account or bring them to trial. 

Art. 66. The Law shall determine the responsibility of Ministers and 
the punishments to which they are liable. 

Art. 67. If the National Consultative Assembly or the Senate shall, 
by an absolute majority, declare itself dissatisfied with the Cabinet or 
with one particular Minister, that Cabinet or Minister shall resign their 
or his ministerial functions. 

Art. 68. Ministers may not accept a salaried office other than their 
own. 

Art. 69. The National Consultative Assembly or the Senate shall 
declare the delinquencies of Ministers in the presence of the Court of 
Cassation, and the said Court, all the members of the tribunals com- 
prised in it being present, will pronounce judgment, save in cases when 
the accusation and prosecution refer to the Minister in his private ca- 
pacity, and are outside the scope of the functions of government entrusted 
to him in his ministerial capacity. 

(N.B. So long as the Court of Cassation is not established, a Com- 
mission chosen from the Members of the two Chambers in equal moieties 
shall discharge the function of that Court.) 

Art. 70. The determination of the delinquencies of Ministers, and of 
the punishments to which they are liable, . in case they incur the suspi- 
cion of the National Consultative Assembly or of the Senate, or expose 
themselves to personal accusations on the part of their opponents in the 
affairs of their department, will be regulated by a special law. 

Powers of the Tribunals of Justice. 

Art. 71. The Supreme Ministry of Justice and the judicial tribunals 
are the places officially destined for the redress of public grievances, 
while judgment in all matters falling within the scope of the Ec- 
clesiastical Law is vested in just mujtahids possessing the necessary 
qualifications. 

Art. 72. Disputes connected with political rights belong to the judicial 
tribunals, save in such cases as the Law shall except. 

Art. 73. The establishment of civil tribunals depends on the authority 
of the Law, and no one, on any title or pretext, may establish any tri- 
bunal contrary to its provisions. 

Art. 74. No tribunal can be constituted save by the authority of the 
Law. 

Art. 75. In the whole Kingdom there shall be only one Court of 
Cassation for civil cases, and that in the capital; and this Court shall 



APPENDIX— A 353 

not deal with any case of first instance, except in cases in which Min- 
isters are concerned. 

Art. 76. All proceedings of tribunals shall be public, save in cases 
where such publicity would be injurious to public order or contrary to 
public morality. In such cases, the tribunal must declare the necessity 
of sitting clausis foribus. 

Art. 77. In cases of political or press offenses, where it is desirable 
that the proceedings should be private, this must be agreed to by all 
the members of the tribunal. 

Art. 78. The decisions and sentences emanating from the tribunals 
must be reasoned and supported by proof, and must contain the articles 
of the Law in accordance with which judgment has been given, and they 
must be read publicly. 

Art. 79. In cases of political and press offenses, a jury must be pres- 
ent in the tribunals. 

Art. 80. The presidents and members of the judicial tribunals shall 
be chosen in such manner as the laws of justice determine, and shall be 
appointed by Royal Decree. 

Art. 81. No judge of a judicial tribunal can be temporarily or perma- 
nently transferred from his office unless he be brought to judgment and 
his offense be proved, save in the case of his voluntary resignation. 

Art. 82. The functions of a judge of a judicial tribunal cannot be 
changed save by his own consent. 

Art. 83. The appointment of the Public Prosecutor is within the com- 
petence of the King, supported by the approval of the ecclesiastical judge. 

Art. 84. The appointment of the members of the judicial tribunals 
shall be determined in accordance with the Law. 

Art. 85. The presidents of the judicial tribunals cannot accept sala- 
ried posts under government, unless they undertake such service without 
recompense, always provided that [in this case also] there be no contra- 
vention of the Law. 

Art. 86. In every provincial capital there shall be established a Court 
of Appeal for dealing with judicial matters in such wise as is explicitly 
set forth in the laws concerning the administration of justice. 

Art. 87. Military tribunals shall be established throughout the whole 
Kingdom according to special laws. 

Art. 88. Arbitration in cases of dispute as to the limitations of the 
function and duties of the different departments of government shall, 
agreeably to the provisions of the Law, be referred to the Court of 
Cassation. 

Art. 89. The Court of Cassation and other tribunals will only give 
effect to public, provincial, departmental and municipal orders and 
by-laws when these are in conformity with the Law. 



354 APPENDIX— A 

Provincial and Departmental Councils (Anjumans). 

Art. 90. Throughout the whole empire provincial and departmental 
councils {anjumans) shall be established in accordance with special regu- 
lations. The fundamental laws regulating such assemblies are -as follows : 

Art. 91. The members of the provincial and departmental councils 
shall be elected immediately by the people, according to the regulations 
governing provincial and departmental councils. 

Art. 92. The provincial and departmental councils are free to exercise 
complete supervision over all reforms connected with the public interest, 
always provided that they observe the limitations prescribed by the Law. 

Art. 93. An account of the expenditure and income of every kind of 
the provinces and departments shall be printed and published by the 
instrumentality of the provincial and departmental councils. 

Concerning the Finances. 

Art. 94. No tax shall be established save in accordance with the Law. 

Art. 95. The Law will specify the cases in which exemption from the 
payment of taxes can be claimed. 

Art. 96. The National Consultative Assembly shall each year by a 
majority of votes fix and approve the Budget. 

Art. 97. In the matter of taxes there shall be no distinction or dif- 
ference amongst the individuals who compose the nation. 

Art. 98. Reduction of or exemption from taxes is regulated by a spe- 
cial law. 

Art. 99. Save in such cases as are explicitly excepted by Law, noth- 
ing can on any pretext be demanded from the people save under the 
categories of state, provincial, departmental and municipal taxes. 

Art. 100. No order for the payment of any allowance or gratuity can 
be made on the Treasury save in accordance with the Law. 

Art. 101. The National Consultative Assembly shall appoint the mem- 
bers of the Financial Commission for such period as may be determined 
by the Law. 

Art. 102. The Financial Commission is appointed to inspect and ana- 
lyze the accounts of the Department of Finance and to liquidate the 
accounts of all debtors and creditors of the Treasury. It is especially 
deputed to see that no item of expenditure fixed in the Budget exceeds 
the amount specified, or is changed or altered, and that each item is 
expended in the proper manner. It shall likewise inspect and analyze 
the different accounts of all the departments of State, collect the docu- 
mentary proofs of the expenditure indicated in such accounts, and submit 
to the National Consultative Assembly a complete statement of the 
accounts of the Kingdom, accompanied by its own observations. 



APPENDIX— 13 355 

Art. 103. The institution unci organization of this commission shall 
be in accordance with the Law. 

The Aemy. 

Art. 104. The Law determines the manner of recruiting the troops, 
and the duties and rights of the military, as well as their promotion, arc 
regulated by the Law. 

Art. 105. The military expenditure shall be approved every year by 
the National Consultative Assembly. 

Art. 106. No foreign troops may be employed in the service of the 
State, nor may they remain in or pass through any part of the King- 
dom save in accordance with the Law. 

Art. 107. The military cannot be deprived of their rights, ranks or 
functions save in accordance with the Law. 

(Copy of the august Imperial Rescript.) 
" In the Name of God, blessed and exalted is He. 

" The complementary provisions of the Fundamental Code of Laws have 
been perused and are correct. Please God, our Royal Person will observe 
and regard all of them. Our sons and successors also will, please God, 
confirm these sacred laws and principles. 

" 29 Shaban, A.H. 1325, in the Year of the Sheep (= October 7, 

1907), 

" In the Royal Palace of Teheran." 



B. 1 

(Translations.) 

(1) Law passed by the Medjlis on May 30, 1911, for the control by 
the Treasurer-general of the money derived from the Imperial Bank Loan 
of 1911. 

(2) Law of June 13, 1911, passed by the Medjlis "to organize the 
financial system of the Persian Empire." 

A LAW RELATING TO THE CONTROL OF THE LOAN. 
Dated 30 May, 1911. 1st Jemadi ul sani, 1329. 

With Regard to the project for the control of the amount of the loan, 

1 These laws were originally prepared in French, from which an ac- 
curate translation was made into Persian, the official language of tha 
Medjlis. 



356 APPENDIX— B 

the Parliament voted and passed by a majority on Wednesday, the 1st 
Jemadi us sani, the following articles: 

Article I. The High and efficient control of the transactions concern- 
ing the £1,250,000 loan which, in accordance with the terms of the Law 
of 5th Rabi us sani, 1329 (5th April), was done with the Imperial Bank 
of Persia and the control of the expenditure which in agreement with 
Arts. 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the law of 19 Jemadi-ul-avval (18th May) has 
been specified therewith, is entrusted to the Ministry of Finance under 
the supervision of the Treasurer-general. 

Art. II. Until the new Institutions at the Ministry of Finance are 
created, the control of the transactions and expenses aforesaid shall be 
temporarily delegated to a section to be specially formed, such action 
being under the control of the Treasurer-general. 

Art. III. At the end of each month, the Ministry of Finance will pre- 
pare a statement on the financial affairs concerning the Loan, which, with 
a covering report, he will submit to the Parliament. 

Art. IV. The section referred to in clause 2 of this project shall take 
the place of and substitute the Commission mentioned in the law of 
Jemadirul-avval, 1329. 

REPORT OF THE PARLIAMENTARY FINANCE REGULATIONS 

COMMISSION. 

Dated 14 Jemadi II, 1329 — 12th June, 1911. 

On Saturday the 10th June, Sunday the 11th, and Monday the 12th, 
the Finance Regulations Commission sat, and duly discussed the proj- 
ect of Law regarding the establishment of financial organization of the 
Empire of Persia which had been submitted to it. At Sunday's seance, 
their Excellencies the Ministers of Finance and of Justice, and the 
Assistant Minister of Finance, were present; at the sitting on Monday, 
the Assistant Minister of Finance and Mr. Shuster, the Treasurer- 
general, attended; and the aforesaid project of Law was amended and is 
hereby submitted to the National Assembly, as follows: 

( 1 ) The Treasurer-general of the Empire of Persia is charged with the 
direct and effective control of all financial and fiscal operations of the 
Persian Government, including the collection of all receipts of every 
description and the control and accounts of all Government expenditures. 

(2) The Treasurer-general shall establish the following organizations 
in the Ministry of Finance: 

(a) Chief Office for the collection of the maliat, taxes and Government 
revenues of every description — whether such maliat and taxes as actu- 
ally exist, or shall hereafter be established. 



APPENDIX— B 357 

(b) Chief Office for the inspection and control of all receipts and 
approved expenditures and the keeping of accounts in connection there- 
with. 

(c) Chief Office for fiscal operations. All transactions of the Govern- 
ment with the Bank and operations respecting the minting of bullion, and 
questions of exchange, loans, interest, amortization, conversion, conces- 
sions and financial agreements, whether any such Agreement yield a 
revenue to the Government or whether it imply a financial obligation of 
the Government, shall, the provisions of the laws established being duly 
observed, be effected by this office. 

(3) In each of the three offices referred to in Article 2, the Treasurer- 
general shall establish such sections and subsections as he may deem 
necessary. 

(4) Whenever the central organization shall have been effected, the 
Treasurer-general shall, whenever expedient, establish the services he 
may consider essential for the organization of each of the different 
Provinces. 

(5) The Treasurer-general shall be charged with the custody of the 
Treasury of the Empire, and no Government expenditure shall, without 
his signature — in the case of direct mandates, — or without his authoriza- 
tion — in the case of credit orders, — be made. 

(6) The Treasurer-general shall prepare such regulations as he thinks 
fit for the proper execution of the reforms referred to in the preceding 
Articles, which regulations shall, after being viseed by the Minister of 
Finance and published, have the form of law. 

(7) A credit of Tumans Sixty thousand (Ts. 60,000) shall be granted 
to the Treasurer-general for the purpose of establishing a special Corps 
d' Inspection. In the event of new employees under contract for the 
establishment of such Corps dTnspection being required, the contracts 
shall, as customary, be submitted to Parliament for approval. 

(8) The preparation of the Budget of the Empire which is to be sub- 
mitted to Parliament on behalf of the Government is one of the functions 
of the Treasurer-general, and all the Ministers and Government employees 
are bound to furnish and submit without delay such information as the 
Treasurer-general may require. 

(9) The Treasurer-general shall make any such economies in the Gov- 
ernment expenditure and transactions as are proper and expedient — this 
being one of his specific functions. 

(10) The Treasurer-General shall prepare and submit to the Govern- 
ment every quarter a report on the situation of the finances of the 
Empire. 

(11) The Treasurer-general shall make the necessary investigations as 
to reforms in existing financial laws and the creation of new sources of 



358 APPENDIX— C 

revenue which shall be at the same time expedient, profitable and fa- 
vorable to the Empire, so that such may be submitted by the Government 
to Parliament. 

( 12 ) The Treasurer-general shall have authority over the personnel 
of the services which, by virtue of the above articles, shall be estab- 
lished under his control. 

( s ) Muazziz-ul-Mulk 

(Hon. Sec. to the Commission.) 

The above Project of Law was passed by a majority of sixty-one votes 
in Parliamentary session on the 13th of June, 1911. 



c. 

MR. SHUSTER'S OPEN LETTER TO THE LONDON "TIMES." 

Teheban, October 21, 1911. 
To the Editor of the Times. 

Sir: — According to a Reuter's despatch, dated London, October 18, the 
Times states editorially that my recently expressed opinions of Russia's 
hostility to Persia's financial regeneration and of Britain's acquiescence in 
Russia's attitude are unjust and unfounded. 

Much as I dislike this class of controversy, still, the importance of the 
subject, my belief in the fair-mindedness of the British public and in 
the desire of your journal to be entirely just, and a slight regard for 
my own reputation, lead me to address you this letter, with the request 
that you give it due publicity in your columns. It is but a relation of 
certain facts and incidents which have either come under my personal 
observation or are of official record during the past five months of my 
stay in Teheran. My opinion was reached after a calm and impartial 
consideration of those facts, in addition to the corroborative impressions 
received in a great number of transactions in which I personally partici- 
pated but which are not susceptible of legal proof. I am, of course, 
willing to abide by the judgment of the thinking public for whatever 
justification may seem necessary. 

I arrived here on May 12, last, with three American assistants and 
with but one object in view — to do a fairly creditable piece of con- 
structive work in behalf of Persia's finances. 

On June 13 the Med j lis passed a law, drafted by me, conferring on 
the Treasurer-general plenary powers in matters fiscal. The law was a 
public one, voted after full and open discussion, and was manifestly 
designed to bring some order out of the pitiable state of chaos into 



APPENDIX— C 359 

which Persia's finances had fallen. The Persian Cabinet and Medjlis had 
almost unanimously approved it. One might expect that the foreign 
powers in interest here would gladly have done likewise. Unfortunately 
they did not. Direct legal proof, of course, being lacking, I neverthe- 
less assert that there is ample documentary evidence of a circumstantial 
nature to show that there was a deliberate agreement between a number 
of foreign legations here, headed by the Russian Legation, to defeat 
my execution of that law, and to thwart the general system of centrali- 
zation of collections, payments and accounting prescribed thereunder. 
The pretexts urged against the system were flimsy and untenable in the 
extreme and their manifest purpose was to prevent any material change 
in the old style of conducting Persia's fiscal affairs. This campaign of 
threats, nagging and general opposition, which even descended into vul- 
gar personalities against me, and into crude attempts to frighten the 
Persian Government, failed utterly, though it did entail a period of delay 
and confusion in initiating certain financial reforms. Among the threats 
made was that of one legation to seize the Northern Customs and put in 
their own officials to collect the revenues. 

Last July, in defiance of Article II of the Protocol of September 7, 
1909, Russia and Britain, and particularly the former, permitted Muham- 
mad Ali, ex-Shah, to escape from Russia; that is, Russia failed utterly 
" to take efficacious measures " to prevent political agitation against 
Persia on his part. In fact, he passed through Russia with a suite, a 
false beard and a consignment of guns and cannon marked " mineral 
water," if we may believe the ante-mortem statement of his late lieuten- 
ant, Arshadu'd-Dawla. He embarked with his party from a Russian port 
on the Russian steamer Christoforos and landed, about July 18, at 
Gumesh-Teppeh on Persian soil — a filibusterer in full swing. 

Assuming that this escape was accidental and that the Russian pass- 
port authorities were off their guard for once, was Russia's attitude one 
of real regret? On the contrary, it is notorious here that her official 
representatives in Persia received the news of the landing with uncon- 
cealed joy. Later, I shall prove that they did not even scruple to show 
that feeling in official communications addressed to Persian Government 
officers. 

On July 23 the Persian Government addressed a note to all the lega- 
tions here, informing them of a law which had just been passed declar- 
ing a state of siege. Most of the legations replied in the usual manner, 
merely calling attention to certain provisions in the Treaty of Turkman- 
chay, but the Russian Legation adopted from the very outset a far dif- 
ferent and most unfriendly tone, claiming among other things the right 
to arrest directly the so-called " illegal Russian subjects " (who were 
defined in the Legation's note), "who might take part in the events actu- 



360 APPENDIX— C 

ally going on in the country." The patent object of this claim put 
forward at this time was to give the Russian Legation and Consuls 
throughout Persia the excuse to arrest, on the mere allegation that they 
were a kind of Russian subject, any Persian fighting men of known repu- 
tation who might take the side of the Government against Muhammad 
Ali. If this threat to arrest all Russian subjects " who might take part 
in events " had been literally executed, it would have been necessary, 
as we shall see shortly, to arrest most of the Russian Consuls and con- 
sular employees themselves. 

At Resht, the Russian Consul went further and actually informed the 
Persian Government of his intention to arrest any one on suspicion of 
his being a Russian subject, to investigate the matter at his leisure and 
to hold them until the end of the trouble. 

On July 31, when Muhammad Ali had barely put foot on Persian soil, 
and had made no appreciable advance towards subjugating the country, 
Britain and Russia addressed to the Persian Government the following 
identique de facto recognition of the ex-Shah's belligerency: 

" Seeing that the ex-Shah, contrary to the advice frequently 
given him by the Governments of England and Russia, in effect 
that he should forbear from any agitation whatever in Persia, 
has now landed in Persia, the British (Russian) Government 
declares that the ex- Shah has now forfeited his right to the pen- 
sion fixed by the Protocol. But, on the other hand, the British 
(Russian) Government believes that, as the ex-Shah is now in 
Persian territory, the British (Russian) Government cannot in- 
tervene. Therefore, the British (Russian) Government states 
that, in the conflict that has unfortunately arisen in Persia, 
they will in no way interfere." 

Scant comfort from friends of a government plunged into the throes 
of civil strife through the negligence or worse of those who had solemnly 
pledged themselves to prevent exactly this contingency! But even this 
declaration of "neutrality" (though the word itself was omitted on the 
demand of the British Legation) might have passed had it been observed. 
And here let us examine what nature of advice was given to the ex- 
Shah by the Government of Russia through its Ambassador at Vienna, 
according to the ante-mortem statement of Arshadu'd-Dawla. I quote 
from the account given by the Times' correspondent at Teheran, who 
speaks Persian and heard the statement a few hours before Arshadu'd- 
Dawla died. (See Times of October 11.) 



APPENDIX— C 361 

" Then Muhammad Ali and I met in Vienna. The Russian 
Ambassador came to see us, and we asked for help. He told us 
that Russia could not help us. Russia and England had an 
agreement with regard to Persia, from which neither would 
depart. They had resolved not to interfere in any way, inter- 
nally. ' But, on the other hand,' he said, ' the field is clear. 
If we can do nothing for you, we equally will do nothing against 
you. It is for you to decide what are your chances of success. 
If you think you can reach the throne of Persia, then go. Only 
remember we cannot help you, and, if you fail, we have no 
responsibility.' ' Well, there is something you can do for us,' we 
answered. ' Lend us some money.' ' No, it is quite impos- 
sible,' he replied. And, though we begged much and had a 
second interview, he rejected our proposal. Only he suggested 
that, if Muhammad Ali had a receipt for some jewels which were 
in the keeping of the Russian Bank at Teheran, money could be 
raised on that receipt. But Muhammad Ali had not got the 
document, and so nothing came of that." 

Perhaps this is " advising the ex-Shah to forbear from any agitation 
whatever in Persia," and perhaps it is not. Perhaps, also, the Russian 
Ambassador (who has never denied the interview) did not advise his 
Government of Khalil's projected journey through Russia, and of his 
purpose, but the unbiased public will probably continue to hold its own 
opinion. 

We shall now see how well Russian officials in Persia observed neu- 
trality in the internal struggle thus precipitated. 

On July 29 the Russian Acting Consul at Isfahan, proceeding upon 
his conception of neutrality, wrote to the Persian Foreign Office repre- 
sentative there in a plain attempt to stifle a public expression of the 
people in favor of the Constitutional Government. He said: "According 
to information received by this Consulate, the Government of Isfahan 
intends to hold a meeting of the clergy, nobles, prominent citizens and 
merchants for the purpose of framing a telegram to the representatives 
of foreign powers to the effect that they, the people, do not desire 
Muhammad Ali, and to protest against his arrival in Persian territory. 
I request you in advance to inform the proper quarters that, as this mat- 
ter concerns Persia and the Persians (delightful sarcasm), it would be 
useless to give trouble (sic) to the Imperial Legation and the Consulates 
of Russia." 

Later he wrote: 



362 APPENDIX— C 

" You must not uselessly give trouble in the matter of Muham- 
mad Ali Shah (sic) to the Imperial Russian Legation and the 
Consulates. It is the duty of the Persian Foreign Office repre- 
sentative and of the Government to restrain and prevent any such 
incidents and they must fulfil it." 

Comment seems unnecessary. 

Rashidu'1-Mulk, Persian subject,' former Governor of Ardebil, Tiaving 
been in command of Government forces, had treacherously fled before an 
inferior number of Shahsevens, tribesmen who had always remained sup- 
porters of the ex-Shah. He was accused of high treason, arrested and 
confined at Tabriz. On July 27, the Russian Consul-General at Tabriz, 
having demanded his release of the Acting Governor, and having been 
informed that Rashidu'1-Mulk was held by orders of the central Gov- 
ernment, sent three hundred Russian soldiers, fully armed, to the 
Governor's palace, beat off the Persian guards, insulted the Acting 
Governor, liberated Rashidu'1-Mulk and took him away. Shortly after- 
wards he joined the rebel forces of Shujaju'd-Dawla, which were threat- 
ening Tabriz. 

To the formal protest lodged by the Persian Government over this 
affair, the Russian Legation replied, officially admitting responsibility 
for the orders given to the Russian Consul-General at Tabriz to " take 
the necessary steps " to prevent certain punishment, which was alleged 
to be threatened, from being inflicted on Rashidu'1-Mulk. We have seen 
what steps the Russian Consul-General took — steps which, in the case 
of two equal powers, would have meant immediate war. 

The sole justification attempted by the Russian Legation for this out- 
rage was that " the representatives of the Government of Russia have 
accorded a certain protection (sic) to Rashidu'1-Mulk." As a matter of 
fact, no sentence at all had been passed on Rashidu'1-Mulk, though, even 
if it had, the outrage would have been none the less. 

After a full examination of the record, I unhesitatingly assert that 
a clearer and more flagrant case of violation of sovereignty could with 
difficulty be found. 

At the moment when Shujaju'd-Dawla was preparing to attack Tabriz 
and the garrison of the city was preparing for defense, the local Gov- 
ernment received a note from the Russian Consul-General there, stating 
that no defensive measures should be taken and that under no circum- 
stances should there be any fighting within the city. At the same time, 
a Russian subject was in charge of the advance guard of Shujaju'd- 
Dawla. 

Shuja-Nizam, likewise accused of high treason, had been arrested by 
the Governor of Marand. The Russian authorities took him from prison. 



APPENDIX— C 363 

Shuja-Nizam afterwards succeeded in establishing himself at Marand and 
in capturing the Governor. The Russian authorities, alleging that he 
is in the service of the Russian road company of Djulfa-Tabriz, continue 
to protect him. 

The citizens of Tabriz having inflicted serious losses on the forces 
of the rebel Shujaju'd-Dawla, the commander of the Russian troops at 
Tabriz sent a detachment of Cossacks to the field, and there, on the 
pretext that the director of a road station had been slightly wounded in 
the forehead by a bullet (he having voluntarily gone to the neighbor- 
hood of a skirmish), arrested seven Persian gendarmes and took them 
prisoners to the Russian barracks. 

When the rebel leader, Mujallalu's-Sultan, was about to enter the town 
of Ardebil, the inhabitants prepared to resist him. The Russian Vice- 
Consul thereupon sent his agent, Esmail Bey, to the Vice-Governor and 
chief of police to give them the following false information: That Muham- 
mad Ali had arrived at one day's journey from Teheran with an army 
of twelve thousand men and had announced a general amnesty; that he 
had charged His Highness the Sipahdar with the control of the city 
and that the latter had accepted; that the prohibition ordered by the 
police of Ardebil about speaking of Muhammad Ali Mirza was wrong; 
" I announce these facts to you privately and for your personal infor- 
mation. The Consulate has received instructions, in effect, telling them 
to watch over the security of the town." Similar announcements were 
made by public criers, the inhabitants were advised to illuminate the 
town in honor of Muhammad Ali's victory and to prepare to receive the 
Governor whom he was sending to them. Later, Mujallalu's-Sultan, pro- 
tected by Russian Cossacks, entered Ardebil in triumph and committed 
the usual acts of barbarism. 

After a stay at Ardebil, Mujallalu's-Sultan joined Shujaju'd-Dawla, 
leaving behind Ghavamu's-Sultan as Governor of the town. The tribe 
of Khameslous having refused to submit to Muhammad Ali's rule, the 
Russian Vice-Consul sent Cossacks to reduce them. 

A Russian cruiser having been stationed for some time at the port 
of Enzeli, the commander, with the Russian Consular agent, visited all 
merchant vessels entering the port, searched passengers, arrested some 
and forced them to return to Russia. 

When the force of Muhammad Ali was defeated and dispersed, many 
of the leaders demanded refuge at the Russian Consulate at Astarabad. 
The Consul received them and refused absolutely to deliver them up to 
the Persian Government for punishment. 

The Russian Commissioner for Gonbad-Ghabous came to Gumesh- 
Teppeh to concert with Muhammad Ali. Later he returned to his post, 
whence he continued to force Turcoman-Persian subjects, by threats, 



364 APPENDIX— C 

to take part with Muhammad Ali. He has since come to Astarabad and 
made himself virtual governor of that place, while the forces of Muham- 
mad Ali remain outside the town. 

At Bender, Djez, the Russian Consular agent, with a party of Rus- 
sian Cossacks, arrested the Persian frontier official and sent him a pris- 
oner to Astarabad, treating him in a thoroughly brutal manner. 

At Resht, a number of Russian subjects, armed and led by the son of 
an employee of the Russian Consulate there, arrested a Persian subject 
and beat him to the point of death. They announced at the same time 
that those who might come to the aid of a certain Persian officer there 
would be shot. 

An employee of the Russian Consulate at Resht called a great num- 
ber of Russian subjects to his house and discoursed to them on the 
lack of security in the town. Failing to arouse sufficient response and 
his plan being discovered, he sent Russian deserters to make trouble 
in the streets — all for the manifest purpose of creating disorder as a 
pretext for calling in Russian troops to quell it. 

After the departure of Muhammad Ali from Savad Kuh, a Russian 
officer came to Barfrush to visit Muhammad Ali's camp, where he re- 
mained six hours, returning to Sari with six thousand tumans in notes. 

When the Teheran Government arrested the well-known reactionary, 
Majdu'd-Dawla, on July 23, the British Minister immediately interfered 
in his behalf; as a result, he was released and immediately took bast in 
the Russian Legation. The effect produced on the excited minds of the 
Persians at this time was that both Britain and Russia were siding with 
Muhammad Ali and the reactionaries, thus making the task of the Con- 
stitutional Government vastly more difficult. 

About July 31, the Consular agent of Russia at Enzeli arrested sev- 
eral persons as deserters, while the Russian Consul at Resht sent Rus- 
sian Cossacks to police headquarters to release a Persian subject who 
had been arrested, pretending that the latter was the " lamplighter " of 
the Cossack barracks. 

According to the Convention of 1907 between Russia and Britain, 
which both parties are so fond of quoting to Persia, the latter's com- 
plete independence and sovereignty are fully recognized, although the 
need for such avowal is not apparent. Yet in the face of that document 
Russia has put forward and still maintains, under the name of " Protege- 
ship," the most novel and remarkable theory ever heard of in interna- 
tional relations. The Russian Legation and Consulates not only claim 
absolute rights in Persia over all Russian subjects, " legal or illegal," 
but they claim a species of protectorate over another class of persons, 
chiefly well-known reactionaries and traitors, who are admittedly Persian 
subjects, yet against Avhom Russia will not permit the simplest govern- 



APPENDIX— C 365 

mental step to be taken, under penalty of incurring her anger and her 
vengeance. This proteg£-ship is likewise used to shield these persons 
from paying their taxes to the Persian Government, and, as most of 
them are rich through methods well known in the former regime, there 
is not only a decided financial loss, but the loss of prestige to the Gov- 
ernment and the encouragement thus given others to rebel against the 
payment of their just dues are even worse. In many instances the Rus- 
sian authorities do not even claim that the protege is anything but a 
Persian subject; in others, some of the pretexts alleged for claiming 
for them Russian nationality are bizarre beyond the wildest dreams. Ask 
the Russian Legation to explain seriously, for instance, why the Princess 
Banou Uzma, of Isfahan, should not pay the Persian Government the 
thousands of tumans of taxes which she has been owing for the past 
few years, and you will be unable to restrain a smile at the answer. Or 
the famous Kamran Mirza, uncle of the ex-Shah. Or why the Russian 
Legation interfered recently when the tax collector of Teheran seized 
the horse of Prince Ezted Dawla for failure to pay his contributions to 
the Government under which he lives. Beyond all this, of course, is the 
trifling fact that even foreign subjects in Persia are- not exempt from 
paying their local taxes, despite the truly absurd claims as to the mean- 
ing of Article IV of the Customs Convention between Persia and Russia. 

The Persian law of naturalization is based on the consent of the sov- 
ereign, given in a formal manner through prescribed channels, yet we 
have such claims put forth and maintained as that a certain Persian 
subject, having once taken bast in a Russian Consulate, he was a Rus- 
sian, or that he claimed Russian nationality under a decree (unpro- 
duced) from the Emperor of Russia. Naturalization laws and regula- 
tions are generally esteemed to be the subject of friendly negotiation 
and arrangement between nations at peace, not as the pretext for abuses 
of the grossest description by the stronger power. 

A better example of Russia's open hostility to the Persian Government 
could hardly be found than the very recent actions of the Russian Consul- 
General at Teheran, Pokhitanof, with all the details of which I am per- 
sonally familiar. The facts are still fresh in the public mind, but it may 
be noted that the arrest and brutal treatment of a few Treasury gendarmes 
by a superior force of Russian Cossacks, led by two Russian Consular 
officers in full uniform, and the subsequent incarceration of the Persian 
gendarmes in the Russian Consulate General, is but a fair sample of 
Russia's real attitude. When it is remembered that this was done in 
the face of the Convention of 1907, whereby Britain and Russia mutually 
engaged to respect the integrity and independence of Persia, and that 
Russia has completely ignored the Persian protest over this incident, and 
that Britain, the other signatory, has quietly looked on, the real value 



366 APPENDIX— C 

to Persia of the famous Convention in question becomes immediately 
apparent. 

To Persia's protest demanding the removal of these three Consular 
officers, the Russian Legation returned the ludicrous answer that in cer- 
tain instances in Mazandaran and Veramin the Russian sovereignty had 
been insulted, in that certain insurgents in arms in the field against the 
Government having hoisted a Russian flag over themselves, they should 
not have been touched. Presumably, they should have been allowed to 
attack the Government forces in peace. 

I could go further and cite the attempts made by Russia to prevent 
any arrangements by which Persia might emerge from her present state 
of financial bondage to Russia, and the claims of Britain that, under the 
rescript of Nasiru'd-Din-Shah of 1888, the Persian Government itself has 
no right to build railroads in the south, that right being reserved to 
Britain, but the list grows too long. 

I do want to mention the Stokes case, not because it is transcendentally 
important in itself, but because of the noxious principle which both 
Britain and Russia have labored to have established with Persia's acqui- 
escence. The British Minister here wrote me on July 22 that he was 
authorized by his Government to tell me " that Major Stokes, before 
accepting the command of the gendarmerie (Treasury), will have to 
resign his commission in the Indian Army." 

As the original tender made by me to Major Stokes did not mention 
that he would be required to resign from the British service, and as 
the situation would have been equally well met from Persia's standpoint 
by his being seconded for three years, I naturally assumed that on his 
tendering his resignation, which he immediately did, by cable, it would 
be accepted. To my intense surprise, I learned that the reply of the 
British Government was the presentation of a note verbale on August 8 to 
the Persian Foreign Office, " warning the Persian Government that they 
ought not to persist in the appointment of Major Stokes, 'unless he is not 
to be employed in Northern Persia. If the Persian Government do per- 
sist, His Majesty's Government will recognize Russia's right (sic) to take 
such steps as she thinks are necessary in order that her interests in 
Northern Persia may be safeguarded." 

A mere trifling threat between friends, this. 

This was followed on August 19 by another note, repeating " the warn- 
ing given on the 8th instant to the effect that, unless Major Stokes is 
not to be employed in North Persia, the Persian Government ought not 
to persist in the appointment, and, if they do persist, His Majesty's 
Government will recognize the right of Russia to take what steps she 
thinks necessary (sic) to safeguard her interests in North Persia." 

Is it at all pertinent to inquire here just what are those undefined 



APPENDIX— C 367 

" interests " in Northern Persia on which so much stress is thus laid ? 
Certainly they are not denned in the Convention of 1907; and it is 
equally clear that the Persian Government does not know them; nor did 
the British Government know of them as late as July 22. Otherwise, 
how could she have contemplated accepting Major Stokes' resignation 
from the Indian Army in order that he might sign the contract of- 
fered him? 

To complete the record, it should be mentioned that the Russian Lega- 
tion, on August 19, addressed a memorandum to the Persian Foreign 
Office, stating that " the Imperial Government of Russia, for reasons 
explained at the time to the Persian Government, considers the engage- 
ment by the latter of Major Stokes as chief of the armed forces — called 
gendarmerie — for the collection of taxes as incompatible with its inter- 
ests, and I am charged to protest against that appointment. Failing satis- 
faction, the Imperial Government would reserve to itself the right to 
take such measures as it might judge to be necessary for the safeguarding 
of its interests in the North of Persia." 

On learning of the first note presented to the Persian Government by 
the British Legation, I expressed the following views to the British 
Minister here: 

" I beg leave to address you, unofficially, on a subject of great 
importance to my work here. I have been intensely surprised to 
learn this evening that your Government has conveyed to the 
Persian Foreign Minister a note of warning or protest against 
my proposed employment of Major Stokes in the Treasury 
Gendarmerie. You are doubtless aware of the course of this 
matter up to the present. Need I say that, in view of the tone 
of the communication which your Government authorized you 
to address to me on July 22 last, in effect that Major Stokes 
could accept the position upon resigning from the Indian Army, 
the apparent volte face indicated by their note of to-day is almost 
incomprehensible ? 

"... Does your Government quite realize the position in 
which it is placing me before the Persian people and their Gov- 
ernment in now suddenly joining with another Power to prevent 
the exercise of the most elementary act of sovereignty by this 
country, whose independence and integrity both of those foreign 
Powers have solemnly pledged themselves, jointly and severally, 
to respect? 

" My personal feelings are of no importance, but the success 
or failure of my mission here is of moment both to Persia which 
entrusted her financial affairs to my care and to my countrymen 

18 



368 APPENDIX— C 

who are not unnaturally interested in the creditable accomplish- 
ment of my task. 

" Before accepting this work I was given clearly to understand 
that neither of the two principal powers having interests here 
offered any objection to my undertaking it, and surely such a 
statement was something more than an empty pledge. 

" JSJo one, I am assured, knows better than yourself that the 
choice of Major Stokes was actuated by no political motive in 
the faintest degree, and no thinking person could suspect me of 
any intention to engage in political jobbery here — a thing which 
would only make me ridiculous and spell absolute ruin for my 
work. 

" What, then, am I to think when I see the first vital step 
which I undertake in the task of bringing order out of chaos here 
obstructed and relentlessly opposed by the very two nations who 
have time and again professed their sincere desire to see the 
progress and prosperity of the stricken country which I am seek- 
ing to serve? 

" Does your Foreign Office fully realize that, in adopting its 
most recent attitude in this affair, it is inevitably producing the 
impression on the Persian people that it is in reality opposed to 
the successful accomplishment of my work, in addition to forc- 
ing me to assume that I can count on no friendly moral assist- 
ance from your Government in a vital matter of this kind? 

" If this were a normal place, where well-trained, capable and 
experienced men could be had in comparative abundance, the 
result (though not the principle) of your Government's objections 
might not be so bad, but here, where, as you know, good men are 
extremely scarce, the attitude adopted amounts to a virtual veto 
of my efforts and a nullification of my chances of success. 

" I hope and trust that in some manner your Government may 
be brought to see the matter in this light, apart from what I am 
frank to say seems to me a totally uncalled-for interference in 
the purely routine and internal affairs of the financial organiza- 
tion which I am endeavoring to build up. 

" Personally, I feel so strongly on the subject that I am forced 
to contemplate the necessity of setting right my own country- 
men, at least with a formal public statement of all my experi- 
ences in this connection since arriving at Teheran. Needless to 
say, such a course would be much to my regret, but there is such 
a thing as just dealing even between Government and individuals, 
and certainly in this case I feel that my own record is suffi- 
ciently clear to bear the light of the most thorough inspection." 



APPENDIX— C 369 

From a review of this incident it is manifest that, unless the Con- 
vention of 1907 is a farce or a deception, by its own terms it has no 
bearing whatever on the proposed appointment of Major Stokes as a 
financial aide to the Treasurer-general. 

First, because the preamble of that document, as published to the 
world, avows that Britain and Russia mutually engage to respect the 
integrity and independence of Persia, and declares the sincere desire of 
the two signatories for the preservation of order throughout that coun- 
try and its peaceful development. Yet one of the primary elements of 
sovereignty is the right to manage internal affairs, at least within the 
limitations of the law of nations, and surely the appointment of its own 
officials by any country can be considered as nothing else. 

Secondly, the plain purpose of the Convention was that neither signa- 
tory power should seek for herself, or support in favor of her subjects, 
any concessions of a political or commercial nature — such as concessions 
for railways, banks, telegraphs, roads, transport, insurance, etc., — within 
the so-called " sphere of influence " of the other power. 

But this is no case of a " concession." Major Stokes is not a bank, 
or a railroad, or a political or a commercial concession of any kind, and 
the voluntary tender to him of a post in the Persian service can, by no 
stretch of the imagination, be converted into a " seeking " or " supporting " 
by Britain of such a concession. 

The second fallacy in the position of the two powers lies in the fact 
that the British Foreign Office itself never thought of construing Major 
Stokes' appointment into a violation of even the so-called " spirit of the 
Convention " until Russia raised the point. The proof of this has been 
cited above. 

Without in any manner recognizing the application or validity of the 
Convention as relating to herself, Persia might point out that, where the 
language of a document is plain and clear, there is no room for interpre- 
tation of the spirit. 

Now that the forces of Muhammad Ali and Salaru'd-Dawla have just 
been routed and dispersed, and before the Persian Government can get 
a breathing-space after all the anxiety, expense and difficulty from 
which it might have been spared by a due observance of the Protocol 
regarding efficacious measures against the agitations of Muhammad Ali, 
the announcement is made that Britain proposes to send two regiments 
of Indian cavalry to Southern Persia to strengthen various Consular 
guards. The reason stated is the unsafe condition of the southern roads 
and the disorders at Shiraz. Regarding the latter, it might be men- 
tioned that the prolonged asylum granted up to a short time ago by 
the British Consulate at Shiraz to Ghavamu'1-Mulk, the sworn foe of 
the Kashghais, has tended in no small degree to render the task of the 



370 APPENDIX— 

Persian central Government in restoring order there more difficult, espe- 
cially in view of the continued efforts of the son of Ghavamu'1-Mulk to 
stir up the Arab tribes against the late Governor, Nizamu's-Saltana. 

The generally expected effect of this incursion of the Indian troops into 
Southern Persia at this time will be the despatch of even larger forces 
©f foreign troops into Northern Persia on even smaller pretexts. 

I have so far confined myself to incidents occurring during the five 
months of my stay here, but this account by no means exhausts the evi- 
dence of the unfriendly attitude of Russia and Britain toward Persia. The 
spectacle given to the world last winter, when the British and Russian 
Legations stooped to personal insults and had the footsteps of the Persian 
Minister of Foreign Affairs dogged by their uniformed Legation serv- 
ants, on the ground that the pension of the ex-Shah was in arrears, was 
sufficiently indicative of the disposition of the two powers and their 
representatives at Teheran towards the Persian Government. 

In all the cases cited above the Persian Foreign Office has lodged formal 
protests against the evident violation of her sovereignty and her dignity, 
and in but few, if any, instances has even a pretense of reparation or 
satisfaction been made. 

Perhaps many of these incidents do not constitute absolute acts of 
war — perhaps some of them may be accounted for as the unauthorized 
acts of subordinate agents, even though they have rarely, if ever, been 
disavowed by the guilty Government, — but that they indicate a " genu- 
ine friendly feeling " on the part of Russia and Britain toward Persia, I 
do not believe any fair-minded person will maintain. 

Some one may here be tempted to ask what all this has to do with 
finance, and with the financial regeneration of Persia. If so, let the 
answer be that no one who has been in Persia a week can fail to realize 
that all possibility of reforming Persia's finances is absolutely dependent 
upon the prompt restoration of order throughout the Empire and the 
creation and maintenance of a strong central Government, powerful enough 
to make itself felt and its decree respected to the furthermost parts of 
the country. So long as the present policy of thwarting the upbuilding 
of such a government continues — so long as it is the manifest attitude 
of the powers to nullify all serious efforts on one pretext or another, 
but always selfish — and to ruin the Government's prestige in the eyes 
of the Persian people themselves, meanwhile keeping the country in a 
state of financial collapse, — just that long will any efforts at financial 
regeneration be as unavailing as certain documents written on the sands 
of temporary advantage or as promises of a neutrality which does not 
neutralize. 

The internal difficulties of Persia are great enough to tax her resources 
to the uttermost limit; they alone will retard her progress for many 



APPENDIX— C 371 

years. If to them we are to add flagrant bullying by outsiders, varied by 
" finger-on-the-nose " diplomacy, the situation is very bad. 

If money is to be obtained for permanent improvements, it must be 
taken on impossible political terms; if railroads are to be built, they 
must be coterminous with our old friends, the " spheres of influence " ; if 
rifles are to be bought, they must be paid for to a rich and friendly 
foreign government at just three times their market price; if officers of 
experience are to be taken into the Persian service to hasten progress, 
they must come from a minor power, or prove themselves to have been 
of the spineless, nerveless type of which the tools of foreign interests are 
produced; even if they are from a minor power, there must not be so 
many of them taken as to indicate .a serious attempt at reform. 

Surely in these days of humanitarian principles and international 
comity the land of Cyrus has fallen upon evil times. 

However, even the ragged misery of the beggar and his indifference to 
fate does not justify us in giving him a gratuitous kick. 

The incidents and facts cited in this letter do not constitute one-third 
of those with which I am familiar; they are merely typical, and, if any 
one doubts the facts, the documentary evidence is available to substantiate 
them and many more of the same style. 

I therefore venture to hope that, with the knowledge of these cases 
before it, the Times, with that spirit of fairness for which it is noted, 
will withdraw the opinion expressed in its leading article of October 18, 
to the effect that my statements as to the attitude of certain powers 
toward Persia were unjust and unfounded. 

I am, 

Your obedient servant, 

(Signed) W. Morgan Shustee, 

Treasurer-general of Persia. 



372 APPENDIX 



D. 

CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN SIR GEORGE BARCLAY, K.C.M.G., 
BRITISH MINISTER AT TEHERAN, AND MR. W. MORGAN 
SHUSTER, TREASURER-GENERAL OF PERSIA. 

Tbeasuby General 

of THE 
Empiee of Pebsia. 

Teheran, July 6, 1911. 
Major C. B. Stokes, 

Military Attache, 

British Legation, Teheran. 
Dear Sir: 

Having heard that you will shortly be giving up your present post in 
the British Legation and leaving Teheran, it has occurred to me that your 
thorough knowledge of Persia and her general conditions, coupled with 
your military training and acquaintance with the Persian language, would 
render you exceedingly valuable to the Imperial Government in connection 
with one most necessary branch of the financial reorganization with which 
I have recently been charged. I refer to the proposed formation of a 
small but efficient Treasury gendarmerie, whose duty it will be to give 
the necessary aid and support, especially in the provinces of the South, 
to the financial agents engaged in the collection of the maliat, opium, 
boyaux and other direct taxes. 

The Med j lis has authorized me to enter into a contract i with a suitable 
person to serve as a financial aide in charge of this particular work. I, 
therefore, take pleasure in tendering you a three years' contract for this 
work on the terms set forth in the accompanying draft. 

I should be glad to know as soon as possible whether you are willing 
to accept this offer, in order that in such case I may at once take steps 
to have a formal application made to the British Government for your 
services. 

With kind regards, I am 

Sincerely yours, 

(Signed) W. Morgan Shuster, 

Treasurer-general of Persia. 

(Note: The above letter was the original tender of appointment to 
Major C. B. Stokes, from which the subsequent correspondence arose.) 

i See draft of contract at end of this Appendix. 



APPENDIX— D 373 

British Legation, 

Teheran. July 14, 1911. 

Dear Mr. Shuster: 

My Government, to whom I have referred the question of the proposed 
appointment of Major Stokes as organizer of the " Treasury gendarmerie," 
evidently thinks that the appointment might cause some international 
jealousy, and they ask me whether the appointment of a Swedish officer or 
of a subject of some other Minor Power would not be a way out of the 
difficulty. 

I should like to have your views as to the willingness of the Persian 
Government to accept this alternative before I reply to my Government. 
Believe me, dear Mr. Shuster, 

Yours sincerely, 

(Signed) G. Barclay. 

Treasury General 

of THE 
Empire of Persia. Teheran, July 14, 1911. 

Dear Sir George: 

I am in receipt of your note of to-day's date, in which you state that 
your Government evidently thinks that the appointment of Major Stokes 
to organize the Treasury gendarmerie might cause some international 
jealousy. You ask me whether the appointment of a Swedish officer or of 
a subject of some other minor Power might not be a way out of the 
difficulty. 

In reply, I beg to state that the Medjlis having recently authorized me 
to appoint a suitable person to organize, under my direct supervision and 
control, a force of Treasury gendarmerie, I tendered the position to Major 
Stokes for the sole reason that I consider him to be the best fitted man 
for the work whom I could possibly obtain. I am personally aware of 
Major Stokes' peculiar qualifications for this task — such as his military 
training, his four years' sojourn in Persia, his knowledge of the country, 
of the Persian language and of French (which is widely spoken here) — 
and, in general, of the high esteem in which he is held in this community 
as an officer and a man. 

I have no hesitancy in assuring you that, in seeking the most efficient 
financial aide whom I could find for this particular branch of my work, 
the question of nationality played no part whatsoever in making up my 
opinion. Had this been so, it is but natural to presume that, the matter 
being left entirely to my discretion, I would have sought such an assistant 
from my own country. 

I may take this occasion to repeat . that the work of financial reform 



374 APPENDIX— D 

here, which I have undertaken in the midst of many grave difficulties, 
and on which I have in a manner risked my professional reputation, is 
in no sense political in its character. No act of mine has been guided by 
political considerations, either local or international, and I naturally feel 
that I could not in any manner accept any suggestion which would cast 
upon my perfectly frank and disinterested tender of a post to Major 
Stokes the light of political bias. 

With all due respect to the subjects of minor Powers, and without 
any disrespect to several of my own countrymen whom I have appointed 
to serve with Major Stokes in the Treasury gendarmerie, I believe that 
Major Stokes is the best qualified to give efficient service to this country 
in connection with my own financial mission, and I would be unwilling, 
under any circumstances, to appoint any one, from any power whatso- 
ever, for this or any other branch of my work unless I, personally, was 
aware of and satisfied with the appointee's special qualifications. 

We know, of course, that one of the greatest handicaps from which 
any foreigner suffers here is, as in my own case, a lack of knowledge 
of the language, habits and modes of thought of the Persian people. This 
defect becomes even more serious in the case of one called upon to deal 
directly with a large number of such men as would go to make up an 
armed force. A Swedish officer, be he ever so competent, would have to 
spend at least a year or more before he could possibly be of any real 
assistance in this line of work, whereas the necessity of getting my 
gendarmerie force organized and at work at once is urgent in the 
extreme. 

In conclusion, permit me to say that, as the fact of my tender of this 
post to Major Stokes is now generally known here, any withdrawal of 
that offer by me could not fail to be interpreted as being dictated by 
purely political considerations, which I could by no means permit. 

Trusting that this statement will enable you to reassure your Govern- 
ment upon this subject, and that I may receive an early and favorable 
consideration by your Government of Major Stokes' acceptance, I am, dear 
Sir George, 

Very sincerely yours, 

(Signed) W. Mokgan Shustek. 

Treasury General 

OF THE 

Empire of Persia. 

Teheran, July 16, 1911. 
Dear Sir George: 

The Minister of Foreign Affairs has transmitted to me the enclosed 
receipts (2), which I understand are for the sum of Fes. 12,500, which the 



APPENDIX— D 375 

Imperial Government is accustomed to receive from your Legation on 
behalf of the Indo-European Telegraph Baluchistan line. The Minister 
requests me to have these payments made to me direct, if entirely agree- 
able to your Legation, in return for my official receipts. I suggested that 
he should indicate this change to you, but he requested me to take the 
matter up. 

If, therefore, there is no objection on your part, I will be very glad to 
receive the payment (and future payments) and to give my official receipt 
as Treasurer-general, — in which case I would request that the enclosed 
receipts of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs be returned. 
With kindest regards, 1 beg to remain, dear Sir George, 
Sincerely yours, 

(Signed) W. Morgan Shustee, 
2 Enclosures. Treasurer-general of Persia. 

His Excellency, 

Sir George Barclay, 
etc., etc., etc., 
Ghulhak. 

British Legation, 
Teheban. 

Ghulhak, July 18, 1911. 
Dear Mr. Shuster: 

I regret to say in reply to your letter of the 16th instant that a draft 
for the 12,500 francs drawn as usual in favour of the Minister of Finance 
had been already purchased for the payment of this half-year. I there- 
fore inclose the Foreign Office receipts for the favour of return to me with 
the addition of whatever countersignature legally represents that Min- 
ister. On their receipt I will despatch the draft which on future occa- 
sions will be made payable to the Treasurer-general. 

I cannot, however, I fear, do otherwise than continue to transmit the 
drafts and receive discharge through the channel of the Ministry of For- 
eign Affairs, with which department alone I am authorized to communi- 
cate officially. 

Trusting that this arrangement will suit your convenience, I am 

Yours sincerely, 

(Signed) G. Babclay. 
W. Morgan Shuster, Esq., 
etc., etc., etc. 

P.S. May I take this opportunity of drawing your attention to the 
fact that I have an accumulated balance of some 25,000 francs on account 
of the rental of the Central Persia line at the disposal of the Persian Gov- 



376 APPENDIX— D 

ernment as soon as they have signified their acceptance of our capital 
account for the construction of the line (see our notes of March 20 and 
July 1, 1911). 

G. B. 



Treasury General 

of THE 
Empire of Persia. 

Teheran, July 20, 1911. 
Dear Sir George: 

May I trouble you by asking whether you can suggest any manner in 
which the signing of Major Stokes' contract with the Persian Government 
may be hastened. 

The fact is that the entire matter of the Treasury Gendarmerie is neces- 
sarily being held up, pending the settlement of this question, and I have 
no hesitancy in saying tbat the formation of this force is most urgently 
and vitally necessary to the financial reorganization of Persia. 

Without this gendarmerie, I am practically helpless, and without Major 
Stokes I am at a loss where to turn for a man possessing anything like 
his qualifications. 

I therefore beg of you to do what you can to expedite this matter. 
May I suggest that you cable your Government, asking for a prompt and 
favorable reply. 

With kindest regards, I am, dear Sir George, 
Very sincerely yours, 

(Signed) W. Morgan Shuster, 

Treasurer-general of Persia. 
Sir George Barclay, K.C.M.G., 
etc., etc., etc., 
Ghulhak. 



British Legation, 
Teheran. 

July 21, 1911. 
Dear Mr. Shuster: 

I yesterday telegraphed to the Foreign Office privately to hasten their 
decision about Stokes, and now that I have had your letter of yesterday 
I have telegraphed officially. 

Yours very sincerely, 

(Signed) G. Barclay. 



Bbitish Legation, 
Teheban. 



APPENDIX— D 377 

July 22, 1911. 



Dear Mr. Shuster: 

I am authorized by my Government to tell you that Major Stokes, be- 
fore accepting the command of the gendarmerie, will have to resign his 
commission in the Indian Army.* 
I am, dear Mr. Shuster, 

Yours very sincerely, 

(Signed) G. Barclay. 

Treasury General 

OF THE 

Empire of Persia. Teheran, July 22, 1911. 

Dear Sir George: 

I have just received your note of to-day informing me that your Gov- 
ernment holds that Major Stokes, before accepting the command of the 
Treasury Gendarmerie, will have to resign his commission in the Indian 
Army. 

I still feel that the Imperial Government should have Major Stokes' 
service at any cost, and I trust that the matter may be speedily arranged. 
Permit me to thank you for the friendly efforts which you have made 
to expedite the decision in this case, and to express the belief that the 
kindly attitude thus displayed towards the financial regeneration of this 
nation will be duly appreciated by all well-wishers of Persia. 
With kindest regards, I am, dear Sir George, 

Very sincerely yours, 

(Signed) W. Morgan Shuster. 
Sir George Barclay, K.C.M.G., 
etc., etc., etc., 
Ghulhak. 

Treasury General 

of THE 

Empire of Persia. Teheran, August 8, 1911. 

Dear Sir George: 

I beg leave to address you, unofficially, on a subject of great importance 
to my work here. 2 I have been intensely surprised to learn .this evening 

1 This condition, laid down by the British Government itself, was 
promptly complied with by Major Stokes, who cabled the resignation of 
his commission in the. British-Indian army. 

- In the interval between this letter and the preceding one Major Stokes 



378 APPENDIX— D 

that your Government has conveyed to the Persian Foreign Minister a note 
of warning or protest against my proposed employment of Major Stokes 
in the Treasury gendarmerie. You are doubtless aware of the course 
of this matter up to the present. Need I say that, in view of the tone 
of the communication which your Government authorized you to ad- 
dress to me on July 22 last, in effect that Major Stokes could accept the 
position upon resigning from the Indian army, the apparent volte face 
indicated by their note of to-day is almost incomprehensible? 

I recognize that I would have no right to say such things to you in an 
official communication, and nothing is further from my thoughts than 
to give offense to any one, but does your Government quite realize the 
position in which it is placing me before the Persian people and their 
Government in now suddenly joining with another power to prevent the 
exercise of the most elementary act of sovereignty by this country, whose 
independence and integrity both of those foreign powers have solemnly 
pledged themselves, jointly and severally, to respect? 

My personal feelings are of no importance, but the success or failure 
of my mission here is of moment both to Persia, which entrusted financial 
affairs to my care, and to my countrymen, who are not unnaturally inter- 
ested in the creditable accomplishment of my task. 

Before accepting this work, I was given clearly to understand that 
neither of the two principal powers having interests here offered any 
objection to my undertaking it, and surely such a statement was some- 
thing more than an empty pledge. 

No one, I am assured, knows better than yourself that the choice of 
Major Stokes was actuated by no political motive in the faintest degree, 
and no thinking person could suspect me of any intention to engage in 
political jobbery here, — a thing which would only make me ridiculous 
and spell absolute ruin for my work. 

What, then, am I to think when I see the first vital step which I 
undertake in the task of bringing order out of chaos here obstructed and 
relentlessly opposed by the very two nations who have time and again 
professed their sincere desire to see the progress and prosperity of the 
stricken country which I am seeking to serve? 

Does your Foreign Office fully realize that, in adopting its most recent 
attitude in this affair, it is inevitably producing the impression on the 
Persian people that it is in reality opposed to the successful accomplish- 
ment of my work, in addition to forcing me to assume that I can count 
on no friendly moral assistance from your Government in a vital matter 
of this kind? 

had cabled his resignation and the British and Russian Governments had 
made a faint protest to the Persian Government against his proposed 
employment. 



APPENDIX— D 379 

If this were a normal place, where well-trained, capable and experienced 
men could be had in comparative abundance, the result (though not the 
principle) of your Government's objections might not be so bad, but here, 
where, as you know, good men are extremely scarce, the attitude adopted 
amounts to a virtual veto of my efforts and a nullification of my chances 
of success. 

I hope and trust that in some manner your Government may be brought 
to see the matter in this light, apart from what I am frank to say seems 
to me a totally uncalled-for interference in the purely routine and in- 
ternal affairs of the financial organization which I am endeavoring to 
build up. 

Personally, I feel so strongly on the subject that I am forced to con- 
template the necessity of setting right my own countrymen, at least with 
a formal public statement of all my experiences in this connection since 
arriving at Teheran. Needless to say, such a course would be much to 
my regret, but there is such a thing as just dealing even between Gov- 
ernments and individuals, and certainly in this case I feel that my own 
record is sufficiently clear to bear the light of the most thorough 
inspection. 

Please pardon me for writing you thus freely, but I know you will 
acquit me of any desire to offend or to increase the perplexities of your 
situation^ - Unfortunately, we all appear to have our own peculiar diffi- 
culties in this strange land, and the Stokes case happens likewise to be 
one of mine. 

With kindest regards and best wishes for what you may yet be able 
to do, I am, dear Sir George, 

Very sincerely yours, 

(Signed) W. Morgan Shuster, 

Treasurer-general of Persia. 

Sir George Barclay, K.C.M.G., 
etc., etc., etc., 
Ghulhak. 



British Legation, 
Teheran. 

Ghulhak, August 12, 1911. 
Dear Mr. Shuster: 

I did not fail to communicate to my Government the substance of your 
letter to me of the 8th instant, drawing attention to its purely personal 
nature. 

His Majesty's Government desire me to assure you in reply that they 
appreciate your work and the singlemindedness of your motives and they 



380 APPENDIX— D 

express their regret that there should be any wish of yours with which 
they are unable to conform. But, His Majesty's Government point out, 
they might themselves have had occasion to object to the appointment 
of a Russian officer to organize an administration, say, on the Indian 
frontier, and that, as soon as they found that Russia would make ob- 
jections to the appointment of Major Stokes, they could not deprecate 
such objection and were bound to warn the Persian Government of the 
difficulties that would arise. 

An understanding with the Persian Government has existed for some 
time past that only subjects of minor Powers should be selected for their 
service. 1 The only exception made was in favour of the United States, 
and the Russian agreement to this exception was influenced by the opin- 
ion of His Majesty's Government that no political motives in Persia 
could be imputed to the United States. If a departure from this under- 
standing was to be made, my Government think it a pity that the Persian 
Government did not sound the Russian Government in advance. 

Sir Edward Grey fears that the appointment of some subject of a 
minor Power in the place of Major Stokes is the only way out of the 
difficulty that has now arisen. 

In communicating this purely private message, permit me to add the 
assurance of my kindest regards towards yourself and believe me to 
remain, , 

Yours very sincerely, 

(Signed) G. Barclay. 

W. Morgan Shuster, Esq., 

Treasurer-general of the Empire of Persia, Teheran. 

British Legation, 
Teheran. 

August 21, 1911. 
My dear Shuster: 

Would it suit you if I visited you at five o'clock on Friday? If not, 
please fix another hour on that or any other day except Wednesday. 

Also, should I come to the Treasury General or to your private 
residence ? 

Yours sincerely 

(Signed) G. Barclay. 

i The Persian Government had no knowledge of this alleged under- 
standing, and sometime later a British subject was engaged by me under 
contract to serve in the Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs with the full 
official approval of the British Government (which was necessary as he 
was in the Indo-European Telegraph Department of the Indian Govern- 
ment), and without objection, special or general, by Russia. 



APPENDIX— D 381 

P.S. I should like particularly to talk to you about railways, and I 
am very keen to hear something of Hart's proposals before the Persian 
Government in any way commits itself to his group. 

Treasury General 

of THE 
Empire of Persia. Teheran, September 13, 1911. 

His Excellency, 

Sir George Barclay, K.C.M.G., 

Minister of Great Britain, Teheran. 

My dear Mr. Minister: 

I take pleasure in informing you that on the 15th ultimo I applied 
to Colonel H. R. Beddoes, the representative of Messrs. Seligman Bros, of 
London, for a loan of £4,000,000 sterling. I enclose herewith copy of my 
letter to him. 

I now request the good offices of Your Excellency's Government and 
Your Excellency's great personal influence to the end that this loan 
may be successfully and satisfactorily negotiated. 

I am, Mr. Minister, with great respect, 
Sincerely yours, 

(Signed) W. Morgan Shuster, 



Treasury General 

of THE 

Empire of Persia. 



Treasurer-general of Persia. 



Teheran, September 18, 1911. 



Dear Sir George: 

The delay which has occurred in getting any intimation of the attitude 
of your Government and of that of the Russian Government towards the 
proposed loan contract with Seligman Brothers of London is proving 
somewhat embarrassing to my work. Even after the matter is under way 
there will inevitably be a number of delays, and if, for any reason, there 
is going to be opposition to the proposed contract, I should like to know 
about it as soon as possible, since it will then be necessary for me to 
take up immediately certain other similar propositions which I have had 
presented. 

I should like very much to know the views of your Government on 
this matter without further delay, and should likewise appreciate any- 
thing you could do to secure an expression of opinion from the Russian 
Government in this same affair. 

II certainly seems to me that the frank manner in which we have laid 



382 APPENDIX— D 

this proposed loan before the two Legations should entitle us to a rea- 
sonably prompt and clear expression of opinion from the respective gov- 
ernments upon this, to us, important and urgent matter. 
With kindest regards, I remain, dear Sir George, 
Very sincerely yours, 

(Signed) W. Morgan Shustek, 

Treasurer-general of Persia. 
His Excellency, 

Sir George Barclay, K.C.M.G., 
H. B. M. Legation, Teheran. 



British Legation, 

Teheran. _ „„ 

September 23, 1911. 

My dear Sinister: 

I am doing my best to hasten an expression of views as to the Selig- 

man proposals. 

Yours sincerely, 

(Signed) G. Barclay. 

British Legation, 

TEHEBAN - October 3, 1911. 

My dear Shuster: 

It has been suggested to me that there might be no objection, if the 
organization of your gendarmerie by Swedish officers is impossible, to 
Stokes' organizing a force at or near Isfahan, provided, of course, any 
portion of it employed in Northern Persia would be commanded by Per- 
sians or by officers of a minor Power. 

Could you let me know what you think of the idea? 

Yours very sincerely, 

G. Barclay. 

Treasury General 

OF THE 

Empire of Persia. m _ , . _ ', 

Teheran, October 5, 1911. 

Dear Sir George: 

Regarding your note of the 3d, to which I was about to reply, let me 
say that the suggestion as to localizing Stokes at Isfahan is, of course, 
out of the question, both on principle and as a matter of practicability. 

I hope that some day the British and Russian Foreign Offices will come 
to believe that when I said I wanted Stokes here m Teheran to assist me, 



APPENDIX— D 383 

by his advice and peculiar knowledge, in the formation of a Treasury 
gendarmerie, I meant just that and nothing more: no arridre pensee, no 
military expeditions, no intrigues, nothing but what I said. 

It seems impossible at times for one to gain any credence for a frank, 
open statement of facts or intentions, but it is equally true that it was 
neither within the letter nor the spirit of my statement to go through 
the truly absurd performance of marooning him at Isfahan or anywhere 
else in order that he might advise and assist me here. 

Is it not about time, dear Sir George, that two big Governments stop 
playing at this matter, and state plainly whether they intend to con- 
tinue to oppose the employment of Stokes along the lines which I have 
mentioned, or not? 

With kindest regards, I am, dear Sir George, 
Sincerely yours, 

(Signed) W. Mobgan Shusteb, 



Treasurer-general of Persia. 



Sir George Barclay, K.C.M.G., 
British Minister, 
Ghulhak. 



British Legation, 
Teheran. 



October 5, 1911. 



My dear Shuster: 

The suggestion as regards the localization of Stokes' functions to 
Isfahan came to me through the Foreign Office and I ought to reply 
to-day. 

I remembered what you had said about the impossibility of giving any 
expression to any localization of his work, but I did not like to reply 
to the Foreign Office without having submitted to you the particular sug- 
gestion in regard to Isfahan, which does not come so near to a recogni- 
tion of the hated spheres of influence as would any undertaking regarding 
Stokes' employment at Shiraz. 

Yours very sincerely 

(Signed) G. Barclay. 



British Legation, 
Teheran. 

October 10, 1911. 
My dear Shuster: 

Many thanks for your letter. I will await you this afternoon. 
I don't think you will have any further difficulty about Shuau's- 
19 



384 APPENDIX— D 

Saltana's garden, but I am sure that your men have been told to avoid 
all unnecessary activity. A conflict would be quite disastrous. 

Yours sincerely, 

(Signed) G. Baeclay. 
Treasury General 

OF THE 

Empire of Persia. 

Teheran, November 2, 1911. 

Purely Personal. 
Dear Sir George: 

Mrs. Shuster and I have received yours and Lady Barclay's very kind 
invitation to dine with you on Monday, the 13th of this month. Need- 
less to say that it would give us great pleasure to do so. I feel, how- 
ever, that under all the circumstances I should not accept the hospitality 
of the British Legation without acquainting you with the fact that I 
have felt impelled, in an open letter to the Times, to criticise in no 
uncertain terms the general attitude of your Government towards my 
work and the nation which I am serving. While there is nothing per- 
sonal in my statements, and though, as I think you know, I entertain 
the highest respect and warmest regard for you, it occurs to me that 
it would relieve you of any possible embarrassment if Mrs. Shuster and 
I did not attend a formal dinner at the Legation. It is solely from 
this standpoint that I write. I feel sure that you will realize that 
nothing but some such reason would keep us from partaking of your 
hospitality. 

May I even suggest, to avoid all possible misunderstanding on your 
part, that Mrs. Shuster and I would be very happy, should you so 
desire it, to dine with you and Lady Barclay informally some time, or 
something of the sort. 

Personally, I do not believe in mixing business or political differences 
with purely social matters, but others may not share my view, and it is 
sometimes difficult to draw the line. In doubtful cases, it is probably 
safe to err on the side of caution. 

If, however, in spite of what I say above, you still desire that we 
should accept your kind invitation, we will do so, but only after hav- 
ing from you that you considered that it could be in no manner used as 
a source of criticism of you by either your Government or your col- 
leagues here in Teheran. 

With kindest regards and best wishes, believe me, dear Sir George, 

Sincerely yours, 

(Signed) W. Morgan Shuster. 

Sir George Barclay, K.C.M.G., 
British Legation, Teheran. 



APPENDIX— D 385 

British Legation, 
Teheran. 

November 2, 1911. 
Many thanks, my dear Shuster, for your friendly note of to-day, the 
spirit of which I warmly appreciate. 

In all the circumstances, I think perhaps it would be better that we 
should postpone our dinner till times are better. 

It is most kind of you to have been so open with me. 
Please give my kindest regards to Mrs. Shuster, and believe me 

Yours sincerely, 

(Signed) G. Barclay. 

British Legation, 
Teheran. 

November 7, 1911. 
My dear Shuster: 

Could I see you for a moment to-morrow? 

I have to read you a telegram I have from my Government about 
Lecoffre's appointment which tells me that I am to " point out " certain 
considerations to you in regard to this appointment; no doubt you can 
guess what these are. 

So far as I know, any time to-morrow will suit me, but I have asked 
for an audience of the Regent and I can't tell what hour he will fix. 

Yours very sincerely, 

(Signed) G. Barclay. 

British Legation, 
Teheran. 

November 10, 1911. 
My dear Shuster: 

I see that your open letter has been published. I should be very much 
obliged if you would let me have a look at it. 

Yours very sincerely, 

G. Barclay. 



W 



British Legation, 
Teheran. 

November 14, 1911. 
My dear Shuster: 

You once said that you would let me see your contract. I wonder 
whether this still holds good, and, if so, whether I could have a copy. 



386 APPENDIX— D 

I have read your open letter with the greatest interest, but I think 
you are too hard on the two Powers. 

Yours sincerely, 

(Signed) G. Babclay. 



Bbitish Legation, 
Teheban. 

November 15, 1911. 
My dear Shuster: 

Could you let me know whether I am right in telegraphing that the 
Prime Minister requested you to withdraw the gendarmes from Shuau's- 
Saltana's house in town and that you replied that the order to seize 
the property had been signed by all the Ministers in the Cabinet, 
and you would only withdraw the gendarmes on a similar order? 

Yours very sincerely, 

(Signed) G. Babclay. 



Tbeasuey Genebal 

OF THE 

Empibe op Pebsia. 

Teheban, November 15, 1911. 
Dear Sir George: 

I have your note about the rumor of a letter from the Samsamu's- 
Saltana to me and my reply. Personally, I should be most happy to 
give you any facts, but, as you apparently request them for transmis- 
sion to your Government, I feel somewhat doubtful, in the present diffi- 
cult situation, as to whether I should say anything. 

Let me illustrate: Suppose I should ask you to confirm the story that 
the Indian Government had accepted Stokes' resignation, would you feel 
at liberty to do so, not knowing the final outcome of the affair? If you 
wish to know personally, as a friend, the exact situation re the 
Shuau's-Saltana matter, I will be glad to run over and tell you, 
unofficially. 

I may add that, to the best of my knowledge, there has been no Prime 
Minister or Cabinet for two days. 

With kindest regards, I remain, 

Sincerely yours, 

(Signed) W. Mobgan Shtjsteb. 

Sir George Barclay, K.C.M.G., 
En Ville. 



Bbitish Legation, 
Teheran. 



APPENDIX— D 387 

November 15, 1911. 



My dear Shuster: 

I quite understand and shall not telegraph. 

In a letter which I wrote yesterday, but which I omitted to send till 
now, I ask for something else. You will, of course, feel perfectly free 
to decline. For I see that what you might have been ready to let me 
know some weeks ago may be impossible now. 

Yours very sincerely, 

(Signed) G. Baeclay. 

Treasury General 

OF THE 

Empire of Persia. 

November 17, 1911. 
Dear Sir George: 

I have your two notes of the 14th, and thank you very much for the 
friendly view-point which you took of my last note to you. 

I have not the slightest objection to having you see a copy of my 
contract, nor even to having your Government see a copy of it, if I could 
be assured that it would not go further. But as it is not a matter that, 
strictly speaking, concerns any one but myself and the Persian Govern- 
ment (and my friends), I could not see that any government could desire 
to see it for any good purpose. If you would like to examine it, I should 
be very glad to send you a copy. 

With kindest regards, believe me, dear Sir George, 

Very sincerely yours, 

(Signed) W. Morgan Shuster. 
Sir George Barclay, K.C.M.G., 
British Legation, 
Teheran. 

Treasury General 

of THE 
Empire of Persia. November 19, 1911. 

Dear Sir George: 

Colonel Beddoes is leaving to-morrow for home, and expects to go via 
St. Petersburg. 

I think that it would be a great advantage, certainly from the Persian 
point of view, and I think, possibly, from that of England and Russia, if 
he could secure a personal interview with Mons. KokovtsofF. I have fully 
explained to Colonel Beddoes my own views upon the financial problems 



388 APPENDIX— D 

of Persia and the lines upon which a durable working arrangement, sat- 
isfactory to these Governments, Persia, Great Britain and Russia, might 
be reached. If you also think that this end is desirable, I should be very 
gratified if you would give to Colonel Beddoes such a letter of introduc- 
tion to the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg as would secure Colonel 
Beddoes a talk with the Russian Premier. If you should wish to state 
in your note that it is given at my request, I should see no objection. 
With kindest regards, I am, dear Sir George, 

Sincerely yours, 

Sir George Barclay, K.C.M.G., (Si S ned) W ' M ° EGAN Shusteb - 

British Minister, 
Teheran. 



British Legation, 
Teheran. 

January 10, 1912. 
My dear Mr. Shuster: 

Many thanks for your kind thought in writing and also for the kind 
words of your letter. 

I also have very much regretted that we have not seen more of each 
other during your time here and I hope that we may meet again one day 
in happier and less constrained circumstances. 

Wishing you a pleasant journey and really agreeable recreation in Paris, 
where I believe you will be staying, I remain 

Very sincerely yours, 

(Signed) G. Barclay. 

CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN HIS EXCELLENCY, S. POKLEWSKI- 
KOZIELL, RUSSIAN MINISTER AT TEHERAN, AND MR. W. 
MORGAN SHUSTER, TREASURER-GENERAL OF PERSIA. 

Treasury General 

of THE 
Empire op Persia. 

Teheran, August 10, 1911. 
His Excellency 

S. Poklewski-Koziell, 

Russian Minister, Teheran. 
(Through the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Persia. X 
Excellency : 

Pursuant to Requisition No. 205 of the Minister of War of the Impe- 
rial Government, I have the honor to transmit to Your Excellency here- 



-ip 



APPENDIX— D 389 

with an order of payment on the Imperial Bank of Persia for Roubles 
Three hundred and sixty thousand, three hundred and ninety-five (360,- 
395), the same being in settlement of some seven thousand (7,000) rifles 
and three million five hundred thousand (3,500,000) cartridges purchased 
in accordance with the authority of the Medjlis heretofore granted. 

Enclosed herewith please find receipt for this amount, which I request 
that Your Excellency sign and return at your convenience. 

With the assurances of my highest esteem, I remain, Excellency, 
Sincerely yours, 

(Signed) W. Morgan Shtjster, 

Treasurer-general of Persia. 



Legation Imperiale de Rtjssie 
Teheran. 

August 12, 1911. 
W. Morgan Shuster, Esq., 
Treasurer-general of Persia, 

Teheran. 
(Through the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Persia.) 
Dear Mr. Morgan Shuster: 

I beg to acknowledge, with many thanks, the receipt of your letter of 
August 10 and of an order of payment on the Imperial Bank of Persia 
for Roubles 360,395, the same being in settlement of rifles and cartridges 
purchased in Russia by the Persians. 

Enclosed please find receipt for the above-mentioned amount. 
I remain, dear Mr. Morgan Shuster, 

Yours sincerely, 

(Signed) S. Poexewski-Koziell. 



Treasury General 

OF THE 

Empire of Persia. 

Teheran, August 19, 1911. 
My dear Mr. Minister: 

I have just received word from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the 
effect that there has been a delay in the payment of the Cossack Brigade, 
and requesting me to take the matter up directly with Your Excellency. 
This I am very happy to do. 

I may say that up to the present time I had supposed that the Banque 
d'Escompte would promptly inform me when any further payment to the 
Cossack Brigade fell due, in the same manner as the Banque did on July 



390 APPENDIX— D 

18, 1911, in the case of a payment for Tumans 16,304.90 for certain 
expenses, for which I immediately sent my check. 

It appears now that, without my knowledge, there has been some delay 
in the matter of paying the Brigade. I regret this exceedingly, but I 
must state that I cannot hold myself responsible for it. I have been at 
any and all times entirely ready to pay the sums due the Cossack Bri- 
gade, and to in every manner maintain the guarantees given by the 
Persian Government in the Convention of December, 1910. 

In order to prevent any further delay, I suggest to Your Excellency 
that the Banque d'Escompte, or the Colonel of the Brigade, immediately 
inform me of the amount now due, in order that I may give the Banque 
an order to transfer this sum on the books of the Banque to the credit 
of the Colonel or any other officer whom he may designate, — in the same 
manner as the transfers are made for the annuities of the loans. It 
seems to me that this procedure is in entire compliance with both the 
letter and the spirit of the Convention, and effectually assures for all time 
the payment of these expenses from the Customs revenues of the North. 

Under any circumstances, in order to avoid any further delay in this 
matter, I suggest to Your Excellency that the sum now in arrear be paid 
at once in this way, with the understanding (if Your Excellency so desire 
to have it) that this particular payment shall not be regarded as a 
precedent, but is only adopted at this time to prevent further loss of 
time. 

I may say that I will be lunching in Ghulhak to-morrow (Sunday), and 
hope to run over and shake hands with Your Excellency during the after- 
noon, — when we may have a chance to chat for a few moments on this 
subject. 

With kindest regards, I remain, Mr. Minister, 

Very sincerely yours, 

(Signed) W. Morgan Shuster. 

His Excellency 

S. Poklewski-Koziell, 

Minister of Russia, Zargundeh. 

Legation Imperiale de Russie, 
Teheran. 

Zargundeh, August 20, 1911. 

Dear Mr. Morgan Shuster: 

Many thanks for your letter and your desire to promptly settle the 
payment of the Cossack Brigade. 

I regret, however, to say that I have very precise instructions on this 
subject from my Government and am unable to change them. My Gov- 
ernment has always thought it necessary, in dealing with Oriental coun- 



APPENDIX— D 391 

tries, to hold them to the strict execution of the very letter of their en- 
gagements, as otherwise the respect of the treaties themselves would be 
easily shaken. 

The Convention of December, 1910, provides that certain fixed charges 
of the Persian Government be paid by our Bank " a l'intervention de 
l'Administration des Douanes " and I am told by my Government to see 
that this procedure shall not be changed while the Convention remains in 
force. I therefore earnestly hope that you will see your way to giving 
Mr. Mornard the necessary powers, — once for all, or every year, — to 
send to our Bank his " mandats " for all the payments mentioned in the 
above-named Convention. 

The payment to the Brigade on July 18 last was an extra one, quite 
outside of its yearly budget and the scope of the Convention, and for 
these reasons it naturally could not be effected without your direct 
intervention. 

I am most pleased at the prospect of seeing you this afternoon and 
hope that our personal intercourse will make in future any misunder- 
standings between us impossible and will facilitate that cordial coopera- 
tion which I sincerely desire. 

With kindest regards, I remain, dear Mr. Morgan Shuster, 

Yours sincerely, 

(Signed) S. Poklewski-Koziell. 

Legation Impebiale de Kussie, 
Teheban. 

September 2, 1911. 
Dear Mr. Morgan Shuster: 

I have just received a telegram from my Government which took nine 
days to reach Teheran. 

Before giving a final answer to the points raised in the conversation 
we had here two weeks ago, my Government would like to have detailed 
information about the numbers and composition of the future Treasury 
Gendarmerie, about its functions, and also where and how it will perform 
its duties. Will there be another Gendarmerie for other purposes, or 
will the Treasury Gendarmerie be the only force of this sort performing 
ordinary gendarmerie duties besides collecting taxes? 

There is also another point which I personally should like elucidated. 
If, after six months' work at Teheran, Major Stokes is going to be 
removed to the South of Persia, is he to retain the command of the 
Gendarmerie also in the North? Would it be possible to arrange that, 
after six months, one of the Swedish officers should be put in command 
of the whole Gendarmerie and that Major Stokes should work then 
nominally under him and outside the so-called Russian zone and that 



392 . APPENDIX— D 

both these last conditions should be clearly expressed in Major Stokes' 
contract ? 

Or would it not be simplest to appoint at once the senior Swedish 
officer to the chief command of the Treasury Gendarmerie while retaining 
Major Stokes for six months in the town of Teheran to assist him and 
with the explicit undertaking that Major Stokes should, at the expiry of 
that time, be sent to the British or neutral zone? 

No doubt the assurances about the character and territorial limits of 
Major Stokes' activities ought to be given to us in writing by the Per- 
sian Government. Do you think the latter is prepared to do so? 

I should be most grateful to you if you would enable me to give to 
my Government clear and comprehensive data about the points raised 
above and I feel sure that our decision will largely depend on the char- 
acter of your reply. 

Believe me, dear Mr. Morgan Shuster, 

Yours sincerely, 

(Signed) S. Pokxewski-Koziell. 



Tbeastjby General, Empire of Peesia. 

Teheban, September 3, 1911. 
Dear Mr. Minister: 

I am in receipt of your note of the 2d instant, stating that your Gov- 
ernment, before giving a final answer to the points discussed in our friendly 
conversation some two weeks ago, would like to have certain information 
concerning the proposed Treasury Gendarmerie. 

In reply, I take pleasure in laying before you all the data which I pos- 
sess along these lines. 

As to the numbers and composition of the Treasury Gendarmerie, and 
its functions: As the name implies, the main purpose of the proposed 
organization is to collect the taxes, both by direct intervention under 
the orders of the different representatives of the Treasurer-general, and 
by producing that feeling of public security and order without which, 
in this county at least, the collection of the internal taxes becomes im- 
possible; the composition will be Persian, with the exception of a few 
European or American supervising officers: as to the number, I estimate 
that from 12,000 to 15,000 will eventually be necessary to perform the 
work properly throughout the Empire, though probably we will be unable 
to reach that strength for eighteen months or more. 

As to whether there will be another gendarmerie, my own view is, very 
positively, that two gendarmerie forces would be both unnecessary and 
uneconomic in view of the existence of a regular army. This, however, 
is only my personal opinion. The mere presence, in most instances, of 



APPENDIX— D 393 

a well-organized and disciplined force will be sufficient to maintain public 
order; such attempts at local disturbances as might arise from time to 
time could well be repressed by a force having general police powers, 
unless the disorder became serious enough to demand the attention of the 
regular army. 

With regard to your personal question, I would say that I have se- 
lected Major Stokes as chief of the entire Treasury Gendarmerie, and 
have tendered him a three-year contract for that post. I could, there- 
fore, have no intention of putting any other officer over Major Stokes 
during the period of the satisfactory performance of his duties. The same 
reasons which led me to select him would of course lead me to retain him, 
so long as his duties were satisfactorily fulfilled. 

The expression of any conditions concerning Major Stokes working 
outside the so-called Russian zone either in his contract or otherwise is, 
for reasons which I have already stated and which I am sure your Gov- 
ernment fully recognizes, impossible of consideration. 

I have no intention of appointing any one but Major Stokes to be my 
principal assistant in my task of organizing the Treasury Gendarmerie, 
for a number of valid reasons touching upon his qualifications which are 
too well known to require repetition here. Major Stokes will, of course, 
be under my personal orders and he will pursue no other policy in any 
respect than that which I may direct. 

Regarding the next-to-last paragraph of your note, my clear under- 
standing and belief is that the Persian Government is not prepared to 
give any assurances whatsoever as to the territorial limits of Major Stokes' 
activities. Certainly I am not, and it is my intention to utilize his serv- 
ices throughout the Empire in such manner as to me, during my period 
of responsibility for the financial reorganization, might seem best calcu- 
lated to accomplish my task. 

I have sought, dear Mr. Minister, to give you with entire frankness 
my views on this matter, and I trust that your Government will see by 
this statement that what is contemplated is but a necessary and proper 
organization for the accomplishment of the difficult task which I have 
undertaken. It seems unnecessary to add that, with the reorganization 
of the finances and internal taxation system of Persia on a modern basis, 
nothing but benefit can accrue to all legitimate commercial interests, both 
foreign and domestic, which are connected with the Persian Empire. 

With kindest regards, I remain, dear Mr. Minister, 

Sincerely yours, 

(Signed) W. Morgan Shtjstek, 

Treasurer-general of Persia. 
His Excellency 

S. Poklewski-Koziell, 



394 APPENDIX—D 

Teeasuby General, Empire of Persia. 

Teheran, September 5, 1911. 
Dear Mr. Minister: 

It has come to my knowledge that in some manner my note to you 
of yesterday has been misconstrued by you and that it is regarded as 
an intentional termination of the discussion of the Stokes affair. If such 
is the fact, please permit me to say that nothing of course could be 
further from my wishes. I did not understand your note of the 2d 
inst. as written in a spirit of negotiation, but that it was, as it appears 
on its face to be, a categorical request for certain detailed, clear and 
comprehensive data, which you and your Government desired to have in 
order to enable you to formulate future action. It was in this light 
that I endeavored to reply to your note by giving to you a full, frank 
and unevasive statement of such information on the questions propounded 
as I possess. 

I should sorely regret that you should have found anything in either 
the tone or the contents of my written reply which would lead you to 
presume on my part any change in the ardent hope which I have felt ever 
since our original conversation that your Government might be brought 
to see the difficulties of this Government and of myself in this particular 
instance over this affair and thereby be inclined to perform a gracious 
and friendly act in withdrawing certain objections which up to the pres- 
ent have been maintained against the proposed contract with Major Stokes. 

It was my original intention to see you yesterday and endeavor to learn 
more of the recent view which your Government may be taking of this 
matter, but I afterwards felt that perhaps you were not prepared to 
discuss the probable future action of your Government in any more 
detail than has already been done, until you had conveyed to it the pre- 
cise and detailed information which your letter alone appeared to call 
for and which I had hoped my reply conveyed. 

I should like very much to see you soon, especially if there has been any 
misconception on your part of the purport of my note, and if agreeable 
will endeavor to get up to Zargundeh some time to-morrow afternoon, say 
about three o'clock. I will ask you to be good enough to let Colonel 
Beddoes know whether this hour is agreeable to you, and he will find 
the means to convey the news to me. 

With kindest regards, dear Mr. Minister, I remain 
Very sincerely yours, 

(Signed) W. Morgan Shttster, 

His Excellency Treasurer-general of Persia. 

S. Poklewski-Koziell, 

Minister of Russia, Zargundeh. 



APPENDIX— D 395 

Teeasuey General 

op the 
Empire of Persia. 

Teheran, September 3, 1911. 
Dear Mr. Minister :* 

I am in receipt of your note of the 2d instant, stating that your Gov- 
ernment, before giving a final answer to the points discussed in our 
friendly conversation some two weeks ago, would like to have certain 
information concerning the proposed Treasury Gendarmerie. 

In reply, I take pleasure in laying before you all the data which I 
possess along these lines. 

As to the numbers and composition of the Treasury Gendarmerie, and 
its functions: As the name implies, the main purpose of the proposed 
organization is to collect the taxes, both by direct intervention under the 
orders of the different representatives of the Treasurer-general, and by 
producing that feeling of public security and order without which, in 
this country at least, the collection of the internal taxes becomes impos- 
sible; the composition will be Persian, with the exception of a few Euro- 
pean or American supervising officers; as to the number, I estimate that 
from 12,000 to 15,000 will eventually be necessary to perform the work 
properly throughout the Empire, though we will probably be unable to 
reach that strength for eighteen months or more. 

As to whether there will be another gendarmerie, my own view is, very 
positively, that two gendarmerie forces would be both unnecessary and 
uneconomic in view of the existence of a regular army. This, however, is 
only my personal opinion. The mere presence, in most instances, of a 
well-organized and disciplined force will be sufficient to maintain public 
order; such attempts at local disturbances as might arise from time to 
time could well be repressed by a force having general police powers, 
unless the disorder became serious enough to demand the attention of 
the regular army. 

With regard to your personal questions, I would say that, as I hope 
to see you at an early date, I will take that opportunity of giving you, 
in conversation, such information as I may have along these lines. 

I have sought, dear Mr. Minister, to give you, with entire frankness, 
my views on this matter, and I trust that your Government will see by 
this statement that what is contemplated is but a necessary and proper 
organization for the accomplishment of the difficult task which I have 
undertaken. It seems unnecessary to add that, with the reorganization 

i This letter was sent to replace the preceding letter of September 3, 
which was subsequently withdrawn. 



396 APPENDIX— D 

of the finances and internal taxation system of Persia on a modern basis, 
nothing but benefit can accrue to all legitimate commercial interests, both 
foreign and domestic, which are connected with the Persian Empire. 
With kindest regards, I remain, dear Mr. Minister, 
Sincerely yours, 

(Signed) W. Morgan Shustee, 

Treasurer-general of Persia. 
His Excellency 

S. Poklewski-Koziell, 

Minister of Eussia, Zargundeh. 



Teeastjby Genebal 

OP THE 

Empire of Peesia. 

Teheban, September 13, 1911. 
His Excellency 

S. Poklewski-Koziell, 

Minister of Russia, Teheran. 
My dear Mr. Minister: 

1 take pleasure in informing you that on the 15th ultimo I applied to 
Colonel H. R. Beddoes, the representative of Messrs. Seligman Bros, of 
London, for a loan of £4,000,000 sterling. I enclose herewith copy of my 
letter to him. 

I now request the good offices of Your Excellency's Government and 
Your Excellency's great personal influence to the end that this loan may 
be successfully and satisfactorily negotiated. 
I am, Mr. Minister, with great respect. 
Sincerely yours, 

L ( Signed) W. Mobgan Shustee, 

Treasurer-general of Persia. 



Teeasuey Genebai, 

OF THE 

Empire of Peesia. 

Teheban, September 13, 1911. 
Dear Mr. Minister: 

May I ask whether you have had any indication from your Government, 
which could be communicated to me, on the subject of our last conversa- 
tion concerning Major Stokes. I would not trouble you on this score 



APPENDIX— D 397 

were it not for the fact that each day's delay is proving a very serious 
handicap to one of the most necessary features of our work. 
With kindest regards, believe me, dear Mr. Minister, 
Yours very sincerely, 

(Signed) W. Morgan Shtjsteb, 

Treasurer-general of Persia. 
His Excellency 

S. Poklewski-Koziell, 

Minister of Russia, Teheran. 



Legation Imperiale de Russie, 
Teheran. 

September 16, 1911. 
Dear Mr. Morgan Shuster: 

1 have not heard yet from my Government concerning Major Stokes, 
and am expecting a reply at any moment. The delay must be due to 
the absence of the Emperor from St. Petersburg. 

I will not lose time in communicating with you, as soon as the tele- 
gram reaches me. 

With kindest regards, 

Yours sincerely, 

(Signed) S. Poklewski-Koziell. 



Legation Imperiale de Russie, 
Teheran. 

October 15, 1911. 
Dear Mr. Shuster :* 

I duly submitted to my Government the proposal you made at our last 
interview and I have now received their reply. It is to the effect that, 
as unfortunately it appears to be impossible to restrict Major Stokes' 
work to the South, my Government are compelled to adhere to their 
protest against the proposed appointment of the officer in question to 
organize a fiscal gendarmerie in Persia. 
Believe me, dear Mr. Shuster, 

Yours sincerely, 

(Signed) S. Poklewski-Koziell. 

i This was Russia's final refusal to withdraw her opposition to Major 
Stokes. Up to this time Mr. Shuster had been in negotiations with the 
British and Russian Legations to secure, on some terms not incompatible 
with Persia's recognition of the so-called " spheres of influence," his badly 
needed services. 



398 APPENDIX— D 

January 10, 1912. 
Personal. 
Dear Mr. Shuster: 

Many thanks for your kind letter, which has deeply touched me. 
I shall always keep the most pleasant recollection of our personal 
acquaintance * * * 

iWith best wishes for your journey, I remain, dear Mr. Shuster, 
Yours very sincerely, 

(Signed) S. Poexewski-Koziell. 



FORM OF CONTRACT TENDERED MAJOR C. B. STOKES BY THE 
TREASURER-GENERAL OF PERSIA. 

This Agreement, made this twenty-fourth day of July in the year 
nineteen hundred and eleven, by and between the Imperial Government 
of Persia, acting through its duly authorized agent, W. Morgan Shuster, 
Treasurer-general of Persia, and Major C. B. Stokes, a British subject, 
late of the Indian Army, resident in the City of Teheran, Persia, wit- 
nesseth that: 

(1) Whereas the Imperial Government of Persia has by a law of the 
Medjlis voted on the 23d day of Jauza, 1329, authorized the Treasurer- 
general of Persia to establish a special corps of inspection, and to make 
contracts, with the approval of the Medjlis, for the financial aides who 
may form a part of said special corps of inspection, and whereas the 
Medjlis has by subsequent laws authorized among others, a contract to 
be made by the Treasurer-General with an European now residing in 
Persia, for the purpose of serving as financial aide to the Treasurer- 
general in charge of the organization of the Treasury Gendarmerie, said 
contract to be made on the same general terms as the contracts already 
made with certain other financial aides to the Treasurer-general, now 
therefore it is hereby stipulated and agreed: 

(2) The Imperial Government of Persia does hereby appoint, desig- 
nate and engage the said Major C. B. Stokes to be and serve as financial 
aide to the Treasurer-general, in special charge of the organization and 
formation of the Treasury Gendarmerie, for the full term of three years 
from the date of this contract. 

(3) The Imperial Government of Persia hereby agrees to pay to the 
said Major C. B. Stokes, as full salary and compensation for his serv- 
ices as said financial aide, the sum of Five thousand (5,000.00) Dollars, 
U. S. Currency, or its equivalent in pounds sterling, per annum, in twelve 
monthly installments, at the end of each month. 

(4) The said Major C. B. Stokes does hereby accept the appointment, 



APPENDIX— E 399 

designation and engagement to serve as said financial aide to the 
Treasurer-general, with the general powers and duties, and at a salary 
and compensation and under the general terms and conditions herein- 
before and hereinafter set forth, and in consideration of the same does 
hereby agree faithfully and well to perform his duties during the con- 
tinuance of this contract. 

(5) The said Major C. B. Stokes hereby agrees to obey, in the per- 
formance of his duties, the instructions and rules of the Treasurer-general 
of Persia. 

(6) In case the said Major C. B. Stokes shall neglect or fail to perform 
his duties or to obey the instructions or rules aforesaid, the Imperial 
Government of Persia, on the recommendation of the Treasurer-general, 
shall have the right to terminate this agreement on the payment of a 
sum equivalent to six months' compensation. 

(7) In case the said Major C. B. Stokes shall resign of his own accord 
before the termination of the period prescribed in this contract, he shall 
be paid only for the period of actual service rendered. 

(8) During the existence of this contract, the said Major 0. B. Stokes 
hereby agrees not to interfere with the religious or political affairs of 
the Persian Empire, except in so far as the proper performance of his 
lawful duties might be in any manner so construed. 

(9) The said Major C. B. Stokes hereby agrees, during the continu- 
ance of this agreement, to use his best efforts and endeavors for the 
upbuilding of the finances and revenues of the Imperial Government of 
Persia and, in general, within the sphere of his proper activities, to work 
for the welfare, happiness, prosperity and progress of the people of 
Persia and for the honor and prestige of the lawfully constituted govern- 
ment of said Empire. 



E. • 

"ONE BRITISH VIEW OF THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN CONVENTION 

OF 1907." 

Speech Delivered by Mr. H. F. B. Lynch, Chairman of The Persia 
Committee, at a Public Dinner Given Under the Auspices of the 
Committee, in Honor of W. Morgan Shuster, at the Savoy Hotel, 
London, on Monday, 29th January, 1912. 

The Chairman (Mr. H. F. B. Lynch) : Ladies and Gentlemen, I have 
now to propose to you the toast of " The guest of the evening, Mr. Mor- 
gan Shuster." In welcoming Mr. Shuster and in inviting this distin- 
guished company to meet him, the Persia Committee have been pursuing 



400 APPENDIX— E 

a course strictly in accordance with their past action. From the very 
first we have supported Mr. Morgan Shuster in the extremely difficult 
and delicate task which was committed to his charge. When we realized 
that difficulties were being placed in the way of the execution of that 
task — I think it was towards the close of last summer's session — we 
approached the Foreign Secretary and pointed out the nature of those 
difficulties, and we asked that steps should be taken to have them, as 
far as possible, removed. On the 7th of November last, at a fully at- 
tended meeting held at the House of Commons, we passed unanimously a 
resolution which was sent in to the Secretary of State. I should like 
to read you that resolution, because it expresses the point of view which 
we of the Persia Committee have consistently taken up: — . . . " In view 
of the great importance to the interests of this country that the finances 
of Persia should be placed on a sound basis and that Persia may thereby 
be enabled to proceed with the reforms necessary for the proper adminis- 
tration of that country, including the security of her communications, 

" And whereas Mr. Morgan Shuster, as Treasurer-general of Persia, has 
shown himself a capable and energetic administrator, 

» " This meeting of Members of Parliament and others invites the serious 
attention of His Majesty's Government to the difficulties placed by the 
Russian Government in the way of Mr. Shuster's efforts to reorganize 
Persian finance, and offers His Majesty's Government their support in 
any action His Majesty's Government may see fit to take, as signatories 
of the Anglo-Russian Convention, to support Mr. Shuster." 

That was the resolution, and I am sorry to say that it only received 
a somewhat curt acknowledgment. That was in November. Those, of 
course, who follow events in Persia know that the despatch of that Reso- 
lution was followed pretty promptly by the issue of an ultimatum by the 
Russian Government to that of Persia, and then by the issue of a second 
ultimatum, which demanded the dismissal of Mr. Shuster. I still do not 
know the precise grounds upon which the Russian Government demanded 
his dismissal. I think a good deal of light ought to be thrown in 
Parliament upon that interesting point. But what, after all, concerns 
us most nearly is the attitude which was taken up towards Mr. Morgan 
Shuster by our own Government. (Hear, hear.) Sir Edward Grey, in 
the recent debate on Persia in the House of Commons, which took place 
as recently as the 14th of December last, stated to us pretty fully the 
nature of that attitude. I should just like to read you his words. He 
said : " The first demand of the Russian Government is that Mr. Shuster, 
the Financial Adviser to the Persian Government, should be withdrawn. 
We have said that we cannot object to that demand, and I will explain 
to the House why. A short time ago, to take only a most recent inci- 
dent, I received news by telegram to say that Mr. Shuster had appointed 



APPENDIX— E 401 

three British officials in Persia as Treasury officials in important places. 
I quite admit Mr. Shuster's ability and his good intentions, but you can- 
not have the spirit or the intention of the Anglo-Russian Agreement 
upset by the action of any individual, however well intentioned. What 
advice I could give to avoid this I gave at the earliest possible moment; 
that advice having failed I, of course, have been absolutely powerless 
to support Mr. Shuster's action. Had I supported him " — I call your 
attention to these words — " Had I supported him, I should have been 
supporting him in the appointment of British officials in the Russian 
sphere of Persia, and I should at any rate have been breaking the 
spirit of the Anglo-Russian Agreement." 

Now, Ladies and Gentlemen, we are not here to deliver an attack upon 
our Foreign Secretary. Many of us have a warm personal regard for 
him, and I am sure that anything which I, or any other speaker, may 
say will be couched in language which at all events we shall have calcu- 
lated not to have any such effect. 

I should like in the first place to dwell upon the satisfactory part of 
this pronouncement, because it contains a satisfactory part. Our For- 
eign Secretary tells us, in the name of His Majesty's Government, that 
he quite admits Mr. Shuster's ability and his good intentions. Therefore, 
you see there is no question either as to Mr. Shuster's capacity or char- 
acter. The only question that we have to judge to-night — and which 
will have to be judged by larger audiences outside these walls — is this : 
whether or not Mr. Shuster has broken the spirit — there is no question 
of his having broken the letter — of the Anglo-Russian Agreement. 

.Now I scarcely know the exact date upon which our Foreign Secretary 
adopted this view of his, that Mr. Shuster had violated the spirit of the 
Agreement. Unless I be wrong — in that case he will correct me — Mr. 
Shuster, when he commenced to reorganize the administration of the 
Persian Treasury, approached our Foreign Office through our Minister at 
Teheran, and asked them whether they would have any objection to his 
appointing Major Stokes to reorganize the Treasury gendarmerie. Major 
Stokes, of course, is a British subject, and he was to take up his duties 
in Northern Persia. Now it is a matter of common knowledge that the 
reply which was handed to Mr. Shuster was to the effect that our Foreign 
Office saw no objection whatever to the appointment. When, therefore, 
did the change come over the attitude of our Foreign Secretary and what 
were the causes which brought it about ? When and why did he come 
to his later conclusion that British nationality is a bar to appointments 
in the Persian Civil Service in Northern Persia? There again is an- 
other question upon which we require light. But if I ask myself: "Did 
Mr. Shuster violate the spirit of the Anglo-Russian Convention in making 
these appointments in Northern Persia ? " then, as a careful student of 



402 APPENDIX— E 

that convention and of the declaration of policy issued in connection with 
it by His Majesty's Government, I answer without hesitation that there 
is nothing whatever in the spirit of that Agreement which would support 
a contention of that kind (cheers). We have had, quite a few days ago, 
a very interesting pronouncement as to the spirit of this Agreement by 
no less an authority than His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburg, 
Sir George Buchanan, who in the course of an eloquent speech, delivered 
on the occasion of the British visit to Russia, spoke as follows: He said 
" I cherish the hope that the Anglo-Russian entente will take root in the 
hearts of the two peoples. It is not by diplomatic acts that true ententes 
are made between nations; it is by feelings of friendship, sympathy and 
mutual confidence that peoples are attracted towards each other. Let our 
entente repose on this basis and nothing can shake it." I think we can 
all subscribe to those words of our Ambassador (hear, hear) and take 
them as an authoritative and a perfectly just exposition of the spirit 
which ought to animate the execution of the Anglo-Russian Agreement. 
So we have to ask ourselves: — when Mr. Shuster appointed these three 
Englishmen, was he violating the spirit of the Agreement, as defined by 
His Majesty's Ambassador and as explained by His Majesty's Ministers 
when defending the Convention before Parliament — a spirit namely of 
mutual confidence between Great Britain and Russia giving place to the 
old spirit of rivalry and suspicion? 

What did Mr. Shuster actually do? He appointed three Englishmen 
to subordinate positions in the Persian Treasury Service in three cities 
of Persia: Tabriz, Isfahan and Shiraz. Now Tabriz is sixty miles from 
the nearest Russian frontier and is the emporium of the great British 
trade with the north of Persia. Isfahan is hundreds of miles from any 
Russian frontier, and it is the terminus of two of the greatest of the 
British trade routes from the Gulf; Shiraz is within the area of what we 
may call the Gulf region. How could Mr. Shuster have known, when 
he was making those appointments of Englishmen in cities of that de- 
scription, in subordinate posts, that he was violating the spirit of the 
Anglo-Russian Convention (cheers) ? Ladies and Gentlemen, just let us 
consider the matter a little more closely. The Russian sphere, as drawn 
in the Anglo-Russian Agreement, is a sphere drawn for commercial pur- 
poses. It has nothing whatever to do with appointments to their Civil 
Service made by the Persian Government. Nothing whatever. Think 
what it would mean if we were to subscribe to the doctrine that no 
British subject can be appointed by the Persian Government within the 
Russian sphere! Why, it would mean that throughout a territory with 
an area greater than that of France, containing the capital and all the 
principal cities of Persia — throughout that immense area the fact that 
a man might happen to be a British subject would constitute an effectual 



APPENDIX— E 403 

bar to his employment in the Persian Service. ( Shame ! ) Ladies and 
Gentlemen, suppose that any of you were to go out to Persia and were 
to desire to take up an appointment in the Persian Civil Service. Sup- 
pose they were to tell you : " House full, no applications received," and 
you were to demur to that, and they were to say : " Well, we are very 
sorry, we should like to have your services, but there are reasons against 
it." Then, if you inquired further, they might say to you : " Well, we 
refer you to the Russian Legation." (Laughter.) And, if you went to 
the Russian Legation, what would be the reply that you would receive? 
You would be told, I have no doubt in a very pleasant way, that the 
reason why you could not be appointed was that the Governments of 
Great Britain and Russia had signed a Convention; that this Convention 
was intended to inaugurate an era of reciprocal confidence and trust 
between those two great Powers, and that for that very reason you, a 
British subject, would never be allowed to enter the Persian Service any- 
where nearer to the Russian frontier than a distance equal to the length 
and breadth of France (loud laughter) and that you would have to 
hand over your prospects of employment to the Russian, to the German, 
to the Italian, to the Belgian, to the Swede — they all would be welcome, 
but in the new halcyon era of Anglo-Russian confidence every Englishman 
would be shut out. (Cheers and laughter.) 

Mow I want to carry your minds from that point to another. I want 
to ask you to consider what were the circumstances which brought Mr. 
Shuster to Persia. I was very closely connected with those circum- 
stances, and, therefore, you may excuse me if I tell you very briefly what 
exactly it was that brought Mr. Shuster there. At the commencement 
of the year 1909 the Persian people, seeing that their monarchy, a dynasty 
of Turcoman rulers, was falling upon evil days, seeing that their country 
was being sold, as they put it, to foreigners, owing to the large amount 
of foreign loans that were being raised — the Persian people determined 
to put an end to this state of things. They had before them the example 
of the West, and their aim was to infuse new life into their political 
institutions. They organized two expeditions, one from the North, the 
other from the South; and in July, 1909, was consummated in Persia 
an almost bloodless revolution, the result of which was that the reigning 
monarch, Mohammed Ali, was forced to take refuge in the Russian Lega- 
tion, and a Constitutional regime was established — or rather, I ought 
to say, restored, because it had had a very short life before. 

But the new Government found itself in this predicament. Here was 
a people which had existed for centuries under an absolute despotism — 
a despotism which had crushed out all the elements of vitality in the 
nation, which had prevented all young Persians from traveling to Europe, 
which, whenever a man showed signs of integrity, capacity or independ- 



404 APPENDIX— E 

ence, put him on the shelf, or proscribed him. Here was a country 
which had long lain under the heel of the despot — and, where the heel 
of the despot has once trodden, the seeds of national life are slow to 
sprout and still more slow to bear fruit. It was out of ground of that 
kind that the Persian Government had to call forth a new race of admin- 
istrators and law-givers. They recognized that they could not do that 
at once, and they said to themselves, and I think rightly: Let us go 
to the West, let us take from the West our first lessons in civil order 
and administration. Let us find there men to recognize our great ad- 
ministrative departments, and to train up a new generation of Persian 
Officials. Ladies and Gentlemen, in pursuing that course, Persia was 
merely copying the example of Japan; and is there any one here who 
would be inclined to throw a stone at the Japanese people because they 
called into their councils foreign administrators — administrators from 
the West — to inculcate some of the lessons of Western civilization ? 

Well, their first necessity was the reform of their financial system. 
They turned for help in this department, in the first instance, I think, 
to France. M. Pichon was then Foreign Minister. M. Pichon was quite 
willing to send them a Financial Mission; but obstacles were raised by 
Russian diplomacy in Paris, and these overtures came to nothing. Italy 
was also approached, with a view to despatching a mission to reorganize 
the Gendarmerie. Here, again, the Persian overtures were brought to 
nothing. Persian statesmen then bethought themselves that, perhaps, the 
same impediments might not be operative in the United States of Amer- 
ica. They applied to the President of a Free Republic, and he sent them 
Mr. Morgan Shuster ( cheers ) . That accounts for Mr. Shuster's presence 
in Persia. 

Let me say one word as to the nature of his work. It has been said 
that Mr. Shuster endeavored to upset the Anglo-Russian Agreement. 
Now I think that is the exact contrary of the fact. I had the bad 
fortune to be kept all last summer in London — you know it was a very 
hot summer, and I had to be in attendance all August and September 
in London, where I was in constant communication by telegraph with Mr. 
Shuster in connection with railway operations in Persia. All through 
those negotiations it was Mr. Shuster's aim to reconcile the railway 
policy of the Persian Government with the provisions of the Anglo- 
Russian Agreement. He went further, and he was prepared to use his 
great influence over the Medjlis in order to induce them to accept — as 
regards British and Russian participation in railway construction — those 
commercial spheres which were delimited by the Convention. Mr. Shuster 
proved himself an excellent friend to the Convention, in so far as its 
objects were public and avowed. 

Then what was the real reason for his dismissal? It can be expressed 



APPENDIX— E 405 

in a sentence — not one of my own coining, but extracted from a letter 
which 1 received some time ago from a countryman, resident in Persia, 
who is not a sympathizer with the Nationalist or Democratic Party. It 
was penned immediately after Mr. Shuster's dismissal, and it runs : — 
" Mr. Shuster's mission was doomed at its inception, seeing that a pros- 
perous Persia would have brought about a weakened Russian control." 

In conclusion, Ladies and Gentlemen, what are our objects in giving 
this dinner? First of all, what are not our objects? I need scarcely tell 
you that we of the Persia Committee are not in any way animated by 
feelings of hostility towards the Russian people. Most of us, I imagine, 
are great admirers of the Russian people. If we could summon to this 
table the great spirits of Russian thought and of Russian literature — 
the Tolstoys, the Tourgenieffs and the rest — why, they would all be 
on our side! (Cheers.) At this very moment the Liberal Press of 
Russia are writing articles on Persian affairs, which, if you were to 
translate them, might almost have been taken from the columns of the 
Daily News or the Manchester Guardian. The representatives of Labor 
in the Russian Duma — speaking for the coming force in politics not only 
in Russia, but all over the world — have gone so far as to refuse to 
participate in the reception of the British visitors, on the ground that 
Great Britain is joining with their own Government in stamping out an 
ancient people like the Persians. 

It is sometimes said that we of the Persia Committee are bent on 
destroying the Anglo-Russian Agreement. That is a deliberate and it 
is a wicked falsehood. We are not out for the destruction of the Agree- 
ment; but we are out for its loyal fulfilment. (Cheers.) Hostility to 
Russia, destruction of the Agreement — those are not our objects : How, 
then, can they be defined? First, we have come here to receive at first 
hand from Mr. Morgan Shuster an account from the inside, culled from 
his own experience and insight, of the situation in Persia. He will be 
able to state how far in his opinion the Persian people are capable of 
effecting their own regeneration, provided that they be given elbow-room 
and breathing-space by their two powerful neighbors. Our second object 
is, perhaps, a more personal one. It is to give expression to our appre- 
ciation of the high purpose which distinguished Mr. Shuster's work in 
Persia, and to our sympathy with him in the untoward circumstances 
which brought that work to a premature close. We are also hoping, 
by this demonstration of our appreciation and of our sympathy with Mr. 
Shuster, to dispel any doubts which may be felt by our kinsmen across 
the Atlantic as to the sentiments of the British nation towards this dis- 
tinguished citizen of the United States. It is with these objects in mind 
that I ask you to raise your glasses and to drink to the health of Mr. 
Morgan Shuster. (Cheers.) 



406 APPENDIX 

F. 

Two Articles Republished from The "Nation. 
I. "THE LOST INDEPENDENCE OF PERSIA." 

Two weeks ago there seemed to be for one brief moment a ray of 
hope in the Persian situation. Persia lay, indeed, under the menace of 
a Russian invasion. But there came from Lord Curzon a plea for a 
change in British policy, as weighty as it was unexpected. The Persians 
threw themselves upon our mercy, and, whether from calculation or from 
sympathy, the good offices of our diplomacy were placed at their disposal. 
If our Foreign Office had been capable of firmness in its dealings with 
a slippery and unscrupulous partner, and if there had existed in the 
minds of Russian statesmen the smallest intention of obliging a friendly 
and singularly complacent associate, the invasion must at once have been 
checked, and Persia, at the cost of some humiliation, must at least have 
kept her territory intact. We fear that these hopes are ended. The Rus- 
sians have proved themselves implacable and disobliging. They have 
turned a deaf ear alike to the apologies of Persia and the mediation of 
Great Britain. Their armies continue to advance on Teheran, and their 
diplomacy at length avows a claim which destroys forever the pretense 
that Persia is a sovereign state. This would not in itself be decisive. 
But, on Monday, Sir Edward Grey defined his own attitude. In a speech 
rather fuller and rather franker than any he has yet delivered, there is 
not a sentence which can be interpreted even as a faint depreciation of 
Russian action, not a word to limit her drastic intervention, not a hint 
of resentment at the rejection by Russia of the counsels of moderation 
which apparently he gave, not a phrase which could assist the Persians 
in saving something from the wreck of their national fortunes. The case 
is even worse than this. Sir Edward Grey has not merely gone out of 
his way to make a wholly gratuitous defense of the action which Russia 
is now taking; he has explicitly sanctioned and adopted the stealthy 
extension of the Anglo-Russian compact which underlies the whole of 
the Russian aggression. So far as the wording of that treaty goes, it 
provides for the division of Persia into economic spheres, within which 
each power binds itself not to compete with the other for concessions. We 
have never thought that arrangement compatible with the integrity and 
independence of Persia, and we have always argued that it would be 
stretched, and must be stretched, into a political partition. At length, 
the avowal has been made, and made apparently without any conscious- 
ness that the terms of the compact have been left behind. The word 
" political " has been subtly introduced by Sir Edward Grey to describe 



APPENDIX— F 407 

the character of the particular interests which each power reserves to 
itself in its own sphere. When once that word is used, the independence 
of Persia is gone, and its partition virtually accomplished. 

It may be advisable to set forth very briefly the grounds of the quar- 
rel between Mr. Shuster and the Russian Government, which is the 
pretext for this intervention. The quarrel dates almost from his arrival 
in the country, and it has passed through many phases. It began with 
an attempt by Russia to veto his demand that, as Financial Controller, 
the customs payments should pass through his hands. The next phase 
was a steady, detailed effort to prevent him from increasing Persian 
revenues from direct taxation, by shielding of Russian proteges, the 
Persian grandees who had hitherto evaded their taxes. Then came the 
Russian veto on the appointment of Englishmen versed in the Persian 
language, and trusted by the Persian people, to posts under the Treasury 
in Northern Persia. We are not sure that Mr. Shuster was altogether 
wise to press these appointments in the absence of any backing either 
from Mr. Taft or from Sir Edward Grey. But, as a matter of right, he 
did well. Here was a test case as to the meaning of the agreement. If 
Persia is still an independent state, she may appoint whom she pleases 
to supervise the collection of her taxes. If Britain and Russia are bound 
only to respect each other's monopoly in economic concessions in their 
respective spheres, then clearly the nationality of a tax collector is not 
a matter affected by their bargain. But if it is political predominance 
which they claim north and south of two arbitrary lines, then clearly the 
sending of an English official into the Russian sphere may be regarded, as 
both parties to the Treaty do regard it, as a breach of its spirit, if not 
of its letter. 

This episode served finally to define the political character of the 
partition. Next came the Shuau's-Saltana incident, over which Sir 
Edward Grey passed lightly. Not even the Times has attempted a defense 
of Russian action here. If a Persian Government may not send Per- 
sian gendarmes to serve a warrant on a Persian subject who is its 
debtor, it has ceased to be the sovereign of its own territory. This 
incident led to the Russian invasion, but the pretext for the continu- 
ance of the Russian march after the Persian Government, under British 
advice, had tendered an apology, and for the presentation of new Russian 
demands, whose acceptance Sir Edward Grey will, we suppose, again 
counsel, is that Mr. Shuster meanwhile had circulated a translation 
of the Times letter, in which he defended himself against Russian criti- 
cisms, and made with deadly effect some countercharges against Russian 
agents for the assistance they had given to the ex-Shah. It seems to be 
doubtful whether Mr. Shuster was personally responsible for circulating 
this document. But if a little country may be invaded by a great power 



408 APPENDIX— F 

because a foreign official in its service has ventured to write a reasoned 
and temperate letter to the Times, in reply to editorial attacks of semi- 
official British and Kussian newspapers, we must revise all our concep- 
tions of international intercourse. If a German official had written to 
the Times to deny McKenna's charges of accelerated shipbuilding, should 
we have been entitled to treat his letter as a casus belli? It is a case 
of the wolf and the lamb, so flagrant and so cynical, that one is hardly 
tempted to analyze it further. 

The plain fact is that Russia from the first has determined to thwart 
Mr. Sinister, because he displayed an American energy and fearlessness, 
which would soon have made Persia solvent and well governed. He was 
not the man to succumb without a struggle, and in the end the Russian 
sword has got the better of Mr. Shuster's pen. The episode ends in the 
formal presentation at a bayonet's point of a Russian demand, which 
Sir Edward Grey justified in his speech on Tuesday, for the recognition 
of a Russian right to put her veto on the employment of foreigners in 
Persia. With that claim, the powers have formally torn up their guar- 
antees of Persian independence. The usual loan to pay the usual in- 
demnity for the Russian invasion will be the next step, and, with the 
installation of a foreign official supervisor subservient to Russia, her dic- 
tatorship in Teheran will be finally established. The next question will, 
of course, be how far we are prepared to allow Southern Persia to be 
governed from Teheran after that city has become a center of Russian 
policy. In the end, the logic of partition must be followed, and some 
separate political organization provided for the South. A British sphere 
can hardly be administered from a city wholly dominated by Russian 
Cossacks, Russian diplomatists, Russian financiers, and foreign inspect- 
ors subject to a Russian veto. Our own procedure has been less drastic, 
less brutal, less hasty than that of our partner. But, because we have 
acquiesced in what she has done, we shall sooner or later be forced to 
imitate it. The lapse of a few years will almost inevitably see us as 
openly in occupation of the South as Russia is of the North, and the 
nightmare which has haunted generations of Anglo-Indian soldiers will 
at length have been realized with our own consent. Russian and British 
armies will confront each other across a vague land frontier and we 
shall have become in the military sense a Continental Power, with Russia 
and Turkey and their vast conscript armies for our uneasy neighbors. 

Had it been possible to argue this Persian question on its merits, the 
history of recent years would have followed a totally different course. 
With or without an agreement, we should have held Russia to a policy 
of abstention in Persian affairs. We have, from first to last, violated 
our natural instincts of chivalry, our liberal principles of respect for 
nationality, and every sane calculation based on our Eastern interests. 



APPENDIX— F 409 

Disastrous and foolish, though we believe this policy to be, we do not 
call it unintelligible. It is a consequence, and one of the worst con- 
sequences, of Sir Edward Grey's European policy. One simple and ele- 
mentary principle has governed it from the first — his dread lest this 
or the other power might be drawn into what he has called the " orbit " 
of German diplomacy. Year in, year out, we have been paying, chiefly 
in other people's goods, for the satisfaction of keeping certain Powers 
from coming to any intimate understanding with Germany. The French 
side of the account is represented by the Moroccan transaction and its 
sequels. To .Russia we have given a free hand over the greater part of 
Persia. It was a large price to pay for anything. But what has been 
gained, even on the low plane of such diplomatic huckstering? Russia 
was the more or less reliable ally of France when the chapter opened. 
To-day no one even suggests that she would have intervened with arms, 
had war resulted from the Agadir incident. For that we are far from 
blaming her. But the fact is that we have failed to keep her even 
where she originally was within the Franco-British " orbit." She came 
to terms with Germany at Potsdam, and neither a free hand in Persia 
nor even the rain of British gold which falls upon all her investments 
and enterprises avails to buy her loyalty. The reason is simple. We 
cannot assist her in the military difficulties to which our policy may 
at any moment expose her. Our failure to make good our violent words 
in the Bosnian crisis settled that forever. We are playing a continental 
role without continental resources, and from great ambition based on 
unsuitable means there must issue in the end either the humiliation of 
a surrender or the disaster of a defeat. When we are driven to pay 
so high a price as Persia to secure the bare neutrality of Russia, it is 
evident that our star is not in the ascendant. — From The Nation (Lon- 
don), December 2, 1911. 

II. "THE PERSIAN SUPPLIANT." 

In the days when the predatory instincts of mankind were qualified by 
a tradition of chivalry, the suppliant enjoyed certain rights which it was 
the pride of the strong to respect. A wretch who embraced the knees 
of a Homeric chieftain became from that moment a protege, whose life 
and cause he was bound by honor to defend. A fugitive who flings him- 
self on the mercy of an Albanian clan may count upon it to espouse 
his interests as though they were its own. These are the pretty manners 
of savages; modern diplomacy has evolved its own code of honor and 
decency. Two weeks ago Persia, menaced by a Russian invasion, per- 
formed the conventional rites, made herself a suppliant at our doors, and 
embraced the stony knees of Downing Street. We accepted the flatter- 



410 APPENDIX— F 

ing but responsible position. We gave her sage, though by no means 
heroic, advice. We recommended her to conform to Russian demands, 
which even our diplomatists cannot have thought equitable, and we bade 
her go in sackcloth and ashes to apologize for the offense of being so 
obviously in the right. The advice was followed, and the Persians in 
their simplicity supposed that our influence would then be used to stay 
the Russian advance. If pity did not move us, one might have supposed 
that pride would have prompted us to aid them. They had followed our 
unpalatable counsels, they had made what we considered an adequate 
reparation to Russia. It seemed to follow that our prestige, if not our 
honor, required us to protect them from further exactions and aggres- 
sions. The event has taught them that one should not rashly assume 
that a modern Foreign Secretary will act with the spirit of a Homeric 
chief or an Albanian brigand. We have done nothing to protect them, 
but, on the other hand, we cannot be accused of mere inaction or indif- 
ference. We have, it appears, approved of the further exactions of our 
Russian partner. He has presented three demands — the dismissal of Mr. 
Sinister, the acceptance by Persia of an Anglo-Russian veto on all de- 
nominations of foreign experts, and the payment of an indemnity to com- 
pensate Russia for her trouble in pressing these demands by an armed 
invasion. Of these claims, the first two have been presented with our 
acquiescence, and apparently with our approval, and the second of them 
establishes for us a privilege which we shall share with Russia. Our 
magnanimity is triumphantly vindicated by the reserves which we have 
expressed against the Russian demand for money. We have suffered 
the suppliant to be torn from our knees; we have joined in violating his 
rights. We save our honor by averting our eyes while his pockets are 
rilled at the conclusion of the process. 

Public opinion has not authorized the Government which acts in its 
name to follow a policy at once so mean and weak as this. Sir Edward 
Grey cannot be wholly indifferent to the wishes of his countrymen, and 
his policy may yet be reversed. It is worth while to show that the 
instinctive disgust which every normally constituted Englishman feels 
at this climax of a disastrous course is based on reasonable grounds. 
It is hardly necessary to how that the Anglo-Russian demands involve 
a violation of Persian sovereignty. To require the dismissal of Mr. 
Shuster because he dared to defend himself in the Times against the 
scurrilous personal attacks of the Russian press, is an act which any 
self-respecting nation would treat as an attempt at coercion and inter- 
ference to which in the last resort war would be the only possible reply. 
But this is not the most fundamental of the three demands. A nation 
may be coerced by invasion or the threat of invasion into an isolated 
compliance with the will of the stronger power, and yet retain its inde- 



APPENDIX— F 411 

pendence, subject only to the risk of a repetition of the aggression. But 
the second demand renders the interference normal and continuous. 
Persia is so unluckily situated that she must employ foreigners to reor- 
ganize her armed forces and her finances. She cannot hope in any other 
way to achieve rapid and effective reform, and on no other terms could 
she secure the loans which she requires in foreign money markets. Mr. 
Shuster's integrity and strength of will was an asset which entirely satis- 
fied the bankers. So long as Persia was allowed to go to neutral and 
disinterested powers for such assistance, her independence remained in- 
tact. The new condition, imposed as much by Sir Edward Grey as by 
Russia, will henceforth enable them to force upon her foreign experts 
who will be their agents. It matters little whether they confine their 
choice to men of British and Russian birth; their object manifestly is 
to secure nominees who will be the tools of their policy. They will stand 
behind these men, and Persia must unavoidably be bound to do their 
bidding. We rule in Egypt by no other means. Our agents give " ad- 
vice " — they hold in the civil departments no executive authority — but 
it is advice which the Egyptian Government is expected to accept. At the 
least, this condition is a gross infringement of Persian sovereignty; it 
will probably amount in practice to a dual control not less drastic than 
our single control in Egypt, 

So far have we traveled since 1907. We cannot refrain from citing the 
despatch in which our Minister explained to the apprehensive Persian 
Government the meaning of the Anglo-Russian Convention. The object 
of the despatch was to assure the Persians that the Convention would 
lead neither to intervention nor partition. Sir Edward Grey and Mons. 
Isvolvsky, it declared, were in " perfect accord," that " neither of the 
two Powers will interfere in Persian affairs, unless some injury is 
inflicted on the property or persons of their subjects." No principle could 
be plainer than this, yet from first to last no suggestion has been made 
that this occasion for intervention has arisen. We need not consider 
whether Mr. Shuster was well advised in choosing British subordinates, 
or in attempting to levy taxes on Persian grandees, or in writing to 
the Times. .Nothing which he has done has touched the person or prop- 
erty of a Russian subject. Nor can it be urged that we are not our 
brother's keeper. We have, in fact, approved the Russian intervention. 
But, if we had merely tolerated it, we should still have violated our own 
interpretation of the obligations which we assumed in the Convention. 
The despatch concluded by assuring Persia that the two Powers desired 
to " ensure her independence forever," and it went on : 

" Not only do they not seek a pretext for intervention, but 
their aim in these friendly negotiations is not to permit one 



412 APPENDIX— F 

another to intervene in Persia on the pretext of safeguarding their 
own interests." 

If this sentence meant anything at all, it was intended to suggest to 
the Persians that the Anglo-Russian partnership was actually a league 
for the protection of Persia, in which each partner would check the 
other if he were tempted unduly to intervene. We are breaking our 
word to-day, and breaking it with a wanton completeness. Russia in- 
tervenes against her own pledge, and not only do we permit her to do 
so; we actually endorse their action. We promised that Persia should 
be " forever delivered from the fear of foreign intervention," and that 
she should " enjoy complete freedom to manage her affairs in her own 
way." Pour years later, we insist that we shall nominate the foreigners 
who are to manage those affairs in our way. The ascendancy which 
Sir Edward Grey has retained over public opinion in this country during 
his anxious and ill-starred years of office rested, we believe, rather on 
his character than on his talents. No one has said of him that he was 
subtle, or adroit, or expert, or possessed of encyclopedic knowledge. But 
on his stability, his caution, and above all upon his honor, the nation 
builded. The final betrayal of Persia would not be the expression of su'ih 
a character. 

The act is not yet completed, and we refuse to recognize that it is 
inevitable. The brief and embarrassed replies of the Foreign Office to 
questions reveal that it is ill at ease, and Lord Morley's reply to Lord 
Curzon suggests at least a change of tone, which is even echoed in the 
Times. Let us hope that it is groping to find a way of escape. Some of 
the consequences, if the act should be consummated, are generally under- 
stood. It means, in moral and intellectual damage, perhaps the worst 
blow which our prestige could suffer in the East. For no one thinks that 
we have been wilfully base. We appear as the weak partner who dares 
not. cheek a powerful and unscrupulous associate. It means in fresh 
commitments a burden at which the advocates of conscription must 
secretly rejoice, for it draws the real boundary of India across the sandy 
wastes of Central Persia, with Russian Cossacks confronting our Indian 
Cavalry upon a vague and indefensible frontier. It contains the possi- 
bilities of acute disputes with Russia, to which our present pusillanimity 
make a sorry preface. One-third of Persia is neutral territory, and 
within it is the greater part of the Gulf coast-line. When Russia domi- 
nates Teheran, who is to control this no-man's land? But of all the 
consequences latent in this situation, perhaps the gravest is the likeli- 
hood that Germany will demand the usual compensation. Russia has 
bought a free hand for herself at Potsdam. But we have not yet paid 
the usual toll. This remote Asiatic question may become, at any mo- 



APPENDIX— F 413 

ment, a European problem, and if that should happen, we m«iy find that 
Turkey, the neighbor of Persia and Egypt, will be deeply interested in 
the resulting " conversations." The Persians, indeed, are impotent to 
resent our share in strangling their national existence at its birth, 
and it will not be from motives of chivalry that another Power will 
embarrass us. But empires are commonly expected to submit to black- 
mail for an outrage on nationality. It is into some such embroilment as 
this that our complaisance to Russia may drag us. From this train of 
disasters Sir Edward Grey can yet escape. He can enter the most em- 
phatic protest against the Eussian ultimatum. He can demand the with- 
drawal from Persian soil by a fixed date, not merely of the new forces, 
but also of the garrisons permanently settled at Tabriz and other centers. 
He can declare that the invasion is a breach of the whole spirit of the 
convention. The mere intimation by private diplomatic channels of 
an intention to take this course would probably suffice. But, if it did 
not, it is time to ask for some return from France for the gift we made 
to her of a North African Empire. Russia could not survive a coldness 
which would close to her at once the Paris Bourse and the London money 
market. The means of dealing with this anxious situation are at Sir 
Edward Grey's disposal, if only he will bring himself to be half as 
rough with a disloyal partner as he was with an open, honest rival. A 
leading article in the Times, backed by another in the Temps, would prob- 
ably avail to check the pace of the Russian advance. We can use such 
expedients to enslave the Moors. Let us use them to free the Persians. — 
From The Nation (London), December 9, 1911. 



INDEX 



Abbas Aqua, shoots Atabak, the 
prime minister, xxv 

Aiwan-i-Kaif, 124 

Alau'd-Dawla, 158, 175, 298; por- 
trait of, 51; assassination of, 176 

Alau's-Saltana, Minister of Public 
Instruction, 100 

American financial administrators, 
Persia decides to obtain, 3; efforts 
of, ridiculed, 35; opposed by for- 
eign powers, 53; end of work, 
230, 268; incidents of departure, 
319, 320 

American State Department its re- 
lation to the financial advisers 
employed by the Persian govern- 
ment, 4, 5 

Aminu's-Sultan (Atabak-i-Azam), 
Prime Minister, character of, 
xxiv; assassinated, August 31, 
1907, xxv, 11; portrait of, xxxi 

Amir Azam, Vice-Minister of War, 
16, 60, 62, 65; portrait of, 63 

Amir Bahadur Jang, xxxvii 

Amir-i-Mufakhkham, 123, 206; por- 
trait of, 208 

Amir-Mujahid, 124, 158, 206; por- 
trait of, 208, 256 

Amnieh, Persian road guards, pic- 
ture of, 144 

Anglo-French entente of 1905, 252 

Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, 
effect on Persian people, xxvi, 
xxxiii; text of, xxvi; Persia not a 
party to, xxxiii; Sir Cecil Spring- 
Rice's communication on, to the 
Persian Government, xxxiii, 272, 
275 ; breach of promise of by 
both countries, xxxvii, 84, 104, 
110; nullified by Potsdam Agree- 
ment, lvi ; purport of, 47 ; did not 
define special interests, 74; pur- 
ported "spirit" of, 78; Russia's 



secret understanding with Ger- 
many about, 251, 257; results of, 
259; "One British View Of"; 
speech by H. F. B. Lynch of the 
Persia Committee, at dinner given 
Sinister in London, 399 

Anjumans, see Secret societies. 

Anti-American Society, 66 

Arbab Kaikhosro, 16, 98; portrait 
of, 244 

Arbad Jemshid, 11 

Arshadu'd-Dawla, 107, 116, 124, 
128; portrait of, 119, 126, 131; 
execution of, 129; character of, 
130 

Asiatic diplomatic field in 1911, 252 

Astarabad, 135 

Atabak-i-Azam, see Aminu's-Sultan. 

Atabak Park, Shuster's residence, 
11, 104, 121, 225; pictures of, 
14, 46, 327 

Aynu'd-Dawla, the Shah dismisses, 
xx ; portrait of, xxvi. 

Ayvan, portrait of, lxi 

Azadu'1-Mulk, declared Regent, 
xlviii; death of, September 10, 
1910, lix; portrait of, 274 

Azarbayjan, province of, 278 

B. 

Bagdad railway concession, 253 

Bagh-i-Shah, Muhammad Ali takes 
refuge in, xxxviii 

Bahais, Americans accused of be- 
ing, 21 

Baker, chief, assassinated, 172 

Bakhtiyari tribesmen, side with 
Nationalists, xlv, 90; demands 
for money, 115, 124; bribed by 
Russia, 200; threaten Treasurer- 
general, 206, 212 

Baku, 159 

Banque d' Escompte de Perse, see 
Russian State Bank 



415 



416 



INDEX 



Barclay, Sir George, British Min- 
ister at Teheran, meets Shuster, 
32; favors Shuster's financial 
plans, 67, 68; the Stokes affair, 
70-78; intervention in execution 
of Majdu'd-Dawla, 99; proposes 
policing of Persia's southern trade 
routes, 123; delivers message con- 
cerning Mr. Lecoffre, 160; Joint 
Note of 1912, 329, 330; Shuster's 
correspondence with, 372 

Baskerville, H. C, killed aiding Na- 
tionalists, xlv; portrait of, xlvii 

Beddoes, Colonel H. K., 117 

Belgian Customs officials harrass 
Treasurer-general, 68 

Bell, Edward, Secretary of Amer- 
ican Legation at Teheran, 225 

Bieberstein, Baron Marschall von, 
German diplomat at Constantino- 
ple, 253 

Bismarck, 258 

Bizot, M., employed to organize 
finances of Persia, 1; failure of, 
28. 

Blagovestchenk, 220 

Boycott against tobacco by Islamic 
clergy, xix; against anything 
Russian, 183, 189 

Bread situation, 170 

British Blue-Book, xxxv, 272, 331 

British foreign policy, 251-276, 331, 
332 

British Government, see England 

British Legation, attempts to em- 
barass Shuster, 27, 29; the Stokes 
incident, 70-80; joins Russian le- 
gation in forcing out American 
financial administrators, 319 

Browne, Professor E. G., author of 
" Persian Revolution," xvi, 4, 272 

Buinak, 229 

C. 

Cabinet, approves law concerning 
control of Imperial Bank loan of 
1911, 24; functions of, 47; atti- 
tude toward the law of June 13, 
1911, 55, 67; friction with the 
Medjlis, 62; "resignation" on 
July 2, 1911, 67; coalition cabinet 
formed on July 19, 85, 98; new 
cabinet formed on July 26, 99; 



approves Stokes contract, 100: 
slaughts of, on the treasury, 1 
marked hostility toward Shus 
116; agrees to payment of troops 
by the treasury, 121; Shuau's 
Saltana affair, 136, 159, 165; ac- 
tion on Russia's first ultimatum, 
158, 159, 161, .162; the second 
ultimatum,' 166, 167, 177, 178, 
181, 183; new cabinet, 165, 172, 
175; executes coup d'etat against 
Medjlis, 199 ; attitude toward 
Shuster, 205-210, 213, 214; dis- 
misses Shuster, 214-216, 224; ap- 
proves Shuster's fiscal plan, 308 
Cabinet ministers, character of, 239 
Cairns, E. S., Director of Taxation, 
9, 66, 121, 147, 223-225, 319, 320, 
323; portrait of, 7 
Charkovsky, Colonel, 293 
Chester, Admiral, 253 
Coinage system in Persia, 317 
Constantinople, Shuster meets Per- 
sians in, 36; German activity in, 
253 
Constitutional monarchy, estab- 
lished August 5, 1906, xix, xx, 
47 ; people poorly prepared to 
sustain, li; Russian minister pre- 
dicts overthrow, 108; sordid end- 
ing of, 200 
Cossack Brigade, xxxv, xxxvii, 
xxxviii, xlii, 290, 293; picture of, 
xxxviii. 
Curzon, Lord, 259, 264 
Customs tariff, 289, 313-315 

D. 

DabiruT-Mulk, Minister of Posts 
and Telegraphs, 100 

Darab Mirza, started movement to 
overthrow constitutional govern- 
ment, lii 

Dardanelles, 253, 257 

De facto government, 199 

Deficit, annual, 303; Mornard's at- 
tack on Shuster concerning cur- 
rent account of the treasury, 319 

Democratic Club at Teheran, picture 
of, 17 

Democratic party, 235 

Denghil Tepe, 220 

Diamantopoulos, M., 80 



INDEX 



417 



Dickey, Bruce G., Inspector of Tax- 
ation, 6, 9, 323 
Dillon, Dr. E. J., 269 
Diplomatic corps at Teheran, 37 

E. 

England, interference of in Persia, 
xxxvii; timidity of in Persia, li; 
"ultimatum" of October, 1910, 
Ivi; attitude in Stokes incident, 
70-80; sides with Russia on cus- 
toms funds, 83 ; requests protec- 
tion in Southern Persia, 122; ad- 
vises Persia to accept Russia's 
ultimatum, 162 ; waning influence 
in Turkey, 253; effect upon, of 
Potsdam agreement, 261; attitude 
toward Russia, 263; weakness of 
in Persian affairs, 247, 331-334; 
loan to Persia, Joint Note of 
March 18, 1912, 329; see also 
British foreign policy 

Enzeli, Russian troops at, 159, 223 

Ephraim Kahn, Armenian, leader of 
Nationalist forces, xlvi; out- 
manceuvers Royalists, xlviii; po- 
lices Teheran, xlix; surrounds 
Rahim Kah», lii; character of, 
86; military plans, 97; success 
against ex-Shah's forces, 127, 135 ; 
loses heart, 200; trouble with the 
Bakhtiyari, 209; pictures of, 81, 
144, 256, 279 

Esteklal, newspaper of Moderates, 
20 

European crisis, 248 

European diplomatic field in 1911, 
252 

F. 

Farajoolah Kahn, 103 

Farman Farma, 29S 

Fars, province of, 287 

Fighting men, picture of, 185 

Finance Regulations Commission, 
report of, 356 

Financial conditions in Persia, 1, 38, 
297, 316 

Financial law of June 13, 1911, 30, 
38, 49 ; attitude of foreign powers 
toward, 53; difficulties of en- 
forcing, 66, 68, 297 ; value of, 301 ; 
purpose of, 302; text of, 356 



Financial loans, see Loans 

Financial system planned by Sinis- 
ter, 49, 2*95-313 

Foreign debt, 48; better secured by 
law of June 13, 1911, 302 

Fundamental Laws of December, 
1906, 337; Supplementary, of 
October, 1907, 345. 

G. 

German North Sea Fleet, 248 

Germany, secret understanding with 
Russia, lvi, 253-261; interests in 
Persia, 53, 54; interests and policy 
in Asia, 253, 258; see also Pots- 
dam Agreement 

Ghavamu's-Saltana, Minister of Jus- 
tice, 85; Minister of Interior, 
100, 210; portrait of, 163 

Giers, M. de, 161 

Graft, 288, 294, 305 

Grey, Sir Edward, British Secre- 
tary of Foreign Affairs, on the 
nature of the Anglo-Russian Con- 
vention, xxxiii; attitude in 
Stokes incident, 78; attitude on 
the control of Persian customs 
funds, 83; attitude toward Le- 
coffre appointment, 160; favors 
Russian ultimatum, 169; charges 
against Shuster, 169; Shuster's 
reply, 268; Shuster's estimate of, 
248, 251-253; Shuster's interview 
with, 259; the Moroccan affair 
and forgetfulness of Persia, 267 ; 
the Joint Note to Persia, 1912, 
329 

Guard Eomayoon, 199 

Gulhak, 117 

H. 
Haase, Major, 94, 124; portrait of, 

279 
Hague Tribunal, 251 
Hajji Agha, portrait of, 51 
Hajji Husayn ibn Khalil, 184 
Hakimu'1-Mulk, Minister of Public 
Instruction, 85 ; Minister of Fi- 
nance, 99, 115 
Haldane, Lord, 259, 325 
Hartwig, M. de, Russian Minister 
at Teheran, threatens Persian gov- 
ernment, xxxvii 



418 



INDEX 



Hildebrand, M., Russian Vice-Con- 
sul, 147 

Hills, Ralph W., accountant, 6, 21 

Hjalmarsen, Colonel, portrait of, 72 

Hormuz Khan, 12 

Husayn Kuli Khan, the Nawwab, 
Persian Minister of Foreign Af- 
fairs, lvi; insulted by British and 
Prussian legations, lix; resigned, 
lix; letter to Persian Legation at 
Washington, 3; character of, 94, 
97; portrait of, 95 

I. 

Imamzadeh-Jaffar, 124 

Imperial Bank of Persia, 43, 44, 67, 
284, 318, 320, 321; loan of 1911, 
23, 290; law relating to control 
of loan, 24, 355 

Imperial Mint, 44, 318 

India, 166 

International brigandage, 247 

International Postal Convention, 
315 

Irani-Nob,, newspaper of Democrats, 
20 

Iswolsky, Alexander, Russian Min- 
ister of Foreign Affairs, xxvi, 
xxxiii 



Joint Note of Russian and British 
Legations, March, 1912, 329 

K. 

Kasvin, 183, 229 

Knox, Secretary of State, Washing- 
ton, letter to Shuster, 5 



Lansdowne, Lord, 252 
Laws, see Financial law; Funda- 
mental laws 
Lecoffre, M., Controlleur, 20, 21, 41, 

160, 210 
Liakhoff, Colonel, protects Shah, 

commands Shah's troops, xxxviii; 

virtual dictator of Teheran, xli; 

carries out designs of Czar, xli; 

surrenders to Nationalists, xlviii 
Liberal cabinet, of England, 248 
Loans, Imperial Bank, of 1911, 23, 

290; law relating to its control, 



24, 355; Shuster's plan for, 122, 
306; Joint Note of Russian and 
British Legations, March, 1912, 
329 

London Times, 107, 153, 154, 161, 
270, 276, 301; Shuster's open let- 
ter to, 154, 161, text, 358 

Lynch, H. F. B., speech at dinner 
given Shuster in London, January 
29, 1912, 399 

M. 

McCaskey, Charles J., Inspector of 
Provincial Revenues, 6, 31, 32, 
44, 224, 323; portrait of, 7 

Majdu'd Dawla, 99 

Map of Persia, facing page 4 

Marling, Mr., British Charge d' 
Affaires, threatens Persian gov- 
ernment, xxxvii 

Med j lis, see National Assembly 

Merrill, Colonel J. N., 124, 332 

Military operations against ex-Shah, 
116 

Mirza Ali Kuli Khan, Persian 
Charge d' Affaires at Washington, 
4, 121 

Mirza Muhammad Riza, assassinates 
Nasiru'd-Din Shah, xix 

Mirzayantz, portrait of, 244 

Moderate party, 235 

Moloney, Mr., London Times cor- 
respondent, 124 

Moore, W. A., London Times cor- 
respondent, xlv, 107, 117, 127; 
portrait of, xlvii 

Morley, Lord, 264 

Mornard, M., Administrator-general 
of Customs, 22, 289; irregularities 
in accounts of, 47, 53; refuses to 
recognize authority of Treasurer- 
general, 53, 67; yields, 69, 79; 
designated to succeed Shuster, 
224; threatens Cairns, 319; his 
charge against Americans con- 
cerning deficit in current account 
of Treasury, 319; plans for Trans- 
Persian Railroad, 326 

Moroccan affair, 166, 178, 267, 332 

Muawinu'd-Dawla, Minister of Fi- 
nance, 43, 85, 90, 93 

Muhammad Ali Shah, begins reign, 
January, 1907, xxiii; character of, 



INDEX 



419 



xxiii; portrait of, xxxi, xliv, lviii; 
attacked by press of Teheran, 
xxxv ; determines to destroy 
Medjlis, xxxv; attempt to assas- 
sinate, xxxvi; causes arrest of 
constitutionalists, xxxviii; abdi- 
cates throne, July 16, 1909, 
xlviii; formally deposed, xlviii; 
terms for leaving Persia, xlix; 
at Odessa, xlix, 83 ; plans to over- 
throw constitutional government, 
lix; efforts to regain throne, 83- 
134; proclamation offering re- 
ward for, 88, 89 

Muhammadan societies, 187 

Muhammadans, 226, 262, 332, 333 

Muin-Homayun, 115, 117, 134, 135 

Mullah Abdullah al-Mazandarani, 
184 

Mullah Muhammad Kazim al-Kho- 
rasani, 184 

Mullahs, conduct bast to force 
granting of constitution, xx 

Mumtazu'd-Dawla, Minister of Fi- 
nance, 15, 16, 20; portrait of, 51 

Mushiru'd-Dawla, Minister of Posts 
and Telegraphs, 85 ; portrait of, 
xxvi; Minister of Justice, 99, 189 

Mushiru's-Saltana, 176 

Mustawfi'l-Mamalik, 235 

Mutaminu'1-Mulk, portrait of, 249 

Mutashamu's-Saltana, Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, 15, 31, 85; por- 
trait of, 51; Acting Premier, 67; 
Medjlis asks for resignation of, 
99; attempt to get in cabinet, 
169; demonstration against, in 
the Medjlis, 172 

Muzaffaru'd-Din Shah, constitution 
established in reign of, xix, xx; 
death of, xxiii 

N. 

Naib Husayn, 135 

Names, complicated system of, xvi 

Nasiru'd-Din Shah, grants tobacco 
concession to British corporation, 
xix; assassinated, May, 1896, xix; 
portrait of. xix 

Nasiru'1-Mulk, Regent, organizes 
cabinet, xxvi ; detained with cab- 
inet by Shah, xxxv, lix; receives 
Shuster, 15; portrait of, 58, 233, 



291; threatens to leave Persia, 
61; approves fiscal reforms, 118; 
character of, 231; obsession of, 
235 

Nation, The, articles republished 
from, 406, 409 

National Assembly, people win 
right to elect, xx; first session, 
October, 1906, xxiii; makes plans 
to check Shah, xxiv; plans na- 
tional bank, xxiv; Muhammad 
Ali Shah plans to destroy, xxxv; 
people resent Shah's attempt to 
destroy, xxxvi; attacked by 
Shah's forces June 23, 1908, 
xxxviii; opens after restoration 
of constitutional government, 
xlix; seeks loan of Russia and 
England, Iv; approves Shuster's 
appointment, 6; sustains Shus- 
ter against M. Mornard, 24; 
passes fiscal law of June 13th, 
1911, 30; abolishes salt-tax, 34; 
real progressive movement of 
Persia, 36; powers of, 47; friction 
with Cabinet, 62; recognizes no 
" Spheres of influence," 80; ap- 
proves coalition cabinet, 85; de- 
clares martial law, 85 ; puts price 
on Muhammad Ali's and brothers' 
heads, 100, 103; employs more 
Americans, 161; almost disrupted, 
175; defies Russia, 183; attempts 
at conciliation, 1S8; destroyed, 
198, 199; pictures of building and 
grounds, 201 ; factional hatred in, 
236; character of deputies, 240; 
aim of, 241 ; truly representative, 
242 

National Bank, xxiv 

National council arranges terms for 
Muhammad Ali's leaving Persia, 
xlix 

Nationalists, resist cossacks, ar- 
rested, executed, xli; behavior of 
troops of, xlviii; fear for govern- 
ment, 85; success of troops of, 
127; body-guard of, 187; pictures 
of troops, 137, 149, 211, 265, 300 

Naus, M., Belgian, customs official, 
influence of checked by Medjlis, 
xxiv; dismissed by Shah, xxiv, 22; 
responsible for Persian fiscal bur- 



420 



INDEX 



dens, 23; portrait of, 26; tariff 
scheme of, 313 

Nicolson, Sir Arthur, British Am- 
bassador, xxvi 

Nizamu's-Saltana, Prime Minister, 
xxxvi, 97 

Nizatu's-Saltana, Lady, 168 

Novoe Vremya, Russian newspaper, 
78, 220 

P. 

Passport Bureau, 284, 289 

Pension system, 308-311; redemp- 
tion plan, 306, 312 

Persia, not a party to Anglo-Rus- 
sian Convention, xxxv; physical 
characteristics, lvi; political di- 
visions, 42; political situation, 
47; strategic position, 262; in- 
jured by tariff discriminations, 
314; by concessions to foreigners, 
315 

Persia Committee, dinner to Sinis- 
ter, address by H. F. B. Lynch, 
399; by Shuster, 270 

Persian army, 41, 86 3 304 

Persian artillery, pictures of, 149, 
185 

Persian Defense Society of Calcutta, 
188 

Persian exiles, 36 

Persian Gulf, 262 

Persian officials, characteristics of, 
35; corruption of, 294, 304 

Persian people, ignorance and irre- 
sponsibility, li; character and 
capacity of, 239-245; Shuster's 
tribute to, 203 

Petroff, M., Russian Vice-Consul, 
147 

Pokhitanoff, M. ? lvi, 147, 151 

Poklewski-Koziell, M., Russian Min- 
ister at Teheran, 32, 66, 117, 148, 
153, 157, 219, 330; explanation 
of Russia's second ultimatum, 
167; correspondence with Shuster, 
388 

Political affairs, peculiarities of, in 
Persia, xv 

Political parties, 189, 190 

Port Arthur, 257 

Posts and Telegraphs, Ministry of, 
284, 289 



Potsdam Agreement of November, 
1910, lvi; secrets of, 253; pro- 
visions of, 254; significance of, 
259; effects of on England, 262; 
cause of Persia's downfall, 267 

Press, Persian, 19, 20, 245 

Preuss, Major, 324, 325 

Public debt, 43, 44 

Q. 
Quadt, Count, German Minister at 
Teheran, 53 

R. 

Rahim Kahn, xlv, lii 

Railroad development in Persia, 
307, 318, 325, 326 

Rashidu'1-Mulk, 111 

Regent, functions of, 47 

Religion of Persia, official, Moham- 
medanism, 305 

Representative government, hopes 
for, revived, xlix 

Reskt, massacre at, 223; army of, 
301 

Reuter's News Agency, 124 

Revenue, sources of 2 42, 277, 289; 
mortgage on, 290; difficulties of 
collecting, 293; customs tariff, 
2S9, 313-315 

Revolution of 1906, resume of, xvi- 
xx 

Royalists, struggles of, with Na- 
tionalists, following destruction of 
Med j lis, xlii; take refuge at Rus- 
sian Legation, 94 

Ruski Slovo, Russian newspaper, 
238 

Russell, Charles W., American Min- 
ister at Teheran, 10, 15, 16 

Russia, threatens Medjlis, xxv; in- 
terference in Persia, xxxvii, xlvi; 
troops of, in Tabriz, xlvi; hos- 
tility toward new Medjlis, li; bad 
faith of, revealed, lv, 118, 148; 
enabled by Potsdam agreement to 
adopt drastic attitude, lvi; petty 
tyranny of, lix; attempts to pre- 
vent Shuster's appointment, 5; 
attitude in Stokes incident, 75, 
103; connives in Muhammad 
Ali's plans to regain throne, 104; 
violates neutrality, 110; ignores 



INDEX 



421 



Persian protests, 112; openly aids 
Persian rebels, 157; threatens to 
seize Persian territory, 159; ulti- 
matum to Persia, 157, 159, 161, 
162 ; second ultimatum, 166, 169, 
177, 181, 182, 223; pours troops 
into Persia, 184; cruelties of in 
Tabriz, Resht, Enzeli, 220, 223; 
reason of, for attack on Persia, 
251; understanding with Ger- 
many about Asia, 253-261; sover- 
eign in Persia, 267 ; loan to Per- 
sia, Joint Note with England, 
Sept. 11, 1907, 329, 331, 332; 
selfishness of, in Persia, 331-334 

Russian Consul at Isfahan, letter 
of, 110; at Resht, statement of, 
109 

Russian Legation, attempts to em- 
harass Shuster, 27, 29; hostility 
of to new fiscal system, 53; atti- 
tude in the Stokes incident, 75; 
joins British Legation in forcing 
out American financial adminis- 
trators, 319 

Russian State Bank (Bauque d'Es- 
compte de Perse), 48, 80; at- 
tempts to defraud Persian Gov- 
ernment, 151; methods of, 290, 
316 

Russo-Japanese war, 252 

S. 

Salaru'd-Dawla, " madcap " prince, 
defeated and captured at Niha- 
wand, June, 1907, xxv; portrait 
of, 39; rumor of capture of 
Tabriz by, 61; threatens govern- 
ment, 79; gathers forces, 86; 
reaches Kirmanshah, 115; occu- 
pies Hamadan, 117; threatens 
Teheran, 121; military operations 
against, 134; defeat of, 135; es- 
tates confiscated, 136 

Salt-tax, 33 

Samsamu's-Saltana, aids National- 
ists, xlv; Minister of War, 85; 
military governor, 87, 90, 93; 
Premier, 99; hostility toward 
Treasurer-general, 116; apology 
of, 159; loyalty of, in doubt, 162; 
sides with Russia, 199; portrait 
of, 309 



Saniu'd-Dawla, Minister of Finance, 
assassinated, February, 1911, 187; 
portrait of, lxi 

Sardar-i-Asad, aids Nationalists, 
xlvi, 24; portrait of, 114, 286 

Sardar-i-Buhadur, 127; portrait of, 
119, 144, 279 

Sardar-i-Jang, 124, 206; portrait of, 
208 

Sardar-i-Muhiy ( Muizzu's-Sultan ) , 
112, 157; portrait of, 156 

Sardar-i-Mutashem, 127, 199 

Sardar-i-Zaffar, portrait of, 208 

Sattar Khan, portrait of, 156 

Sayyid Fathu'llah, 296 

Schools of Persia, 245 

Secret service, Persian, organized by 
Shuster, 317 

Secret societies, composed of pa- 
triots, xxv, 176; among Persian 
women, 193, 324 

Secretary of State for India, de- 
spatch of, 260 

Self-government, Persians capacity 
for, 203 

Seligman Bros., of London, 117 

Shahsevens, 111, 133 

Sharud, 100 

Shuau's-Saltana, 100, 134; confisca- 
tion of estate of, 136, 139; por- 
trait of, 92 

Shujau'd-Dawla, 111, 133 

Shuster, W. Morgan, portrait of, 
frontispiece; tendered Treasurer- 
generalship of Persia, 4; Russia's 
attempt to prevent appointment 
of, 5; leaves New York, April 8, 
1911, 6; journey to Teheran, 9- 
12; drafts law relating to Im- 
perial Bank loan of 1911, 24, 355; 
advice on the salt tax, 33; takes 
charge of fiscal affairs, 43-48; 
drafts law of June 13, 1911, 49, 
356; plans for reorganization of 
the finances, 49, 295-313; takes 
over offices of finance department, 
66; plans the Treasury Gendar- 
merie, 70, 74, 105, 190," 226; life 
of, threatened, 100, 103, 184, 187; 
offered post under ex-Shah, by 
Russian Minister, 118; letter to 
London Times, 154, 161, text, 358; 
charges against, made by Sir Ed- 



422 



INDEX 



ward Grey, 169; answers to 
charges, 268; relations with de 
facto government, 205, 213; note 
of dismissal of, 214; reply by, 
215; transfers office to Mr. 
Cairns, 224; leaves Teheran, 225- 
230; views of departure, 228; 
charges against Russia and Eng- 
land, 247, 331-334; changes made 
and recommended in taxation sys- 
tem, 282-288, 305; difficulties of 
administration, 295; efforts to 
prepare a budget, 303; attempt 
to restore credit of Persia, 317; 
correspondence with Sir George 
Barclay, 372; with M. Poklewski- 
Koziell, 3S8; dinner given to, in 
London, by Persia Committee, 
January 29, 1912, 399; address 
to Persia Committee, 270 

Sikutu'd-Islam, hung, 219 

Sipahdar-i-Azam, aids Nationalists, 
xlv; made prime minister and 
minister of war by restored 
Medjlis, xlix; Sinister calls upon, 
16; description of, 19, 20; pres- 
tige of, 27; garden fete of, 31; 
schemes of, 55 ; leaves Teheran in 
anger, 61; at Resht, 62, 66; re- 
turns to Teheran, 79 ; declared 
prime minister again, 85 ; treach- 
ery of, 90, 97, 99, 116; Medjlis 
asks resignation of, 99; dishon- 
esty of, 301; portrait of, 102, 
149, 286 

Skobeloff, 220 

Spring-Rice, Sir Cecil, British Min- 
ister at Teheran, communication 
to Persian Government explaining 
Anglo-Russian convention, xxxiii, 
272, 275 

Stokes, Major C. B., Military At- 
tache of British Legation, pro- 
posed appointment of, as aid to 
the Treasurer-general, 69-78, 80, 
100, 187; portrait of, 72; form 
of contract tendered by Treasurer- 
general, 398 

Strikes by government employees, 
66 

Sulayman Mirza, leader of Demo- 
crats, 175, 238; portrait of, 174 

Sultan Ahmad Mirza, son of Mu- 



hammad Ali, proclaimed Shah, 
July, 1909, xlviii, xlix, 121; por- 
trait of, 221; farewell to Shuster, 
225 

T. 

Tabriz, struggle between Royalists 
and Nationalists, xlii; famine in, 
xlv; Russians take possession of, 
xlv; rumor of capture, 61; threat- 
ened by Shahsevens, 133; views 
of, 218; massacre at, 216, 219, 
223 

Tamadun, Persian newspaper, 161 

Taqi-Zada, 36; portrait of, 174 

Tariff system, Russia's scheme, ap- 
parent in, 313 

Tax collectors of Persia, 281, 284, 
287 

Taxation system of Persia, 42, 277- 
294; changes made by Shuster, 
282-288, 305 

Tea, its use in Persian diplomacy, 
20 

Teheran, capture of by Nationalists, 
July, 1909, xlviii, 19; social life 
at, 37; climate of, 121 

Tobacco concession, agitation 
against, 1891, xix, 316 

Trans-Persian Railway, 325, 326 

Treasurer-general, see Shuster 

Treasury Gendarmerie, 70, 74, 190, 
226, 283; picture of, 105 

Treasury officials, picture of, 180 

Triple Entente, 253, 257 

Tripoli, 332 

Turcomans under ex-Shah, 86; pil- 
lage Sharud, 100; defeated, 127; 
picture of heads of, 322 

Turkestan, Russian massacre in 
1881, 220 

Turkey, protests with Persia against 
England's " ultimatum " of Octo- 
ber, 1910, lvi; political situation 
in, 262 

Turkmanchay, Treaty of, lii, 109 



Vadbolski, Colonel, 209 
Varnet, M., 226, 229 
Vladivostok, 257 



INDEX 



423 



w. 

Wahidu'1-Mulk, portrait of, 249 

Women, of Persia, courage and 
bravery of, 191-198; picture of 
woman, 196 

Wood, A. 0., 56 

Wuthuqu'd-Dawla, Minister of In- 
terior, 85; Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, 99, 165, 210, 214, 330; 
portrait of, 163 



Y. 

Young Turk movement, 246 



Zapolski, Captain, leads Persian 
Cossacks, xlvii 

Zarghamu's-Saltana, aids National- 
ists, xlv 

Zargundeh, 94 

Zillu's-Sultan, people of Isfahan re- 
volt against, xxv 



THE END 



JUN 29 1912 



) ' 6 



LIBRARY i 



M 



